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The High Court held that the notice dated March 25, 2019, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2012-13, to Gayatri Integrated Services Private Limited (GISPL) is without jurisdiction and unsustainable. The Court noted that GISPL had amalgamated with the petitioner, Gayatri Microns Limited, by an order dated June 18, 2015, passed by the High Court, and thus had ceased to exist as an independent entity prior to the issuance of the notice. The petitioner had duly informed the respondent about this amalgamation. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Maruti Suzuki India Limited, which held that a jurisdictional notice issued in the name of a company that has ceased to exist due to an approved scheme of amalgamation is fundamentally illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court also referred to its own decision in Dharamnath Shares and Services (P) Ltd., which stated that an amalgamated company no longer has an independent existence and is not amenable to assessment proceedings. Therefore, the notice issued to the extinct entity was quashed and set aside.
The High Court noted that the controversy in the present case was concluded by its earlier judgment dated 27.09.2019 in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) v. Gujarat Cricket Association, rendered in Tax Appeals No.268 of 2012 and allied matters. In that judgment, the issue had been decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Consequently, the High Court held that the present appeal does not give rise to any question of law, much less a substantial question of law, warranting interference. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The specific findings of the ITAT on the issues of exemptions under Sections 11 and 12, and the applicability of Section 2(15) read with Section 13(8) of the Act, were not detailed as the High Court relied on its prior decision.
The High Court held that the controversy in the present appeal was concluded by its own judgment dated September 27, 2019, passed in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) v. Gujarat Cricket Association, rendered in Tax Appeals No. 268 of 2012 and allied matters. In that prior judgment, the issues were decided in favor of the assessee and against the Revenue. Consequently, the High Court found that the present appeal did not give rise to any question of law, much less a substantial question of law, warranting interference. The appeal was therefore dismissed. The reasoning is based on the principle of res judicata or the binding precedent of its own prior decision on identical issues.
The High Court held that the respondent authorities were not justified in refusing to process the refund claims of the petitioners. The Court found the respondents' stand that Reliance Industries Ltd. must file the refund claim to be legally untenable and practically unworkable, especially considering Reliance had informed the authorities that its buyers would approach for refunds and had provided customer-wise details. The Court noted that Reliance was not disputing the petitioners' entitlement to the refund. The Court emphasized that the respondents were bound to comply with the clear directions of the Rajasthan High Court. It was held that the petitioners, as ultimate consumers of High Speed Diesel (HSD) purchased in inter-state trade for mining, were entitled to the refund, and the question of passing on tax burden or unjust enrichment did not arise. The petitions were allowed, directing the respondents to process the refund claims and grant refunds within twelve weeks. It was clarified that Reliance Industries Ltd. would not be entitled to claim any such refund once the petitioners' claims were processed.
The High Court held that the respondent authorities were not justified in refusing to process the refund claims of the petitioners. The Court found the respondents' stand that Reliance Industries Ltd. must file the refund claim to be legally untenable and practically unworkable, especially considering Reliance had informed the authorities that its buyers would approach for refunds and had provided customer-wise details. The Court noted that Reliance was not disputing the petitioners' entitlement to the refund. The Court emphasized that the respondents were bound to comply with the clear directions of the Rajasthan High Court. It was held that the petitioners, as ultimate consumers of High Speed Diesel (HSD) purchased in inter-state trade for mining, were entitled to the refund, and the question of passing on tax burden or unjust enrichment did not arise. The petitions were allowed, directing the respondents to process the refund claims and grant refunds within twelve weeks. It was clarified that Reliance Industries Ltd. would not be entitled to claim any such refund once the petitioners' claims were processed.
The High Court held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not the appropriate forum to determine the employer-employee relationship and the entitlement of the petitioners to be appointed as employees of the respondent no.1. The Court found that an efficacious alternative remedy was available under the Labour Laws, and therefore, chose not to entertain the writ petition without entering into the merits of the matter. However, the Court noted the Office Memorandum of 2013 concerning the regularization of casual labourers and directed the department to consider it positively. Specifically, the Court directed the concerned authority to grant temporary status or regularization to casual labourers if possible, as per the endeavor outlined in the Office Memorandum. The Court also directed respondent no.2 (the contractor) to allocate work to the petitioners, who had continued for many years, without prejudice to the rights of either party to challenge regularization. This direction was not to preclude parties from ending the contractual relation through prescribed legal procedures, and no findings or observations were to affect the parties' rights to pursue further legal courses.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that for ISD invoices, the date of the invoice is to be taken for computing the one-year period stipulated in clause (e) of paragraph 3(III) of Notification No. 12/2013-ST. The Court reasoned that distribution of credit is an internal administrative matter, and parties must manage their affairs to file claims within the prescribed time. The Court also held that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that no reasons are required to be assigned for extending the period for filing refund claims. The adjudicating authority must apply its mind to the question of delay and provide reasons for extending the time limit, as the discretion vested in them requires justification. However, despite disagreeing with the Tribunal's reasoning and answering the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellant, the Court did not deem it fit to interfere with the impugned order to the extent it upholds the refund, as the Tribunal had found that the appellant could not point out any incorrectness in the refund claim itself. The issue regarding the applicability of clause (e) to Table-II claims was left open for future determination by the appropriate forum.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the impugned order of the Tribunal. Regarding unaccounted sales, the Court noted that the AO had accepted the assessee's books of account. The CIT(A) made a lump-sum disallowance of Rs. 6,00,000/- after appreciating the material on record, considering the non-maintenance of a stock register and a fall in the gross profit rate. The Tribunal concurred with this finding, which was based on a concurrent finding of fact. Therefore, no infirmity was found in the approach. Concerning power and fuel expenses, the CIT(A) deleted the addition, finding that the AO had not provided reasons for the disallowance, nor had bogus claims been proven, nor was it established why the store items should be transferred to CWIP – R&D. The CIT(A) concluded that the onus was on the AO to disprove the business purpose of the expenditure, which was not discharged. The Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A)'s findings. As both decisions were based on concurrent findings of fact without perversity, no question of law arose. The appeal was summarily dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal's order did not suffer from any infirmity. Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that the assessment was reopened beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, and a scrutiny assessment had already been made. In such cases, it is incumbent upon the AO to record in the reasons for reopening that there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The reasons recorded by the AO did not contain any such whisper. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction beyond four years lacked validity. Regarding the second issue, while Explanation 1 to Section 147 permits reopening based on existing material from which new evidence could be discovered, the AO did not observe that the material was embedded in such a manner that it was not possible to notice it during the scrutiny assessment. Furthermore, the very same issue had already been scrutinized during the original assessment. Consequently, the appeal was summarily dismissed.
The High Court held that neither of the grounds of appeal raised by the revenue gave rise to a substantial question of law. Regarding the addition of Rs.19,54,012/- under Section 69C, the Court noted that the ITAT's conclusion was based on concurrent findings of fact by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, who had appreciated the material on record. The assessee had demonstrated that the wheat flour sold was converted from its existing stock of wheat, and the quantity records and closing stock confirmed this explanation. The revenue could not point to any contrary material or perversity in the Tribunal's findings. Similarly, concerning the addition of Rs.1,59,184/- for unexplained current liability, the Court found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had deleted the addition after the assessee submitted reconciliation from the books of Gujarat Agro Sortex Pvt. Ltd., showing the difference was due to a rectification entry in the subsequent year. The Tribunal concurred with this finding. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was based on a pure finding of fact, and no perversity was pointed out. Therefore, the appeal was summarily dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had merely applied the decision of the High Court in the case of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) to the facts of the present case. The appellant did not contend that the Tribunal had wrongly applied this decision. The sole ground raised by the appellant was the pendency of a Special Leave Petition filed by the revenue against the said decision before the Supreme Court. The Court found no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, as it was based on a binding precedent of the High Court. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose warranting interference. The appeal was summarily dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). The sole ground for disallowance by the Assessing Officer was that the expenses were incurred in a previous year and not the current year. It was an admitted position that the assessee was entitled to deduction under Section 80IA of the Act. The Court reasoned that the consequence of disallowing the expenditure would be an enhancement of the eligible income under Section 80IA, entitling the assessee to a higher deduction. Therefore, the issue was tax neutral, and the Tribunal's conclusion that the issue was tax neutral and its upholding of the Commissioner's order were justified. The appeal was dismissed as it did not give rise to a substantial question of law.
The High Court held that the provisions of Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not applicable. The Court noted that an essential prerequisite for invoking Section 41(1) is that an allowance or deduction must have been made in any assessment year for any loss, expenditure, or trading liability incurred by the assessee. Subsequently, if the creditor remits or waives such liability, the assessee becomes liable to pay tax. The Court emphasized that the objective of Section 41(1) is to prevent an assessee from obtaining a double benefit – once by way of deduction and again by not being taxed on the benefit received in a later year due to remission of such liability. In the present case, it was an admitted position that the assessee had not claimed any allowance or deduction in respect of the unsecured loan from Matrix Logistics Private Limited in any previous year. Therefore, the conditions for invoking Section 41(1) were not satisfied. The Tribunal had rightly applied the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. CIT and CIT v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. The appeal was summarily dismissed.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the impugned order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal had merely applied the decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, (2014) 366 ITR 170 (Guj.). In that precedent, it was held that sums received by an assessee from employees, to which Section 2(24)(x) applies, are eligible for deduction under Section 28 only if credited to the employees' account in the relevant fund on or before the due date specified in the explanation to Section 36(1)(va). Consequently, the Tribunal had erred in deleting disallowances of employees' contribution to PF/ESI accounts when such sums were not credited to the employees' accounts in the relevant funds by the due date. The High Court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's application of this established legal principle to the present case.
The High Court held that the impugned order of the Tribunal did not give rise to any substantial question of law, warranting interference. Regarding the suppression of closing stock, the Court noted that the ITAT concurred with the CIT(A)'s findings that the assessee's books of accounts were not found to have any defect or infirmity by the AO. The CIT(A) had relied on the High Court's decision in CIT v. Arrow Exim Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 230 CTR (Guj.) 293, finding that the difference in stock valuation was due to differing accounting methods and that the stock was reflected in the books. For inflated current liability, the judgment excerpt is incomplete, but the overall conclusion suggests the Tribunal's findings were based on concurrent facts. Concerning cessation of liability under Section 41(1), the Court agreed with the Tribunal and CIT(A) that for the section to apply, there must be a remission or cessation of liability. The assessee had not written off the liabilities, and there was no evidence of remission or cessation. The AO had not established that the liabilities had ceased to exist. Therefore, the invocation of Section 41(1) was not justified. The appeal was summarily dismissed.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the impugned order of the Tribunal. The Court noted that the controversy involved in the present case is no longer res integra, meaning it has already been decided. The Court specifically referred to its own prior decision in the case of General Motors India P. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, (2013) 354 ITR 244 (Guj). For the reasons set out in that earlier judgment, the High Court concluded that the appeal fails. The operative direction is that the appeal is summarily dismissed.
The High Court of Gujarat disposed of the appeal as not pressed. The decision was based on the submission made by the Revenue's counsel regarding CBDT Circular No. 17 of 2019. This circular stipulates that appeals with a tax effect below Rs. 1,00,00,000/- should not be filed before the High Court and is retrospectively applicable to pending appeals. The amount in dispute in this case was Rs. 49,16,866/-, which falls below the specified monetary limit. The Court noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular was not applicable for any reason, the appellant would have the liberty to seek revival of the appeal. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as not pressed.
The High Court held that the issue of whether purchases were bogus or made from bogus parties is essentially a question of fact. The Tribunal had concurred with the Commissioner (Appeals) who found that while purchases were not from the named parties, they were made from the grey market. The assessee was able to reconcile purchases with material consumed for construction work. The High Court found no infirmity in the approach of restricting the addition to 12.5% of the bogus purchases, representing the profit element, citing decisions of the jurisdictional High Court in CIT v. Sathvanarayan P. Rathi, CIT v. Simit P. Sheth, and CIT v. Bholanath Polyfab (P) Ltd. The controversy in question (A) did not give rise to a question of law. Regarding question (B), the High Court noted that the ITAT order did not refer to the N.K. Industries Ltd. decision, nor was it relied upon by either party before the lower authorities. Therefore, the question of its applicability did not arise from the impugned order. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose, and the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court admitted the appeal on the first proposed question concerning CENVAT receivable. Regarding the second proposed question on Section 14A disallowance, the Court held that it did not give rise to a question of law. The reasoning was that the assessee had suo motu disallowed Rs. 20,25,500 (8.50% of exempt income), and the ITAT had concurred with the Commissioner (Appeals) who followed the Tribunal's earlier decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2009-10. Similarly, the third proposed question concerning the disallowance of provision for doubtful debts was also rejected as not giving rise to a question of law. The Court noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) applied the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Vijaya Bank and directed the AO to verify entries to ascertain entitlement to deduction under Section 36(1)(vii). The ITAT concurred with this view. The operative direction was to admit the appeal on the first issue and reject the other grounds as not raising substantial questions of law.
The High Court held that the issue of whether purchases were bogus or made from bogus parties is essentially a question of fact. The Tribunal had concurred with the Commissioner (Appeals) who found that while purchases were not from the named parties, they were made from the grey market. The assessee was able to reconcile purchases with material consumed for construction work. The High Court found no infirmity in the approach of restricting the addition to 12.5% of the bogus purchases, representing the profit element, citing decisions of the jurisdictional High Court in CIT v. Sathvanarayan P. Rathi, CIT v. Simit P. Sheth, and CIT v. Bholanath Polyfab (P) Ltd. The controversy in question (A) did not give rise to a question of law. Regarding question (B), the High Court noted that the ITAT order did not refer to the N.K. Industries Ltd. decision, nor was it relied upon by either party before the lower authorities. Therefore, the question of its applicability did not arise from the impugned order. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose, and the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court of Gujarat, having considered the submissions advanced by the learned senior standing counsel for the applicant and the averments made in the memorandum of application, was of the view that the delay occasioned in preferring the appeal has been sufficiently explained. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was allowed. The delay caused in filing the captioned tax appeal was hereby condoned, and the rule was made absolute with no order as to costs. The Tribunal's order dated 06.09.2018, which was the subject of the intended appeal, was not adjudicated upon on its merits as the focus was solely on the condonation of delay.
The High Court, having considered the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for both parties, and particularly the averments made in the memorandum of application, was of the view that the delay of five days in preferring the appeal had been sufficiently explained. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was allowed. The rule was made absolute, condoning the delay in filing the Tax Appeal. No order as to costs was made. The judgment does not record any specific findings on the merits of the Tax Appeal itself, as the decision pertains solely to the condonation of delay.
The High Court, having considered the submissions advanced by the learned senior standing counsel for the applicant and the averments made in the application, was of the view that the delay occasioned in preferring the appeal had been sufficiently explained. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was allowed. The delay of six days in filing the Tax Appeal was condoned, and the rule was made absolute. No order as to costs was made. The specific reasons for the delay were not detailed in the judgment, but the court found them satisfactory. The core principle applied is that if a party demonstrates sufficient cause for the delay, the court has the discretion to condone it under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to allow the appeal to be heard on merits.
The High Court, having considered the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for both parties, and particularly the averments made in the memorandum of application, was of the view that the delay of five days in preferring the appeal had been sufficiently explained. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was allowed, and the delay was condoned. The rule was made absolute with no order as to costs. The judgment does not record any decision on the merits of the Tax Appeal itself, as the focus was solely on the condonation of delay.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for reopening the assessments for AY 2011-12 and 2012-13 were invalid. The Court found that the sole ground for reopening was the cash withdrawals from the bank accounts, which the AO considered as escaped income. However, the Court noted that the AO did not allege that the deposited amounts were unaccounted or that their source was unexplained. It was held that mere withdrawal of tax-paid amounts from bank accounts, where the source of deposits was not doubted, cannot be termed as escapement of income chargeable to tax under Section 147. Furthermore, since the reopening was sought beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment years and the reasons recorded did not indicate any failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 was invalid. The Court, while acknowledging the petitioner's participation in proceedings, declined to relegate the petitioner to face re-assessment proceedings as the formation of belief by the AO was without foundation.
The High Court held that both proposed questions of law were concluded by previous judgments of the same court. Regarding the first issue, concerning the deduction under Section 80IA(4), the court noted that this controversy was already decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue by this High Court's judgment dated October 3, 2016, in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Vadodara-1 v. Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 708 of 2016). Therefore, no question of law arose on this ground. For the second issue, relating to the disallowance under Section 14A, the court found that this controversy was also concluded in favour of the assessee by this court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. [2019] 416 ITR 13 (Guj). Consequently, the court found no substantial question of law warranting interference and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) did not err in its order. The Tribunal had relied on its earlier decision in the case of the vendor, M/s. Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd., wherein it was held that the transaction materialized in the accounting period relevant to assessment year 2012-13. The Tribunal further held that since the vendor sold the wind energy division in assessment year 2012-13, the assessee acquired the asset in that year and was entitled to depreciation. Crucially, the revenue had appealed the ITAT's decision in the vendor's case to the High Court, which was dismissed. As the ITAT merely followed its upheld decision and applied it to the present case, the High Court found no legal infirmity warranting interference. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the impugned order. Regarding proposed question (a), concerning the addition of Rs. 14,51,000/- on account of amortization of lease rent, the Tribunal had merely applied this Court's decision in Tax Appeal No. 579 of 2016, which in turn relied on its earlier decision in Tax Appeals No. 778 to 780 of 2013. Since the Tribunal followed the jurisdictional High Court's precedent, no question of law arose. Similarly, for proposed questions (b), (c), and (d), which dealt with the replacement cost of re-membrane cells, the Tribunal had applied this Court's decision rendered on August 1, 2016, in Tax Appeal No. 577 of 2016. As the Tribunal applied the High Court's ruling, no question of law arose concerning these grounds. Consequently, the appeal was summarily dismissed.
The Tribunal granted permission to the appellant (Revenue) to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning is solely based on the instruction received from the Income-tax Officer (Tech) to withdraw the appeal as it fell below the monetary threshold of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. The appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. The Tribunal also noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the instruction dated 22.08.2019 was not applicable for any reason, the appellant would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. No specific issue was decided on merits, and no ratio decidendi for future citation was established as the appeal was withdrawn.
The High Court granted the permission as prayed for by the appellant's counsel. The appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. The Court noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the instruction dated 22.08.2019 was not applicable for any reason, it would be open for the appellant to seek revival of the appeal. The specific merits of the original appeal before the ITAT were not decided.
The High Court granted the permission as prayed for by the appellant. The appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. The Court also noted that in case there is any error in the computation of the tax effect involved or if for any reason, the instruction F.No.390/MISC/116/2017-JC dated 22.08.2019 is not applicable, it would be open for the appellant to seek revival of the appeal. No specific finding was given on the merits of the case as the appeal was withdrawn.
The Tribunal noted that the Revenue's counsel stated the tax effect in the appeal was less than Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. In light of Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which stipulates that appeals with a tax effect not exceeding Rs. 1,00,00,000/- should not be filed before the High Court and is retrospectively applicable to pending appeals, the Revenue's counsel did not press the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed. The High Court also noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the Circular was not applicable for any reason, the appellant would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that while purchases from Vishal Traders were bogus, the assessee had made actual purchases from farmers, which were reflected in stock and sales. The Assessing Officer could not dispute the sales and stock position. Relying on the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Sanjay Oil Cake Industries v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 316 ITR 274, the CIT(A) had restricted the addition to 25% of the bogus purchases, a finding concurred with by the Tribunal. For the second issue, the Court found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s approach of telescoping the undisclosed income into the addition sustained for bogus purchases, even though the Tribunal did not give a categorical finding. The Court concluded that the impugned order of the Tribunal suffered from no legal infirmity warranting interference, and thus the appeal failed.
The High Court held that the appeal fails and is summarily dismissed. Regarding the first issue concerning the deletion of disallowance of interest income under Section 80IAB, the Court noted that this controversy was concluded in favour of the assessee by a previous decision of the same court in the assessee's own case (Tax Appeal No. 643 of 2017), which relied on the High Court's decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Nirma Limited, [2014] 367 ITR 12 (Guj). Therefore, this ground of appeal did not give rise to any question of law. Concerning the second issue related to the disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D, the Court referred to its judgment and order of even date in Tax Appeal No. 678 of 2019, also in the assessee's own case, where it was held that this ground of appeal did not give rise to any question of law. Consequently, for the reasons recorded in those judgments, this ground also did not merit acceptance. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.
The High Court held that none of the proposed questions of law give rise to any substantial question of law. Regarding proposed question [A], the court noted that the controversy was concluded in favour of the assessee by this court's decision in the assessee's own case (Tax Appeal No.643 of 2017), which relied on the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Nirma Limited, [2014] 367 ITR 12 (Guj). For proposed questions [B] and [C], the court referred to its judgment and order of even date in Tax Appeal No.678 of 2019 in the assessee's own case, where it was held that these grounds of appeal do not give rise to any question of law. Consequently, the appeal was summarily dismissed.
The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that when a return is filed under Section 139 and subsequently found to be defective, and those defects are rectified by the assessee within the time allowed, the rectified return relates back to the date of filing of the original return. Therefore, for the purpose of calculating the limitation period for issuing a notice under Section 143(2), the date of filing of the original return (September 10, 2016) should be considered. The statutory period for issuing a notice under Section 143(2) is six months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished. For the return filed on September 10, 2016, the financial year ended on March 31, 2017, making the last date for issuing the notice September 30, 2017. The impugned notice dated August 9, 2018, was issued well beyond this period. Consequently, the notice was quashed and set aside. The Court made no mention of any issue left undecided.
The High Court held that the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on 11.08.2018, was barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that when a return is filed, and subsequently, defects are pointed out under section 139(9) and rectified by the assessee within the stipulated time, the rectified return relates back to the date of the original filing. In this case, the original return was filed on 29.11.2016. The defects were removed on 19.07.2017. According to section 143(2), the notice must be served within six months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished. Therefore, the limitation period for issuing the notice would end on 30.09.2017. Since the impugned notice was issued on 11.08.2018, it was beyond the prescribed time limit. The Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice and all consequential proceedings.
The High Court held that the impugned order passed by the Settlement Commission was not contrary to any provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Regarding the findings of fact recorded by the Settlement Commission to the effect that there had been no wilful attempt to conceal material facts, the Court held that these findings could not be examined by the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction, as there was no challenge to such findings on the ground of perversity. The Court also noted that it is not possible to state that the impugned order was in any manner contrary to any provisions of the IT Act. The Court further observed that it is an admitted position that prior to the presentation of the petition, the order of the Settlement Commission had been fully implemented by the revenue authorities, despite which the petition sought a stay on its execution. This led the Court to conclude that the petition suffered from suppression of material facts. Therefore, the Court found no infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference and dismissed the petition.
The High Court of Gujarat, in light of the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondent assessee, quashed and set aside the findings recorded by the Tribunal in paragraph 20 of its order dated 13.04.2018. The Tribunal's direction to the Assessing Officer to verify whether a reference was made to the TPO for determining the arm's length price of international transactions between the assessee and its Head Office was thus nullified. The appeal filed by the revenue was allowed to this extent. The ratio decidendi is that if the assessee concedes to the setting aside of a particular direction by the Tribunal, the High Court will accept that concession and allow the appeal on that limited point. No other issues were decided.
The High Court held that the question of which method is most appropriate for determining the arm's length price and whether a transaction is a comparable uncontrolled transaction is fundamentally a question of fact. The Court noted the concurrent findings of fact by the Tribunal and the Commissioner (Appeals) that the terms of functions performed, assets employed, risks undertaken, and prices charged in the contracts between APL/JPL and Shandong HO were identical to those in the contract awarded to Shandong PO by Shandong HO. Based on these concurrent findings, the Tribunal concluded that the CUP method was appropriate and no transfer pricing adjustment was needed. The High Court found no perversity in the Tribunal's findings of fact, nor was any irrelevant material considered or relevant material ignored. Since no substantial question of law arose from the impugned order, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the seizure of the petitioner's car and mobile phones was without any authority of law and a gross abuse of powers. The Court found that Section 67(2) of the GGST Act clearly envisages authorization by an officer not below the rank of Joint Commissioner for carrying out search and seizure. The impugned order did not demonstrate any such authorization. Furthermore, the premises mentioned for search, the State Tax Office, was not a place where a search under Section 67(2) would typically be conducted. The Court also noted that Section 83 of the GGST Act, which deals with provisional attachment of property, does not empower the Commissioner to take action during the pendency of proceedings under Section 71. Therefore, the order of seizure was not relatable to any provision of the GGST Act. While the Court was inclined to award exemplary costs due to the gross abuse of powers, it refrained from doing so at the petitioner's request, who feared reprisal. The Court quashed and set aside the seizure order and directed the immediate release of the vehicle and mobile phones. The registry was directed to communicate the order to the Chief Secretary of the State.
The Tribunal noted that the Revenue's learned senior standing counsel stated that the tax effect involved in the appeal was less than Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. In light of Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which provides that no appeal wherein the tax effect does not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- shall be filed before the High Court and which has been made retrospectively applicable to pending appeals, the Revenue did not press the present appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed. The Tribunal also noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the Circular was not applicable for any reason, it would be open for the appellant to seek revival of the appeal. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was withdrawn by the appellant.
The Tribunal held that since the tax effect involved in the appeal was less than Rs. 1,00,00,000/-, and in light of Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which is applicable retrospectively to pending appeals, the Revenue did not press the present appeal. The reasoning was based solely on the monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT circular. The Tribunal accordingly disposed of the appeal as not pressed. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as not pressed. The judgment also noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular was not applicable for any reason, the appellant would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the learned senior standing counsel for the appellant (Revenue) stated that the tax effect involved in the appeal is less than Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. In light of Circular No. 17 of 2019, dated 08.08.2019, which stipulates that no appeal with a tax effect not exceeding Rs. 1,00,00,000/- shall be filed before the High Court and which has been made retrospectively applicable to pending appeals, the Revenue did not press the present appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed. The High Court also noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular was not applicable for any reason, it would be open for the appellant to seek revival of the appeal.
The High Court held that in light of the Circular No. 17 of 2019, which mandates that appeals with a tax effect not exceeding Rs. 1,00,00,000/- should not be filed before the High Court and is applicable retrospectively to pending appeals, the Revenue did not press the present appeal. The Court's reasoning was directly based on the stated tax effect being below the monetary limit stipulated in the circular. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of as not pressed. The Court also provided a liberty to the appellant to seek revival of the appeal if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular was not applicable for any reason. No specific issue regarding the substantive tax dispute was decided.
The High Court noted that the Revenue's learned senior standing counsel stated that the tax effect in the appeal was less than Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. In light of Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which sets a monetary limit for filing appeals before the High Court and is retrospectively applicable to pending appeals, the Revenue stated it did not press the appeal. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the appeal as not pressed. The Court also noted that if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the Circular was not applicable for any reason, the appellant would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. No specific findings on the merits of the case were made.
The Tribunal decided that the appeal should be disposed of as not pressed. The reasoning was based on the appellant's submission that the tax effect involved was less than Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. This submission was made in light of Circular No. 17 of 2019 dated 08.08.2019, which mandates that appeals with a tax effect below Rs. 1,00,00,000/- should not be filed before the High Court and is applicable retrospectively to pending appeals. Therefore, the appellant's counsel did not press the appeal. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as not pressed. However, the appellant was granted liberty to seek revival of the appeal if there was any error in the computation of the tax effect or if the circular was not applicable for any reason. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal concurred with the Commissioner (Appeals) and held that the AOP was formed solely to secure work, with execution being handled by the joint venture members. Business receipts were shared as per their understanding. Crucially, the Tribunal relied on CBDT Circular No.7/2016, which clarifies that there is no tax liability on the income of a joint venture if the same income has been offered to tax by its members. The Tribunal found that the members of the joint venture had disclosed the entire income in their books and returns, and these returns were assessed under Section 143(3). Since both the joint venture and its members are taxed at the maximum marginal rate, no loss accrued to the revenue. Therefore, no addition could be made in the hands of the assessee as the income was already taxed in the hands of its members, satisfying the conditions of the CBDT circular. The High Court found no legal infirmity in the Tribunal's order and no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the impugned order of the Tribunal. Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal found that the members of the joint venture had duly disclosed the income in their returns and paid tax thereon. The Court noted that since both the joint venture and its members are taxed at the maximum marginal rate, no loss has been caused to the revenue. The Tribunal's finding that the conditions of CBDT Circular No. 7/2016 were satisfied, meaning that once the amount was offered to tax by the members, the assessee could not be saddled with tax liability on the same amount, was crucial. The Court found concurrent findings of fact by the lower authorities and concluded that the Tribunal's order did not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.
The High Court held that the revenue's stand was against the spirit of settlement envisaged under Section 245D of the Act. The court found that the assessees had not accepted the liability for the 5% trading expenses but offered to pay the computed amount to bring the matter to a close and buy peace of mind. This offer was made to achieve settlement and did not amount to a non-disclosure of full and true facts in the Section 245C applications. The court noted that no revised applications were filed and the additional amounts offered were meager compared to the overall disclosures. Therefore, the contention of non-disclosure of full and true facts was not accepted. Regarding the second issue, the court found that the Settlement Commission had applied its mind to the disclosures, revenue's contentions, and the assessees' explanations, and had given its findings. The impugned order was not a non-speaking order, and thus this contention was also rejected. The court found no infirmity in the Settlement Commission's order warranting interference.