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The High Court held that the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law. The ITAT had specifically found that the assessee had produced all relevant documentary evidence to establish the genuineness of the transaction, and there was no contrary evidence to doubt the correctness of these documents. Therefore, treating the transaction as sham was not justified. The ITAT had also relied on the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur Vs. Smt. Pooja Agarwal, where a similar appeal by the Revenue was dismissed. The Court reiterated the Apex Court's pronouncements on admitting appeals on substantial questions of law, emphasizing that if the Tribunal, on consideration of material and relevant facts, arrived at a possible conclusion, it should be allowed to rest, especially if there was no gross violation of procedure or principles of natural justice. The Court found that the ITAT had provided logical reasoning and there was no failure of justice. Following a coordinate bench's decision in a similar case, the Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the ITAT's order. The Court found that the ITAT had logically dealt with the questions of fact and law involved in a reasoned manner. The ITAT had considered the entire facts, given a categorical finding that the assessee produced all documentary evidence to establish the genuineness of the transaction, and that the AO failed to produce contrary material to rebut the assessee's claim. The ITAT had considered bank statements, demat accounts, books of account, and contract notes, deeming them external documents not in the assessee's control, thus the claim of manipulation was not proven. The ITAT also distinguished the revenue's relied-upon judgments, noting the assessee held shares in 12 companies and only one scrip was doubted. The High Court relied on the Apex Court judgment in Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Designated Authority, stating that if the Tribunal, on consideration of material and relevant facts, arrived at a possible conclusion, it should be allowed to rest. The Court found no gross violation of natural justice or failure of justice, and no error in the ITAT's order. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law formulated did not arise. The ITAT had logically dealt with the questions of fact and law involved in a reasoned order. The ITAT had considered all facts and documentary evidence produced by the assessee to establish the genuineness of the transaction. The AO had failed to produce contrary material evidence to rebut the assessee's claim. The ITAT had considered bank statements, demat accounts, books of account, and contract notes, which were external documents, and found that the claims of manipulation and sham transactions were not proven. The ITAT had also distinguished judgments relied upon by the revenue, noting that the assessee held shares in 12 companies, and only one scrip was doubted by the AO, making the reliance on cases involving single-script transactions distinguishable. The Court relied on the Apex Court judgment in Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Designated Authority, which states that if the Tribunal, on consideration of material and relevant facts, arrived at a conclusion that is a possible conclusion, it must be allowed to rest. The Court found no gross violation of natural justice or failure of justice, and no error in the ITAT's order. A coordinate bench had also taken a similar view in another appeal.
The High Court held that the writ petition is finally disposed of in terms of the order dated 04.05.2022 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Others Vs. Ashish Agarwal. The Supreme Court's order directed that impugned Section 148 notices issued under the unamended Act from 01.04.2021 till date shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act and construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The Assessing Officer is to provide information and material relied upon within thirty days, and assessees have two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry under Section 148A(a) is dispensed with as a one-time measure. The Assessing Officers are to pass orders under Section 148A(d) and thereafter issue notice under Section 148 as substituted. All defenses available to the assessees and Revenue under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law shall continue to be available. The authorities concerned are directed to proceed in accordance with these directions.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision was based on logical findings and relied on various judgments of different High Courts and considered the provisions of Section 56(2)(vii) pre- and post-amendment. The ITAT had correctly held that the law contained in Section 56(2)(vii)(b) as it stood on the date of the allotment letter (11.11.2009), falling in assessment year 2010-11, did not contemplate the situation of a receipt of property by the buyer with inadequate construction. The ITAT had categorically held that the amended provisions of Section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) could not be applied, relying on the judgment in Bajranglal Naredi vs. ITO. The High Court, citing Apex Court judgments in Commissioner of Customs-I vs. Aasu Exim Pvt. Ltd. and Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Designated Authority, stated that if the Tribunal, on consideration of material and relevant facts, arrived at a conclusion which is a possible conclusion, it must be allowed to rest. In this case, the ITAT gave logical reasonings, and there was no gross violation of procedure or principles of natural justice. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose, and the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the trial court erred in its conclusion and that the suit property was part of the partition deed, not the partnership firm. The sale deed to the 7th defendant was declared void and hit by Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. The court's decision was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The counsel stated that the issue raised and the question of law proposed in the present appeal were identical to those in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 22/2021. This prior appeal had been dismissed by the same court on April 6, 2022, with a finding that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Consequently, the High Court, after considering the contents of the present appeal, the proposed question of law, and the order in the previous appeal, dismissed the current appeal for the same reasons without recording separate reasons. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the controversy at hand does not survive in view of the judgment dated 04.05.2022 rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Ashish Agarwal (Civil Appeal No.3005/2022) and other connected matters. Consequently, the instant writ petition was disposed of in light of the Supreme Court's judgment. The stay application was also disposed of. The specific findings or ratio decidendi from the Ashish Agarwal judgment that led to this conclusion are not elaborated upon in this order, nor are any specific issues expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The reasoning provided is that the appellant's counsel explicitly stated that the issue and the question of law in this appeal are identical to those in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 22/2021. This prior appeal was dismissed by the court on April 6, 2022, with the finding that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Therefore, following the precedent set by the earlier order, the present appeal is also dismissed for the same reasons, without recording separate reasons. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court found that there was sufficient material on record to frame the charges against the applicant. The court did not find any illegality in the trial court's order framing the charges.
The High Court dismissed the present appeal. The court noted that the learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) explicitly stated that the issue raised and the question of law proposed in this appeal are identical to those in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 22/2021. This prior appeal had been dismissed by the same court on April 6, 2022, with a finding that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Consequently, in view of the appellant's submission and having reviewed the contents of the appeal, the proposed question of law, and the order in the previous appeal, the court found it appropriate to dismiss this appeal for the same reasons recorded in the order dated April 6, 2022, without recording separate reasons. No specific relief was granted or denied on the merits of the case, as the appeal was dismissed on a procedural ground related to the existence of a substantial question of law.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The reasoning was based on the appellant's submission that the issue and question of law were identical to those in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 22/2021. This prior appeal had already been dismissed by the same court on April 6, 2022, on the grounds that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Therefore, following the precedent set by its own prior order in a similar case, the court found no need to record separate reasons and dismissed the present appeal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issues were left undecided.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur-2. The court noted that the appellant's counsel explicitly stated that the issue and the question of law proposed in the present appeal were identical to those considered in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 22/2021. This earlier appeal had been dismissed by the same court on April 6, 2022, with a finding that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Consequently, the court found no reason to record separate reasons and dismissed the present appeal for the reasons already recorded in the order dated April 6, 2022. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The tribunal held that the electricity supplied to the township was not intrinsically connected to BALCO's business operations and that the amendment to Rule 43 of the CGST Rules was not clarificatory but expanded the scope of supplies. Therefore, the amendment was not retrospective.
The Tribunal decided that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. This decision was based on the explicit submission by the appellant's counsel that the issue and the question of law proposed in this appeal are identical to those that were raised in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 22/2021. The court had previously dismissed D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 22/2021 on 06.04.2022, finding that no substantial question of law was involved. Consequently, applying the same reasoning and the principle of consistency, the present appeal (D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 30/2021) was also dismissed without recording separate reasons. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The tribunal held that the electricity supplied to the township was not intrinsically connected to BALCO's business operations and that the amendment to Rule 43 of the CGST Rules was not clarificatory but expanded the scope of supplies. Therefore, the amendment was not retrospective.
The High Court held that the writ petition was to be finally disposed of in terms of the order dated 04.05.2022 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Ashish Agarwal. The High Court directed that the authorities concerned shall proceed to decide the matter in accordance with the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of its order. This means that the impugned Section 148 notices issued to the assessee would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act and construed as show-cause notices. The Assessing Officer was to provide information relied upon by the Revenue, and the assessee would have a period to reply. The requirement of conducting prior inquiry under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer would pass orders under Section 148A(d) and, if necessary, issue a notice under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessee and Revenue under the Finance Act, 2021, and law were preserved. The Supreme Court's order was made applicable PAN India and was passed in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
The High Court held that the writ petition was to be finally disposed of in terms of the order dated 04.05.2022 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Others Vs. Ashish Agarwal. The Supreme Court's order, passed in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, provided that impugned Section 148 notices issued under the unamended Act would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A and treated as show-cause notices. The assessing officer was directed to provide information and material relied upon within thirty days, with assessees having two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure. Thereafter, assessing officers were to pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses and contentions available to both parties under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law were preserved. The Supreme Court's order was made applicable PAN India and would govern pending writ petitions with similar challenges.
The High Court held that the writ petition is finally disposed of in terms of the order dated 04.05.2022 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Ashish Agarwal. The Supreme Court's directions, which are to be followed PAN India, stipulate that notices issued under the unamended Section 148 of the Income Tax Act shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices are to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The Assessing Officer is directed to provide information relied upon within thirty days, and assessees have two weeks thereafter to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry under Section 148A(a) is dispensed with as a one-time measure. After following the procedure under Section 148A, the Assessing Officer may issue a notice under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, shall remain available. The Supreme Court's order was passed under Article 142 of the Constitution to avoid further appeals.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 23.04.2021 for Assessment Year 2014-15 and 30.06.2021 for Assessment Year 2015-16, were invalid and impermissible in law. The Court found that the issue was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). Following the precedent set in that case, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside. The reasoning was based on the prior judgment which had found such notices to be invalid. The ratio decidendi is that if notices under Section 148 have been found invalid by a coordinate bench, subsequent identical notices should also be quashed. The petition was allowed, and the notices were quashed.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court noted the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the issue involved was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the Court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. In that earlier decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Applying the same reasoning, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and impermissible. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the case. After the petitioner's counsel argued the matter extensively, he sought and was granted liberty to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn. No findings were made on any substantive legal issues, and no operative directions were issued regarding the tax dispute itself. The judgment does not record any specific reasoning for the withdrawal or any decision on the underlying tax matter.
The High Court, in its judgment dated 04/05/2022, allowed the petition. The Court noted the submission by the petitioner's counsel that the issue was settled by the Division Bench's decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. on 27.01.2022, where notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were held to be invalid and impermissible in law and were consequently quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued in the present case. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the petition. The court noted the submission by the petitioner's counsel that the issue was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same court on 27.01.2022 in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. In that earlier decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Applying this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice in the present case was also invalid and impermissible. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted the submission by the petitioner's counsel that no assessment order had been passed. Crucially, the Court acknowledged the petitioner's argument that the issue of the validity of notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, had been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. on 27.01.2022, where such notices were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and impermissible in law. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The operative direction was to quash the notice.
The Tribunal, following the ratio of the judgment in Sudesh Taneja vs. Income Tax Officer & Ors., held that notices issued after April 1, 2021, must be in accordance with the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021. The Court found no indication that the past provisions would continue to apply after substitution. It specifically addressed the first proviso to Section 149(1), stating that no notice under Section 148 could be issued for assessment years beginning on or before April 1, 2021, if such notice could not have been issued within the time limits prevailing before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021. Therefore, the extended period available under the newly substituted Section 149(1)(b) cannot be used for reopening assessments for past periods. The Court also held that the explanations introduced by CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, exceeded the jurisdiction of subordinate legislation as they attempted to alter the plain meaning of statutory provisions. Consequently, the impugned notices were declared invalid and bad in law and were quashed and set aside. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court allowed the petition. It held that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid and impermissible in law for the reasons stated in the Division Bench's order dated 27.01.2022 in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the notice issued to the petitioner under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid and impermissible in law. The Court's reasoning was based on its prior decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions) dated January 27, 2022. In that judgment, the Court had quashed similar notices. Therefore, following the precedent set in the Sudesh Taneja case, the impugned notice in the present petition was also quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed, granting relief to the petitioner by invalidating the notice. No other issues were decided.
The High Court allowed the petition. It held that the impugned notice issued to the petitioner under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid and impermissible in law. This decision was based on the reasoning provided in a prior judgment by a Division Bench of the same court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). The court found that the reasons stated in the Sudesh Taneja judgment were applicable to the present case. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed and set aside. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's decision was based on the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the issue had been decided by a Division Bench of the same court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch), where notices under Section 148 were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. The High Court found the present case to be covered by the aforesaid decision. The petition was allowed, and the notice was quashed and set aside. No other issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal, in view of the petitioner's submission and the precedent set by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch), held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were invalid and impermissible in law. Consequently, the impugned notice issued in the present case was quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed based on the reasoning provided in the aforementioned precedent. No specific issue was left undecided.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued to the petitioner under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's decision was based on the submission made by the petitioner's counsel, who stated that no assessment order had been passed and that the issue was no longer res integra. The Court noted that a Division Bench of the same High Court, in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, had previously held notices issued under Section 148 to be invalid and impermissible in law and had quashed them. Following this precedent, the Court found the impugned notice in the present case to be similarly invalid. The petition was allowed, and the notice was quashed and set aside. The operative direction was the quashing of the notice and the allowance of the writ petition.
The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the present case, was invalid and impermissible in law. The Court's decision was based on the reasoning provided in its earlier judgment dated January 27, 2022, in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (and batch of petitions). The ratio decidendi is that if similar notices have been previously quashed by a Division Bench of the same High Court for being invalid, then subsequent identical notices should also be quashed. The operative direction was to quash and set aside the impugned notice and allow the writ petition.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel, upon instructions, submitted that no assessment order had been passed. Crucially, the petitioner's counsel pointed out that the issue involved was no longer res integra, as a Division Bench of the same court, in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions) decided on January 27, 2022, had found notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to be invalid and impermissible in law and had quashed them. Following this precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued in the present case and allowed the petition. The ratio decidendi is that if a notice under Section 148 has been held to be invalid by a higher bench of the same court, subsequent similar notices should also be quashed.
The Tribunal held that the re-assessment notice dated 29.06.2021 is invalid and bad in law. Following the decision in Sudesh Taneja Versus Income Tax Officer and Another, the Tribunal found that for any action of issuance of notice under Section 148 after 01.04.2021, the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, including the procedure under Section 148A, must apply. The Court reasoned that the Finance Act, 2021, brought about a significant change in the reassessment scheme, and there was no indication that the old provisions would continue to apply after 01.04.2021. The explanations in the CBDT notifications dated 31.03.2021 and 27.04.2021, which sought to apply the pre-amendment provisions, were held to be unconstitutional and invalid as they exceeded the delegated power. Therefore, the impugned notice, issued without following the procedure under Section 148A, was quashed and set aside. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court held that re-assessment notices issued after April 1, 2021, must comply with the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, including the procedure under Section 148A. The court found that the impugned notice was issued without following the mandatory procedure under Section 148A and thus was invalid. The court relied on its previous decision in Sudesh Taneja Versus Income Tax Officer and Another, which quashed similar re-assessment notices. The court also declared the explanations introduced by CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, as unconstitutional and invalid because they exceeded the delegated powers by attempting to alter the statutory provisions regarding the applicability of reassessment procedures. The ratio is that any notice under Section 148 issued after April 1, 2021, must follow the new procedure under Section 148A, and subordinate legislation cannot override or alter the parent Act's provisions. The impugned notice was quashed and set aside.
The High Court held that all notices issued under Section 148 after 01.04.2021 must be in accordance with the newly introduced provisions of the Finance Act, 2021, including the procedure under Section 148A. The Court relied on its coordinate bench's decision in Sudesh Taneja Versus Income Tax Officer and Another. The Court found that the reassessment notice in the present case was issued after 01.04.2021 without following the procedure under Section 148A and was therefore invalid. The Court also addressed the validity of CBDT notifications, holding that the explanations introduced by them exceeded the delegated powers and were unconstitutional as they attempted to alter the parent Act's provisions. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed and set aside. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court held that re-assessment notices issued after April 1, 2021, must comply with the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, including the procedure under Section 148A. The Court found that the impugned notice was issued without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 148A and was therefore invalid. The Court relied on its prior decision in Sudesh Taneja, which held that the new scheme of reassessment under the Finance Act, 2021, applies to all notices issued after April 1, 2021. The Court also declared the explanations in CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, as unconstitutional and invalid for exceeding the delegated powers by attempting to alter statutory provisions. The ratio decidendi is that any action of issuing a notice under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, must adhere to the newly introduced provisions, and notices issued without following Section 148A are invalid. The impugned notice was quashed and set aside.
The Tribunal held that notices of re-assessment issued after April 1, 2021, must be in accordance with the newly introduced provisions of the Finance Act, 2021, including Section 148A and the substituted Section 149. The Court found that the first proviso to Section 149(1) clearly indicates that the extended period available under the new clause (b) of Section 149(1) cannot be used for reopening assessments for past periods if the notice could not have been issued under the old provisions. Furthermore, the Court declared the explanations in CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, as unconstitutional and invalid, stating that they exceeded the delegated powers under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Tribunal quashed the impugned notice, finding it invalid and bad in law. The ratio is that reassessment notices issued after April 1, 2021, must adhere to the new regime, and subordinate legislation cannot override statutory provisions or extend time limits beyond what the parent Act permits.
The Tribunal, by referring to and adopting the reasoning of the Division Bench judgment in Sudesh Taneja vs. Income Tax Officer, held that all notices issued after April 1, 2021, must be in accordance with the newly introduced provisions of the Finance Act, 2021. This includes the mandatory procedure under Section 148A. The Tribunal found that the extended time limits available under the substituted Section 149(1)(b) cannot be applied to reopen assessments for past periods, as indicated by the first proviso to Section 149(1). Notices that had become time-barred prior to April 1, 2021, under the old provisions, cannot be revived. Furthermore, the Tribunal declared the explanations in the CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, as unconstitutional and invalid because they exceeded the delegated powers under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, by attempting to alter the application of statutory provisions. The Tribunal quashed the impugned notice as invalid and bad in law. The operative direction was to quash the notice and dispose of the petition.
The Tribunal, following the Division Bench judgment in Sudesh Taneja vs. Income Tax Officer, held that all notices issued under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, must be in accordance with the newly introduced provisions of the Finance Act, 2021. This includes the mandatory procedure under Section 148A. The Tribunal found that the first proviso to Section 149(1) explicitly prevents the application of the extended time limits under the newly substituted clause (b) of Section 149(1) for reopening assessments for past periods. Consequently, any notice that had become time-barred prior to April 1, 2021, under the then-prevailing provisions cannot be revived. The explanations introduced by CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, which sought to apply the pre-amendment provisions, were declared unconstitutional and invalid as they exceeded the delegated powers under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The impugned notice was quashed and set aside. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.
The Tribunal held that for any action of issuing a notice under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, would apply. The Court referred to the judgment in Sudesh Taneja vs. Income Tax Commissioner, which clarified that the extended time limits for issuing notices under Section 148, as amended by the Finance Act, 2021 (specifically Section 149(1)(b) allowing a period of 10 years instead of 6), cannot be used to reopen assessments for past periods if such notice could not have been issued under the provisions prevailing before April 1, 2021. The first proviso to Section 149(1) was crucial, indicating that a notice which had become time-barred prior to April 1, 2021, would not be revived by the application of the new provisions. Consequently, all notices issued after April 1, 2021, without following the procedure contained in Section 148A, were deemed invalid. The writ petition was allowed in terms of the Sudesh Taneja judgment.
The Tribunal held that for any action of issuing a notice under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, would apply. The extended time limits available in the substituted Section 149(1)(b) cannot be pressed into service for reopening assessments for past periods if the notice had become time-barred prior to April 1, 2021, as per the prevailing provisions. The explanations in CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, which sought to apply the pre-amendment provisions of Section 149 and 151, were declared unconstitutional and invalid as they exceeded the delegated powers under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The notices impugned were found to be invalid and bad in law. The Tribunal quashed the notice and allowed the writ petition, dismissing the revenue's appeals. The operative direction was to quash the impugned notice.