679 orders · Page 3 of 14
The High Court held that notices of re-assessment issued after April 1, 2021, must be in accordance with the newly introduced provisions of the Finance Act, 2021, including Section 148A and the revised time limits under Section 149. The Court found that the Finance Act, 2021, made significant departures from the old scheme, and there was no indication that the past provisions would continue to apply after the substitution. The first proviso to Section 149(1) was interpreted to mean that notices issued after April 1, 2021, could not revive time-barred assessments under the old provisions by resorting to the extended periods in the new Section 149(1)(b). Furthermore, the Court declared the explanations in the CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, as unconstitutional and invalid. These explanations, which sought to apply the pre-amendment provisions of Section 148 for issuance of notice, were held to have exceeded the delegated powers under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, and could not amend the parent Act. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed as invalid and bad in law. The Court followed the view taken by the Allahabad and Delhi High Courts in similar cases.
The High Court held that for any action of issuing a notice under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, would apply. The Court found no indication that the past provisions would continue to apply after substitution. Specifically, the extended period available under the new Section 149(1)(b) cannot be pressed into service for reopening assessments for past periods, as per the first proviso to Section 149(1). Notices that had become time-barred prior to April 1, 2021, would not be revived. Furthermore, the Court declared the explanations in the CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, as unconstitutional and invalid. The Court reasoned that the CBDT, in issuing these explanations, exceeded its jurisdiction as a subordinate legislation by attempting to alter the statutory provisions of the parent Act. Consequently, the impugned notices were found to be invalid and bad in law. The Court quashed and set aside the notices and all consequential proceedings. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the issue involved in the petition was no longer res integra, as it had been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court on January 27, 2022, in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-l(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued in the present case for the same reasons stated in the Sudesh Taneja judgment. The petition was allowed.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner craved liberty to withdraw the instant writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn. All pending applications associated with the writ petition were also disposed of. No decision on the merits of the case was made as the petition was withdrawn. The ratio decidendi is that a party has the liberty to withdraw a writ petition, and the court will grant such liberty if sought.
The High Court held that any action of issuing a notice under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, must be in accordance with the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021. The court found no indication that the past provisions would continue to apply after the substitution. Specifically, the extended period available in the new Section 149(1)(b) cannot be used for reopening assessments for past periods, as per the first proviso to Section 149(1). Notices that had become time-barred prior to April 1, 2021, would not be revived. The court also held that the explanations in the CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, were unconstitutional and invalid. These explanations, by providing that the old provisions of Section 149 and 151 would apply, exceeded the delegated powers under the Relaxation Act, 2020, and attempted to amend the parent Act. The court quashed the impugned notices as invalid and bad in law. The ratio is that reassessment notices issued after April 1, 2021, must comply with the Finance Act, 2021, and subordinate legislation cannot override statutory provisions or amend the parent Act.
The High Court held that for any action of issuing a notice under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, must apply. The court found no indication that the past provisions would continue to apply after substitution, and in fact, strong indications to the contrary were present. The first proviso to Section 149(1) clearly states that no notice under Section 148 shall be issued at any time for a relevant assessment year beginning on or before April 1, 2021, if such notice could not have been issued within the time limits specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 149 as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021. Therefore, the extended period available in the newly substituted clause (b) of Section 149(1) cannot be pressed into service for reopening assessments for past periods. Furthermore, the court held that the explanations introduced by the CBDT in its notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, were unconstitutional and invalid. These explanations, which provided that for the purpose of issuing notice under Section 148, the provisions as they stood on March 31, 2021, before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021, shall apply, plainly exceeded the jurisdiction of subordinate legislation. The subordinate legislation could not travel beyond the powers vested by the parent Act. Consequently, the impugned notices were held to be invalid and bad in law and were quashed and set aside. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that for any action of issuing a notice under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, must apply. The mere extension of time limits under Section 148 would not alter this position. The first proviso to Section 149(1) clearly indicates that notices which had become time-barred prior to April 1, 2021, as per the then prevailing provisions, would not be revived by virtue of the application of Section 149(1)(b) effective from April 1, 2021. Therefore, all notices issued after April 1, 2021, without following the procedure under Section 148A, are invalid. Regarding the CBDT notifications, the Tribunal found that the explanations provided therein, which sought to apply the pre-amendment provisions of Section 148, exceeded the delegated powers under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. Subordinate legislation cannot travel beyond the powers vested in it by the parent Act. Consequently, these explanations were declared unconstitutional and invalid. The ratio is that reassessment notices issued after April 1, 2021, must adhere to the new procedures and time limits under the Finance Act, 2021, and CBDT notifications cannot override statutory provisions or exceed delegated powers. The impugned notices were quashed and set aside.
The High Court held that all notices issued under Section 148 after April 1, 2021, must strictly adhere to the newly introduced provisions of the Finance Act, 2021, including the mandatory procedure under Section 148A. The court found no indication that the old provisions would continue to apply post-amendment. Crucially, the first proviso to Section 149(1) was interpreted to mean that the extended period available under the newly substituted Section 149(1)(b) (10 years instead of 6) cannot be used to reopen assessments for past periods if the notice would have been time-barred under the pre-amended provisions. Regarding the CBDT notifications, the court declared the explanations provided therein as unconstitutional and invalid. It reasoned that these explanations, in the guise of clarification, exceeded the delegated powers granted by the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, and attempted to alter the statutory provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the impugned notices and all consequential proceedings, including the assessment order dated March 8, 2022, were quashed and set aside. The writ petition was allowed.
The tribunal held that the complainant failed to prove the existence of a legally recoverable debt and the source of income to lend the claimed amounts. Furthermore, the complainant did not prove the service of a demand notice, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 138 of the NI Act.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court noted the submission by the petitioner's counsel that no assessment order had been passed. Relying on its own prior decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr., the Court held that notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were invalid and impermissible in law. Consequently, the impugned notice in the present case was quashed and set aside. The ratio decidendi is that notices issued under Section 148 are invalid if they do not comply with the principles laid down in the Sudesh Taneja judgment, especially when no assessment order has been passed. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel submitted that the issue was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court on January 27, 2022, in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice in the present case was also invalid and impermissible for the same reasons. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the issue involved was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court on January 27, 2022, in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and impermissible in law. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The operative direction was to quash the notice.
The Tribunal held that all notices issued for reassessment after April 1, 2021, must be in accordance with the newly introduced provisions of the Finance Act, 2021, including the procedure under Section 148A. It was further held that the extended time limits under the amended Section 149(1)(b) cannot be applied to past assessment periods if the notice would have been time-barred under the provisions prevailing before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021. This is based on the plain meaning of the first proviso to Section 149(1), which prevents the revival of time-barred notices. The Tribunal also declared the explanations introduced by CBDT notifications dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, as unconstitutional and invalid because they exceeded the delegated powers under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Tribunal found that these notifications could not alter the statutory provisions of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside as invalid and bad in law. The ratio is that reassessment proceedings initiated after April 1, 2021, must strictly follow the new regime, and subordinate legislation cannot override or amend parent statutes.
The Tribunal held that notices issued for reassessment after April 1, 2021, must strictly adhere to the newly introduced provisions of the Finance Act, 2021, including the mandatory procedure under Section 148A. The extended time limits provided in the amended Section 149(1)(b) cannot be applied retrospectively to revive assessments that had become time-barred under the pre-amendment provisions. The Court found no indication that the legislature intended the old provisions to continue applying after the substitution. Regarding the CBDT notifications, the Tribunal ruled that the explanations introduced by the CBDT exceeded the scope of delegated powers under the Relaxation Act, 2020. Subordinate legislation cannot amend or override the parent Act. Therefore, these explanations were declared unconstitutional and invalid. Consequently, the impugned notices were found to be invalid and bad in law. The writ petition was allowed, and the notices were quashed and set aside. The appeals of the revenue were dismissed.
The High Court allowed the petition. It noted the submission by the petitioner's counsel that no assessment order had been passed. Crucially, the Court acknowledged the petitioner's argument that the issue of the validity of Section 148 notices had been settled by a Division Bench of the same Court in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. on 27.01.2022, where such notices were found to be invalid and quashed. Following this precedent, the Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued to the petitioner. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court held that the issue involved in the petition was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued in the present case for the same reasons stated in the earlier order. The petition was allowed. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court held that the ITAT's finding regarding the non-disclosure of material and denial of cross-examination was not perverse or suffering from patent illegality. The Court found that the Revenue could not satisfy it with any judgment supporting the use of undisclosed and unverified material for addition without proper disclosure and cross-examination. Regarding the prudent investor argument, the Court considered it to be in the realm of appreciation of facts and circumstances, not a substantial question of law. On the issue of retracted statements under Section 132(4), the Court noted that while the Revenue relied on judgments like Sumati Dayal, the facts of the present case did not warrant interference. The Court observed that the ITAT's view that a retracted statement alone, without other admissible material, could not justify an addition was supported by decisions of various High Courts, including Delhi and Gujarat. The Court concluded that the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law.
The High Court allowed the petition. It held that the issue concerning the validity of notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. on 27.01.2022. In that decision, the notices issued under Section 148 were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court found the impugned notice in the present case to be invalid and impermissible for the same reasons. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's decision was based on the submission made by the petitioner's counsel that no assessment order had been passed by the Assessing Authority and that the issue was no longer res integra. The Court found that the notice was invalid and impermissible in law, following its own prior decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. The ratio decidendi is that notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, are invalid and liable to be quashed if they suffer from the same defects as those identified in the Sudesh Taneja case. The petition was allowed, and the notice was quashed.
The High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. The court's reasoning was based solely on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. As a result, the petition was disposed of as having become infructuous. The court did not delve into the merits of any potential dispute between the petitioner and the Income Tax Department. No specific findings were made on any substantive legal issues, and no operative directions such as remand or deletion were issued. Any issues that might have been raised in the petition were not decided.
The High Court, in its decision dated 04/04/2022, allowed the writ petition. The Court noted the submission of the petitioner's counsel that no final order of assessment had been passed. Crucially, the Court acknowledged that the issue of the validity of notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, had been settled by a Division Bench of the same Court in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). Following the precedent set in Sudesh Taneja, where such notices were declared invalid and quashed, the High Court held that the impugned notice in the present case was also invalid and impermissible in law. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court allowed the petition. It held that the issue concerning the validity of notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. on January 27, 2022. In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued to the petitioner in the present case for the assessment year 2013-14. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's decision was based on the submission made by the petitioner's counsel that the issue was no longer res integra. The Court referred to its own Division Bench decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr., dated 27.01.2022, wherein notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were consequently quashed. Applying the ratio of the Sudesh Taneja case, the Court held that the impugned notice in the present case was also invalid and set it aside. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned.
The High Court allowed the petition. It quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's decision was based on the submission made by the petitioner's counsel that the issue was no longer res integra and had been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. In that precedent, notices issued under Section 148 were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were consequently quashed. The High Court applied the same reasoning to the present case, thereby granting relief to the petitioner. No specific amount in dispute was recorded. The Court did not leave any issue undecided.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the present case were invalid and impermissible in law. The Court's reasoning was based on its prior decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. dated January 27, 2022. In that judgment, the Division Bench had found similar notices to be invalid and quashed them. Applying the same reasoning, the High Court in the present case quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued to the petitioner. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court noted the submission of the petitioner's counsel that no final order of assessment had been passed. Crucially, the Court acknowledged that the issue was covered by its own Division Bench's decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch), where notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice in the present case. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the issue was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court on January 27, 2022, in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and impermissible in law. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its previous decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr., where similar notices were held to be invalid and impermissible in law. The reasoning was that the issue was no longer res integra, meaning it had already been authoritatively decided by a higher bench of the same court. The ratio decidendi is that if a notice under Section 148 has been found to be invalid in a prior binding precedent of the same court, then subsequent similar notices should also be quashed on the same grounds. The petition was allowed, and the impugned notice was set aside. No other issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the notices impugned in the writ petition were invalid and bad in law, and therefore quashed and set aside. The Court agreed with the co-ordinate bench's decision in 'Sudesh Tanesh Vs. Income Tax Officer'. Regarding the first issue, the Court reasoned that upon substitution, the original provisions stood repealed and had no existence. The new scheme of reassessment under the Finance Act, 2021, including Section 148A and the revised time limits in Section 149, would apply to any notice issued after April 1, 2021. The Court emphasized that the first proviso to Section 149(1) indicated that notices which had become time-barred prior to April 1, 2021, under the old provisions could not be revived by the extended period available under the new Section 149(1)(b). For the second issue, the Court found that the explanations in the CBDT circulars dated March 31, 2021, and April 27, 2021, which sought to apply the pre-amendment provisions for issuance of notice under Section 148, plainly exceeded the delegated powers granted under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. Such subordinate legislation could not travel beyond the parent Act and could not amend the provisions of the parent Act under the guise of clarification. Therefore, these explanations were declared unconstitutional and invalid. The Court directed that the directions issued in the 'Sudesh Taneja' case would apply mutatis mutandis.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel had submitted that the issue involved was no longer res integra, as it had been conclusively decided by a Division Bench of the same Court in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and impermissible in law. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a precedent exists where similar notices under Section 148 have been quashed as invalid, then subsequent identical notices should also be quashed.
The High Court held that for any action of issuance of notice under Section 148 after 01.04.2021, the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021, would apply. The Court found no indication that the past provisions would continue to apply for assessment periods prior to the substitution. The first proviso to Section 149(1) was interpreted to mean that a notice which had become time-barred prior to 01.04.2021, as per the then prevailing provisions, would not be revived by virtue of the application of the newly substituted Section 149(1)(b). Regarding the CBDT notifications, the Court held that the explanations introduced by the CBDT, providing that the provisions as they stood on 31.03.2021 before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021, shall apply for issuance of notice under Section 148, plainly exceeded the CBDT's jurisdiction as a subordinate legislation. The subordinate legislation could not travel beyond the powers vested by the parent Act. Therefore, these explanations were declared unconstitutional and invalid. Consequently, the impugned notices and all consequential proceedings were held to be invalid and bad in law. The writ petition was allowed, and the notices were quashed and set aside.
The High Court held that the issue involved in the present petition was no longer res integra, as it had been conclusively decided by a Division Bench of the same court on January 27, 2022, in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). In that precedent-setting judgment, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were declared invalid and impermissible in law and were consequently quashed. Applying the ratio decidendi of the Sudesh Taneja case to the present facts, the High Court found the impugned notice issued to Upasana Colonisers to be similarly invalid. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the issue involved was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same court on 27.01.2022 in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions). In that prior decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the impugned notice in the present case was also quashed and set aside. The ratio decidendi is that if a notice under Section 148 has been held to be invalid by a higher bench of the same court, subsequent similar notices should also be quashed.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued to the petitioner under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's decision was based on the submission by the petitioner's counsel that the issue was no longer res integra, referencing the Division Bench's order dated January 27, 2022, in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). In that precedent, notices issued under Section 148 were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Therefore, for the same reasons stated in the earlier order, the present petition was allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a batch of similar writ petitions challenging Section 148 notices have been decided in favour of the assessee by a Division Bench on grounds of invalidity, subsequent identical petitions should also be allowed on the same grounds. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court held that the issue involved in the present petition was no longer res integra. The Court referred to its own prior decision rendered on January 27, 2022, in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued in the present case for the same reasons stated in the earlier judgment. The petition was allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a similar notice under Section 148 has been quashed by a Division Bench of the High Court on grounds of invalidity and impermissibility in law, subsequent identical notices should also be quashed.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel submitted that the issue involved was no longer res integra, as it had been decided by a Division Bench of the same court on January 27, 2022, in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Consequently, for the reasons stated in the aforementioned order, the impugned notice issued in the present case was also quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a precedent exists from a Division Bench of the same High Court on the same issue, subsequent benches are bound to follow it.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner was permitted to withdraw the writ petition. The reasoning provided is that the learned counsel for the petitioner explicitly sought to withdraw the petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No specific findings on the merits of any substantive issue were made, as the case was disposed of on the petitioner's request for withdrawal. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the issue was no longer res integra, referencing the Division Bench's decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer dated January 27, 2022. In that case, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and impermissible in law. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a prior Division Bench decision has settled a legal issue regarding the validity of Section 148 notices, subsequent identical notices should be quashed based on that precedent.
The Tribunal held that the issue involved in the writ petition was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the High Court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, dated 27.01.2022. In that precedent, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this binding precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued to the petitioner in the present case. The petition was allowed based on the reasoning provided in the Sudesh Taneja judgment. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned, nor were any other issues expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel had submitted that the issue involved was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same court on January 27, 2022, in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed on the basis of the reasoning provided in the Sudesh Taneja case. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned.
The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's decision was based on the submission made by the petitioner's counsel that the issue was squarely covered by a previous Division Bench judgment of the same court. In the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch), the Division Bench had held that notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were invalid and impermissible in law and had quashed them. Following this precedent, the Court found the notice in the present case to be similarly invalid and quashed it. The operative direction was to quash and set aside the impugned notice.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the issue involved was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same Court on January 27, 2022, in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions). In that precedent, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this binding precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case, for the reasons stated in the order dated January 27, 2022, was also invalid and impermissible. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted the submission made by the petitioner's counsel that the issue involved was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same court in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. on January 27, 2022. In that precedent, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this binding precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and impermissible. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a precedent exists where similar notices under Section 148 have been quashed for being invalid, then subsequent similar notices should also be quashed.
The Tribunal, accepting the submission made by the learned counsel for the revenue, held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. This conclusion was based on the fact that the issue presented in this appeal was identical to the issues decided by the same Court in a previous batch of appeals and petitions, specifically D.B. Income Tax Appeal No.81/2018, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Versus M/s Rajasthan State Ganganagar Sugar Mills Ltd., decided on 17.04.2018. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on this ground. The Court noted the presence of the respondent's counsel but did not record any specific arguments from them as there was no prayer for stay.
The High Court allowed the petition. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel submitted that the issue was no longer res integra, having been decided by a Division Bench of the same court on January 27, 2022, in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions). In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued in the present case for the same reasons. The petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the issue involved in the present petition was no longer res integra, as it had been decided by a Division Bench of the same court in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. on January 27, 2022. In that decision, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Therefore, following the precedent set in the Sudesh Taneja case, the impugned notice issued to the petitioner in the present case was also quashed and set aside. The petition was allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a High Court Division Bench has already ruled on the validity of a particular type of notice under a specific section of the Income Tax Act, subsequent similar notices should be quashed based on that precedent. The operative direction was to quash the notice and allow the petition.
The High Court held that the issue involved in the writ petition was no longer res integra, citing the Division Bench decision in Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. dated January 27, 2022. In that precedent, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were declared invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this binding precedent, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued to the petitioner under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The petition was accordingly allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a notice under Section 148 has been issued in contravention of established legal principles as laid down by a Division Bench of the same High Court, such a notice is liable to be quashed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel submitted that the issue involved was no longer res integra, as it had been conclusively decided by a Division Bench of the same court in the case of Sudesh Taneja Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3) & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/2022 and batch of petitions) on 27.01.2022. In that judgment, notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were found to be invalid and impermissible in law and were quashed. Following this precedent, the High Court held that the impugned notice issued in the present case was also invalid and impermissible. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed. The ratio decidendi is that if a legal issue concerning the validity of Section 148 notices has been decided by a Division Bench, subsequent similar notices should be quashed based on that precedent.