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166 orders · Page 3 of 4
The Tribunal erred by not considering the Supreme Court's decision in ICDS Ltd. and by dismissing the miscellaneous application without proper adjudication. The matter needs to be re-examined on merits.
The High Court held that electricity is movable property and the assessee, engaged in power generation, is entitled to additional depreciation. Consequently, the initiation of proceedings under Section 263 was deemed unnecessary.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, agreeing that the addition was wrongly made as the remand report established the genuineness of share transactions. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the case.
The High Court held that the original assessment order was non-speaking and did not address Section 115JB, thus the reassessment was not based on a change of opinion. The ITAT's finding was deemed perverse.
The Tribunal's decision to allow maintenance and depreciation on aircrafts, and deduction of lease rent for vehicles was upheld. The court found the aircrafts were used for business, and lease rent was a deductible revenue expenditure based on Supreme Court precedent.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the tax effect was below the monetary limit prescribed by the Central Board's circular. Therefore, the Revenue could not prosecute the appeal further.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, finding that the Commissioner's order under Section 263 was barred by limitation. The Tribunal had correctly determined the limitation period based on the original assessment order.
The High Court set aside the impugned order dated July 30, 2021, rejecting the petitioner's objection, and the subsequent notice under Section 142(1). The case was remanded to the Assessing Officer for a limited purpose: to reconsider the Tribunal's judgment in the case of Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle-6, Kolkata Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in (2016) 72 taxmann.com 116 (Kolkata-Trib.) on the issue of MAT and the petitioner's contention regarding change of opinion. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass a fresh speaking order after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner within four weeks. The subsequent proceedings under Section 147 would depend on this fresh order. The Court found the revenue's submissions unconvincing and noted the Assessing Officer's inability to demonstrate new material. The allegations in the writ petition were deemed denied by the respondents as the writ petition was disposed of at the motion stage without calling for an affidavit.
The tribunal held that the APL, through its nominees, can exercise voting rights in the tier-one companies and influence decisions in lower-tier companies as shareholders. However, the APL cannot directly interfere with the internal affairs of companies or lift the corporate veil.
The High Court permitted the Revenue to withdraw the present appeal. The reasoning was based on the Revenue's submission that the amount of income tax involved was less than ₹1 crore, which fell below the minimum limit prescribed for filing appeals in the High Court as per Circular No. 17/2019. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. However, the High Court explicitly stated that the question of law raised in the appeal was kept open. No specific finding was given on the merits of the case, and no operative directions were issued other than the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the recovery of the cash amount in accordance with law. Crucial documents and witnesses related to the seizure were not examined, and the defense's explanation for the money's source was not adequately disproven.
The Tribunal held that the revenue failed to provide sufficient evidence to doubt the genuineness of the trusts' activities. It also noted that donations to a corpus fund by a charitable trust are considered application of income, and the cancellation of registration with retrospective effect was without jurisdiction.
The High Court held that the appeal was misconceived as the order of the Commissioner under Section 263, which formed the basis for the Assessing Officer's consequential order, had already been set aside. Therefore, the consequential order was non-est.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The Court noted that the assessee had settled the dispute with the department and paid the disputed tax amount. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was disposed of as withdrawn. However, the Court explicitly stated that the substantial questions of law were left open. This means that the merits of the original dispute decided by the ITAT were not adjudicated upon by the High Court, and the withdrawal does not set any precedent on the substantive legal issues.
The tribunal decided to correct the typographical errors in its previous order. These corrections pertained to the appeal numbers, assessment years, and the correct name of the assessee.
The Court was not inclined to entertain the writ petition for a direction upon the Assessing Officer to consider the petitioner's application under Section 220(6) of the Act. The Court noted that the application was filed in September 2018, and the writ petition was filed in July 2021, without any explanation for the delay in approaching the Court, despite the petitioner claiming prejudice from the demand notices issued in 2018. The Court opined that instead of filing a writ petition, the petitioner should have taken steps to expedite the pending appeal arising from the Assessment Order and demand. Therefore, finding no merit, the writ petition was dismissed. The dismissal does not preclude the petitioner from taking steps for the expeditious disposal of its appeal before the Appellate Authority.
The High Court was not inclined to entertain the writ petition for a direction upon the Assessing Officer to consider the petitioner's application under Section 220(6) of the Act, which was filed in September 2018. The Court noted that the petitioner filed the writ petition in July 2021 without explaining the delay in approaching the Court, especially if the petitioner was prejudiced by the demand notices raised in 2018. The Court opined that instead of filing a writ petition, the petitioner should have taken steps to expedite the pending appeal before the Appellate Authority, which arose out of the impugned assessment order and demand. Finding no merit in the writ petition, it was dismissed. However, the dismissal was without prejudice to the petitioner's right to take suitable steps for the expeditious disposal of the appeal before the Appellate Authority.
The Tribunal disposed of the writ petition by granting liberty to the petitioner to file an application before the CBDT under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. This application should seek authorization for the concerned officers to consider the petitioner's claim for exemption by condoning the delay in filing Form No. 10 for the relevant assessment year. The CBDT is directed to consider and dispose of such an application within four weeks from its receipt, provided it is filed by the petitioner within three weeks from the date of the order, and to decide the case on its own merits and strictly in accordance with law. The Court explicitly stated that it had not gone into the merits of the case.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by granting liberty to the petitioner to file an application before the CBDT under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. The application should pray for authorization to the concerned officers to consider the exemption by condoning the delay in filing Form No. 10 for the relevant assessment year. If the petitioner files such an application within three weeks from the date of the order, the CBDT is directed to consider and dispose of the application within four weeks from its receipt, in accordance with law, and intimate the petitioner. The Court explicitly stated that it had not gone into the merits of the case, and the concerned authority would decide the matter on its own merits and strictly in accordance with law.
The High Court permitted the appellant (revenue) to withdraw the present appeal. The reasoning was based on the appellant's submission that the income tax involved was less than ₹1 crore, falling below the threshold prescribed by Circular No. 17/2019 for filing appeals in the High Court. The Tribunal's order dated September 13, 2017, was thus not adjudicated on its merits. The High Court explicitly stated that the question of law raised in the appeal was kept open. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal did not decide the substantive issues of the appeal on merits. Instead, the appeal was disposed of based on a procedural ground. The appellant (Revenue) sought permission to withdraw the appeal, citing that the income tax involved was below the minimum limit prescribed for filing appeals in the High Court as per CBDT Circular No.17/2019. The Court granted this permission. The operative direction was to dispose of the present appeal, keeping open the question of law raised therein. This implies that the appeal was not decided on its merits, and the legal question remains unresolved for future consideration if a similar situation arises with a higher monetary threshold.
The High Court disposed of the appeal by dismissing it, noting that the amount of tax involved was below the minimum limit prescribed for filing appeals in the High Court as per Circular No.17/2019. The Court's reasoning was based on the explicit instruction in the circular regarding the monetary threshold for appeals. While the appeal was dismissed on procedural grounds related to the tax effect, the Court explicitly stated that the questions of law raised in the appeal were kept open. Therefore, no decision was made on the merits of the substantive issues.
The High Court permitted the Revenue to withdraw the present appeal. The Court disposed of the appeal, however, explicitly keeping open the question of law that was raised therein. This means that while the appeal itself was withdrawn and not decided on its merits, the legal issue remains undecided and could potentially be raised in future proceedings. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as withdrawn, with a specific rider preserving the question of law.
The High Court permitted the Revenue to withdraw the present appeal. The court noted the submission by the Revenue's counsel regarding the income tax involved being less than ₹ one crore, which falls below the minimum limit for pursuing appeals in the High Court as per Circular No. 17/2019. The appeal was disposed of accordingly. However, the court explicitly stated that the question of law raised in the appeal remains open. No specific finding was made on the merits of the case, and no operative directions for deletion or remand were issued.
The High Court held that a show-cause notice under Section 274, when issued after the Assessing Officer has recorded particulars of concealed income in the assessment order, is a valid notice for penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c). Such notice complies with the principles of natural justice.
The High Court dismissed the appeal at the admission stage. It held that the question of law framed by the appellant was not a substantial question of law, citing previous similar orders.
The Tribunal held that the revenue's contention that the matter was time-barred was not acceptable. The assessment order to be revised was received by the petitioner on February 4, 2020, and the limitation period for passing the impugned order was two years from that date, meaning it would become barred on February 3, 2022. Therefore, the PCIT had sufficient time to consider the petitioner's objection dated March 26, 2021, before passing the order on March 29, 2021. The Tribunal found that the PCIT had hastily passed the order without considering the objection, leading to a violation of the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the impugned order dated March 29, 2021, was set aside. The Tribunal directed the PCIT to reconsider the petitioner's case afresh, pass a reasoned and speaking order after providing an opportunity of hearing, and strictly in accordance with law within eight weeks. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not gone into the merits of the case.
The tribunal held that the APL, through its nominees, can exercise voting rights in the tier-one companies and influence decisions in lower-tier companies as shareholders. However, the APL cannot directly interfere with the internal affairs of companies or lift the corporate veil.
The High Court held that since the assessee had settled the dispute with the department and paid the entire amount of disputed tax under the Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020, the present appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed as withdrawn. The court explicitly stated that the substantial questions of law were left open, meaning the merits of the original ITAT order were not adjudicated upon. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court, while noting that it was not fully convinced with the reasons provided by the Revenue for the enormous delay of 979 days, decided not to adopt a technical approach. The Court observed that the impugned ITAT order dismissed the Revenue's appeal by following the assessee's own case for assessment years 2008-09 and 2009-10. It was also noted that the Revenue had previously withdrawn appeals against the ITAT's orders for those years due to the assessee's participation in the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme. Therefore, to consider the correctness of the ITAT's decision, the matter needed to be heard on its merits. The Court exercised its discretion to condone the delay to allow the appeal to be considered. The application for condonation of delay was allowed.
The High Court allowed the Revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted the submission by the Revenue's counsel that the amount of income tax involved was less than ₹ 1 crore, which was below the minimum limit prescribed for filing or pursuing appeals in the High Court as per Circular No. 17/2019. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. However, the Court explicitly stated that the questions of law raised in the appeal were kept open. No specific findings were made on the merits of the ITAT's order, and no operative directions were issued beyond the dismissal as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the Entry Tax Act, 2012 was in force at the time of its amendment and that the amendments introduced by the West Bengal Finance Act, 2017 were valid and not discriminatory. Consequently, the impugned order of the learned tribunal was set aside.
The High Court held that the writ petitions filed by the Central Board of Trustees (EPFO) are maintainable, even if the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (RPFC) or Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner (APFC) had made partial recovery of dues. The Court found that the EPF Appellate Tribunal's orders were subject to judicial review under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
The High Court held that the writ petitions filed by the Central Board of Trustees (EPFO) are maintainable, even if the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (RPFC) or Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner (APFC) had made partial recovery of dues. The Court found that the EPF Appellate Tribunal's orders were subject to judicial review under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
The High Court dismissed the revenue's application for condonation of delay. The Court found that the revenue would not be entitled to the benefit of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Furthermore, the affidavit filed in support of the application did not provide any reasons, let alone satisfactory reasons, to condone the inordinate delay of 614 days. Consequently, the appeal filed by the revenue was rejected. The connected stay application was also closed as a result of the dismissal of the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that an inordinate delay without satisfactory reasons cannot be condoned, even if there is a general extension order from the Supreme Court, if the facts do not warrant its application.
The tribunal held that the APL, through its nominees, can exercise voting rights in the tier-one companies and influence decisions in lower-tier companies as shareholders. However, the APL cannot directly interfere with the internal affairs of companies or lift the corporate veil.
The High Court permitted the appellant to withdraw the present appeal. The reasoning provided is that the appellant intends to pursue its application under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2020. The Court granted liberty to the appellant as prayed for. No specific issue was decided on merits, and the appeal was disposed of based on the appellant's request to withdraw.
The High Court permitted the appellant to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with the legal issue raised being kept open.