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548 orders · Page 3 of 11
The Tribunal noted the assessee's lackadaisical conduct but, in the interest of substantial justice, allowed one more opportunity. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on the condonation of delay and, if successful, on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in exercising revisionary powers under Section 263 without conducting independent inquiry. The CIT(E) had set aside the assessment order to the AO for further verification, which is not permissible without first establishing that the assessment order is erroneous.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. While not going into the merits, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had not filed crucial documents before the AO and filed them before the CIT(A) without permission. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for denovo decision.
The Tribunal condoned the delays in filing the appeals, finding that the non-compliance was not wilful but due to genuine constraints of the assessee. The Tribunal set aside the ex parte orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest income received from cooperative banks, which are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal distinguished this from the Apex Court's ruling in Totgar's case, which dealt with interest income from members.
The Tribunal held that interest income received from cooperative banks, which are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal distinguished this from the Apex Court's ruling in Totgar's case, which dealt with interest income from members.
The Tribunal held that interest income received from cooperative banks, which are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal distinguished this from the Apex Court's ruling in Totgar's case, which dealt with interest income from members.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 22,50,000 for the purchase of immovable property was deleted as the assessee had discharged the initial onus by providing supporting documents and loan confirmations. Similarly, the cash credit of Rs. 4,06,663 was also deleted as the assessee provided relevant documents to substantiate the business operations.
The Tribunal held that interest income received from cooperative banks, which are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal distinguished this from the Apex Court's ruling in Totgar's case, which dealt with interest income from members.
The Tribunal held that interest income received from cooperative banks, which are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal distinguished this from the Apex Court's ruling in Totgar's case, which dealt with interest income from members.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the cross-objection, citing the genuine and bona fide reasons provided by the assessee. The Tribunal further held that the notice under Section 143(2) was mandatory and jurisdictional, and since it was issued by an officer without the requisite authority based on the declared income, the assessment order was a nullity.
The Tribunal held that the true character of the receipt needed proper examination. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for de novo adjudication, allowing the assessee a final opportunity to substantiate their claim with cogent evidence.
The Tribunal found that the assessee never requested withdrawal of the appeal against the Section 143(1) intimation. Instead, the assessee had requested clubbing of appeals or to keep the appeal pending. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Ld. Commissioner.
The Tribunal held that interest income received from cooperative banks, which are registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal distinguished this from the Apex Court's ruling in Totgar's case, which dealt with interest income from members.
The Tribunal noted a split verdict in previous years. In the current case, the Third Member concurred with the Judicial Member, holding that future and options income is business income, but losses from delivery-based share trading are speculative and cannot be set off against F&O income.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum addition was deleted by a prior order of the Tribunal, stating the proprietor had already declared the amount as income. The issue of two PAN numbers (company and proprietor) and the linkage of the bank account required further inquiry.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum addition was deleted by a prior order of the Tribunal, stating the proprietor had already declared the amount as income. The issue of two PAN numbers (company and proprietor) and the linkage of the bank account required further inquiry.
The Tribunal noted that the quantum addition was deleted by a prior order of the Tribunal, stating the proprietor had already declared the amount as income. The issue of two PAN numbers (company and proprietor) and the linkage of the bank account required further inquiry.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to credit of TDS to the extent deduction from its receipts is established by contemporaneous material on record. The denial of credit by CPC and its affirmation by the CIT(A) were set aside. The reasoning was that Section 205 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, clearly bars making a direct demand on the assessee to the extent tax has been deducted at source, even if the deductor fails to deposit it. The Tribunal relied on CBDT Instruction No. 275/29/2014 and Office Memorandum dated 11.3.2016, which direct field officers not to enforce demands created due to non-payment of TDS by deductors. Judicial precedents from the Bombay High Court (Yashpal Sahni, Pushkar Prabhat Chandra Jain) and Delhi High Court (Incredible Unique Buildcon) were also cited, reinforcing the principle that the Revenue cannot refuse credit and simultaneously demand the same sum from the deductee when tax has been deducted. The Tribunal emphasized that Form 26AS is a departmental statement reflecting the deductor's compliance and should not be the sole condition for credit when primary evidence like invoices and bank statements demonstrate deduction. Denying credit in such cases would lead to taxing the same income twice, which Section 205 is designed to prevent. The Assessing Officer was directed to verify the assessee's reconciliation with invoices, payment advices, and bank statements and allow the corresponding TDS credit. The issue of whether the assessee must first secure rectification from the deductor was expressly left undecided, with the Tribunal stating the statute does not impose such a precondition.
The Tribunal held that the stamp duty valuation should be considered as on the date of the allotment letter, not the date of the agreement, as part payments were made through banking channels prior to the agreement. The addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was not maintainable due to the low tax effect, which fell below the monetary limit set by the CBDT Circular. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
The Tribunal allowed the appeals filed by the assessees. Regarding the additions under Section 69, the Tribunal found substance in the assessees' contentions, particularly concerning the lack of independent corroborative evidence, failure to establish a nexus with the seized documents, and the denial of procedural fairness. Citing various precedents, including CIT Vs. Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. and H.R. Mehta v/s Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, the Tribunal held that the failure to provide the assessee with the material used against them and to grant an opportunity for cross-examination of deponents whose statements were relied upon, constitutes a breach of the principles of natural justice and renders the assessment orders vulnerable and bad in law. Consequently, the AO was directed to delete the additions made under Section 69. The ground challenging the validity of the notice under Section 153C without DIN was dismissed as not pressed. All grounds assailing the addition under Section 69 were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the appeals filed by the assessees. The primary issue revolved around additions made under section 69 of the Act for alleged cash payments. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not provided with the full statements of Shri Imran Ansari or Shri Tabrez Shaikh, nor was the alleged Excel sheet shared, depriving the assessee of an effective opportunity to rebut the evidence. Citing precedents such as CIT vs. Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. and H.R. Mehta v/s Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, the Tribunal held that the failure to provide an opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses whose statements are relied upon, and the denial of access to material used against the assessee, constitutes a breach of the principles of natural justice and renders the assessment order vulnerable. Consequently, the AO was directed to delete the additions made under section 69. The ground challenging the validity of the notice issued under section 153C without DIN was dismissed as not pressed. All grounds related to the addition under section 69 were allowed.
The Tribunal held that additions made solely on third-party information without further scrutiny or opportunity for cross-examination are bad in law. The assessees were denied procedural fairness and access to crucial documents.
The Tribunal allowed the grounds related to the addition under Section 69, directing the AO to delete the additions. The reasoning was that the additions were made based on third-party information (Excel sheets) and statements without providing these to the assessee or allowing cross-examination of the individuals whose statements were relied upon. This was held to be a breach of the principles of natural justice, rendering the assessment vulnerable. The Tribunal cited judgments like CIT vs. Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. and H.R. Mehta v/s Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax to support the view that denial of an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements are relied upon, and failure to provide material used against the assessee, renders additions bad in law. The ground challenging the validity of the Section 153C notice issued without DIN was dismissed as not pressed. Consequently, all appeals filed by the assessees were allowed.
The Tribunal, while noting the assessee's non-compliant attitude, decided to provide one more opportunity by remanding the case to the Commissioner (Appeals) for a fresh decision, subject to a cost of Rs. 11,000/-.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, accepting the assessee's explanation of unavoidable medical circumstances. The matter was then restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication with specific directions regarding the valuation of property.
The Tribunal held that the consideration received for granting a license for broadcasting cinematographic films, without transferring any copyright, does not fall within the definition of 'royalty' under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act or Article 12(3) of the India-Mauritius DTAA. Therefore, the income is not taxable in India as royalty.
The Tribunal held that the provisions of the IBC, 2016, would prevail over the Income Tax Act. However, Income Tax authorities have a limited jurisdiction to assess or determine the quantum of income tax dues but do not have the authority to initiate recovery of such dues during the period of moratorium in violation of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC. The Income Tax Authorities are to be treated as any other creditor and must stake their claim before the liquidator within the statutory limitation period provided under the IBC. Such claims can be considered in accordance with the waterfall mechanism provided under Section 53 of the IBC. The Tribunal noted that, similar to civil litigation where an appeal is a continuation of a suit, the outcome of these appeals would result in the determination of the revenue's tax dues only. Therefore, there is no legal impediment in deciding these appeals, which would amount to the determination of tax dues. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) and restored the matters to his file for fresh adjudication on merits, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the CIT(A) erred in law in declining to adjudicate the grounds of appeal on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had duly explained the source of funds in her foreign account. The opening balance was carried forward from the previous year and was transferred through the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) following RBI guidelines. The balance in the Indian account was explained as transfers from her father's account and her own income and savings. The interest earned from M/s OVKS LLC was also explained with corroborative evidence and offered to tax. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s doubt regarding the gift amount from the assessee's father to be unreasonable, noting that the amount transferred from the assessee's own Indian account to her US account was substantial and the closing balance was consistent with this. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee had substantiated the source of funds with documentary evidence. Therefore, the addition made by the AO and sustained by the CIT(A) was deleted. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the dividend income was eligible for exemption under Section 10(34) as the trust had not claimed benefits under Section 11 and 12. It also directed the AO to allow the deduction under Section 80-GGA after verification. The Tribunal further ruled that the tax should be levied at normal slab rates, not the Maximum Marginal Rate.
The Tribunal held that the additions made under Section 69 of the Act were unsustainable. The reasoning was based on the principle that relying solely on third-party information without providing the assessee with an opportunity to cross-examine the deponents and access the incriminating material violates the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal cited several High Court and Supreme Court judgments, including CIT Vs. Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. and H.R. Mehta v/s Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Mumbai, which emphasize that denying the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements are relied upon renders the assessment order a nullity. The Tribunal found substance in the assessee's contention that they were deprived of an effective opportunity to verify the veracity of the documents and rebut the allegations. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the additions made under Section 69. The ground challenging the validity of the notice issued under Section 153C without DIN was dismissed as not pressed. All grounds assailing the addition under Section 69 were allowed. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment in some cases were passed under Section 144, but the CIT(A) decided the issue on merits, and the Tribunal's decision on the merits would apply.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities relied solely on third-party information without independent investigation. While acknowledging the possibility of revenue leakage, it found that disallowing 100% of purchases was excessive, especially since sales were accepted and the assessee had shown a good gross profit.
The Tribunal allowed the grounds of appeal related to additions under Section 69, directing the AO to vacate these additions. The reasoning was based on the principle that additions made solely on third-party information without further scrutiny and denying the opportunity of cross-examination are bad in law, violating principles of natural justice. The Tribunal cited the cases of CIT vs. Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. and H.R. Mehta v/s Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Mumbai, emphasizing that failure to provide the assessee with material used against them and denying cross-examination renders the assessment orders vulnerable. The ground challenging the validity of the notice under Section 153C without DIN was dismissed as not pressed. Consequently, all appeals filed by the assessees were allowed, with the additions made under Section 69 being directed to be deleted. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that this was a repetitive issue where the CIT(A) had consistently found the remuneration paid to Mr. Nasser Hussain not to be excessive in preceding years. Considering the facts, Mr. Hussain's extensive experience, increased roles and responsibilities, and the consistent findings of the CIT(A), the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities relied solely on third-party information without independent investigation. While acknowledging the possibility of revenue leakage, it found that disallowing 100% of purchases was excessive, especially since sales were accepted and the assessee had shown a good gross profit.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the onus by providing purchase bills, bank statements, and DP statements. Relying on various High Court and Tribunal judgments involving the same scrip, the Tribunal found no evidence of the assessee's involvement in price rigging or manipulation.
The Tribunal allowed the appeals, holding that the additions made under Section 69 of the Act were unsustainable. The Tribunal noted that while incriminating material was found during the search and confronted to key persons of the Rubberwala Group who admitted receiving cash, the assessees consistently denied making such cash payments. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that the Revenue had not provided the statements used against the assessees, nor had it allowed the cross-examination of the persons whose statements were relied upon. This failure to provide an opportunity to cross-examine and confront the evidence, especially when the assessee denied the allegations, constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal relied on its own coordinate bench decisions in similar cases arising from the same search, which emphasized that additions made solely on third-party information without scrutiny and denying cross-examination are bad in law. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to delete the additions made under Section 69. Ground No. 1 regarding the notice under Section 153C without DIN was dismissed as not pressed. The operative direction was to vacate the additions made under Section 69.
The Tribunal held that the partial disallowance upheld by the CIT(A) was not justified, as the purchases were found to be for the purpose of business. The Tribunal deleted the entire disallowance made under Section 37(1).
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 for AY 2015-16 on July 22, 2022, was barred by limitation and therefore without jurisdiction, quashing the reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the partial disallowance upheld by the CIT(A) was not justified, as the purchases were found to be for the purpose of business. The Tribunal deleted the entire disallowance made under Section 37(1).
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities relied solely on third-party information without independent investigation. While acknowledging the possibility of revenue leakage, it found that disallowing 100% of purchases was excessive, especially since sales were accepted and the assessee had shown a good gross profit.
The Tribunal held that while the grounds regarding the assessing officer's hospitalization and the validity of the assessment order were not elaborated, the assessee was entitled to a benefit of Rs. 2,50,000 as per CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2017 and an additional Rs. 50,000. Therefore, Rs. 3,00,000 was deleted from the addition.
The Tribunal held that the partial disallowance upheld by the CIT(A) was not justified, as the purchases were found to be for the purpose of business. The Tribunal deleted the entire disallowance made under Section 37(1).
The Tribunal held that the partial disallowance upheld by the CIT(A) was not justified, as the purchases were found to be for the purpose of business. The Tribunal deleted the entire disallowance made under Section 37(1).
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities relied solely on third-party information without independent investigation. While acknowledging the possibility of revenue leakage, it found that disallowing 100% of purchases was excessive, especially since sales were accepted and the assessee had shown a good gross profit.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in law by declining to adjudicate the grounds of appeal on merits and allowing the appeal solely on the basis of the completion of insolvency proceedings. The Tribunal, respectfully following a coordinate bench decision in Doshion Veolia Water Solutions Pvt. Ltd., noted that while the IBC prevails over the Income Tax Act, Income Tax authorities have a limited jurisdiction to assess/determine the quantum of Income Tax dues but no authority to initiate recovery during the moratorium period in violation of IBC provisions. The Income Tax Authorities are like any other creditor and must stake their claim before the liquidator within the statutory limitation period, with such claims to be considered according to the waterfall mechanism under Section 53 of the IBC. The Tribunal found no legal impediment in deciding these appeals, as doing so would amount to determining the revenue's tax dues only. Consequently, the impugned orders of the CIT(A) were set aside, and the matters were restored to his file for fresh adjudication on merits. The operative direction was to remand the matters back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is not hit by the proviso to Section 2(15) and is entitled to exemption under Section 11. The additions made by the AO regarding interest income and corpus donations were rightly deleted.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not adjudicating the grounds of appeal on merits. It stated that while IBC prevails, tax authorities can determine quantum but not initiate recovery during moratorium. The appeals were set aside and restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the difference between the stamp duty valuation and the sale consideration was within the tolerance limit. The addition made by the AO and affirmed by the Commissioner is liable to be deleted.