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The Delhi High Court held that the Assessing Officer's reasoning in issuing the notice under Section 148A(d) was palpably erroneous and lacked application of mind. The Court found that the petitioner had adequately explained that the time deposits were not made from her funds, that the funds belonged to her husband, that her husband had duly disclosed these deposits and the resultant income in his income tax returns, and that the TDS was in her husband's name. The Court concluded that the AO disregarded the petitioner's explanation and the provided evidence. Consequently, the impugned order passed under Section 148A(d), the notice under Section 148, and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were set aside. The petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the impugned order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could not be sustained. The Court found that the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on information related to ACL and its associated parties, but crucially, the SEBI's findings did not identify the petitioner as a related party. Furthermore, the order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), which had reduced penalties on ACL by finding no misappropriation or share price manipulation, was not considered by the AO. The Court noted that the petitioner had declared a profit of ₹60,00,000/- on the sale of property to ACL, which was offered to tax. Therefore, even if the transactions were considered paper transactions, it would not result in the petitioner's income escaping assessment. The AO's observation regarding non-deduction of TDS was also not material, as the obligation, if any, lay with the purchaser. Regarding the loan from HVPL, the impugned order did not provide a reason to consider it bogus, especially given HVPL's financial standing. Consequently, the impugned notice and order were set aside. The AO was permitted to re-initiate proceedings if further material suggestive of income escaping assessment was found.
The Delhi High Court held that the controversy in the present case is covered in favour of the Assessee by the decision of this court in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice were set aside. The ratio decidendi is that if a similar issue regarding limitation for reassessment proceedings has been decided in favour of the assessee by a coordinate bench of the High Court, the same principle will apply. The operative direction was to set aside the proceedings.
The High Court held that the Resale Price Method (RPM) was appropriate for benchmarking the transaction as the assessee was primarily a trader with no significant value addition before resale. Aggregation of transactions is a fact-dependent exercise.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2013-14 was beyond the period of limitation. The court relied on its earlier decisions in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax -Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The court noted that the assessment could be reopened for a period of ten years as stipulated in the proviso to Section 153A of the Act. However, in terms of the proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act, assessments for prior years could not be reopened if they could not have been opened at the material time due to being beyond the time limit. The court observed that no satisfaction note had been recorded, and therefore, the ten-year period should be reckoned from the end of the AY relevant to the year in which the impugned notice was issued. Based on the tabular statement provided by the petitioner, AY 2013-14 fell outside this ten-year block. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the impugned notice and all proceedings pursuant thereto were set aside.
The High Court found no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the PCIT. The Court held that individuals responsible for filing the return cannot claim that their own inter se disputes prevented them from doing so. It was difficult to accept that such disputes could be considered genuine hardship warranting condonation of delay under Section 119(2) of the Act, which is intended for genuine hardships and exigencies that are difficult or impossible to overcome. The Court noted that no director had initiated any legal action to obtain necessary information from other directors within the stipulated period. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as unmerited.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The dismissal was based on the low tax effect involved, aligning with a previous decision on a connected appeal.
The High Court admitted the appeal on two questions of law. These questions pertain to whether the income is FTS under Section 9(1)(vii) and if it's a case of revenue sharing.
The Delhi High Court held that the petitioner's grievance did not survive. This conclusion was based on the submission made by the Revenue that the reassessment proceedings for the assessment years 2021-2022 and 2022-2023 had been completed. The Revenue further clarified that no additions were made during these completed proceedings. As the primary reason for filing the writ petitions was the challenge to the reassessment notices and the potential for additions, the completion of these proceedings without any adverse findings rendered the petitions infructuous. The Court, therefore, disposed of the writ petitions and all pending applications.
The High Court allowed the petition. Regarding AY 2017-18 and AY 2018-19, the Court found that the ITAT's order clearly stayed the recovery, and adjustment of refunds constitutes recovery. Therefore, the adjustment of ₹7,12,46,726/- and ₹3,13,20,749/- was set aside. For AY 2016-17, the Court held that even if the ITAT's order was interpreted as restraining only coercive action, the Revenue failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of issuing prior notice under Section 245 of the Act before making the adjustment. The Court cited Vijay Singh Kadan v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and Kshipra Jatana v. Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 63 (1) & Ors. to emphasize that an ex post facto notice cannot cure this fatal defect. Consequently, the adjustment of ₹3,02,64,095/- and ₹6,09,12,310/- for AY 2016-17 was also set aside. The Court directed that the adjusted refund amounts be paid to the petitioner along with applicable interest within eight weeks.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the disallowance, finding that the property was indeed an investment and not stock-in-trade. Since the amount was not claimed as an expenditure, Section 40A(3) was not applicable.
The High Court allowed the application for change of name. The appeal was dismissed by the court due to the low tax effect, as agreed by both parties.
The High Court of Delhi dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The primary reason for dismissal was the low tax effect, which was below the threshold limit of ₹2,00,00,000/- as stipulated in the Circular dated 17.09.2024. The Court noted that the tax effect was not covered by any exceptions mentioned in the circular. Therefore, the appeal was not entertained on its merits. No finding was given on the substantive issues that might have been before the ITAT. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The decision was based on the joint submission made by the learned counsel for both parties. They stated that the tax effect involved in the present appeal was below the threshold limit of ₹2,00,00,000/- as stipulated in the Circular dated 17.09.2024. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the appeal was not covered by any of the exceptions set out in the circular. Consequently, the Court found no reason to proceed with the appeal on its merits and disposed of it solely on the ground of low tax effect. No decision was made on the substantive issues of the appeal.
The High Court quashed the impugned order under Section 148A(d) dated May 3, 2023, and the impugned notice under Section 148 dated May 3, 2023. The matter was remitted back to the stage of consideration of notices under Section 148A(b) of the Act. The Court found that the revenue had not been able to demonstrate that the impugned notices were ever served upon the assessee at its registered office in Singapore. The fact that the assessee has no Permanent Account Number nor any credentials in the IT Portal was not controverted by the revenue. Since the facts and incidental issues raised by the assessee had neither been placed before the AO nor considered, the Court deemed it apposite not to examine the merits of whether the MRO services would constitute FTS/FIS or if they were covered under the DTAA, as the notice under Section 148A(b) requiring the assessee to provide relevant information and satisfactory explanation appeared not to have been received by the assessee. The Court provided three weeks for the assessee to file its substantive reply, after which the AO was to proceed in accordance with law. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the revenue fairly conceded to this course of action, and the assessee's counsel also agreed.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that the assessment proceedings for AY 2010-11 were time-barred. The Court noted that the ITAT's order of October 21, 2020, directed a de novo assessment. The Court referred to Section 153(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and its provisos concerning the period of limitation for assessments made pursuant to directions from appellate authorities. The Court observed that the ITAT's order was passed after April 1, 2019, which meant the period of limitation under the principal part of Section 153(3) would be read as 12 months, not 9 months. Calculating 12 months from the ITAT's order date of October 21, 2020, the Court found that the jurisdiction of the respondents to frame an assessment order would have ended on October 21, 2021. Therefore, any assessment proposed thereafter is time-barred. The Court quashed the notices dated March 6, 2023, and March 19, 2023, and declared that any assessment for AY 2010-11 would be contrary to the mandate of Section 153(3).
The Delhi High Court admitted the appeal for hearing on specific questions of law. The court did not decide the merits of the case but framed the legal issues for further adjudication.
The High Court held that the Tribunal's order confirming the disallowance was not perverse. The inability of the assessee to produce all vouchers necessitated a reasonable estimation of expenses by the AO and CIT(A).
The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Ms. Arham Infrabuild Limited. The Court held that the issue raised by the petitioner was squarely covered by a previous decision of the same Court in T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Ward 25 (3) New Delhi, Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:8330-DB. In that precedent, the Court had ruled on the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in the context of faceless assessment proceedings. Therefore, based on this binding precedent, the present petition was found to be without merit. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petition, meaning the impugned notices and proceedings were allowed to stand.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the reassessment notice dated March 31, 2021, and the order dated March 6, 2022, rejecting objections. The Court held that the validity of a Section 148 action must be evaluated based on the reasons recorded by the AO at the time of issuing the notice, not on subsequent disclosures in a counter affidavit. The Court found that the reasons recorded by the AO were skeletal and failed to allude to any material or information gathered by the Investigation Wing that implicated the petitioner in the alleged manipulation of penny scrips. The Court noted that the AO's reasons were silent and failed to make even a rudimentary disclosure to justify the formation of an opinion that income taxable in the hands of the petitioner had escaped assessment. The Court also found the revenue's stand contradictory regarding the disclosure of information. The respondents were left open to draw proceedings afresh if otherwise permissible in law.
The High Court condoned the delay of 602 days in re-filing the appeal, having considered the cause shown by the appellant. Subsequently, the appellant requested that the appeal be dismissed as withdrawn, stating that they had resorted to a settlement procedure. The Revenue did not object to this request. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the appeal.
The High Court found no justification to entertain the Revenue's appeals, noting the consistent favourable decisions for the assessee and the lack of distinguishing facts. The court emphasized the principle of consistency.
The Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notices dated March 30, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AYs 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2019-20. The Court's decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue. The Revenue agreed to quash the notices if the petitioner, as the legal heir, undertook to update and upload the details of the legal heirs of the deceased assessee on the Income Tax portal within three weeks. The petitioner agreed to this condition. The Court bound the petitioner to this undertaking. The writ petitions were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs. No specific issue was left undecided.
The Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notices dated March 30, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AYs 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2019-20. The Court's decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue that the notices were issued against a deceased assessee and were therefore liable to be quashed. The quashing was made conditional upon the petitioner, as the legal heir, undertaking to update and upload the details of the legal heirs of the deceased assessee on the Income Tax portal within three weeks from the date of the order. The Court bound the petitioner to this undertaking. The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of accordingly, without any order as to costs.
The High Court held that the ITAT erroneously applied principles from a criminal case regarding 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' to the 'reason to believe' standard under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act. This misapplication rendered the ITAT's judgment unsustainable.
The Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notices dated March 30, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AYs 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2019-20. The Court's decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue and the undertaking provided by the petitioner. The Revenue acknowledged that the notices were issued against a deceased assessee and agreed to their quashing, provided the petitioner updated the legal heir details on the portal. The petitioner, on instructions, agreed to this condition. The Court bound the petitioner to this undertaking and directed them to update and upload the details of the legal heirs/legal representative on the Revenue's portal within three weeks from the date of the order. The writ petitions were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs. The primary issue of maintainability against a deceased assessee was resolved through this procedural compliance and concession.
The High Court held that the appeal was not maintainable due to the low tax effect. The court noted that the tax effect was quantifiable and below the threshold, and therefore, the exception for non-quantifiable tax effect did not apply.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition on terms identical to those provided in paragraphs 27 to 29 of its judgment in Kanwaljeet Kaur vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [2025 SCC OnLine Del 605]. This means the concerned Assessing Officer (AO) is directed to evaluate the individual show-cause notices (SCNs) under Section 148 of the Act. The AO must consider the judgments in T.K.S. Builders, Abhinav Jindal, and Naveen Kumar Gupta, which have settled issues regarding sanction under Section 151 and the authority of the AO to commence reassessment, as well as the applicability of Section 153C in search cases. Furthermore, the AO must examine the issue of the surviving period for each notice under Section 148, guided by the judgments in Rajeev Bansal and Ram Balram. The AO is to pass a reasoned and speaking order addressing the impact of these judgments on the impugned reassessment notices, determining whether they survive or should be recalled. Petitioners are permitted to challenge any adverse orders in accordance with law. The specific finding on whether the reassessment is time-barred is left to the AO's evaluation.
The High Court of Delhi condoned the delay of 602 days in re-filing the appeal. Subsequently, the appellant's counsel stated that as the procedure for settlement had been resorted to, the appeal may be dismissed as withdrawn. The Revenue's counsel had no objection to this request. Therefore, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the appeal. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the concerned Assessing Officers (AOs) to evaluate the individual show cause notices (SCNs) under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This evaluation must consider the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal and of the Delhi High Court in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer & Anr. The AOs are also to bear in mind the Court's previous judgments in T.K.S. Builders, Abhinav Jindal, and Naveen Kumar Gupta, which have settled issues concerning sanction under Section 151 and the authority of the AO to commence reassessment. The AOs must pass a reasoned and speaking order addressing the impact of these judgments on the impugned reassessment notices, determining whether they survive or should be recalled. The petitioner is at liberty to challenge any adverse orders.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. Regarding the first issue, the Court noted the conceded position that the petitioner's case fell under 'Category C' and the notice dated March 31, 2021, would be treated as referable to Section 148A(b). The Court acknowledged the directions in Suman Jeet Agarwal to verify the date of dispatch from the Income Tax Business Application portal and treat it as the date of issuance. However, the Court found that the reassessment initiation was faulted on the second plank of challenge concerning Section 151. The Court observed that as the reassessment was sought to be initiated after the expiry of four years from the relevant Assessment Year, the approval should have been granted by the Commissioner or Principal Chief Commissioner, as per Section 151 of the Act as it stood prior to April 1, 2021. Since the approval was granted by the Joint Commissioner, which was not the competent authority for reassessments beyond four years, the Court held that the reassessment action could not be sustained. The Court quashed the Section 148 notice, without prejudice to the respondents' rights to initiate proceedings afresh if otherwise permissible in law.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the concerned Assessing Officers (AOs) to evaluate the individual show cause notices (SCNs) under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This evaluation must be conducted bearing in mind the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal and of the Delhi High Court in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer & Anr. The AOs are also to consider the judgments in T.K.S. Builders, Abhinav Jindal, and Naveen Kumar Gupta, which have settled issues pertaining to the accordal of sanction under Section 151 and the authority of the jurisdictional AO to commence reassessment. The AOs shall pass a reasoned and speaking order addressing the impact of these judgments on the impugned reassessment notices, determining whether they survive or are liable to be recalled. The petitioners retain the liberty to assail any adverse orders in accordance with law. The issue of surviving period was to be examined by the AO in light of the cited judgments.
The High Court held that the appeal is not maintainable due to the low tax effect, as it falls below the threshold limit specified in the relevant CBDT circular. The court noted that the tax effect was quantifiable and below the prescribed limit.
The High Court held that the ITAT erroneously applied principles from a criminal case regarding 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' to the 'reason to believe' standard under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act. This misapplication rendered the ITAT's judgment unsustainable.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal without engaging with the grounds or examining the issues, rendering a non-speaking order. The High Court found this unsustainable.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the substantial questions of law raised were not res integra. The court noted that a co-ordinate bench had already decided these issues against the Revenue in a previous case involving the same assessee.
The High Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding that the complainant had already been cross-examined on financial capacity. The court also noted that the evidence of both parties had concluded and the matter was at the stage of final arguments, making the recall application inappropriate.
The Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition. The Revenue must first establish the existence of an international transaction or an arrangement between associated enterprises before commencing a benchmarking analysis.
The Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition. The Revenue must first establish the existence of an international transaction or an arrangement between associated enterprises before commencing a benchmarking analysis.
The High Court noted that the substantial questions of law raised were already decided against the Revenue by a co-ordinate bench in a previous case involving the same assessee. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose in the present appeal.
The Delhi High Court noted that the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal had already been decided against the Revenue by a coordinate bench in a previous case involving the same assessee. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the substantial questions of law raised had already been decided against the Revenue by a coordinate bench in a previous case involving the same assessee. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to deduct interest expenses under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, as the loans were for business purposes and used for stock-in-trade. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's decision on the capitalization of interest expense.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the substantial questions of law raised had already been decided against the Revenue by a coordinate bench in a similar case involving the same assessee.
The High Court held that interest on borrowed capital used for business purposes, including obtaining stock-in-trade like construction projects, is deductible under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act. The court found no provision to sustain the apportionment and disallowance of interest expenses.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had proceeded on the basis that its prior determination had survived, despite the MAP resolution. Consequently, the impugned orders of the Tribunal were set aside.
The Court noted that an Assessment Order had been passed during the pendency of the writ petition, and an appeal had been filed before the CIT(A). Consequently, the issue of the surviving period for the reassessment notice would necessarily have to be examined by the CIT(A). The Court directed the CIT(A) to decide the issue bearing in mind the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal and this Court in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer & Anr., as well as previous judgments of this Court in T.K.S. Builders, Abhinav Jindal, and Naveen Kumar Gupta concerning sanction under Section 151 and the authority of the jurisdictional AO. The CIT(A) was instructed to pass a reasoned and speaking order addressing the impact of these judgments on the impugned reassessment notices, determining whether they would survive or be liable to be recalled. It would be open to the petitioner to assail any adverse orders passed by the CIT(A) in accordance with law. The Court disposed of the writ petition with these directions.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that the reassessment action, initiated after the expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year (2016-17), required sanction from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, as per Section 151(ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The sanction granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax was found to be invalid. The Court clarified that the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, merely extended the period within which action could be initiated but did not alter the structure for approval and sanction as erected by Section 151. The judgment relied on its prior decision in Abhinav Jindal HUF v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors. The Court quashed the impugned order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148, both dated 29 July 2022. The decision was without prejudice to the respondent's right to initiate other permissible proceedings.
The Delhi High Court, while dealing with identical issues in a batch of writ petitions disposed of in Kanwaljeet Kaur vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, directed the Assessing Officers (AOs) to evaluate individual show-cause notices (SCNs) under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act. This evaluation must consider the judgments in T.K.S. Builders, Abhinav Jindal, and Naveen Kumar Gupta, which settled issues regarding sanction under Section 151 and the AO's authority to undertake reassessment. Furthermore, the AOs are mandated to examine the 'surviving period' for each notice under Section 148, guided by the judgments in Rajeev Bansal and Ram Balram. The AOs are to pass reasoned and speaking orders determining whether the reassessment notices survive or should be recalled. The writ petitioners retain the liberty to challenge any adverse orders. The present writ petition was disposed of on identical terms.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the reassessment action. The Court found that the reasoning provided in the order under Section 148A(d) was 'de hors' the allegations initially made in the notice under Section 148A(b). The Court reiterated its earlier observation in ATS Infrastructure Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 1 (1) & Ors. that the validity of proceedings initiated under Section 148 must be judged based on the reasons existing at the time of issuing the notice, and additional or changed reasons cannot be introduced subsequently. The Court also referred to the Bombay High Court's decision in Indivest Pe. Ltd. v. Additional Director of Income-tax, emphasizing the need for tangible material to reopen an assessment. The Court noted that the First Proviso to Section 148 also mandates that action must be based on information suggesting escaped income. Therefore, the reassessment action was found to be unsustainable due to the shifting basis of allegations. The Court quashed the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148, but left it open for the respondents to draw proceedings afresh if permissible in law.