DR. RAJEEV DHAVAN vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE 2, DELHI & ORS.

O R D E R % 21.04.2025

contained details of cash payments made by the petitioner to Sh. Kashyap. Based on the said material, the Assessing Officer [AO] issued the impugned notice on 31.03.2024. 4. Although the provisions of Section 153C of the Act are inapplicable in respect of searches conducted after 31.03.2021, it is relevant to consider whether a notice under Section 153C of the Act could be issued for the relevant AY 2013-14 for the purposes of determining whether a notice under Section 148 of the Act could be issued in view of the proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act.

“8. Undisputedly, and in terms of Section 153C(3) of the Act, any search if conducted after 01 April 2021, would cease to be regulated by that provision. Sub- section (3), in that sense, embodies a sunset clause insofar as the applicability of Section 153C is concerned. The First Proviso to Section 149(1), however, bids us to go back in a point of time, and to examine whether a reopening would sustain bearing in This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.

mind the timeframes as they stood embodied in Section 149(1)(b) or Section 153A and 153C, as the case may be. The First Proviso essentially requires us to undertake that consideration bearing in mind the timeframes which stood specified in Sections 149, 153A and 153C as they stood prior to the commencement of Finance Act, 2021. 9. Thus, an action of reassessment which comes to be initiated in relation to a search undertaken on or after 01 April 2021 would have to meet the foundational tests as specified in the First Proviso to Section 149(1). A reassessment action would thus have to not only satisfy the time frames constructed in terms of Section 149, but in a relevant case and which is concerned with a search, also those which would be applicable by virtue of the provisions of Section 153A and 153C.

legal fiction on the basis of which the commencement date for computation of the six year or the ten year block is deemed to be the date of receipt of books of accounts by the jurisdictional AO. The identification of the starting block for the purposes of computation of the six and the ten year period is governed by the First Proviso to Section 153C, which significantly shifts the reference point spoken of in Section 153A(1), while defining the point from which the period of the “relevant assessment year” is to be calculated, to the date of receipt of the books of accounts, documents or assets seized by the jurisdictional AO of the non- searched person. The shift of the relevant date in the case of a non-searched person being regulated by the First Proviso of Section 153C (1) is an issue which is no longer res integra and stands authoritatively settled by virtue of the decisions of this Court in SSP Aviation and RRJ Securities as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Jasjit Singh. The aforesaid legal position also stood reiterated by the Supreme Court in Vikram Sujitkumar Bhatia. The submission of the respondents, therefore, that the block periods would have to be reckoned with reference to the date of search can neither be countenanced nor accepted. E. The reckoning of the six AYs’ would require one to firstly identify the FY in which the search was undertaken and which would lead to the ascertainment of the AY relevant to the previous year of search. The block of six AYs’ would consequently be those which immediately precede the AY relevant to the year of search. In the case of a search assessment undertaken in terms of Section 153C, the solitary distinction would be that the previous year of search would stand substituted by the date or the year in which the books of accounts or documents and assets seized are handed over to the jurisdictional AO as opposed to the year of search which constitutes the basis for an assessment under Section 153A. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.

F. While the identification and computation of the six AYs’ hinges upon the phrase “immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year” of search, the ten year period would have to be reckoned from the 31st day of March of the AY relevant to the year of search. This, since undisputedly, Explanation 1 of Section 153A requires us to reckon it “from the end of the assessment year”. This distinction would have to necessarily be acknowledged in light of the statute having consciously adopted the phraseology “immediately preceding” when it be in relation to the six year period and employing the expression “from the end of the assessment year” while speaking of the ten year block.”

earlier decisions of this court in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others: Neutral Citation: 2024: DHC:4554-DB, KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi : Neutral Citation : 2024:DHC:8214- DB and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. : Neutral Citation : 2025:DHC:157-DB.