Loading High Court cases…
1,246 orders · Page 21 of 25
The High Court, in light of the consent of the parties and the fact that the controversy was squarely covered by its previous judgment in 'M/s. S.M. Industries vs. Union of India & Anr.' (decided on 20.03.2025), disposed of the writ petitions. The Court held that the notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers were illegal and quashed them. The respondents were granted liberty to proceed via the mode of Faceless Assessment in terms of the judgment rendered in 'Sharda Devi Chhajer' (supra). The period during which the petitions remained pending before the Court was to be excluded for the Faceless Assessing Officer proceedings. Any issues of limitation were to be decided by the Assessing Officer as per 'Rajeev Bansal' (supra). Any other unadjudicated issues were left open for parties to agitate again before the Court. Further proceedings under the Faceless Assessment Scheme were to be conducted strictly in accordance with law.
The High Court held that the notices dated March 8, 2021, impugned in the six writ petitions (CWP Nos.10722/2021, 10730/2021, 10740/2021, 10741/2021, 10743/2021 and 10750/2021) were covered by the law laid down in Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 1 (1), Maharashtra, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Interim Board (Settlement Commission), New Delhi, Union of India. Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside these notices. The Court also directed that any application filed before the Interim Board be considered and disposed of in accordance with the law. The rights and contentions of the parties were kept open. No specific assessment year or amount in dispute was mentioned.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing and setting aside the impugned notice dated March 31, 2023. The Court found sufficient force in the petitioner's argument that the controversy was no longer res integra, having been settled by a co-ordinate bench in the case of Sharda Devi Chhajer. The Court's reasoning was based on the operating portion of the judgment in Sharda Devi Chhajer, which held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Act of 1961 must be strictly followed and that the JAO (Jurisdictional Assessing Officer) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act. The Court reiterated that adherence to an algorithm-based random assessing system is required for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT notification dated March 29, 2022, by keeping the FAO (Facilitation Assessing Officer) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was to be excluded for computing the limitation for issuance of fresh notices, if needed.
The High Court held that the notices dated March 8, 2021, impugned in the six writ petitions (CWP Nos.10722/2021, 10730/2021, 10740/2021, 10741/2021, 10743/2021 and 10750/2021) were covered by the law laid down in Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. (supra). Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside these notices. The Court explicitly stated that all rights and contentions of the parties were kept open. It was also directed that any application filed before the Interim Board should be considered and disposed of in accordance with the law. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned in the judgment.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notices dated 08th March 2021 and 28th June 2021. The Court followed the law laid down in Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. (supra). The reasoning was that the ground for rejection based on the cut-off date was not sustainable. Furthermore, the Court noted that the additional ground raised by the revenue regarding the absence of pending proceedings was not recorded in the impugned orders. Therefore, the Court directed that the application filed before the Interim Board be considered and disposed of in accordance with law, keeping open all rights and contentions of the parties. The operative direction was to quash the impugned notices and to have the application reconsidered.
The High Court quashed and set aside the notices dated March 8, 2021, issued to the petitioner in six writ petitions (CWP Nos.10722/2021, 10730/2021, 10740/2021, 10741/2021, 10743/2021, and 10750/2021). The court's decision was based on the concession made by the revenue that these petitions were covered by the law laid down in Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. The court explicitly stated that all rights and contentions of the parties were kept open. Furthermore, any application filed before the Interim Board was to be considered and disposed of in accordance with the law. The petitions were disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the controversy in the present batch of writ petitions concerning the jurisdiction of the Faceless Assessing Officer versus the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer was settled by its previous judgment in 'Sharda Devi Chhajer'. Consequently, the Court declared the notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers as illegal and quashed them. The respondents were granted liberty to proceed via the mode of Faceless Assessment in terms of the 'Sharda Devi Chhajer' judgment. The period during which the petitions remained pending before the Court was to be excluded for the Faceless Assessing Officer proceedings. Any issues of limitation were to be decided by the Assessing Officer in terms of 'Rajeev Bansal'. The Court clarified that any other unadjudicated issues could be agitated again. The proceedings under the Faceless Assessment Scheme were to be conducted strictly in accordance with law.
The High Court held that the notices dated March 8, 2021, impugned in the six writ petitions (CWP Nos.10722/2021, 10730/2021, 10740/2021, 10741/2021, 10743/2021 and 10750/2021) were covered by the law laid down in Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside these notices. The Court clarified that this decision was made keeping open all rights and contentions of the parties. It also directed that any application filed before the Interim Board be considered and disposed of in accordance with law. The ratio decidendi is that if a precedent from a higher court or a coordinate bench clearly covers the issue, the revenue should concede or the court should follow it, leading to the quashing of the impugned notices. No specific issue was left undecided, as the revenue conceded on merits for most petitions.
The High Court held that the notices dated March 8, 2021, impugned in five of the six petitions (CWP Nos.10722/2021, 10730/2021, 10740/2021, 10741/2021, 10743/2021 and 10750/2021) were covered by the law laid down in the case of Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. (supra). Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside these notices. The Court explicitly stated that all rights and contentions of the parties were kept open. It also directed that any application filed before the Interim Board be considered and disposed of in accordance with law. The issue pertaining to D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10735/2021 was not decided on merits as it was excluded from the concession made by the revenue.
The High Court held that the notices dated March 8, 2021, impugned in the six writ petitions (CWP Nos.10722/2021, 10730/2021, 10740/2021, 10741/2021, 10743/2021 and 10750/2021) were covered by the law laid down in Sar Senapati Santaji Ghorpade Sugar Factory Ltd. (supra). Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside these notices. The Court also directed that any application filed before the Interim Board be considered and disposed of in accordance with the law. The rights and contentions of the parties were expressly kept open. The principle established is that if a precedent from a High Court is directly on point and conceded by the revenue, similar notices can be quashed.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the present writ petition was squarely covered by its previous judgment in Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra). Consequently, the petition was disposed of with similar directions. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned Notices and Assessment Order to the extent of the jurisdiction of the JAO for issuing notices under Sections 148 & 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The respondents were directed to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, with the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was to be excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if required. Both parties were granted liberty to raise their respective issues before the Assessing Authority. The ratio decidendi is that notices issued under Section 148 of the Act must adhere to the algorithm-based random assessing system mandated by Section 151A and the faceless regime, and jurisdictional errors in such notices are to be quashed.
The Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It was further held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as this would weaken Section 151A and potentially lead to its diminished activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to an algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs to issue them. The Court allowed the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, with the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for fresh notices. The Court also noted that both parties could raise their respective issues before the Assessing Authority.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the present writ petition was squarely covered by its previous judgment in Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra). Consequently, the petition was disposed of with similar directions. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned Notices and Assessment Order concerning the jurisdiction of Joint Assessing Officers (JAOs) for issuing notices under Sections 148 and 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The respondents were granted liberty to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, by keeping the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was to be excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if needed. Both parties were at liberty to raise their respective issues before the Assessing Authority.
The Tribunal held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It was decided that the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as this would weaken Section 151A and potentially lead to its diminished activation. The court emphasized that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence must be made to the algorithm-based random assessing system. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs. The respondents were granted liberty to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, keeping the FAO as the assessing officer. The ratio is that jurisdictional errors in notices issued under Section 148, violating the automated allocation mandate of Section 151A, render such notices invalid.
The High Court considered the request of the petitioner's counsel to withdraw the writ petition. In view of the subsequent development and the petitioner's desire to withdraw the petition with liberty to file a fresh one if needed, the Court allowed the withdrawal. The writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn with the liberty granted to the petitioner. The judgment does not delve into the merits of the original grievance that led to the filing of the writ petition, nor does it provide any reasoning on the substantive issues. The operative direction was to dispose of the petition as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It was further held that the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as this would weaken Section 151A and potentially lead to its diminished activation. The court emphasized that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, adherence to an algorithm-based random assessing system, as per Section 151A, is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs. The court allowed the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, by keeping the FAO (presumably referring to the Facilitation Assessing Officer or a similar designated authority) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was to be excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if needed.
The High Court held that in view of the subsequent assessment orders passed by the Income Tax Department, the relief sought by the petitioner in the writ petition was no longer required to be pressed. Consequently, the writ petition was rendered infructuous. The court disposed of the writ petition on this basis. Any pending applications related to the writ petition were also disposed of. The court did not delve into the merits of the original grievance, as the changed circumstances made the petition moot.
The High Court held that the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (supra) had not been followed. The court found that the respondents were unable to demonstrate from the record that the objections filed by the petitioner were dealt with by passing a speaking order. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the respondent No.1 (Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax) to decide the objections of the petitioner in accordance with law. It was clarified that the petitioner shall not raise the issue that the proceedings are time-barred. The ratio decidendi is that failure to pass a speaking order on objections against reassessment proceedings, as mandated by the Supreme Court, vitiates the subsequent assessment order.
The Tribunal permitted the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning was based on the Revenue's submission that the tax effect was below the threshold stipulated in the CBDT circular dated 17.09.2024, which allows for withdrawal of appeals in such circumstances. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the proposed substantial question of law is kept open for consideration in an appropriate case. The department was granted liberty to move an appropriate application for revival if the need arises.
The Tribunal held that the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the order dated 04.05.2022 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Ashish Agarwal. The Supreme Court's order, in essence, treated notices issued under the unamended Section 148 as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). It directed that the Assessing Officer should provide information and material to the assessee, allow a reply, and then pass orders under Section 148A(d). The Supreme Court also allowed dispensing with the requirement of enquiry under Section 148A(a) as a one-time measure and permitted proceedings to be drawn afresh. Crucially, the Supreme Court's order also provided that all defenses available to the assessees and the Revenue would continue to be available. In this specific case, the revenue was granted liberty to proceed against the legal representative of the deceased in accordance with the Supreme Court's directions.
The High Court acknowledged that the petitioner had already deposited 20% of the disputed demand, amounting to Rs. 63,10,265/-. The court noted its consistent practice in similar cases of passing interim orders staying the demand except for 20% of the total recovery amount. Consequently, the court directed that the order dated 12.10.2018, which stayed the insistence on monthly installments of Rs. 10,000,00/-, would continue until the disposal of the appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) (CIT(E)). The CIT(E) was directed to endeavor to decide the appeal within six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. No unwarranted adjournments were to be granted to either party. The issue of the validity of the demand beyond 20% was implicitly addressed by continuing the interim order.
The High Court, without commenting on the merits of the case, disposed of the writ petition as not pressed. The Court directed the appellate authority (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to decide the pending appeals expeditiously, not later than four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The core of the decision is the procedural direction for speedy resolution of the appeals, acknowledging the petitioner's grievance regarding the adjustment of refunds while pending appeals, but not adjudicating on the legality of the adjustment itself. The ratio decidendi is that the High Court can direct expeditious disposal of pending appeals when a taxpayer faces procedural delays that impact their financial position, even if the petition is not pressed on its substantive grounds.
The Tribunal, in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rajeev Bansal, set aside the impugned order. The reasoning is that the Supreme Court has authoritatively decided the issues concerning limitation and sanction. The Tribunal also noted the petitioner's reliance on the Seahorse Mercantile Company Private Limited case, which allowed for matters to be sent back for the assessee to raise objections. Consequently, the matters were remitted back to the respective Income Tax Officers to decide the objections afresh. The petitioners were granted liberty to file additional objections within two weeks and were directed to appear before the Income Tax Officer on a specified date. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, disposed of the writ petition without commenting on the merits of the case. The Court directed the respondent No. 2, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), to complete the remand proceedings pursuant to the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the High Court's order. To facilitate this, the petitioner was directed to appear before the office of respondent No. 2 on May 30, 2025, at 11:00 AM, to avoid further delay and complications. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original exemption withdrawal or the subsequent remand proceedings, as the petition was disposed of on procedural grounds.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue. The substantial question of law was answered against the revenue. The decision was based on the High Court's prior judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax versus Harish Jain & other connected matters, reported in [2025: RJ-JP;9218-DB]. In that precedent, an identical issue concerning the interference by the ITAT with an order passed under Section 263 of the Act was decided, and the substantial question of law was answered against the revenue. The revenue's counsel could not differentiate the present case from the cited judgment. Therefore, following the binding precedent, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue. The substantial question of law was answered against the revenue. The decision was based on the High Court's prior judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax versus Harish Jain & other connected matters, reported in [2025: RJ-JP;9218-DB]. In that precedent, an identical issue concerning the interference by the ITAT with an order passed under Section 263 of the Act was decided, and the substantial question of law was answered against the revenue. The revenue's counsel could not differentiate the present case from the cited judgment. Therefore, following the binding precedent, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court followed its earlier order dated January 30, 2025, passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1102/2025 (Sunil Agrawal vs. Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax & Anr.). This decision, in turn, relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Jai Lakshmi Rice Mills [(2015) 379 ITR 521 (SC)]. The core reasoning, as applied from the Sunil Agrawal case, was that penalty proceedings under Section 271D cannot be initiated in the absence of specific satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer (AO) for initiating proceedings under that particular section. In the present case, the AO had recorded satisfaction for Section 271AAC, not Section 271D. The respondents could not provide any distinguishing arguments. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271D were quashed, and the writ petition was allowed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue. The substantial question of law was answered against the revenue. The decision was based on the High Court's prior judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax versus Harish Jain & other connected matters, reported in [2025: RJ-JP;9218-DB]. In that precedent, an identical issue concerning the interference by the ITAT with an order passed under Section 263 of the Act was decided, and the substantial question of law was answered against the revenue. The revenue's counsel could not differentiate the present case from the cited judgment. Therefore, following the binding precedent, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court found that the present appeals were identical to the case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax versus Harish Jain & other connected matters, which had been decided by the same High Court on 03.03.2025. In that prior decision, the substantial question of law concerning the interference by the ITAT with the Section 263 order was answered against the revenue. Therefore, following its own precedent, the High Court answered the substantial question of law against the revenue and dismissed the appeals. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeals were disposed of based on the prior judgment.
The Tribunal (High Court) disposed of the writ petition as not pressed. The petitioner was granted liberty to avail the remedy of appeal. The Court further directed that if the petitioner files an appeal within four weeks from the date of the order, it shall be treated as filed within the period of limitation. Additionally, the petitioner was given liberty to request the appellate authority for expeditious disposal of the appeal, and the Court expressed that such a request would be considered sympathetically and expeditiously. No decision was made on the merits of the assessment order itself.
The Tribunal noted the respondent's reply dated 06.08.2024, which stated that the initial notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 25.06.2021, was issued in the name of the deceased assessee. Consequently, the subsequent notice under Section 148A(b) dated 27.07.2022 and the order under Section 148A(d) dated 27.07.2022 were deemed invalid. The Tribunal observed that the reassessment proceedings under Section 148 had been dropped. In light of the respondent's submission and the dropping of proceedings, the petition was disposed of as infructuous. The respondent was granted liberty to proceed in accordance with law, implying the possibility of initiating fresh proceedings if permissible.
The High Court held that the very foundation for the issuance of the notice under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was eroded. The court noted the revenue's submission, supported by a communication from the department, that the information regarding M/s Vasuki Tradelink Pvt. Ltd. was wrongly sent by the GST department and the actual information related to M/s Varuni International. This clarification meant that the basis on which the reopening proceedings were initiated was factually incorrect. Consequently, the court found that the impugned order dated April 15, 2024, passed under Section 148A(d) and the notice itself were unsustainable. The court quashed both the notice and the order. The ratio decidendi is that if the information forming the sole basis for reopening an assessment is subsequently found to be erroneous and withdrawn, the reopening proceedings are liable to be quashed.
The High Court held that the view taken by the assessing officer was hyper-technical. The Court noted that the petitioner's reply was available on record and the impugned order was passed approximately one month after the objections were filed, without considering them. The Court found that the intent of the procedure introduced by Section 148A of the Act had been defeated on a technical basis. Consequently, the impugned order dated 21.07.2022 was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the ITO Ward No. 6(2), Jaipur, to proceed in accordance with law for deciding the objections. The petitioner was directed to appear before the ITO on 04.06.2025 at 11:00 AM.
The Tribunal (High Court) held that the writ petition had become infructuous. This decision was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The counsel stated that an interim order was granted, and subsequently, the petitioner's return of income was accepted during the pendency of the writ petition. Consequently, the petition was disposed of as having become infructuous. No specific reasoning beyond accepting the petitioner's submission is provided. The ratio decidendi is that if the underlying issue of a writ petition is resolved by subsequent events, such as the acceptance of a return, the petition can be disposed of as infructuous. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition.
The High Court held that it was not inclined to interfere with the order under challenge through a writ petition. The court noted that none of the grounds urged by the petitioner related to the order being wholly without jurisdiction, violation of principles of natural justice, or mala fide actions. Given the availability of an alternative statutory remedy, the court directed the appellant to pursue that remedy. The appellant was advised to file an appeal and raise all grounds, including those presented in the writ petition. The writ petition was accordingly disposed of, leaving the petitioner to work out their alternative remedy.
The High Court held that it was not inclined to interfere with the order under challenge through a writ petition. The court noted that none of the grounds urged by the petitioner related to the order being wholly without jurisdiction, violation of principles of natural justice, or mala fide actions. Consequently, the court directed the appellant to pursue their alternative remedy by filing an appeal before the appropriate appellate authority. All grounds raised in the writ petition, including those already presented, could be raised in the appeal. The writ petition was disposed of on this basis, with no decision on the merits of the grounds raised.
The High Court, without commenting on the merits, disposed of the writ petition. It acknowledged that the petition had been pending for approximately six months and that the petitioner had raised a dispute regarding the permissibility of attaching overdraft facility/cash credit, with a liability of Rs. 3 crores. Considering these factors, the Court directed the respondents (revenue authorities) to examine the petitioner's representations and take an appropriate decision in light of Section 226(3)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which allows for revocation of attachment in appropriate cases. The respondents were instructed to decide the representations at the earliest, within an outer limit of three weeks from the date of the order.
The High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. The court's decision was based solely on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The reasoning was that the passage of time had rendered the petition moot. Therefore, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as having become infructuous. No other issues were decided, and no specific directions were issued beyond the dismissal. The ratio decidendi is that a writ petition can be dismissed as infructuous if the petitioner concedes that it has become so due to the passage of time.
The High Court, upon a request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to withdraw the instant petition, passed an order dismissing the petition as withdrawn. The court did not delve into the merits of the case or the underlying dispute that led to the filing of the writ petition. The reasoning for the dismissal was solely based on the petitioner's expressed desire to withdraw the case. Any pending applications related to the petition were also dismissed as a consequence. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petition as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there is no way to bypass it. It was further held that a Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as this would weaken Section 151A and diminish its activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in conjunction with the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to an algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs for issuing notices under Sections 148 and 148A. The question raised was answered in terms of the aforementioned findings. The respondents were granted liberty to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, by keeping the FAO (Facilitation Assessing Officer) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was to be excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if required. All pending applications were disposed of.
The High Court allowed the withdrawal of the appeal. The Revenue, represented by its counsel, sought permission to withdraw the present appeal, citing CBDT Circular No.9 of 2024, which discourages appeals with a total tax effect below two crores. This decision was also influenced by a prior order in a similar case, D.B. Income Tax Appeal No.08 of 2021. The Court, acknowledging the Revenue's submission and the issuance of the new circular, disposed of the appeal as withdrawn. The specific tax effect of Rs.45,37,964/- was noted, which falls below the threshold mentioned in the later circular. No other issues were decided on merits.
The Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the instant petition with liberty to file a proper petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty. Any pending applications in the matter were also dismissed as infructuous. The judgment does not delve into any substantive issues of income tax law, as the matter was disposed of on procedural grounds.
The Tribunal (High Court in this case) held that the petitioner's request to withdraw the instant petition with liberty to file a proper petition is granted. Consequently, the petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty granted. Any pending applications are also dismissed. The reasoning is based on the petitioner's explicit request for withdrawal and the court's discretion to allow such withdrawal with liberty, especially when a proper petition is intended to be filed. The operative direction is the dismissal of the petition as withdrawn with liberty.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court ordered that the petition be dismissed as withdrawn, granting the petitioner liberty to file a proper petition. Any pending applications related to the petition were also dismissed. The Court did not decide on the merits of the case, as the withdrawal was permitted. The specific grounds for seeking withdrawal or the nature of the 'proper petition' to be filed were not elaborated upon.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the instant petition with liberty to file a proper petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn, with the liberty granted to the petitioner to file a proper petition. Any pending applications, if any, were also dismissed as a consequence of the withdrawal of the main petition. The Court did not delve into the merits of any substantive issue related to the income tax assessment.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the Civil Writ Petition. The Court held that the petition is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file a proper petition. Any pending applications, if any, were also dismissed as a consequence of the withdrawal of the main petition. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn with liberty.
The Gauhati High Court allowed the petitioner's prayer to withdraw the transfer application. The court noted that the petitioner's counsel informed the court about ongoing discussions for a compromise between the parties and requested permission to withdraw the application. The court also granted the petitioner the liberty to file a fresh application if the settlement attempts were unsuccessful. Consequently, the transfer application was dismissed on withdrawal, with the liberty granted as sought.