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548 orders · Page 2 of 11
The Tribunal held that the distribution revenue received by the assessee from Indian sub-distributors represents consideration for distribution of software products and allied rights under a commercial distribution arrangement. The assessee operates as a limited-risk distributor, does not own or exploit any intellectual property, and does not render any technical, managerial, or consultancy services, nor does it make available any technical knowledge, experience, skill, or know-how. Therefore, the recharacterization of such distribution revenue as fees for technical services by the AO and DRP is unsustainable. The Tribunal found the invocation of the India-Switzerland DTAA to be impermissible as the assessee is a tax resident of Singapore and entitled to the benefits of the India-Singapore DTAA. Under the India-Singapore DTAA, the distribution revenue does not qualify as FTS as the 'make available' condition under Article 12(4) is not satisfied. In the absence of a PE in India, such income is not taxable as business profits. The Tribunal also found that the receipts cannot be characterized as FTS under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, as there was no rendition of services, human intervention, or consultancy provided. The assessee had duly discharged Equalization Levy and furnished proof thereof. Consequently, the exclusion provided under Section 10(50) of the Act squarely applies, and the addition made by the AO is directed to be deleted. The Tribunal also directed the AO to verify and grant credit for TDS as per Form 26AS. Penalty proceedings under Section 270A were dismissed as premature. The issue of limitation was left open.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was void ab initio as it was passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by law, considering the delays in the special audit report and extensions granted. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal noted that in a previous assessment year (AY 2010-11), for similar transactions, the CIT(A) had directed the application of a profit rate of 0.25% on total turnover, which remained unchallenged. Given that the assessee for the current year had already offered profit at 0.5% of the total turnover, the Tribunal directed the AO to apply this 0.5% profit rate instead of the peak credit method for the addition under Section 69, also mandating credit for already declared profit.
The Tribunal decided on the issue of tax credit for dividends received from the Singapore subsidiary. It held that the dispute was primarily about the method of calculation and not the eligibility for tax sparing credit under Article 25(2) and (3) of the India-Singapore DTAA. The Tribunal found that the AO's disallowance was based on an assumption regarding the utilization of reserves of TAPL, without cogent evidence. The assessee had provided calculations under both FIFO and LIFO methods. The Tribunal considered the FIFO method, which considers dividends from accumulated profits within reserves, to be appropriate. Therefore, the Tribunal directed that the tax sparing credit be allowed to the assessee based on the working provided under the FIFO method. This decision allowed Ground No. 1 raised by the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that its observations and findings on other issues would apply mutatis mutandis to all assessment years and respective grounds of appeal. The judgment indicates that the appeals of both the revenue and the assessee were partly allowed.
The Tribunal deleted additions made solely on the basis of AIR/Form 26AS information without supporting evidence. It directed verification for TDS credit and allowed interest under Section 244A as per CBDT circulars. Some grounds were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 120 days in filing the appeals, accepting the assessee's explanation of advanced age, illiteracy, ill health, and lack of awareness of the CIT(A)'s order as bona fide. The Tribunal acknowledged the principle of substantial justice and adopted a liberal approach. Regarding the estimation of profit, the Tribunal found that a fair average GP rate could be arrived at by taking the average of the GP rates declared by the assessee for the years under consideration. Based on the chart provided, the average GP rate was calculated as approximately 0.18% ( (0.20+0.20+0.18+0.07+0.26+0.17) / 7 years). The Tribunal directed the AO to adopt this rate of 0.18% or the higher rate declared by the assessee, whichever is higher, for estimating the profit for AY 2014-15 to AY 2018-19, after factual verification. The contention regarding AY 2017-18 was not accepted as it would require further verification of facts. The legal grounds were not pressed by the assessee and were deemed dismissed as withdrawn. The appeals for AY 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2019-20 were allowed, while appeals for AY 2015-16 to 2018-19 were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's medical condition and the complexities of the faceless assessment regime. On merits, the Tribunal held that the date of allotment of the property, not the agreement for sale, should be considered for determining the holding period for capital gains.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of interest on the loan amount of Rs. 25 lakhs, which was already deleted by a coordinate bench for AY 2012-13, is to be deleted. The AO is directed to recompute the income accordingly.
The Tribunal held that the date of allotment, supported by substantial part payment, should be considered for stamp duty valuation, not the later registration date. The addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was therefore deleted.
The Tribunal found that while the AO failed to reject the assessee's books of account, there were discrepancies in cash sales and deposits. Considering the facts and the assessee's alternate prayer, the Tribunal held that 8% of the total cash sales would be sustained as addition, representing the gross profit.
The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148, issued beyond three years, required approval from a higher specified authority as per section 151(ii) of the Act. Since the approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner, the same was legally unsustainable, rendering the notice void ab initio and the subsequent reassessment proceedings invalid.
The Tribunal, following the Jurisdictional High Court's ruling, held that the CIT(A) cannot dismiss an appeal without adjudicating on merits, even in cases of non-prosecution. Therefore, the case was remanded to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal deleted additions made solely on the basis of AIR/Form 26AS information without supporting evidence. It directed verification for TDS credit and allowed interest under Section 244A as per CBDT circulars. Some grounds were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed a rectification application under Section 154 of the Act. The CPC, vide its order dated 23.06.2025, had rectified the mistake and determined the income from property at Rs. 6,44,299, effectively accepting the assessee's contention.
The Tribunal held that the dispute was only regarding the method of calculation of tax sparing credit, not its eligibility. It found the assessee's FIFO method to be appropriate and directed that the tax sparing credit be allowed based on the assessee's working.
The Tribunal held that the AO's action was based on generalized investigation material without independent verification. The assessee provided documentary evidence for share allotment and sale, and the partial sale at a moderate price did not suggest an accommodation entry. The CIT(A) had correctly deleted the addition.
The Tribunal noted that the AO relied on third-party statements without cross-examination, violating natural justice. The Tribunal found that the SEBI report did not establish wrongdoing and AO's findings were based on conjecture. The assessment order under Section 143(3) was held invalid due to denial of cross-examination and reliance on unsubstantiated statements.
The Tribunal decided on the issue of tax credit for dividends received from the Singapore subsidiary. It held that the dispute was primarily about the method of calculation and not the eligibility for tax sparing credit under Article 25(2) and (3) of the India-Singapore DTAA. The Tribunal found that the AO's disallowance was based on an assumption regarding the utilization of reserves of TAPL, without cogent evidence. The assessee had provided calculations under both FIFO and LIFO methods. The Tribunal considered the FIFO method, which considers dividends from accumulated profits within reserves, to be appropriate. Therefore, the Tribunal directed that the tax sparing credit be allowed to the assessee based on the working provided under the FIFO method. This decision allowed Ground No. 1 raised by the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that its observations and findings on other issues would apply mutatis mutandis to all assessment years and respective grounds of appeal. The judgment indicates that the appeals of both the revenue and the assessee were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that while the purchases were alleged to be bogus, the assessee had provided primary evidence and there were no adverse findings in its financials. The addition should be restricted to the difference in GP rates.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee's sales were accepted and the assessee could not have made sales without purchases, the entire disallowance of purchases was not justified. The addition should be limited to bringing the GP rate on alleged bogus purchases to the same rate as other genuine purchases.
The Tribunal restored the issue of deduction under Section 80IA to the Assessing Officer for fresh verification. The AO was directed to allow claims for projects that were part of the Settlement Commission's application and disallow claims voluntarily withdrawn by the assessee.
The Tribunal restored the issue of deduction under Section 80IA to the Assessing Officer for fresh verification. The AO was directed to allow claims for projects that were part of the Settlement Commission's application and disallow claims voluntarily withdrawn by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the date of allotment of the redeveloped flat, as per the allotment letter, should be considered the date of acquisition for calculating the holding period. Therefore, the asset was held for more than 36 months.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, considering the explanation of the assessee regarding the lapse of her counsel. The matters were restored to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal, while noting the lack of documentary evidence to support the assessee's claim, decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to present his case before the Assessing Officer. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by filing primary evidence to establish the genuineness of the transactions, including bank statements, allotment letters, contract notes, and demat account details. The Assessing Officer had not disputed these primary evidences. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue had not been able to substantiate its claim of Banas Finance Ltd. being a penny stock and had proceeded to make additions based merely on third-party statements without further verification. The Tribunal also observed that the SEBI order dated 27.04.2018, relied upon by the Revenue, did not name the assessee and did not allege price rigging by Banas Finance Ltd. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the transactions were carried out through registered brokers on the stock exchange via an online platform. Relying on the co-ordinate bench decision in the assessee's brother's case, which dealt with identical facts and undisputed evidence, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the view taken by the CIT(A) and upheld the deletion of the addition. The grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the receipts earned by the assessee from Indian customers cannot be treated as royalty under Article 12 of the India-Germany DTAA. The Tribunal reasoned that the provision of flight information/data and software licenses, along with ancillary services like training and support, did not involve the transfer or imparting of industrial, commercial, or scientific experience in a manner that would enable the customer to independently reproduce or apply such experience. The Tribunal distinguished between a know-how contract and a service contract, emphasizing that where the provider continues to use their expertise to perform a task for the recipient, the payment is for services and not royalty. The Tribunal also noted that the restrictions on the software, such as prohibiting disassembly or reverse engineering, indicated a limited right of use rather than a transfer of underlying technology. Regarding the sale of printed charts, the Tribunal held that a sale of tangible goods cannot be transmuted into royalty for 'experience' merely because expertise was involved in their production. Since the revenue did not contend that the assessee had a Permanent Establishment in India, the receipts, being in the nature of business income, are not chargeable to tax in India. Consequently, the addition made by the AO and sustained by the DRP was directed to be deleted. The issue regarding the refund/credit of equalization levy was rendered academic due to the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 70,00,000/- made by the AO under section 69 was based solely on third-party electronic images and loose notings. It was undisputed that this material was not seized from the assessee, the alleged payees denied receipt of cash, and no independent corroborative evidence was produced. The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench in the assessee's own case for AY 2012-13, on identical facts and using the same seized material, had upheld the deletion of a similar addition. The Tribunal found no distinguishing feature presented by the Revenue for the current assessment year. Following judicial discipline and consistency, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition. The operative direction was to dismiss the Revenue's appeal.
The Tribunal admitted additional grounds regarding the condonation of delay in filing Form 10. It directed the Assessing Officer to consider the assessee's claim for both assessment years, emphasizing substantial justice over technicalities and granting an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) subject to a cost, considering the peculiar circumstances and the prior consultant's inaction. The case was remanded to the Commissioner for a fresh decision on merits, with directions for the assessee to raise all grounds.
The Tribunal held that there were significant factual inconsistencies between the assessment order and the order of the CIT(A), particularly concerning the chronology of statutory notices and procedural events. The CIT(A) relied on a timeline of notices (e.g., notice u/s 148 dated 24.11.2010, return filed on 16.10.2010, notices u/s 143(2) and 142(1)) that was not demonstrably supported by the assessment order. The assessment order itself did not clearly narrate a section-wise, date-wise procedural history, and crucially, did not refer to the issuance of notice u/s 148, which formed a foundational premise for the CIT(A)'s findings. The Tribunal noted a chronological anomaly where the return was stated to be filed before the notice u/s 148 was issued. These inconsistencies, especially regarding the validity of proceedings and the opportunity of hearing, were considered fundamental. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to re-examine the issues afresh after reconciling and conclusively determining the correct chronology of notices and proceedings strictly with reference to the assessment records, and thereafter adjudicate the grounds on merits after granting due opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the addition was made on the sole reliance of a retracted statement of a third party without corroborative evidence. The assessee had provided substantial explanation with documentary evidence, and the seller's AO had accepted the transaction without addition.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While not going into the merits, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had not filed crucial documents before the AO and filed them before the CIT(A) without permission. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for denovo decision.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition, affirming that the CIT(A) has the power to admit additional evidence under Rule 46A(4) and Section 250 of the Act, especially when such evidence is called for by the CIT(A). It concluded that the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan transactions were established based on the documents examined by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that the increase in capital account was a result of a family settlement and distribution of business entities. Shares received as part of such a settlement are on capital account and not taxable in the hands of the individual.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was invalid because the escaped income was below Rs. 50 lakhs, making Section 149(1)(b) inapplicable. Furthermore, the sanction for issuing notices was obtained from the Pr.CIT instead of the Pr.CCIT, violating Section 151.
The Tribunal held that an invalid order passed by the AO does not render the assessee's appeal invalid. Furthermore, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the period of limitation for filing appeals was extended, making the assessee's appeal within the prescribed time. Thus, the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals on these grounds.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) subject to a cost, considering the peculiar circumstances and the prior consultant's inaction. The case was remanded to the Commissioner for a fresh decision on merits, with directions for the assessee to raise all grounds.
The Tribunal found that the impugned order was passed ex parte. In the interest of justice, the assessee was granted one effective opportunity of being heard before the first appellate authority.
The Tribunal held that an invalid order passed by the AO does not render the assessee's appeal invalid. Furthermore, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the period of limitation for filing appeals was extended, making the assessee's appeal within the prescribed time. Thus, the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeals on these grounds.
The Tribunal held that the assessee discharged the onus under Section 68 by providing loan confirmations, ITRs, and bank statements of lenders, and deleted the addition. It also held that the jewellery found was within reasonable limits for a joint family, considering CBDT instructions and judicial precedents, and deleted that addition as well.
The Tribunal held that the invocation of Section 50C was not warranted. The subject matter of transfer was a limited and determinable life interest coupled with an undivided share, and not land or building or both. The Tribunal distinguished the present case from the jurisdictional Bombay High Court's decision in Vidharbha Veneer Industries Ltd. v. ITO, noting that the assessee did not hold a leasehold estate or a commercially exploitable interest. The assignment was of a life interest under a trust, which is determinable and incapable of conferring dominion over the corpus. This limited interest does not partake the character of transfer of land or building to attract Section 50C. The CIT(A) did not adequately appreciate the true legal nature of the interest transferred. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 80,04,300/- sustained under Section 50C was directed to be deleted. The grounds raised by the assessee on merits were allowed. The issue of reopening under Section 147 and the deduction of indexed cost of acquisition were not explicitly decided in the provided excerpt, but the primary issue regarding Section 50C was resolved.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under section 271B was not sustainable. The core issue was the interpretation of 'turnover' or 'gross receipts' for section 44AB, given the assessee's role as a commission agent. The Tribunal noted that for commission agents (kachha arhatiyas), only the commission earned constitutes turnover for section 44AB, as clarified by CBDT Circular No. 452. The assessee's explanation that bank deposits represented funds collected for principals, not his own turnover, was accepted. The Tribunal found no material on record to suggest the assessee was a pucca arhatiya or that the deposits were his sales. The burden shifted to the Revenue to disprove the assessee's explanation, which it failed to do. Since the assessee's actual turnover (commission income) did not exceed the threshold under section 44AB, the obligation to get accounts audited did not arise. Consequently, the penalty under section 271B, which is contingent on a failure to comply with section 44AB, could not be sustained. The penalty of Rs. 1,50,000/- was deleted.
The Tribunal admitted additional grounds related to condoning the delay in filing Form 10, citing substantial justice over technicalities. For AY 2018-19, it directed the assessee to approach CBDT for condonation, and for AY 2017-18, it directed the AO to consider the claim. The matter was remitted to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restrict the addition to 5% of the bogus purchases. The Tribunal found the facts to be similar to the assessee's own case for earlier assessment years, where a similar restriction was applied.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's lackadaisical conduct but, in the interest of substantial justice, allowed one more opportunity. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on the condonation of delay and, if successful, on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) subject to a cost, considering the peculiar circumstances and the prior consultant's inaction. The case was remanded to the Commissioner for a fresh decision on merits, with directions for the assessee to raise all grounds.
The Tribunal held that the initial return filed under Section 139(4) was valid and should be processed. Consequently, the updated return filed under Section 139(8A) should be ignored as it was filed as a remedial action after the rejection of the first return.
The Tribunal found no infirmity in the Ld. CIT(A) issuing notice to the email address available on the ITBA portal. However, considering that issues should be decided on merits, the matter was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) subject to payment of costs.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order was unjustified in upholding the AO's adoption of market value without considering the assessee's request for DVO valuation. The matter was remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication, including reference to the DVO for valuation and examination of proportionate share.