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6,745 orders from the Gujarat High Court.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The High Court held that the audit report is not liable to be quashed on the ground of being time-barred. While acknowledging that the respondents failed to intimate the petitioner about missing documents, which contributed to the delay, the Court emphasized the Explanation to Section 65 of the CGST Act. This explanation provides two alternative events for determining the commencement of the audit: the date on which records are made available or the date the audit is actually instituted at the place of business, whichever is later. Given the dispute regarding the completeness of document submission and the allegation of the petitioner prolonging proceedings, the date of actual institution of the audit at the place of business (June 19, 2024) serves as a valid basis for commencement. Therefore, the audit report, prepared on August 2, 2024, was considered within the specified three-month period. Regarding the show-cause notices, the Court was not inclined to set them aside at this stage, suggesting the petitioner respond to them and pursue appellate remedies under Section 107 of the CGST Act if necessary. The writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that the trial court rightly determined the deceased's annual income at Rs. 1,18,000/- based on the produced ITRs. However, it found that the trial court failed to properly appreciate the deceased's future prospects, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi (supra). The Court recalculated the compensation, adding 40% for future prospects to the established income, applying a multiplier of 16, and including conventional heads for loss to estate, consortium, and funeral expenses. This resulted in an enhanced total compensation of Rs. 18,33,200/-. The Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State and partly allowed the cross-objections. The claim of the parents was not reconsidered due to the enhanced compensation awarded to the widow and son. The interest rate on the enhanced amount was fixed at 6% from the date of the trial court's disposal. The State was directed to deposit the entire enhanced amount within three months.
The High Court held that the plaintiffs proved the deceased died due to injuries sustained from the falling gantry, and the incident occurred due to the defendants' negligence in maintaining the old gantry. The trial court rightly determined the deceased's annual income at Rs. 1,18,000/- based on ITRs. However, the court found that the trial court failed to properly consider future prospects, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi (supra). Applying the principle that an addition of 40% should be made for future prospects for a deceased below 40 years old, and using a multiplier of 16, the court recalculated the compensation. The total compensation was enhanced to Rs. 18,33,200/- from Rs. 12,79,372/-. The claim of the parents was not reconsidered due to the enhanced award. The appeal by the State was dismissed, and the cross-objections were partly allowed. The interest rate on the enhanced amount was fixed at 6% per annum from the date of the trial court's disposal.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned order dated 31.03.2016 passed by the respondent authority under Section 179 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court held that for invoking Section 179(1), a finding must be recorded that the non-recovery of tax dues from the company is attributable to gross negligence, misfeasance, or breach of duty on the part of the director. The petitioner had provided an exhaustive reply explaining his non-involvement in the company's affairs after his resignation, including not operating bank accounts, filing returns, managing affairs, or being a signatory to financial documents. The Court noted that the respondent authority failed to apply its mind to whether the petitioner had siphoned off funds or defrauded the revenue, or whether the non-recovery was due to his gross negligence. The judgment clarified that the onus is on the director to establish that non-recovery is not attributable to these factors, but once this is done, the authority must examine these grounds. The Court found the impugned order bereft of such findings, thus Section 179(1) was not attracted. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the reference dated 24.06.2023 made by the Assessing Officer to the District Valuation Officer under Section 142A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was a colourable exercise of power and was without jurisdiction. The Court found that the Assessing Officer was aware that the assessment proceedings would become time-barred on 25.06.2023. Despite having all the material, the AO showed remissness in completing the assessment within the prescribed time. By creating an artificial cause of action of referring the determination of the valuation of assets and the claim of depreciation, the AO attempted to extend the time by resorting to Explanation-1(v) to Section 153 of the Act. The Court also noted that the revenue failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay from December 28, 2022, to June 17, 2023. The show cause notices issued on June 17 and 20, 2023, were silent on the aspect of assets, indicating that the issue of asset valuation was not a genuine concern until the limitation period was approaching. Therefore, the impugned order dated 24.06.2023, referring the matter to the DVO, was quashed. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the petitioner is entitled to interest at the rate of 6% for the period from August 1, 2021, till March 2, 2024. The Court rejected the revenue's submission that interest should be calculated from July 1, 2022, based on the consequential order. The Tribunal found that Section 5(2) of the VsV Act, 2020, stops at the issuance of Form-5 and does not envisage a consequential order. While the revenue's Circular No. 03 of 2021 did not prescribe a timeline for consequential orders, the Central Action Plan 2021-2022, specifically Clause-9, did. This clause stipulated that for Form-5 issued before June 30, 2021 (as in this case, May 24, 2021), the order giving effect should have been issued by July 31, 2021. Since the order was issued on June 17, 2022, there was a significant delay. The Court emphasized that the VsV Act is a special act intended to benefit assessees and the clarification in Clause-9 of the Action Plan cannot be ignored. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Tata Chemicals Ltd. regarding the entitlement to interest on refunds. The operative direction is to grant interest at 6% from August 1, 2021, to March 2, 2024, to be implemented within six weeks, failing which further interest of 9% would be levied on the erring officers.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the impugned order of the Tribunal. Regarding issue 1, the court noted that the CIT(Appeals) had found that the additions made in the reassessment order were not based on the reasons recorded for reopening. The court agreed with the legal position that when no addition is made on the grounds for which reassessment was initiated, the AO cannot make additions on other grounds not forming part of the recorded reasons. Concerning issue 2, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, stating that an explanation cannot expand the scope of the main statutory provision. The court found that Explanation 3 to Section 147, while clarifying the AO's power to assess issues that come to notice subsequently, does not override the necessity of fulfilling the conditions in the substantive part of Section 147, particularly when no income has escaped assessment as per the recorded reasons and no addition is made on those grounds. The court also noted that the ITAT had followed the jurisdictional High Court's decision. As for issue 3, the deletion of the disallowance under sections 43(5), 73, and 40A(2)(b) was upheld as part of the overall finding that the reassessment proceedings were vitiated.
The High Court held that while the counter-claim of defendant no.1 firm was not maintainable, the expenses incurred by it for the second and third consignments were required to be reimbursed. The court considered the expenditures totaling Rs. 13,66,118/- which included airfreight charges for two consignments, costs for goods returned by Yugoslavian buyers, charges for not supplying spare parts, demurrage, and clearing and forwarding charges. The court found that the trial court had erred in not allowing these expenses, particularly concerning deficit goods, and that the plaintiff was ultimately responsible for the payment of deficit goods. Consequently, the decretal amount awarded by the trial court was reduced by Rs. 13,66,118/-, modifying the decree to Rs. 36,15,218/- with proportionate interest. The appeals were disposed of in terms of this modification.
The High Court modified the decree passed by the Trial Court. While upholding the Trial Court's finding that the counter-claim of defendant no.1 firm was not maintainable, the Court held that expenses incurred by defendant no.1 firm for the 2nd and 3rd consignments, totaling Rs. 13,66,118/-, were required to be reimbursed. This amount was deducted from the original decretal amount. The Court specifically addressed the issue of defective goods, noting the Trial Court's finding that the Yugoslavian buyers had paid the full amount despite some defective goods, and also the issue of deficit goods, stating that the plaintiff was ultimately responsible. Consequently, the decretal amount was reduced from Rs. 49,81,336/- to Rs. 36,15,218/-. The appeals were disposed of in terms of this modification, with no order as to costs. The issue of freight and other charges and the liability of defendants 5 and 6 were not explicitly detailed in the provided excerpt of the conclusion.
The High Court, without delving into the merits, found it appropriate to remand the matter back to the E.S.I Court for fresh consideration. The Court noted that a relevant judgment, Shri Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad vs. Union of India and Another, which dealt with similar facts regarding women utilizing raw materials supplied by a branch and rolling papads at home, was not brought to the notice of the E.S.I Court. The Court also acknowledged that Shree Mahila Gruh Udyog Lijjat Papad had been granted exemption from the E.S.I Act in Maharashtra. Given these aspects and the need for re-analysis, the parties were granted liberty to lead fresh evidence. The impugned judgments were quashed and set aside, and the proceedings were restored to the E.S.I Court for a fresh decision, preferably within nine months.
The High Court, without delving into the merits, found it appropriate to remand the matter back to the E.S.I Court for fresh consideration. The Court noted that a relevant judgment, Shri Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad vs. Union of India and Another, which dealt with similar facts regarding women utilizing raw materials supplied by a branch and rolling papads at home, was not brought to the notice of the E.S.I Court. The Court also acknowledged that Shree Mahila Gruh Udyog Lijjat Papad had been granted exemption from the E.S.I Act in Maharashtra. Given these aspects and the need for re-analysis, the parties were granted liberty to lead fresh evidence. The impugned judgments were quashed and set aside, and the proceedings were restored to the E.S.I Court for a fresh decision, preferably within nine months.
The High Court held that Rule 8A(3) of the Wealth Tax Rules, 1957, is constitutionally valid and not ultra vires Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The Court reasoned that Article 19(6) permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on professions by prescribing qualifications in the public interest. The Court found that the prescribed qualification of a Degree in Agricultural Science for valuing agricultural lands is justified due to the specialized knowledge and practical experience required, as evidenced by the detailed particulars sought in Form O-2 for valuation reports. The Court noted that this form requires information on land classification, revenue records, crops, irrigation, market value factors, and comparable sales, all of which necessitate specialized knowledge. The Court also observed that the Rule's classification, which includes eligible former gazetted government officers with relevant service experience, is consistent with the legislative intent to ensure expertise across different asset classes. Striking down Rule 8A(3) would have a cascading effect on the entire scheme of Rule 8A. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court granted permission to the Revenue to withdraw the appeals. The reasoning provided is that the tax effect in these appeals falls below the threshold limit stipulated by the CBDT circular dated 11.07.2018. This circular guides the department on when to prefer and maintain appeals before the High Court. Consequently, the Tax Appeals were disposed of as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of any substantive tax issue was made. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeals as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the impugned notice dated July 27, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is invalid. This is because the notice was issued after July 11, 2022, which was determined as the last date for issuance of a notice under Section 148, applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The Court referred to paragraph 114(g) and (h) of the Rajeev Bansal judgment, which states that reassessment notices under the new regime must be issued within the time limit surviving under the Income-tax Act read with TOLA. Notices issued beyond this 'surviving period' are time-barred and liable to be set aside. Consequently, the impugned order dated July 26, 2022, and the notice dated July 27, 2022, along with all consequential proceedings, were quashed and set aside. The writ petition was allowed to this extent.
The High Court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfactorily prove the execution of the Agreement to Sale dated September 26, 1990 (Exh.108) and the extension agreement dated April 21, 1991 (Exh.109). The Court found that the plaintiffs had not proven their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract within the stipulated period of 15 months. The trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to prove the agreement to sale, particularly the extension for six years, was upheld. The Court also noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the payment of Rs. 1,90,000/- and Rs. 5,00,000/- through corroborative evidence. The trial court was justified in dismissing the suit for specific performance as no decree could be passed based on the oral and documentary evidence presented. The appeal was therefore dismissed. The interim relief of maintaining status-quo regarding title and possession was continued for eight weeks.
The High Court recalled its order dated August 19, 2016, passed in Tax Appeal No. 627 of 2007, and restored the appeal to the file. The Court found that the fact that the restraint order under Section 132(3) was passed in the name of all four assessees was not considered in the previous order. This oversight led to the decision on the limitation issue being made in favour of the assessee, and consequently, other grounds of appeal were not considered on merits. The Court allowed the Miscellaneous Civil Application, holding that the previous order was passed without considering a material fact. Subsequently, in the restored Tax Appeal, the Revenue submitted that the appeal was not maintainable due to a low tax effect, citing Circular No. 9 of 2024. The Court disposed of the Tax Appeal on the ground of low tax effect, with liberty to revive in case of difficulty. The ratio is that an order passed without considering a material fact can be recalled, and appeals can be disposed of based on updated circulars regarding tax effect.
The High Court directed the petitioner to approach the State Government (Respondent No. 1) for exemption from electricity duty. The Court acknowledged the petitioner as a charitable trust providing social services and not engaged in commercial activities. Respondent No. 1 was instructed to consider the petitioner's case for exemption from 2010 onwards, taking into account their charitable nature and non-commercial activities. The Court also ordered that no recovery of past electricity duty should be made from the petitioner until a decision is taken by Respondent No. 1. The petition was disposed of with these directions, and the rule was made absolute to the extent of these directions. The specific question of whether the petitioner was liable for duty prior to 11.11.2025 was not definitively decided but was remitted to the State Government for consideration of retrospective exemption.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were required to be quashed and set aside. The Court found that the Assessing Officer had taken a plausible view by referring the valuation of the land to the DVO and making additions based on the DVO's report. The Court reiterated that while the Commissioner can invoke Section 263 if an order is erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue, such powers are to be exercised sparingly. If the Assessing Officer has made a plausible inquiry and adopted a plausible view considering the relevant material, the Commissioner cannot substitute their opinion. The Court observed that the Assessing Officer's approach was not erroneous, and therefore, the Commissioner ought not to have invoked Section 263. The judgment cited *JMC Projects (India) Ltd.*, which held that Section 263 powers are not meant for improving an assessment order, and as long as income is assessed and tax levied, the order cannot be considered prejudicial to the revenue. The Court also held that the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction when the show-cause notice is illegal. Therefore, the writ petitions succeeded.
The High Court held that the impugned notices issued under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were required to be quashed and set aside. The Court reasoned that the Commissioner can invoke Section 263 powers only if the Assessing Officer's order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. However, such powers must be exercised sparingly, particularly when the AO has made a plausible inquiry and taken a view after considering relevant material. In this case, the AO referred the matter to the DVO and made additions based on the DVO's report, which was a plausible view. The Court found no error in the AO's approach that would make the order prejudicial to the revenue. The judgment cited precedents, including JMC Projects (India) Ltd., emphasizing that Section 263 powers are not for improving an assessment order but for rectifying erroneous and prejudicial orders. Since the income was assessed and tax levied, the order could not be considered prejudicial to the revenue. The Court also held that the writ petition was maintainable despite the alternative remedy, as the show-cause notice was illegal.
The High Court held that the Trial Court's direction to produce income-tax returns was de hors any reasoning or logic. The Court found that the impugned order did not demonstrate how the income-tax returns were relevant for deciding the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court reasoned that income-tax returns cannot disclose the complainant's right to charge interest or the aggregate outstanding amount due from the accused. However, the Court acknowledged that documents pertaining to the authority to charge interest and account maintenance were germane to the dispute. Therefore, the High Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders dated October 27, 2016 (Exh. 68) and May 29, 2017 (Exh. 80) to the extent they directed the production of certified copies of income-tax returns. The petition was disposed of, and the rule was made absolute to that extent. The Court noted that the case of *Quazi Mohomed-Hanif* did not deal with the production of income-tax returns. The reliance on *Hiten Parekh* was considered substantial, as it highlighted that a conviction under Section 138 could be overturned if the complainant failed to prove a legally enforceable debt due to lack of cogent proof like income-tax returns, but in that case, the High Court had found other documentary evidence sufficient.
The High Court held that both tax appeals are not pressed by the Revenue due to the low tax effect, in accordance with Circular No. 17/2019 dated August 8, 2019. The Court noted the revised monetary limits for appeals as per the circular, which set a limit of Rs. 1,00,00,000 for appeals before the High Court. The appeals were disposed of accordingly. The Court also granted liberty to the Revenue to revive the tax appeals in case of any difficulty. The specific tax effect or the assessment years were not recorded in the judgment.
The High Court partly allowed the appeal. It found that the respondent-husband had not provided full and accurate information in his affidavit as mandated by the Supreme Court in *Rajnesh vs. Neha*. The Court noted significant discrepancies and contradictions in the respondent's disclosures regarding his income, business involvement, property acquisitions, and the timing of loan repayments. The Court also observed that the respondent had adopted a son while his marriage to the appellant was subsisting and had seemingly entered into a second marriage, as evidenced by social media posts and wedding invitations. The Court held that the respondent's stand of having no independent income was unbelievable and based on falsehood, describing him as "a poor son of a wealthy father." The Family Court's reliance on Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act was found to be misapplied in light of the respondent's evasiveness. The Court directed the respondent-husband to pay Rs. 50,000/- per month (Rs. 30,000/- for the wife and Rs. 20,000/- for the daughter) from the date of the application. Litigation expenses were enhanced from Rs. 15,000/- to Rs. 50,000/-, and travelling expenses were enhanced to Rs. 5,000/- per appearance. The Court also prima facie opined that the respondent had committed contempt of court for failing to provide accurate information and directed the Registry to place the matter before the bench taking up contempt matters.
The High Court held that the writ petitions fail legal scrutiny and dismissed them, restraining itself from interfering with the impugned orders. The Court noted the flawed approach by the jurisdictional officers in dealing with the cancellation of ARTIPL's registration and the registration of ATIL. It observed that the erstwhile ARTIPL could not seek any benefit of refund from the fault of the jurisdictional officer when it was equally at fault. The Court found that ATIL could not claim the refund of unutilized credit lying in ARTIPL's electronic ledger as the statute does not permit the course suggested by ATIL. The Court also found that the petitioner's reliance on various case laws was misconceived or irrelevant to the specific facts and statutory provisions governing the issue. The ratio of cited judgments, which dealt with directory provisions or absence of consequences for non-compliance, did not apply as the relevant statutory provisions used the word 'shall' and mandated steps within prescribed time limits. The Court directed the Revenue to issue appropriate directions/instructions for scrupulously following statutory provisions in cases of amalgamation to avoid future complications and to take prompt steps within the time frame once amalgamation is known.
The High Court held that the writ petitions fail legal scrutiny and dismissed them, restraining itself from interfering with the impugned orders. The Court noted the flawed approach by the jurisdictional officers in dealing with the cancellation of ARTIPL's registration and the registration of ATIL. It observed that the erstwhile ARTIPL could not seek any benefit of refund from the fault of the jurisdictional officer when it was equally at fault. The Court found that ATIL could not claim the refund of unutilized credit lying in ARTIPL's electronic ledger as the statute does not permit the course suggested by ATIL. The Court also found that the petitioner's reliance on various case laws was misconceived or irrelevant to the specific facts and statutory provisions governing the issue. The ratio of cited judgments, which dealt with directory provisions or absence of consequences for non-compliance, did not apply as the relevant statutory provisions used the word 'shall' and mandated steps within prescribed time limits. The Court directed the Revenue to issue appropriate directions/instructions for scrupulously following statutory provisions in cases of amalgamation to avoid future complications and to take prompt steps within the time frame once amalgamation is known.
The High Court held that the writ petitions fail legal scrutiny and dismissed them, restraining itself from interfering with the impugned orders. The Court noted the flawed approach by the jurisdictional officers in dealing with the cancellation of ARTIPL's registration and the registration of ATIL. It observed that the erstwhile ARTIPL could not seek any benefit of refund from the fault of the jurisdictional officer when it was equally at fault. The Court found that ATIL could not claim the refund of unutilized credit lying in ARTIPL's electronic ledger as the statute does not permit the course suggested by ATIL. The Court also found that the petitioner's reliance on various case laws was misconceived or irrelevant to the specific facts and statutory provisions governing the issue. The ratio of cited judgments, which dealt with directory provisions or absence of consequences for non-compliance, did not apply as the relevant statutory provisions used the word 'shall' and mandated steps within prescribed time limits. The Court directed the Revenue to issue appropriate directions/instructions for scrupulously following statutory provisions in cases of amalgamation to avoid future complications and to take prompt steps within the time frame once amalgamation is known.