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548 orders · Page 1 of 11
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not adhere to the procedure for filing the return of income in time nor raised objections against the reopening. The assessee's ground regarding the non-issuance of a notice under Section 143(2) was dismissed as the return was filed on the same day as the assessment order. The assessee's contention that the reassessment order was passed without jurisdiction and proper opportunity was also not found to have merit.
The Tribunal held that the benefit of carry forward of losses can be availed by the assessee, subject to an opportunity for the Income Tax Authority to pass appropriate orders. The issue was remitted to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer for consideration.
The Tribunal held that the cash deposits were explained by the assessee's turnover and cash in hand, and the cash sales were duly recorded. Regarding the Section 40A(3) disallowance, the Tribunal found that the payments were split into smaller amounts to individual workers and supported by vouchers and ledger accounts, thus not attracting the provision.
The Tribunal upheld the exclusion of Excel Infoways Ltd. as a comparable and directed the inclusion of Jindal Intellicom Ltd. The Tribunal also directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to allow working capital adjustment.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the burden by submitting relevant documentary evidence, and the AO failed to point out any discrepancies. The addition made under Section 68 was deleted, and consequently, the addition under Section 69C was also deleted.
The Tribunal held that the cash deposits were explained by the assessee's turnover and cash in hand, and the cash sales were duly recorded. Regarding the Section 40A(3) disallowance, the Tribunal found that the payments were split into smaller amounts to individual workers and supported by vouchers and ledger accounts, thus not attracting the provision.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 80JJAA, finding that the necessary documentation was provided. It also directed the AO to grant credit for DDT paid by the assessee. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT validly exercised his revisionary jurisdiction. The retrospective amendment of Section 40(a)(ii) disallows the claim for Higher Education Cess as a business expense. The assessee's arguments regarding the Assessment Unit not being an Assessing Officer and the pending appeal before CIT(A) were rejected.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) due to sufficient cause and the absence of malafide intention. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to decide all grounds on merits.
The Tribunal decided on the issues as follows: Regarding Transfer Pricing (Issue 1): The Tribunal found that the TPO erred in rejecting the assessee's TP documentation and conducting a fresh benchmarking analysis. The Tribunal noted that the TPO had applied inappropriate filters and inconsistent comparability criteria. It was held that the TPO should not have substituted the assessee's analysis with his own conjectures and assumptions. The Tribunal also found that the TPO erred in rejecting comparables considered by the assessee while including fresh comparables based on a new search, contrary to judicial precedents. The Tribunal directed the AO to re-examine the TP adjustment by applying appropriate filters and considering the assessee's risk profile and allowing necessary adjustments under Rule 10B. The issue was remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication. Regarding Section 10A deductions (Issues 2, 3, and 4): The Tribunal held that the denial of Section 10A deduction for the UB Plaza unit, Titanium unit, and the unit acquired from RIPL was incorrect. The Tribunal relied on Circular No. 1, dated January 17, 2013, which clarifies that a slump sale does not result in splitting or reconstruction of an existing business and that a mere change in ownership cannot lead to denial of Section 10A deduction. The Tribunal found that these units were eligible for Section 10A deduction. The AO was directed to allow the deduction for these units. Regarding depreciation on goodwill (Issue 5): The Tribunal held that the claim for depreciation on goodwill was not allowable as it was not an asset acquired in a slump sale. The Tribunal noted that goodwill is not an identifiable asset for depreciation purposes unless specifically acquired as such. The claim was denied. Regarding depreciation on software (Issue 6): The Tribunal held that the denial of depreciation on software purchases due to non-deduction of tax at source under Section 40(a)(i)/40(a)(ia) was incorrect. The Tribunal found that these provisions are applicable only to payments made to non-residents and not to domestic payments. The AO was directed to allow the depreciation claim.
The Tribunal addressed each ground raised by both the assessee and the revenue. For the assessee's appeal, Ground No. 1 was dismissed as not pressed. Regarding Ground No. 2, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, confirming the AO's action of not allowing the exclusion of the written-back amount from taxable income, noting that a Co-ordinate Bench had consistently allowed the deduction under Section 43B in earlier years, implying the amount written back should be taxed. For Ground No. 3, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim, following the Co-ordinate Bench's decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2009-10, which permitted netting off of interest paid to the Income Tax Department against interest received from it, citing the jurisdictional High Court's decision in DIT vs. Bank of America NT and SA. For the revenue's appeal, Ground No. 6 & 7 were dismissed, reversing the CIT(A)'s decision and upholding the addition made by the AO regarding the dividend from Alexandria Carbon Black Co. UAR (Egypt), following consistent Co-ordinate Bench rulings that such dividends are taxable in India. Grounds No. 8 & 9 concerning the disallowance of employee contribution towards ESI and Labour Welfare Fund were allowed in favour of the revenue, upholding the disallowance based on the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT. Finally, for Grounds No. 10 & 11, the Tribunal rejected the revenue's grounds, allowing the claim for additional depreciation in the succeeding AY where assets were used for less than 180 days, respectfully following the Co-ordinate Bench's decision in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the burden by submitting relevant documentary evidence, and the AO failed to point out any discrepancies. The addition made under Section 68 was deleted, and consequently, the addition under Section 69C was also deleted.
The Tribunal held that the grant-in-aid received by the assessee from the State of Maharashtra is not taxable, following its own previous decisions. However, the issue of interest income on fixed deposits was not fully adjudicated in this excerpt, with the appeal being partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the purchases alleged to be bogus were not substantiated by cogent evidence and the assessee had provided documentary evidence to support the transactions. The ad-hoc disallowance of expenses was also deleted due to lack of proper justification.
The Tribunal allowed Grounds 1 to 3 of the assessee's appeal. The primary issue addressed was the validity of the notice issued under Section 148. The Tribunal, respectfully following the Supreme Court's decision in UOI vs. Rajeev Bansal and the decisions cited by the assessee, held that the impugned notice dated 26.07.2022 was barred by limitation. The Court in Rajeev Bansal observed that TOLA does not apply to AY 2015-16, and therefore, the last date to issue notice under the new provisions of Section 148 was 31.03.2021. Since the notice was issued on 26.07.2022, it was clearly beyond the period of limitation. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the notice under Section 148, rendering the consequential assessment proceedings bad in law. As a result, the additions made in the assessment order were deemed to have no legal standing. The Tribunal expressly did not decide on Ground 4 concerning the addition of Rs. 1,26,49,760/- as it was consequential to the quashed notice.
The Tribunal held that dividend income earned from mutual funds falls within the provisions of Section 10(35) and is therefore exempt in its entirety, not restricted to Rs. 10 lacs as per Section 115BBDA. The addition made by the AO was deleted. The second ground regarding disallowance of capital loss was allowed for statistical purposes as per the CIT(A)'s direction.
The Tribunal partly allowed the revenue's appeal regarding the exclusion of comparables, finding one comparable to be not suitable. It dismissed the revenue's appeal concerning the exclusion of expenses from export turnover, following Supreme Court precedent. The assessee's appeal was partly allowed, with some grounds dismissed as infructuous or kept open.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's Transfer Pricing (TP) documentation was prepared bona fide and in compliance with the Act and Rules. It found that the TPO erred in conducting a fresh benchmarking analysis using only current year data and in rejecting the assessee's comparability analysis without proper justification. The Tribunal also held that the denial of deduction under Section 10A for the UB Plaza STPI Unit was incorrect, as the unit was a continuation of an existing eligible undertaking and not a new business formed by acquiring used assets. The Tribunal relied on Circular No. 1 dated 17/01/2013, stating that a slump sale does not result in splitting or reconstruction of business, and a change in ownership alone cannot deny Section 10A deduction. Similarly, the denial of Section 10A deduction for the Titanium STPI Unit and the unit acquired from RIPL was held to be erroneous, as these were considered eligible undertakings. The Tribunal further held that the claim for depreciation on goodwill in respect of undertakings acquired from TBI and RIPL was allowable, as the conditions for claiming depreciation on intangible assets were met. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to re-examine the comparability analysis and grant the eligible deductions and depreciation.
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's ground regarding the validity of the notice u/s 153C as not pressed. It upheld the disallowance of deductions for amounts paid/written back under Section 43B and the disallowance of interest paid to the Income Tax Department. The Tribunal also upheld the taxability of dividend income from an Egyptian company and the disallowance of employee contributions to ESI and Labour Welfare Fund.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a regular income tax filer with sufficient declared income. Considering the deposited amount was not abnormal and a lenient view was taken, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had deleted the addition on a protective basis because the substantive addition in the hands of the alleged beneficiary, M/s First Winner Industries Ltd., had already been confirmed by the CIT(A). The Tribunal found discrepancies in the companies and amounts considered by the AO and the CIT(A).
The Tribunal condoned the 656-day delay in filing the appeal, applying a lenient view for substantial justice. It remitted the matter back to the CIT (Exemption) for fresh consideration, directing the CIT (Exemption) to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the Assessee, and the Assessee to ensure timely compliance.
The Tribunal concurred with the Ld. CIT(A)'s view that the reassessment notice dated July 31, 2022, was barred by limitation. Since the root cause of the assessment (the notice) was held to be beyond the period of limitation, the entire assessment proceedings were quashed as bad in law.
The Tribunal considered various grounds related to transfer pricing adjustments, the disallowance of tax credits, and the treatment of provision of guarantees. The decision likely involved re-evaluating the application of DTAA provisions and transfer pricing methodologies.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition of ₹3,75,00,000/- made by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer's conclusion was based on two primary factors: alleged discrepancies in the consultancy agreements and general information from the Insight Portal regarding M/s. AGV Consultants. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that two agreements, a draft and a final, existed and that the final agreement was duly signed and acted upon. The Tribunal noted that M/s. AGV Consultants had not denied providing services and that the assessee had provided documentary evidence including the agreement, invoices, bank statements, and TDS certificates. The Tribunal held that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for proof, and the Assessing Officer failed to discharge the burden of disproving the transaction by bringing on record cogent material. The Tribunal also observed that the assessment order contained extraneous observations unrelated to the consultancy expenditure. Since the addition was not sustained on merits, the legal grounds raised by the assessee challenging the reassessment proceedings were rendered academic and dismissed as infructuous. The appeal by the Revenue was dismissed, and the cross-objection by the assessee was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without valid approval as mandated by Section 151 of the Income Tax Act, as the approval was granted by an authority not competent for notices issued beyond three years. This jurisdictional defect is incurable.
The Tribunal noted that the AO relied on third-party statements without cross-examination, violating natural justice. The Tribunal found that the SEBI report did not establish wrongdoing and AO's findings were based on conjecture. The assessment order under Section 143(3) was held invalid due to denial of cross-examination and reliance on unsubstantiated statements.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay of 120 days in filing the appeals, acknowledging the assessee's explanation regarding his age, illiteracy, health, and lack of notification of the order. The Tribunal found that the delay was not deliberate and that substantial justice would be served by admitting the appeals. Regarding the estimation of profit, the Tribunal proposed to arrive at a fair rate by taking the average of the Gross Profit (GP) rates declared by the assessee for the years under consideration. Based on the chart provided, the average GP rate was calculated as approximately 0.18% ( (0.20+0.20+0.20+0.18+0.07+0.26+0.17) / 7 years ). The Tribunal directed the AO to adopt this rate of 0.18% or the declared GP rate by the assessee, whichever is higher, for estimating the profit for AY 2014-15 to AY 2018-19. The contention regarding AY 2017-18 was not accepted as it would require further factual verification. The legal grounds were not pressed by the assessee and were considered dismissed as withdrawn. Appeals for AY 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2019-20 were allowed, while appeals for AY 2015-16 to 2018-19 were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds regarding disallowance under Section 40(a)(i) for payments to non-residents, following previous consistent rulings. The issue of payments to retired partners was also decided in favor of the assessee, referencing prior favorable tribunal orders.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, finding no evidence that the assessee incurred the alleged cash expenditure. The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, confirming that no corroborative evidence was brought on record to link the assessee to the seized documents or prove the actual incurrence of cash expenditure. The Tribunal emphasized that the incurring of expenditure must be established before invoking Section 69C.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15, the appeals were allowed as the assessments were found to be barred by limitation. For assessment years 2015-16 to 2018-19, the appeals were partly allowed, directing the Assessing Officer to adopt a fair average GP rate of 0.18% or the declared GP rate, whichever is higher.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was void ab initio as it was passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by law, considering the delays in the special audit report and extensions granted. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee's sales were accepted and the assessee could not have made sales without purchases, the entire disallowance of purchases was not justified. The addition should be limited to bringing the GP rate on alleged bogus purchases to the same rate as other genuine purchases.
The Tribunal deleted additions made solely on the basis of AIR/Form 26AS information without supporting evidence. It directed verification for TDS credit and allowed interest under Section 244A as per CBDT circulars. Some grounds were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 120 days in filing the appeals, accepting the assessee's explanation of advanced age, illiteracy, ill health, and lack of notice of the order as bona fide. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's request to estimate the GP rate on a fair basis without adjudicating all legal and merit-based contentions. To arrive at a fair GP rate, the Tribunal calculated the average GP rate from the years under consideration, which was approximately 0.18% ( (0.20+0.20+0.20+0.18+0.07+0.26+0.17) / 7 = 0.18%). The Tribunal directed the AO to adopt a justified rate of 0.18% of the bank credits or a higher rate if already declared by the assessee for estimating the profit. The contention regarding AY 2017-18 was not accepted, as it would require further verification of whether incriminating material was surfaced during the search. The legal grounds were not pressed by the assessee and were dismissed as withdrawn. The appeals for AY 2015-16 to 2018-19 were partly allowed for statistical purposes. The appeals for AY 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2019-20 were allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's medical condition and the complexities of the faceless assessment regime. On merits, the Tribunal held that the date of allotment of the property, not the agreement for sale, should be considered for determining the holding period for capital gains.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and the facts on record. Regarding the delay, the Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's explanation of his advanced age, illiteracy, deteriorating health, and lack of familiarity with tax procedures, coupled with the absence of any notification regarding the CIT(A)'s order. The Tribunal found these reasons to be bona fide and, in the interest of substantial justice, condoned the delay of 120 days in filing the appeals. On the merits, the Tribunal noted the assessee's request to estimate the profit on a fair basis and the revenue's support for the lower authorities' orders. The Tribunal decided to arrive at a fair Gross Profit (GP) rate by taking the average of the GP rates declared by the assessee for the years under consideration. This average was calculated as approximately 0.18%. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to adopt this rate of 0.18% or the higher GP rate declared by the assessee for estimating the profit for AY 2014-15 to AY 2018-19, after factual verification. The contention that no estimation should be done for AY 2017-18, as it was a scrutiny assessment, was not accepted, as it would require further verification of incriminating material. The legal grounds raised by the assessee were not pressed and were thus dismissed as withdrawn. Consequently, appeals for AY 2015-16 to 2018-19 were partly allowed for statistical purposes, and appeals for AY 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2019-20 were allowed.
The Tribunal decided on the issue of tax credit for dividends received from the Singapore subsidiary. It held that the dispute was primarily about the method of calculation and not the eligibility for tax sparing credit under Article 25(2) and (3) of the India-Singapore DTAA. The Tribunal found that the AO's disallowance was based on an assumption regarding the utilization of reserves of TAPL, without cogent evidence. The assessee had provided calculations under both FIFO and LIFO methods. The Tribunal considered the FIFO method, which considers dividends from accumulated profits within reserves, to be appropriate. Therefore, the Tribunal directed that the tax sparing credit be allowed to the assessee based on the working provided under the FIFO method. This decision allowed Ground No. 1 raised by the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that its observations and findings on other issues would apply mutatis mutandis to all assessment years and respective grounds of appeal. The judgment indicates that the appeals of both the revenue and the assessee were partly allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 120 days in filing the appeals, accepting the assessee's explanation of advanced age, illiteracy, ill health, and lack of awareness of the CIT(A)'s order as bona fide. The Tribunal acknowledged the principle of substantial justice and adopted a liberal approach. Regarding the estimation of profit, the Tribunal found that a fair average GP rate could be arrived at by taking the average of the GP rates declared by the assessee for the years under consideration. Based on the chart provided, the average GP rate was calculated as approximately 0.18% ( (0.20+0.20+0.18+0.07+0.26+0.17) / 7 years). The Tribunal directed the AO to adopt this rate of 0.18% or the higher rate declared by the assessee, whichever is higher, for estimating the profit for AY 2014-15 to AY 2018-19, after factual verification. The contention regarding AY 2017-18 was not accepted as it would require further verification of facts. The legal grounds were not pressed by the assessee and were deemed dismissed as withdrawn. The appeals for AY 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2019-20 were allowed, while appeals for AY 2015-16 to 2018-19 were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15, the appeals were allowed as the assessments were found to be barred by limitation. For assessment years 2015-16 to 2018-19, the appeals were partly allowed, directing the Assessing Officer to adopt a fair average GP rate of 0.18% or the declared GP rate, whichever is higher.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, upon hearing the appeal ex-parte due to the assessee's non-appearance, the Tribunal found that the assessee failed to establish the prima facie case under Section 10(38) and discharge the onus under Section 68.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals were filed by both the assessee and the revenue against the orders of the CIT(A). The core of the dispute revolves around transfer pricing adjustments made by the revenue authorities and the subsequent deletions made by the CIT(A). The assessee has raised multiple grounds challenging the validity of the transfer pricing proceedings, including alleged non-compliance with mandatory conditions under Section 92C(3) and Section 92CA(1) of the Act, lack of proper satisfaction recording by the Assessing Officer (AO) and Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO), and failure to establish the intent of tax evasion. The assessee also argued that the CIT(A) erred in re-characterizing international transactions, disregarding legally binding agreements, rejecting functional and economic analysis, and the benchmarking undertaken. Furthermore, the assessee contested the classification of guarantee provisions as international transactions and the method of calculating guarantee fees, seeking to rely on earlier ITAT orders. The revenue's contentions were not recorded in the provided excerpt. The Tribunal's decision on these specific grounds is not detailed in the provided text.
The Tribunal held that the date of allotment, supported by substantial part payment, should be considered for stamp duty valuation, not the later registration date. The addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was therefore deleted.
The Tribunal decided on the issue of tax credit for dividends received from the Singapore subsidiary. It held that the dispute was primarily about the method of calculation and not the eligibility for tax sparing credit under Article 25(2) and (3) of the India-Singapore DTAA. The Tribunal found that the AO's disallowance was based on an assumption regarding the utilization of reserves of TAPL, without cogent evidence. The assessee had provided calculations under both FIFO and LIFO methods. The Tribunal considered the FIFO method, which considers dividends from accumulated profits within reserves, to be appropriate. Therefore, the Tribunal directed that the tax sparing credit be allowed to the assessee based on the working provided under the FIFO method. This decision allowed Ground No. 1 raised by the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that its observations and findings on other issues would apply mutatis mutandis to all assessment years and respective grounds of appeal. The judgment indicates that the appeals of both the revenue and the assessee were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the distribution revenue received by the assessee from Indian sub-distributors represents consideration for distribution of software products and allied rights under a commercial distribution arrangement. The assessee operates as a limited-risk distributor, does not own or exploit any intellectual property, and does not render any technical, managerial, or consultancy services, nor does it make available any technical knowledge, experience, skill, or know-how. Therefore, the recharacterization of such distribution revenue as fees for technical services by the AO and DRP is unsustainable. The Tribunal found the invocation of the India-Switzerland DTAA to be impermissible as the assessee is a tax resident of Singapore and entitled to the benefits of the India-Singapore DTAA. Under the India-Singapore DTAA, the distribution revenue does not qualify as FTS as the 'make available' condition under Article 12(4) is not satisfied. In the absence of a PE in India, such income is not taxable as business profits. The Tribunal also found that the receipts cannot be characterized as FTS under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, as there was no rendition of services, human intervention, or consultancy provided. The assessee had duly discharged Equalization Levy and furnished proof thereof. Consequently, the exclusion provided under Section 10(50) of the Act squarely applies, and the addition made by the AO is directed to be deleted. The Tribunal also directed the AO to verify and grant credit for TDS as per Form 26AS. Penalty proceedings under Section 270A were dismissed as premature. The issue of limitation was left open.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue had not brought forth concrete evidence to substantiate that the assessee made cash payments for the property. Following coordinate bench decisions and Gujarat High Court rulings, the addition was deleted.
The tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15, the appeals were allowed as the assessments were found to be barred by limitation. For assessment years 2015-16 to 2018-19, the appeals were partly allowed, directing the Assessing Officer to adopt a fair average GP rate of 0.18% or the declared GP rate, whichever is higher.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed a rectification application under Section 154 of the Act. The CPC, vide its order dated 23.06.2025, had rectified the mistake and determined the income from property at Rs. 6,44,299, effectively accepting the assessee's contention.
The Tribunal deleted additions made solely on the basis of AIR/Form 26AS information without supporting evidence. It directed verification for TDS credit and allowed interest under Section 244A as per CBDT circulars. Some grounds were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the dispute was only regarding the method of calculation of tax sparing credit, not its eligibility. It found the assessee's FIFO method to be appropriate and directed that the tax sparing credit be allowed based on the assessee's working.