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929 tribunal orders from the Jodhpur bench in 2026.
Showing 40 of 929 orders. Use the months below for the rest.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 of the Act, though dated 31.03.2021, was dispatched on 01.04.2021 as per the ITBA portal screenshot and email record. The Tribunal noted that the amended provisions of Sections 148 and 148A of the Act, effective from 01.04.2021, mandate certain procedures, including conducting an enquiry and providing an opportunity of being heard, which were not followed. Relying on various High Court judgments (M/s Navyug Eduventure Private Ltd., Sumanjeet Agarwal, Sharad Garg, Daujee Abhushan Bhandar (P.) Ltd., and Kalyan Chillara), the Tribunal concluded that the mere generation or digital signing of a notice does not amount to issuance; the dispatch date is crucial. Since the notice was dispatched after the prescribed limitation period of 31.03.2021, it was considered barred by limitation and without jurisdiction. Consequently, all proceedings initiated pursuant to this notice were liable to be quashed. The appeal was allowed on this ground, rendering other grounds not requiring specific adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was passed ex parte and the first appeal was dismissed as time-barred without considering the merits. The Tribunal noted the assessee's submission that they only became aware of the proceedings on 30.09.2022 when a penalty demand notice was received, and that the CIT(A) declined to condone the delay. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition versus Mst Katiji, the Tribunal emphasized the need for a liberal approach in condoning delay to enable disposal on merits and achieve substantial justice. The Tribunal found that to ensure issues are decided on merits and to achieve the goal of justice, the appellant should be allowed to submit an explanation with documentary evidence. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication after providing an effective opportunity of being heard. The appellant was also directed to cooperate in the assessment proceedings. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that an assessment or reassessment notice issued and finalized in the name of a dead person is void ab initio and a fundamental jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured under Sections 292B or 292BB of the Act. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had ignored the material fact that the assessee had expired on November 17, 2020, and the first notice under Section 148 was issued on March 31, 2021, after the assessee's death. The CIT(A) also failed to consider the established legal position and the judicial precedents cited by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) disposed of the appeal by suggesting a fresh assessment order be passed, which was inappropriate given the fundamental flaw. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders passed against the deceased assessee as invalid and void ab initio. The findings in the lead case (ITA No. 1167/Jodh/2025) were applied mutatis mutandis to ITA Nos. 1168 and 1169/Jodh/2025. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that an assessment or reassessment notice issued and finalized in the name of a dead person is void ab initio and a fundamental jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured under Sections 292B or 292BB of the Act. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had ignored the material fact that the assessee had expired on November 17, 2020, and the first notice under Section 148 was issued on March 31, 2021, after the assessee's death. The CIT(A) also failed to consider the established legal position and the judicial precedents cited by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) disposed of the appeal by suggesting a fresh assessment order be passed, which was inappropriate given the fundamental flaw. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders passed against the deceased assessee as invalid and void ab initio. The findings in the lead case (ITA No. 1167/Jodh/2025) were applied mutatis mutandis to ITA Nos. 1168 and 1169/Jodh/2025. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the JCIT(A) and CPC erred in not allowing the full credit of TDS amounting to ₹99,850/-. The Tribunal noted that the assessee is a 'Kaccha Arhatia' acting as a middleman, and as per CBDT Circular No. 452 dated March 17, 1986, such agents act only as agents of their constituents and not as principals. The Tribunal found that the JCIT(A) had not appreciated the facts correctly. Following the decisions of coordinate benches in similar cases and in light of CBDT Circular No. 452 of 1986, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to examine and verify the contents of Form 26AS at the time of giving appeal effect and grant credit for the TDS mismatch, if any, to the appellant, subject to the provisions of Section 199 of the Income Tax Act and Rule 37BA of the Income Tax Rules. The AO was instructed to verify total receipts in Form 26AS and ITR and give TDS credit if the corresponding income was offered for taxation by the assessee, the Kachha Adatiya, or its principal in the relevant year. The appeal of the assessee was accordingly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the learned CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal in limine without properly adjudicating the application for condonation of delay. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) observed the petition for condonation was not proper and lacked reasons. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition versus Mst. Katiji, the Tribunal emphasized that the power to condone delay is intended to facilitate substantial justice on merits and that the term 'sufficient cause' is broad enough to serve the ends of justice. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) adopted a pedantic approach. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) to ensure the goal of justice and disposal of issues on merits. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to decide the application for condonation of delay and, if sufficient cause is found, to admit the appeal and adjudicate the grounds on merits. The appellant was to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to furnish relevant documents and submissions. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh consideration of the application for condonation of delay. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and decide the issue of condonation of delay afresh in accordance with law. If the delay is ultimately condoned, the CIT(A) shall then adjudicate the appeal on merits. The Tribunal clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the additions/disallowances. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. The ratio decidendi is that procedural technicalities should not bar the adjudication of an appeal on merits, especially when a plausible explanation for delay is provided, and a liberal approach is warranted in the interest of justice.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeal deserved to be allowed. The decision was based on the submissions advanced by the assessee, the factual matrix of the case, and following a Coordinate Bench decision in similar cases, as well as CBDT Circular No. 452 dated March 17, 1986. The Tribunal directed the Learned Assessing Officer (AO) to examine and verify the contents of Form 26AS at the time of giving appeal effect and grant credit for any TDS mismatch to the appellant assessee. The reasoning was that the assessee, acting as a 'Kaccha Arhatia' (a middleman), sells crops on behalf of farmers, and according to the circular, such transactions are not to be treated as the agent's turnover. Therefore, the TDS credit should be allowed if the corresponding income has been offered for taxation by the assessee, the Kaccha Adatiya, or its principal. The Tribunal noted that the issue had been decided by a coordinate bench in the case of Rajender Kumar Legha (ITA No. 1038/Jodh/2025) and other similar cases.
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order passed by the CIT(A) and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to afford a reasonable and effective opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to cooperate in the proceedings and furnish all necessary submissions and evidence. The CIT(A) is to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law, without being influenced by the observations made in the present order. The primary reasoning for this decision was the assessee's contention that an adjournment request was not properly addressed by the CIT(A) before passing the order. The Tribunal found merit in this procedural grievance. No specific findings were made on the substantive issues of the assessment.
The Tribunal found considerable cogency in the submissions made by the appellant. It held that in order to achieve the object of justice and ensure disposal of issues on their merits, the delay in filing the appeal should have been condoned. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) to the extent challenged. The matter was remitted back to the file of the learned CIT(E) with a direction to examine the issue afresh and decide it in accordance with the law. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the proceedings and furnish all relevant details and evidence. The Tribunal noted that the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 2,00,000/- deserved to be deleted. The reasoning was based on respectfully following the judicial precedents cited by the assessee's counsel, which were considered squarely applicable to the present case. Specifically, the Tribunal referred to the principles laid down in *Jayshriben Bipinchandra Modi vs. ITO Ahmedabad*, where cash payments explained as domestic savings, pin money, and small contributions were held to warrant deletion of additions due to the diminutive nature of the amount. Similarly, in *Avinash Singla vs. DCIT Ludhiana*, where cash was explained as past family savings and gifts, and a substantial amount was declared in a company to cover irregularities, the Tribunal found the availability of cash sources established. The Tribunal concluded that the addition of Rs. 2,00,000/- should be deleted, thereby allowing the appeal. The operative direction was the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal noted that the appeal was preferred against the order dated 16.03.2026, passed by the NFAC, Delhi, which had dismissed the assessee's appeal against an order under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The judgment, however, does not contain any discussion or findings on the merits of the case, nor does it record the arguments presented by either the assessee or the revenue. Consequently, the Tribunal has not decided the issue regarding the validity of the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) or the correctness of the NFAC's order. No operative directions or relief granted are mentioned, and no issue was expressly left undecided as the core matter was not adjudicated.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 245 days in filing the appeal, finding that the appellant had sufficient cause and that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate, in order to ensure substantive justice. Regarding the merits, the Tribunal noted that the assessment order was passed ex parte and non-responsive. Consequently, the impugned order of the NFAC was set aside to the extent challenged. The matter was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) with a direction to examine the issue afresh. The AO was instructed to consider the submissions and evidence furnished by the appellant and afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Simultaneously, the appellant was directed to cooperate with the assessment proceedings and furnish all relevant details and evidence as and when called for. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that an assessment or reassessment notice issued and finalized in the name of a dead person is void ab initio and a fundamental jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured under Sections 292B or 292BB of the Act. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had ignored the material fact that the assessee had expired on November 17, 2020, and the first notice under Section 148 was issued on March 31, 2021, after the assessee's death. The CIT(A) also failed to consider the established legal position and the judicial precedents cited by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) disposed of the appeal by suggesting a fresh assessment order be passed, which was inappropriate given the fundamental flaw. The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders passed against the deceased assessee as invalid and void ab initio. The findings in the lead case (ITA No. 1167/Jodh/2025) were applied mutatis mutandis to ITA Nos. 1168 and 1169/Jodh/2025. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 31 days in filing the appeals before it, adopting a liberal approach as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector Of Land Acquisition versus Mrs. Katiji and others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC). The Tribunal found the explanation furnished by the assessee satisfactory, considering the facts and circumstances. Since the Learned CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals without adjudicating the grounds on merits, the ITAT, in the interest of justice, set aside the order of the Learned CIT(A) to the extent of the dismissal on account of delay. The matter was restored to the file of the Learned CIT(A) with a direction to admit the appeals and decide them on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was permitted to adduce necessary evidence and explanations. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the grounds raised by the assessee, leaving all issues open for adjudication by the Learned CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeal should be allowed. Following the decisions of coordinate benches in similar cases and relying on CBDT Circular No. 452 dated March 17, 1986, the Tribunal directed the Learned AO to examine and verify the contents of Form 26AS at the time of giving appeal effect. The AO was instructed to grant credit for any TDS mismatch to the appellant assessee. The reasoning was based on the principle that a 'Kaccha Arhatia' acts as an agent and not a principal, and sales made on behalf of principals should not be included in the agent's turnover. The Tribunal acknowledged that the TDS credit is dependent on the filing of TDS statements by the deductor and that the assessee has the liberty to get rectified TDS statements issued. The ratio decidendi is that TDS credit should be allowed if the corresponding income is offered for taxation, and the AO must verify Form 26AS and grant credit for TDS mismatch after due verification, considering the nature of business as an agent.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 31 days in filing the appeals before it, adopting a liberal approach as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector Of Land Acquisition versus Mrs. Katiji and others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC). The Tribunal found the explanation furnished by the assessee satisfactory, considering the facts and circumstances. Since the Learned CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals without adjudicating the grounds on merits, the ITAT, in the interest of justice, set aside the order of the Learned CIT(A) to the extent of the dismissal on account of delay. The matter was restored to the file of the Learned CIT(A) with a direction to admit the appeals and decide them on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was permitted to adduce necessary evidence and explanations. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the grounds raised by the assessee, leaving all issues open for adjudication by the Learned CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that while the appellant had a duty to appear and cooperate with the authorities, the principles of natural justice mandate that disputes should be decided on merits after providing a due opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal without adjudicating the grounds on merit. Considering the facts and circumstances and the substantial cause of justice, the Tribunal decided to provide one more opportunity to the appellant to contest the appeal on merits. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT(A) to provide a meaningful and effective opportunity of being heard. The appellant was directed to appear before the CIT(A) within 60 days. The Tribunal clarified that this decision does not reflect on the merits of the dispute, which are to be adjudicated independently by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the appeal deserved to be allowed by deleting the addition in question. The Tribunal noted that there was no contrary material before the lower authorities to suggest the appellant had income other than agricultural sources. The AO had reduced the agricultural income to Rs. 3,00,000 from Rs. 6,12,500, stating a lack of evidence regarding the cultivation of land in the mother's name. However, the CIT(A) had accepted the appellant's plea, considering the scale of landholding, seasonality of sales, and absence of competing non-agricultural activities. The Tribunal found merit in the submission that the AO's reduction of agricultural income was arbitrary. Consequently, the Tribunal decided to delete the addition in question. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 31 days in filing the appeals before it, adopting a liberal approach as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector Of Land Acquisition versus Mrs. Katiji and others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC). The Tribunal found the explanation furnished by the assessee satisfactory, considering the facts and circumstances. Since the Learned CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals without adjudicating the grounds on merits, the ITAT, in the interest of justice, set aside the order of the Learned CIT(A) to the extent of the dismissal on account of delay. The matter was restored to the file of the Learned CIT(A) with a direction to admit the appeals and decide them on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was permitted to adduce necessary evidence and explanations. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the grounds raised by the assessee, leaving all issues open for adjudication by the Learned CIT(A).
The Tribunal acknowledged the significant delay of 1042 days in filing the appeal. The assessee had filed an application for condonation of delay, supported by an affidavit, and argued that the delay was not intentional and that sufficient cause existed. The Tribunal, after considering the submissions, decided to set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the file of the learned CIT(E) with a specific direction to examine the issue afresh. This examination was to be conducted after considering the submissions and evidence furnished by the assessee and after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was also directed to cooperate with the assessment proceedings and furnish all relevant details. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, indicating that the procedural defect (delay) led to a remand for fresh consideration on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not properly considered the explanation provided by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeal and had dismissed the appeal in limine. To meet the ends of justice, the Tribunal decided to provide the assessee with one more opportunity to be heard. The delay was condoned, and the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to provide a meaningful and effective opportunity of being heard to the assessee and decide the appeal afresh on merits. The Tribunal clarified that this decision was not an expression on the merits of the dispute, which would be adjudicated independently by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the ex-parte completion of appellate proceedings by the Learned CIT(A) was against the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that both the AO and CIT(A) observed a lack of required documents and submissions from the appellant, leading to ex-parte orders. The Tribunal opined that matters should be decided on merits, avoiding a purely technical viewpoint. Therefore, providing the appellant one more opportunity to present their case was deemed justified. Consequently, the impugned order of the NFAC was set aside to the extent challenged. The matter was restored to the file of the learned Assessing Officer with a direction to examine the issue afresh after considering the submissions and evidence furnished by the appellant and affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The appellant was also directed to cooperate with the assessment proceedings and furnish all relevant details. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the enhanced exemption limit of Rs. 25,00,000/-, as prescribed by CBDT Notification No. 31/2023 dated 24.05.2023, is applicable to the leave encashment received by the assessee on retirement during the year relevant to Assessment Year 2021-22. The Tribunal noted that coordinate Benches of the Tribunal have consistently allowed the benefit of the enhanced limit in similar cases, citing decisions like Renu Moongia, Ram Charan Gupta, and Govind Chhatwani. The Tribunal agreed with the principle that CBDT circulars, if beneficial to the assessee, can mitigate the rigors of the law. Since the assessee's leave encashment amount of Rs. 5,25,698/- is below the enhanced limit, the assessee is eligible for exemption of the entire amount. The order of the Addl. CIT(A) was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the assessee's claim for exemption of Rs. 5,25,698/- under Section 10(10AA) of the Act.
The Tribunal, considering the ex-parte order passed by the CIT(A) and the submissions of the assessee, deemed it fit to set aside the matter back to the file of the CIT(A). The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to grant one more opportunity of hearing to the assessee, verify all relevant documents to be filed by the assessee, and then pass a fresh order in accordance with the provisions of law. The assessee was also directed to cooperate by filing all required documents. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's grounds of appeal raised substantial issues regarding the existence of the firm, ownership of the bank account, potential double taxation, and incorrect PAN mapping, which warranted a decision on merits. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the penalty imposed under Section 271C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is liable to be deleted. The reasoning was based on the appellate order passed in the case of the assessee's wife, who was a co-owner of the same property. In that case, the CIT(A) had deleted the penalty by observing that the seller had duly disclosed the entire sale consideration in their Income Tax Return (ITR), claimed deductions under Section 54, and paid the due taxes. Furthermore, a Form 26A certificate from a Chartered Accountant was provided, confirming the seller's compliance. The Tribunal noted that the facts in the present case were identical, except for the assessee being the other co-owner. Therefore, following the precedent set in the wife's case, the penalty was deleted. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had paid the interest due under Section 201/201(1A) of the Act. The appeal was allowed, and the penalty was deleted.
The ITAT, following a decision of a Coordinate Bench for the Assessment Year 2015-16 in the assessee's own case, found the issue squarely covered. It held that the interest rate paid was at arm's length and consequently deleted the disallowance.
The Tribunal deleted the Section 44AD additions, finding the cash deposits explained and unsecured loans to be opening balances from prior years. It also deleted the interest income addition, noting the nexus with interest expenditure, and the Section 68 addition for sundry creditors as they were opening balances, consequently deleting the Section 69C disallowance.
The Tribunal held that Rs. 1.00 lakh of the receipt was a refund of security deposit and not income. Furthermore, receipts cannot be taxed on a gross basis without allowing for expenses incurred in earning them. The addition was deemed unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the addition was not justified as it was based solely on a loose sheet found in another party's premises, without any corroborative evidence from the assessee's side. The Tribunal noted that a similar addition in the case of the purchaser (BGCCPL) had already been deleted by a Coordinate Bench.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence, including party-wise details, invoices, and transportation documents, to establish the source of cash deposits as sales proceeds. Therefore, the addition made by the Assessing Officer was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the addition was unsustainable as the assessee had provided account confirmations from the lenders, and the loans were availed and repaid through banking channels in earlier years.
The Tribunal found that the credit and debit entries in the bank account represented loans given and recovered, which was the assessee's primary activity. The AO failed to provide credible material to justify the addition made on a presumptive business profit basis.
The tribunal noted that the assessee wished to withdraw the appeal and the Ld. DR had no objection. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that Section 87A provides rebate on the entire tax liability computed on total income without distinguishing between normal and special rate incomes. The proviso to Section 87A and the non-obstante clause in Section 115BAC(1A) do not exclude special rate incomes from the rebate calculation for the relevant assessment year.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's jurisdiction to cancel the registration was not established as the Revenue failed to produce any order under section 127 or other jurisdictional instruments. Consequently, the impugned order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of books of account was unsustainable as the assessee had provided sufficient explanation and supporting documents. The addition under section 69A was deleted because the cash deposited was recorded in the books and did not exceed the cash balance, and the revenue failed to establish an undisclosed source.
The Tribunal held that the addition sustained by the CIT(A) could not be upheld as the sales and trading results were not disturbed, and the revenue failed to establish any separate undisclosed source. Assessing the amount again under section 68 would result in double inclusion of business receipts.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) was justified in not treating the proposal for amendment dated 20.06.2025 as an effective amendment until approved and registered under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, citing *Palghat Shadi Mahal Trust* and *CIT v. Dawoodi Bohara Jamat*. However, the Tribunal found that the CIT(E) rejected the application solely on the potential applicability of section 13(1)(b) and clause (d) of the Explanation below section 12AB(4), without identifying actual application of income constituting a violation. The Tribunal noted that while an object might refer to needy persons of the Jain community, assistance to the poor is essentially relief to the poor, and the restriction on beneficiaries may have consequences under section 13(1)(b) during exemption assessment, but does not convert the activity's nature from charitable to non-charitable for registration purposes. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee that the applicability of section 13(1)(b) is generally for the Assessing Officer to examine during assessment based on actual application of income. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the application to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, directing the assessee to provide the current status of amendments, the amended deed if registered, evidence of approval, a note on activities, books of account, and beneficiary details. The CIT(E) is to examine the legal efficacy of amendments, the genuineness of activities, and compliance with laws, and not reject the application based on the mere possibility of section 13(1)(b) applicability. The Tribunal did not express a final opinion on the assessee's entitlement to registration.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) failed to adjudicate the grounds of appeal properly, including jurisdictional objections, the denial of cross-examination, and the treatment of additional evidence. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.