TRAVEL DESIGNER INDIA PVT LTD vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,

By this petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged   the   notice   dated   11.08.2018   issued under   sub­section   (2)   of   section   143   of   the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and the proceedings initiated pursuant thereto.

The petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act, 2013. For the assessment year 2016­17, the petitioner had filed its return of income   under   section   139(1)   of   the   Act   on 29.11.2016. Thereafter,   the   petitioner   received an intimation of defective return under section 139(9) of the Act on 25.01.2017. The petitioner filed   its   reply   to   the   notice   under   section 139(9)   of   the   Act   on   02.02.2017. However,   the petitioner received an intimation regarding non­ acceptance   of   response   of   defective   return   on 10.07.2017, wherein the petitioner was asked to correct the defects within a period of fifteen days   from   the   receipt   of   said   notice.   The petitioner filed its reply to the non­acceptance of response of defective return through e­portal on 19.07.2017. 3. Subsequently, the return was processed under sub­section   (1)   of   section   143   of   the   Act   on 25.08.2017, wherein the date of original return is   referred   to   as   29.11.2016. Thereafter,   the impugned notice under sub­section (2) of section 143   of   the   Act   came   to   be   issued   to   the petitioner on 11.08.2018, which has given rise to the present petition.

Mr. Darshan Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner,   assailed   the   impugned   notice   under section 143(2) of the Act by submitting that the notice is barred by limitation as the same has been issued beyond the permissible time limit, as provided under section 143(2) of the Act. It was pointed   out   that   in   this   case,   the   original return under sub­section (1) of section 139 of the   Act   was   filed   on   29.11.2016   and   that thereafter,   the   petitioner   was   called   upon   to remove   the   defects   under   sub­section   (9)   of section 139 of the Act, which ultimately came to be removed on 19.07.2017. It was submitted that considering the date of filing of the original return,   viz.,   29.11.2016,   a   notice   under   sub­ section (2) of section 143 of the Act, could have been issued on or before 30.09.2017; however, the impugned   notice   has   been   issued   on   11.08.2018, which is clearly beyond the period of limitation.

1 The learned advocate further pointed out that the intimation issued under section 143(1) of the Act after the defect in the return of income was removed, acknowledges the date of filing of the return to be 29.11.2016. It was submitted that the provisions contained in section 139(9) of the Act make a distinction between a defective return and an invalid return and that a defective return is not ipso facto to be regarded as an invalid return and that it is only when a return contains any specified defects and the Assessing Officer, in his discretion, intimates the defects to the assessee and the assessee fails to rectify the same   within   the   specified   time,   that   the Assessing   Officer   may   treat   the   return   to   be invalid. Therefore, it is only if the defect is not   removed   within   the   time   period   allowed   or within the extended time period that the return can   be   treated   as   an   invalid   return.   It   was submitted   that   therefore,   it   is   the   date   of filing   of   the   original   return   under   section 139(1)   of   the   Act   which   is   required   to   be reckoned for the purpose of calculating the time limit for issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act.

2 It   was   further   submitted   that   the   return filed   in   response   to   the   notice   under   section 139(9) of the Act is not a fresh return, but is in continuation of the original return rectifying the specified defects, as per the notice issued under section 139(9) of the Act. It was submitted that when the provisions of section 139(9) of the Act   provide   an   opportunity   to   the   assessee   to remove any defect/s in the original return filed and if the assessee removes the defect/s within the time period allowed under section 139 of the Act, then the same should be treated as a valid return duly filed with effect from the date of filing of the original return.

3 Mr. Patel next submitted that in the present case it is only because the petitioner has duly rectified   the   defects   within   the   time   allowed under   section   139(9)   of   the   Act,   that   in   the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act, the return has been treated as a valid return under section   139(1)   of   the   Act   with   effect   from 29.11.2016. It   was   further   submitted   that   the notice   under   section   139(9)   of   the   Act categorically states that an opportunity has been given   to   the   assessee   only   to   remove   the specified   defects   in   the   original   return   as mentioned   in   the   notice   itself   and   that   the assessee has not been allowed to make any further modifications while furnishing the return under section 139(9) of the Act except to remove the specified defects identified and mentioned in the notice   itself.   Therefore,   the   return   filed   to remove the defects under section 139(9) of the Act would be a corrected return and would relate back   to   the   date   of   filing   of   the   original return. 4.4 It was further submitted that it is a well settled proposition of law that the notice under section 143(2) of the Act is a statutory notice and has to be mandatorily issued as per law for assuming   jurisdiction   for   assessment   by   the Assessing Officer and that in the absence of a notice   under   section   143(2)   of   the   Act   being issued   within   the   prescribed   time   limit,   the entire assessment proceedings would be rendered without jurisdiction. It was submitted that the controversy involved in the present case is no longer res integra as various High Courts have taken a view that the date of removal of defects would relate back to the date of filing of the original return.

5  In  support   of such   submission,   the  learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Prime Securities Ltd. v. Varinder Mehta, Assistant   Commissioner   of   Income­tax   (Inv.), Circle   1(1),   [2009]   182   Taxman   221   (Bombay), wherein   the   court   has   held   that   even   if   the defect in the original return came to be cured under section 139(9) of the Act on 15.10.1992, the same would relate back to 31.12.1991, which is the date of original filing of the return. 4.6 Reliance was also placed upon an unreported decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Atul Projects India Private Limited v. Union of India and another rendered on 24.01.2019 in Writ Petition   No.3501   of   2018,   wherein   the   court placed reliance upon its earlier decision in the case of Prime Securities Limited (supra) and held that the date of filing of return would be the date on which it was originally presented and not on the date on which the defects were removed.

7 Reference   was   made   to   the   decision   of   the Delhi High Court in case of Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income­tax, [2007] 165 Taxman 314 (Delhi), wherein the court has held that upon the defects   being   removed,   the   return   would   relate back to the original filing date.

8 It was, accordingly, urged that the impugned notice, being barred by limitation, deserves to be   quashed   and   set   aside   and   the   petition deserves   to   be   allowed   in   the   terms   of   the reliefs prayed for.

Opposing   the   petition,   Mrs.   Mauna   Bhatt, learned   senior   standing   counsel   for   the respondent,   submitted   that   the   return   filed   by the petitioner for assessment year 2016­17 under section   139(9)   of   the   Act   on   19.07.2017   was selected for scrutiny under the CASS system in August 2018. Therefore, the notice under section 143(2)   of   the   Act,   which   was   issued   on 11.08.2018,   was   well   within   the   period   of limitation.   It   was   submitted   that   the   original return of income under section 139(1) of the Act was filed on 29.11.2016, but it was a defective return and intimation about the defective return was communicated to the petitioner on 25.01.2017 and   the   petitioner   was   asked   to   remove   the defects   within   fifteen   days   of   receipt   of   the intimation. On 02.02.2017, the petitioner filed return under sub­section (9) of section 139 of the Act electronically and while this return was being   processed,   the   petitioner   suo   motu   filed another return on income under sub­section (9) of section 139 on 19.07.2017. It was submitted thus that   after   making   corrections   and   removing   the defects, the return under section 139(9) of the Act   was   ultimately   filed   by   the   petitioner   on 19.07.2017,   whereafter   it   was   selected   for scrutiny. Thus, it was the corrected return and not   the   defective   return   filed   on   29.11.2016 which was selected for scrutiny. It was submitted that the return filed under section 139(1) of the Act on 29.11.2016 was a defective return and a return with defects is not a valid return under the   Act.   Therefore,   the   date   of   filing   of   the defective   return   cannot   be   taken   into consideration   for   the   purpose   of   computing   the limitation for issuance of notice under section 143(2)   of   the   Act.   According   to   the   learned senior   standing   counsel,   once   the   defects   have been removed within the prescribed time limit, a fresh return has to be filed under section 139(9) of the Act, which is considered  to be a valid return.   Accordingly   when   the   time   limit   for issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act was available till the expiry of six months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished, it would mean that the time limit has to be considered from the date when a valid return has been filed and if the return is filed   with   some   defects,   then   it   cannot   be treated as a return of income. Thus, as and when such defects are removed, such return becomes a valid return under section 139 of the Act and the date of limitation for issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act will be determined on the basis of the date when such return of income is treated to be a valid income.

1 The attention of the court was invited to the provisions of section 143 of the Act to point out that sub­section (2) thereof refers to a return furnished under section 139 or in response to a notice under section 142(1) of the Act. It was submitted that section 143(2) of the Act does not state   that   such   return   is   required   to   be furnished   under   section   139(1)   of   the   Act   and hence, the period of limitation does not have to be computed from the date on which the return is filed   under   section   139(1)   of   the   Act.   It   was submitted that in the facts of the present case, it is only on the date when the corrected return came to be filed under section 139(9) of the Act that the return could be considered to be valid and hence, in terms of section 143(2) of the Act, the   period   of   limitation   would   have   to   be calculated   from   the   date   when   such   corrected return was filed under section 139(9) of the Act.

2 In  support   of her  submissions,   the  learned senior   standing   counsel   placed   reliance   upon   a decision   of   this   Court   in   case   of  Principal Commissioner   of   Income­tax­1   v.   Babubhai Ramanbhai Patel, [2017] 249 Taxman 470 (Gujarat), wherein the court has held that in terms, sub­ section (5) of section 139 allows the assessee to revise the return filed under sub­section (1) or sub­section   (4)   as   long   as   the   time   frame provided   therein   is   adhered   to   and   the requirement   of   revised   return   has   arisen   on discovery of any omission or a wrong statement in the return originally filed. The court held that assessment can be completed only on the basis of the   correct   and   completed   return.   The   earlier return, after a revised return has been filed, cannot form the basis of assessment although it may   be   used   to   indicate   the   conduct   of   the assessee. There is a clear distinction between a revised return and a correction of return. Once a revised return is filed, the original return must be taken to have been withdrawn and substituted by a fresh return for the purpose of assessment.

3 The learned senior standing counsel submitted that   considering   the   defects   enumerated   in   the Explanation,   it   is   not   possible   to   make   an assessment unless such defects are removed.

4 Reliance was placed also upon the decision of this court in the case of Hytaisun Magnetics Ltd. v.   Joint   Commissioner   of   Income­tax,   [2018]   95 taxmann.com 248 (Gujarat) wherein the court held thus: “Section 139 of the Act pertains to return of income.   Sub­section   (9)   of   section   139 provides   that   where   the   Assessing   Officer considers that the return of income filed by the   assessee   is   defective,   he   may   intimate the defect to the assessee and give him an opportunity   to   rectify   the   defect   within   a period of fifteen days from the date of such intimation or within such further period, on an   application   made   in   this   behalf,   the Assessing Officer may grant; if such defect is   not   rectified   within   such   period   or extended

5 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Madan   Roller   Flour   Mills   v.   Commissioner   of Income­tax, 2008 (301) ITR 1.

6 Reference   was   made   to   the   decision   of   the Madras High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income­tax   v.   Anaimugan   Transports   (P.)   Ltd., [1995] 129 CTR 51 (Madras), wherein the court has held that it will be a mistake to accept for all purposes, the return as one filed by the assessee under sub­section (1) of section 139 of the Act as   the   starting   point   of   limitation   for   the completion of assessment as a return, which is not complete in all respects and that as regards the   return   furnished   by   the   assessee,   doubts exist   whether   a   return   filed   under   sub­section (4)(a) of section 139 may be the relevant return and in case any omission in the return furnished is   discovered   by   the   assessee   and   a   revised return   is   filed,   the   same   may   be   the   relevant return. The court held that in section 153, in this   behalf,   a   mention   of   section   143   clearly reckons a return on which assessment is made and a   demand   notice   is   issued   under   clause   (a)   of sub­section   (2)   of   section   143   of   the   Act.   A return for this purpose is a return under section 139(1), section 139(4) as well as section 139(5) of   the   Act.   An   assessment   in   terms   of   section 143, it is obvious, is an assessment on the basis of the return in one case under  clause (a) of sub­section   (1)   of   section   143   and   in   another case, under sub­section (3) of section 143 of the Act.   In   the   case   of   best   judgment   assessment, where there is no return filed by the assessee and where the assessee has not responded to any enquiry before the assessment under section 142 of   the   Act,   the   period   of   limitation   for assessment   will   reckon   only   in   terms   of   the default   of   the   assessee,   which   is   contemplated under section 144 of the Act.

7 It   was   submitted   that   therefore,   for   the purpose of computing the limitation for issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act, the return filed by the petitioner in response to the notice under section 139(9) of the Act should be treated to be akin to a revised return. It was, accordingly,   urged   that   the   petitioner   having filed   the   correct   return   in   response   to   the notice   under   section   139(9)   of   the   Act   on 19.07.2017, the impugned notice dated 11.08.2018 is   well   within   the   period   of   limitation prescribed under section 143(2) of the Act and that   the   petition,   being   devoid   of   merits, deserves to be dismissed.

In the backdrop of the facts and contentions noted hereinabove, the sole question that arises for consideration in this case is as to whether the   impugned   notice   under   sub­section   (2)   of section 143 of the Act has been filed within the period of limitation provided thereunder.

In this case, the original return of income under sub­section (1) of section 139 of the Act came to be filed on 29.11.2016. Intimation under sub­section (9) of section 139 of the Act came to be   issued   on   25.01.2017,   calling   upon   the petitioner   to   remove   the   defects   enumerated therein. The petitioner rectified such defects on 02.02.2017 within a period of fifteen days from the date of such intimation. However, thereafter, on   10.07.2017,   the   petitioner   received   an intimation   regarding   non­acceptance   of   response to   defective   return   notice   communication.   The petitioner filed its response to the above notice of non­acceptance of response to defective return notice   communication   on   19.07.2017. Thereafter, the   petitioner   received   intimation   under   sub­ section (1) of section 143 of the Act wherein the date of the return was shown to be 29.11.2016. Subsequently,   the   impugned   notice   under   sub­ section (2) of section 143 of the Act came to be issued on 11.08.2018. 8. In the present case, there is some dispute with regard to the date of removal of defects in terms of the intimation under sub­section (9) of section   139   of   the   Act.   While   the   petitioner contends   that   the   defects   were   removed   on 02.02.2017,   it   appears   to   be   the   case   of   the respondent that the petitioner had suo motu filed another return under sub­section (9) of section 139 of the Act on 19.07.2017, which according to him is required to be considered to be the date of filing of the return of income. Since nothing much turns upon the date of actual removal of the defects,   the   date   of   removal   of   defects   is referred to as 19.07.2017. 9. Undisputedly,   if   the   date   of   the   original return under sub­section (1) of section 139 of the Act, viz.29.11.2016 is required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the limitation under section 143(2) of the Act, the   impugned   notice   would   be   barred   by limitation.   However,   if   the   date   on   which   the defects in the original return came to be removed under section 139(9) of the Act viz., 19.07.2017 is to be taken into consideration for the purpose of   computing   the   period   of   limitation,   the impugned notice can be said to have been issued will   within   the   period   of   limitation.   The question that therefore, arises for consideration is as to which of the above two dates can be said to be the date on which the petitioner filed its return on income.

In this regard, it may be germane to refer to the provisions of section 139 of the Act, which to   the   extent   the   same   is   relevant   for   the present purpose, reads as under: “139. Return of income ­ (1) Every person,­ (a) being a company or a firm; or (b) being a person other than a company or a firm, if his total income or the total   income   of   any   other   person   in respect of which he is assessable under this   Act   during   the   previous   year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income tax, shall, on or before the due date, furnish a return of his income or the income of such other   person   during   the   previous   year,   in the   prescribed   form   and   verified   in   the prescribed   manner   and   setting   forth   such other particulars as may be prescribed: xxxxxxx Explanation   2.­   In   this   sub­section,   “due date” means,­ (a) where   the   assessee   other   than   an assessee referred to in clause (aa)] is (i) a company; (ii) a   person   (other   than   a   company) whose   accounts   are   required   to   be audited   under   this   Act   or   under   any other law for the time being in force; or (iii) a working partner of a firm whose accounts   are   required   to   be   audited under  this   Act   or  under   any   other  law for the time being in force, the   30th   day   of   September   of   the assessment year; (aa) in the case of an assessee who is required to furnish a report referred to in   section   92­E,   the   30th   day   of November   of   the   assessment   year;

A study of the provisions of section 139 of the Act shows that under sub­section (1) thereof, an   assessee   is   required   to   file   return   on   or before the due date. As to which is the due date for   filing   of   return   has   been   provided   under Explanation 2 to sub­section (1) of section 139 of   the   Act.   Sub­section   (3)   of   section   139 contemplates filing of a return of income by any person who has sustained a loss in any previous year as provided thereunder, and further provides that all the provisions of the Act shall apply as if it were a return filed under sub­section (1). Therefore, a return filed under sub­section (3) of section 139 of the Act is treated as a return under sub­section (1) thereof. Sub­section (5) of section 139 of the Act provides that if a person who has filed a return under sub­section (1) or in pursuance of a notice under sub­section (1) of section   142,   discovers   any   omission   or   wrong statement   in   such   return,   he   can   furnish   a revised return within the time provided therein. Thus, sub­section (1) of section 139 of the Act contemplates filing of a return of income, sub­ section (3) also contemplates filing of a return of income to which all the provisions of the Act apply as if it were a return  filed under sub­ section   (1)   and   sub­section   (5)   provides   for filing   of   a   revised   return   where   there   is   any omission   or   wrong   statement   in   the   original return   of   income   filed   under   sub­section   (1). Therefore,   all   these   sub­sections   clearly envisage filing of a return.

Sub­section (9) of section 139 of the Act is attracted   when   the   Assessing   Officer   considers the return of income filed by the assessee to be defective. If the Assessing Officer considers the return of income to be defective, he is required to intimate such defect to the assessee and give him an opportunity to rectify such defect within a period of fifteen days from the date of such intimation or within such further time, which the Assessing Officer in his discretion allows on an application made by the assessee in this behalf. If   the   defects   are   not   removed   within   fifteen days or within such further period granted by the Assessing Officer, then notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Act, the return shall be treated as an invalid return and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the assessee has failed to furnish his return. Thus, if the defects are removed within fifteen days or within the further time granted by the Assessing Officer, the very same return would be considered to be valid.

If one looks at the language employed in sub­ sections (1), (3) and (5) of section 139 of the Act, a common thread in all the sub­sections is that the assessee is required to file a return of income   under   those   sub­sections.   However,   from the   language   employed   in   sub­section   (9)   of section 139 of the Act, the same does not require any return to be filed by the assessee. All that the   sub­section   says   is   that   the   assessee   is required to be given an opportunity to rectify the defect in the return filed by him within the time provided; failing which such return would be treated as an invalid return. Unlike sub­section (5) of section 139 of the Act which requires an assessee to file a revised return of income in case of any omission or wrong statement in the return   of   income   filed   under   sub­section   (1) thereof, sub­section (9) of section 139 of the Act, does not require an assessee to file a fresh return of income, but requires the assessee to remove   the   defects   in   the   original   return   of income   filed   by   him   within   the   time   provided therein. Once the defects in the original return of   income   are   removed,   such   return   would   be processed   further   under   the   Act.   In   case   such defects are not removed within the time allowed, such   return   of   income   would   be   treated   as   an invalid return.

In view of what is discussed hereinabove, the contention that the return under sub­section (9) of   section   139   of   the   Act   was   filed   by   the petitioner on 19.07.2017, and that it was this return which was selected for scrutiny under the CASS system in August 2018 and not the defective return   filed   on   29.11.2016,   does   not   merit acceptance.  While the impugned notice under sub­ section (2) of section 143 of the Act does say that   the   return   filed   by   the   petitioner   on 19.07.2017 has been selected for scrutiny, in the opinion   of   this   court,   the   reference   to   the return   as   the   return   filed   on   19.07.2017   is incorrect, inasmuch as sub­section (9) of section 139 of the Act, does not contemplate filing of a return of income. As noticed hereinabove, it is the original return filed by the assessee which gets rectified upon the removal of the defects contained therein.

Under sub­section (9) of section 139 of the Act, it is only the original return which gets corrected and no new return is filed. In other words,   the   original   return   which   was   defective when it was filed is rectified upon removal of the defects under sub­section (9) of section 139 of the Act and becomes a valid return. Thus, as held by the Bombay High Court in the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner as referred to hereinabove, the action of removal of the defects would relate back to the filing of the original return of income and accordingly, it is   the   date   of   filing   of   the   original   return which has been to considered for the purpose of computing   the   period   of   limitation   under   sub­ section (2) of section 143 of the Act and not the date   on   which   the   defects   actually   came   to   be removed.

Reference may also be made to the decision of this court in case of  Principal Commissioner of Income­tax­1 v. Babubhai Ramanbhai Patel (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the learned senior   standing   counsel   for   the   respondents, wherein   this   court   has   placed   reliance   upon   a decision of the Allahabad High Court in case of Dhampur Sugar Mills v. CIT,  [1973] 90 ITR 236, wherein it has been held that there is a clear distinction   between   revised   return   and   a correction of return. Once a revised return is filed, the original return must be taken to have been withdrawn and substituted by a fresh return for   the   purpose   of   assessment.   Thus,   when   a revised return is filed under section 139(5) of the Act, the original return gets substituted and it   is   the   revised   return   which   is   to   be considered   as   a   return   for   the   purpose   of assessment. However, the court has clearly drawn a   distinction   between   a   revised   return   and   a correction of return. Adverting to the facts of the present case, this case relates to correction of the return of income originally filed and not a revised return. Had it been a case of filing of a revised return of income, the original return of   income   would   have   stood   substituted   by   the revised return, but when it comes to correction of a return of income, it is only the original return of income which gets corrected.

Since   the   impugned   notice   has   been   issued under sub­section (2) of section 143 of the Act, reference may be made to the said sub­section, which reads as under: “143.Assessment.­   (1)   Where   a   return   has been made under section 139, or in response to a notice under sub­section (1) of section 142, such return shall be processed in the following manner, namely:­ xxxxxxx (2) Where a return has been furnished under section   139,   or   in   response   to   a   notice under   sub­section   (1)   of   section   142,   the Assessing Officer or the prescribed income­ tax   authority,   as   the   case   may   be,   if, considers   it   necessary   or   expedient   to ensure that the assessee has not understated the   income   or   has   not   computed   excessive loss or has not under­paid the tax in any manner, shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring   him,   on   a   date   to   be   specified therein, either to attend the office of the Assessing Officer or to produce, or cause to be produced before the Assessing Officer any evidence on which the assessee may rely in support of the return: Provided   that   no   notice   under   this   sub­ section   shall   be   served   on   the   assessee after the expiry of six months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished.”

On   a   plain   reading   of   sub­section   (2)   of section 143 of the Act, it is apparent that the Assessing   Officer   or   the   prescribed   income­tax authority   must   issue   a   notice   under   that   sub­ section only in those cases where a return has been made under section 139 or in response to a notice   issued   under   section   142(1),   if   he considers   it   necessary   or   expedient   to   ensure that the assessee has not understated the income or   has   not   computed   excessive   loss   or   has   not under­paid the tax in any manner, but such notice must be served within a period of six months from the   end   of   the   financial   year   in   which   such return is furnished. Thus, if, after furnishing a return of income, the assessee does not receive a notice under sub­section (2) of section 143 of the Act within the period referred to in the sub­ section, the assessee is entitled to presume that the   return   has   become   final   and   no   scrutiny proceedings are to be started in respect of that return. It is only after the issuance of notice under sub­section (2) of section 143 of the Act that   the   Assessing   Officer   can   proceed   further under   sub­section   (3)   thereof   to   make   an assessment   order.   Therefore,   the   notice   under section 143(2) of the Act is a statutory notice, upon   issuance   of   which,   the   Assessing   Officer assumes   jurisdiction   to   frame   the   scrutiny assessment under sub­section (3) of section 143 of the Act. Consequently, if such notice is not issued within the period specified in sub­section (2) of section 143 of the Act viz. before the expiry   of   six   months   from   the   end   of   the financial year in which the return is furnished, it is not permissible for the Assessing Officer to proceed further with the assessment.

In   the   facts   of   the   present   case,   as discussed   earlier,   the   petitioner   filed   its return of income under sub­section (1) of section 139 of the Act on 29.11.2016. Since the return was defective, the petitioner was called upon to remove such defects, which came to be removed on 19.07.2017, that is, within the time allowed by the   Assessing   Officer.   Therefore,   upon   such defects   being   removed,   the   return   would   relate back   to   the   date   of   filing   of   the   original return, that is, 29.11.2016 and consequently, the limitation   for   issuance   of   notice   under   sub­ section (2) of section 143 of the Act would be 30.09.2017, viz. six months from the end of the financial   year   in   which   the   return   under   sub­ section (1) of section 139 came to be filed. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the   impugned   notice   under   sub­section   (2)   of section   143   of   the   Act   has   been   issued   on 11.08.2018, which is much beyond the period of limitation   for   issuance   of   such   notice   as envisaged   under   that   sub­section.   The   impugned notice,   therefore,   is   clearly   barred   by limitation and cannot be sustained.

For   the   foregoing   reasons,   the   petition succeeds   and   is,   accordingly,   allowed.   The impugned   notice   dated   11.08.2018   issued   under sub­section (2) of section 143 of the Act and all proceedings   taken   pursuant   thereto   are   hereby quashed   and   set   aside.   Rule   is   made   absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs. (HARSHA DEVANI, J) (SANGEETA K. VISHEN,J) PRAVIN KARUNAN