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380 orders · Page 3 of 8
The Tribunal held that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer prior to March 29, 2022, was without jurisdiction. The notification regarding Section 151A, which governs the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, came into effect from March 29, 2022. The Tribunal noted that notices under Section 142(1) were issued on December 14, 2021, and a show-cause notice was issued on March 24, 2022, both in a faceless manner, and the assessment order was passed on February 24, 2022, all prior to the effective date of the notification. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench's decision in Nabiul Industrial Metal Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO. It observed that the show-cause notice dated March 28, 2022, was digitally signed on March 29, 2022, at 00:20:37 IST, yet directed the assessee to explain by March 29, 2022, which was illogical. Consequently, the assessment order and all subsequent orders were deemed to be without jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed on this legal issue, making it unnecessary to decide other grounds. The Tribunal directed that the appeal be allowed.
The Tribunal dismissed four appeals filed by the Revenue on the grounds that the tax effect was below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT circulars, and no exceptional clauses were invoked. For the lead case (ITA No. 3163/2025), the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) which allowed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the assessee is a cooperative society and the interest income was earned from investments in entities registered as cooperative societies under the Sikkim Cooperative Societies Act, 1978. The Tribunal relied on judicial decisions, including that of the ITAT Chandigarh, which held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal did not find merit in the Revenue's arguments regarding Section 80P(4) or the procedural objections raised concerning delay condonation and admission of fresh evidence, implicitly finding the CIT(A)'s actions justified. The addition of Rs. 2,04,46,919/- was deleted.
The Tribunal dismissed four appeals filed by the Revenue on the grounds that the tax effect was below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT circulars, and no exceptional clauses were invoked. For the lead case (ITA No. 3163/2025), the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) which allowed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the assessee is a cooperative society and the interest income was earned from investments in entities registered as cooperative societies under the Sikkim Cooperative Societies Act, 1978. The Tribunal relied on judicial decisions, including that of the ITAT Chandigarh, which held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal did not find merit in the Revenue's arguments regarding Section 80P(4) or the procedural objections raised concerning delay condonation and admission of fresh evidence, implicitly finding the CIT(A)'s actions justified. The addition of Rs. 2,04,46,919/- was deleted.
The Tribunal dismissed four appeals filed by the Revenue on the grounds that the tax effect was below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT circulars, and no exceptional clauses were invoked. For the lead case (ITA No. 3163/2025), the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) which allowed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the assessee is a cooperative society and the interest income was earned from investments in entities registered as cooperative societies under the Sikkim Cooperative Societies Act, 1978. The Tribunal relied on judicial decisions, including that of the ITAT Chandigarh, which held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal did not find merit in the Revenue's arguments regarding Section 80P(4) or the procedural objections raised concerning delay condonation and admission of fresh evidence, implicitly finding the CIT(A)'s actions justified. The addition of Rs. 2,04,46,919/- was deleted.
The Tribunal dismissed four appeals filed by the Revenue on the grounds that the tax effect was below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT circulars, and no exceptional clauses were invoked. For the lead case (ITA No. 3163/2025), the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) which allowed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the assessee is a cooperative society and the interest income was earned from investments in entities registered as cooperative societies under the Sikkim Cooperative Societies Act, 1978. The Tribunal relied on judicial decisions, including that of the ITAT Chandigarh, which held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal did not find merit in the Revenue's arguments regarding Section 80P(4) or the procedural objections raised concerning delay condonation and admission of fresh evidence, implicitly finding the CIT(A)'s actions justified. The addition of Rs. 2,04,46,919/- was deleted.
The Tribunal dismissed four appeals filed by the Revenue on the grounds that the tax effect was below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT circulars, and no exceptional clauses were invoked. For the lead case (ITA No. 3163/2025), the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) which allowed the deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the assessee is a cooperative society and the interest income was earned from investments in entities registered as cooperative societies under the Sikkim Cooperative Societies Act, 1978. The Tribunal relied on judicial decisions, including that of the ITAT Chandigarh, which held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from deposits with cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal did not find merit in the Revenue's arguments regarding Section 80P(4) or the procedural objections raised concerning delay condonation and admission of fresh evidence, implicitly finding the CIT(A)'s actions justified. The addition of Rs. 2,04,46,919/- was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act was barred by limitation. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed, and the other grounds of appeal were not adjudicated.
The Tribunal addressed the issues as follows: Regarding the receipt of Royalty income (issue 5), the Tribunal noted the assessee's concession that the TPO did not share the search strategy and requested the issue be set aside to the TPO for a fresh decision after providing the search strategy and an opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal accepted this submission and set aside the issue to the file of the Ld. TPO for fresh consideration. Additional grounds (vii) and (viii) concerning technical support services were dismissed as redundant because the TPO made no adjustment, and these issues were not before the CIT(A). The Tribunal held that the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed on all grounds except for the issue of royalty income, which has been set aside for fresh consideration. Therefore, the appeal of the Revenue is partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) order was ex-parte and did not decide all grounds on merits. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment, with a direction for the assessee to participate and be heard.
The Tribunal held that the application should be decided on merits, especially as the assessee is an old trust and had provisional approval. The CIT(E) was directed to decide the application afresh after granting an adequate opportunity of being heard and condoning any delay.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had not sufficiently justified the rejection and that the assessee needed another opportunity to prove its claim. Therefore, the order of the CIT(E) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that Section 50C was correctly invoked for computing capital gains. However, it directed the Assessing Officer to allow a pro-rata deduction under Section 54F based on the amount deposited and to recompute capital gains by adding an estimated cost of improvement.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(E) and remanded the matter back for fresh consideration. It was held that in the interest of justice, the assessee should be given another opportunity to present its case, especially since provisional approval under Section 80G(5)(iv) was granted earlier.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee, a bank, had claimed a deduction under Section 36(1)(viii) of the Act. The assessee paid the tax liability and filed Form 68 on October 26, 2021 (online) and October 29, 2021 (physical) seeking immunity from penalty proceedings. However, the AO denied this immunity, and this denial was upheld by the CIT(A). The assessee's submission was that it had not suppressed any income and the addition was made based on a difference of opinion. The Tribunal found that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) had considered the assessee's filing of Form 68 for immunity. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the file of the AO with a direction to pass a fresh order after hearing the assessee and considering the legal precedents cited. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should be granted an opportunity to present its case before the Assessing Officer. The assessment was initially made because the AO found that the assessee had not furnished complete documentary evidence to prove the genuineness of cash deposits. The assessee subsequently placed a list of documents before the ITAT. Considering these submissions and the orders of the lower authorities, the Tribunal was of the view that the assessee ought to be given an opportunity to place its case before the AO. Therefore, the appeal of the assessee was remitted back to the file of the AO with a direction to pass a fresh order after affording an opportunity to hear the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under Section 271AAC(1) cannot be sustained if the quantum addition, which formed the basis for the penalty, has been deleted. The reasoning was that the order imposing penalty under Section 271AAC(1) was predicated on the assessee making huge cash deposits and failing to prove their nature and source, leading to an addition under Section 69A. However, the ITAT, in a prior appeal (ITA No. 431/2025), had deleted this addition under Section 69A. Since the quantum addition was deleted, the penalty proceedings based on that addition are consequently unsustainable in law. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the penalty. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had indeed dismissed the appeal in limine without condoning the delay. Upon reviewing the affidavit submitted by the assessee explaining the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), the Tribunal considered these reasons to be bona fide and sufficient. Consequently, the Tribunal condoned the delay, set aside the order of the CIT(A), and restored the appeal to the file of the AO. The AO was directed to decide the appeal on its merits after providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to furnish necessary documents and details to substantiate their claim without unreasonable adjournments. The Tribunal noted that the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the case required proper verification by the Assessing Officer (AO). It noted that the NFAC had dismissed the assessee's appeal concerning the disallowance of investment fees of Rs. 1,80,35,090 (USD 28,986) incurred outside India for earning interest and dividend income. The assessee claimed these fees were properly claimed as per US tax returns. The Tribunal observed that similar investment fees had been allowed as a deduction in AY 2012-13 and AY 2017-18, and the CIT(A) had allowed investment fees of Rs. 13,22,200 for AY 2014-15. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to remit the appeal back to the file of the AO with a direction to pass an order after reviewing the assessee's submissions and documentary evidence for AYs 2012-13, 2017-18, and 2014-15, as the assessee had received relief on similar issues in those years. The operative direction was to set aside the order of the lower authority and allow the appeal for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal has not yet decided on the substantive issues of the appeal as the provided text is incomplete and only presents the grounds of appeal and the procedural history leading to the ITAT. The grounds raised by the assessee primarily focus on seeking condonation for a procedural lapse (non-filing of return within the due date) and attributing it to the remote location, uneducated members, and lack of guidance. The Tribunal's decision on the merits of the additions made by the AO (Rs. 63,95,615 under Section 68 r.w.s 115BBE and Rs. 5,48,508 as Business Income) and the disallowance of Section 80P deduction is not recorded. The operative directions and the ratio decidendi are therefore not available from the given extract. The issue of whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, given the acknowledged procedural lapse, is implicitly raised by the assessee's first ground.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had established the availability of cash in hand, and the Assessing Officer did not provide contrary evidence to show how the cash was spent. Therefore, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the rent paid was at arm's length, offered to tax by the recipient, and supported by lease deeds. The interest liability and trade payables were not unexplained cash credits or income under Section 41(1) as they were existing liabilities. Advances from customers were adjusted or written back in the ordinary course of business.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its burden under Section 68 by providing documentation for the loan, including repayment with interest. The addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was deleted.
The Tribunal held that Section 68 applies to sums credited, not sums advanced. It also noted that the assessee received repayment of the loan, and no adverse findings were made in subsequent assessment years. The categorization of a company as 'shell' without justification was insufficient to sustain the addition.
The Tribunal, considering the additional documents produced by the assessee, decided to remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment. The assessee will have the opportunity to present all supporting documents.
The Tribunal held that LTC is meant for travel within India and foreign travel does not qualify for exemption under Section 10(5). Consequently, the assessee was liable for tax deduction at source on such payments.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had not properly appreciated the evidence and had cancelled the approval without following the procedure under Section 12AB(4). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that LTC is meant for travel within India and foreign travel does not qualify for exemption under Section 10(5). Consequently, the assessee was liable for tax deduction at source on such payments.
The Tribunal held that LTC is meant for travel within India and foreign travel does not qualify for exemption under Section 10(5). Consequently, the assessee was liable for tax deduction at source on such payments.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, holding that the filing of Form 10B is a procedural and directory requirement. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and remitted the matter back to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal found that the assessment order was not time-barred. However, it noted that crucial evidence regarding the source of the cash deposit was not filed before the AO. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the issue back to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had not properly appreciated the evidence and had cancelled the approval without following the procedure under Section 12AB(4). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 143(2) is not a prerequisite for an assessment under Section 153C. Relying on the decisions of the Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Promy Kuriakose, the Delhi High Court in Ashok Chaddha v. Income Tax Officer, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Tarsem Singla v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, the Tribunal found that the non-obstante clause in Section 153C(1) read with Section 153A excludes the requirement of Section 143(2). The Tribunal distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Hotel Blue Moon, noting it applied to Section 158BC, which explicitly mentions the application of Section 143(2), unlike Section 153C. Therefore, the issuance of a time-barred notice under Section 143(2) does not invalidate the assessment under Section 153C, and the additional ground raised by the assessee was dismissed. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal found that the assessee failed to substantiate the claim that the unaccounted income of Rs. 20,00,000 (AY 2019-20) and the peak credit (AY 2020-21) were derived from brokerage and trading of iron and iron-related products. The Tribunal noted the lack of supporting evidence, the low profit offered by a related firm despite significant turnover, and the fact that the income was not offered in the return. Consequently, the findings of the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) in upholding the addition and the levy of tax under Section 115BBE were confirmed.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 143(2) is not a prerequisite for an assessment under Section 153C. Relying on the decisions of the Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Promy Kuriakose, the Delhi High Court in Ashok Chaddha v. Income Tax Officer, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Tarsem Singla v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, the Tribunal found that the non-obstante clause in Section 153C(1) read with Section 153A excludes the requirement of Section 143(2). The Tribunal distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Hotel Blue Moon, noting it applied to Section 158BC, which explicitly mentions the application of Section 143(2), unlike Section 153C. Therefore, the issuance of a time-barred notice under Section 143(2) does not invalidate the assessment under Section 153C, and the additional ground raised by the assessee was dismissed. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal found that the assessee failed to substantiate the claim that the unaccounted income of Rs. 20,00,000 (AY 2019-20) and the peak credit (AY 2020-21) were derived from brokerage and trading of iron and iron-related products. The Tribunal noted the lack of supporting evidence, the low profit offered by a related firm despite significant turnover, and the fact that the income was not offered in the return. Consequently, the findings of the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) in upholding the addition and the levy of tax under Section 115BBE were confirmed.
The Tribunal held that the tax effect was below the monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT circular. As the revenue did not clearly suggest an applicable exception clause, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the University of Calcutta is exempt from the requirement of auditing its books of accounts under Section 44AB as its income is exempt under Section 10(23C)(iiiab). Consequently, no penalty can be levied under Section 271B.
The Tribunal held that the income arising from the rental of shops in Pink Square Mall, Jaipur, should be treated as business income and not income from house property. The Tribunal analyzed the facts in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Karnani Properties Ltd. vs. CIT, which outlines three conditions for rental income to be treated as business income: (1) services rendered should be the result of continuous, organized activities; (2) services should be with a set purpose; and (3) services should be rendered with a view to earn profits. The Tribunal found that the assessee's MoA clearly stated its main object was to establish malls and lease them out, providing a host of services and facilities. The Tribunal noted that the department had accepted rental income as business income in earlier assessment years. The Tribunal also addressed a separate issue concerning the computation of long-term capital gains, accepting the assessee's recomputed indexed cost of acquisition and directing the deletion of the consequent addition of Rs. 10,89,668/-. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was invalid because the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148 was obtained from the PCIT instead of the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT), as required for reopening beyond three years. Consequently, the assessment and the penalty were quashed.
The Tribunal held that for AY 2010-11, since the assessment year was unabated at the time of search, additions under Section 153A could only be made on the basis of seized incriminating material. As neither the AO nor the CIT(A) referred to any seized material, and the AO's basis was merely perusal of bank and audited accounts, the addition was not supported by any seized documents. Therefore, the assessment was considered bad in law and without jurisdiction. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, directing the AO to delete the addition. For AY 2014-15, the issue was similar to AY 2010-11, and the appeal was allowed accordingly. For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal found that the assessee had furnished all documentary evidence regarding share subscribers, including their ITRs and bank statements. While summons under Section 131 were not complied with by two parties, the Tribunal held that if the assessee provided all evidence and the AO did not conduct further inquiry or point out defects, additions cannot be made solely on the ground of non-compliance with summons. Following the cited precedents, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the AO to delete the addition.
The Tribunal held that the penalty notice was vague and non-speaking, rendering the penalty proceedings and the consequent order null and void. The AO's failure to specify the limb of Section 271AAB deprived the assessee of a proper opportunity to respond.
The Tribunal held that the penalty notice was vague and non-speaking, rendering the penalty proceedings and the consequent order null and void. The AO's failure to specify the limb of Section 271AAB deprived the assessee of a proper opportunity to respond.
The Tribunal held that the University of Calcutta is exempt from the requirement of auditing its books of accounts under Section 44AB as its income is exempt under Section 10(23C)(iiiab). Consequently, no penalty can be levied under Section 271B.
The Tribunal held that the statement made during the survey has no evidentiary value without corroboration and set aside the addition. It also held that the delay in uploading the tax audit report was a technical breach and a reasonable cause, thus deleting the penalty.
The tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was based on borrowed satisfaction and incorrect facts, as the assessee had not claimed exempt income as stated by the AO. The AO also incorrectly noted that no assessment was framed under section 143(3) when it was.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, noting that the CIT(A) order was ex-parte and did not decide all grounds on merits. The case was restored to the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the ITAT, citing the liberal approach to condoning delays with sufficient cause. The Tribunal also found sufficient cause for the delay in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) and set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding it to be for bonafide reasons. The Tribunal held that the ex-parte decision by the lower authorities violated Section 250(6) and restored the appeal to the AO for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings were without jurisdiction because Section 151A of the Act, which governs faceless assessment, became effective from March 29, 2022, while the assessment order was dated March 25, 2022. Therefore, the assessment order could not be sustained.
The Tribunal held that advertisement and sales promotion expenses are recurring in nature and are necessary for sustaining business in a competitive market. It noted that similar expenses were allowed in previous years by the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was passed without jurisdiction as Section 151A of the Act, which governs faceless assessment, was not effectively applicable at the time of the assessment. Consequently, the penalty order also lacked basis.
The Tribunal held that the AO could not accept purchases and sales as genuine while treating corresponding sundry creditors as non-genuine without rejecting the books of account. The CIT(A) also failed to provide cogent reasons for confirming the addition.