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1,215 orders · Page 8 of 25
The Tribunal held that the issuance of a Section 153C notice in the name of the deceased assessee, without it being subsequently re-issued in the name of the legal heir after being duly intimated of the death, renders the entire proceedings void. Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents establishing that such a procedural lapse is fatal to the jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was vitiated as it was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, considering the draft assessment orders were forwarded without the complete assessment record. The approvals were found to be composite for multiple years and thus not in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that technical aspects must yield to the cause of substantial justice. Quoting the Supreme Court in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), the Tribunal emphasized that procedural delays should not be a bar to the adjudication of a case on merits when there are justifiable reasons. The CIT(A)/NFAC's refusal to condone the significant delay of 692 days was set aside. The Tribunal restored the assessee's appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication on its merits. The taxpayer was directed to plead and prove their case at their own risk and responsibility. The CIT(A)/NFAC was given three effective opportunities to adjudicate the matter. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's order was passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The primary issue was the allowability of certain expenses claimed by the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer had disallowed these expenses on the grounds that they were not substantiated or were not incurred for the purpose of business. The assessee contended that sufficient evidence was provided and that the disallowance was arbitrary. The Tribunal, after considering the submissions of both parties and the material on record, found that the Assessing Officer had not properly examined the evidence submitted by the assessee. The Tribunal held that the disallowance of expenses was premature and lacked proper reasoning. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the Assessing Officer and remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after considering all the evidence and providing a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to pass a speaking order after due verification.
The Tribunal held that money collected by a company cannot be assessed in the hands of its director as unexplained money. If an addition is to be made, it should be in the hands of the company, not the director.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal observed that in the assessment proceedings, the assessee had not provided adequate details, with the counsel submitting that notices were not received. It was also noted that the CIT(A) sustained the additions in the absence of any submissions from the assessee. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore all appeals to the file of the AO for a fresh assessment. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the appeals were restored to the AO for deciding the issues afresh after providing an adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee for statistical purposes. No specific finding was given on the merits of the grounds raised, as the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, making it invalid. Consequently, the entire proceedings initiated under section 153C read with section 153A were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was vitiated as it was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, considering the draft assessment orders were forwarded without the complete assessment record. The approvals were found to be composite for multiple years and thus not in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act dated 27.07.2022 was beyond the period of limitation. It was observed that the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) was not applicable for reopening assessments for AY 2015-16, as conceded by the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders in all eight cases were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed as being barred by limitation.
The Tribunal observed that the addition was made substantively for AY 2017-18 and protectively for other years, leading to potential double taxation. The assessee argued he was merely an employee and not involved in IFAMA's financial activities.
The Tribunal held that Section 153D approval is not a mere formality but requires an independent application of mind. It found the impugned approvals to be vitiated for not being granted in accordance with law and for being a composite approval for multiple years.
The Tribunal observed that the addition was made substantively for AY 2017-18 and protectively for other years, leading to potential double taxation. The assessee argued he was merely an employee and not involved in IFAMA's financial activities.
The tribunal noted that the lower appellate authority did not follow the proper procedure of framing points of determination and providing a detailed discussion. Considering the additional evidence filed by the assessee and the possibility of communication gaps due to the new faceless hearing system, the tribunal decided to restore the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the penalty paid for late supply of goods, as per tender conditions, is a breach of contract and not an offense. Therefore, it should be allowed as a business expenditure under Section 37.
The Tribunal, following the ratio of the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Roca Bathroom Products (P) Ltd. and numerous orders of co-ordinate benches, held that the impugned Final Assessment Orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and material on record. Citing the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PCIT vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Southern Gujarat Chamber Trade and Industrial Development Centre vs. ITO, and the ITAT Mumbai Bench in DCIT vs. Prasad Shetty, the Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was indeed barred by limitation. The Tribunal found that the reassessment proceedings were not completed within the surviving time limit as stipulated by the law and judicial pronouncements.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a complete statutory cycle for assessments involving draft orders and DRP directions, and its time limits are not superseded by Section 153. The special regime of Section 144C governs the period from the draft order to the final assessment order.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions without a remand report from the AO was not sustainable. In the interest of justice, the case was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after considering the additional evidence and providing the assessee with an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders in all five cases were passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was quashed on this limited legal issue.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessments involving the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), and its time limits are to be applied independently of Section 153. The provisions of Section 144C are intended to provide an alternate dispute resolution mechanism and do not render the assessment void if the final order is passed within the time stipulated by Section 144C, even if it exceeds the general time limits of Section 153.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessment orders involving eligible assessees and the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). The time taken for this process under Section 144C is not subject to the general limitation period prescribed under Section 153.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC proceeded ex-parte and that there might have been communication gaps due to the new faceless hearing system. Therefore, to meet the ends of justice, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after the draft order, which operates notwithstanding the general limitation in Section 153. The assessee cannot contend that the assessment is void due to time consumed in the statutorily created DRP process.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C, which deals with the process of passing a final assessment order after a draft order, operates independently of the general limitation period prescribed under Section 153. The special regime under Section 144C governs the time from the draft order to the final order.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessments involving eligible assessees, and its timelines operate independently of Section 153. The time consumed in DRP proceedings is statutorily created for the benefit of the assessee and does not render the assessment void.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was vitiated as it was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, considering the draft assessment orders were forwarded without the complete assessment record. The approvals were found to be composite for multiple years and thus not in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was vitiated as it was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, considering the draft assessment orders were forwarded without the complete assessment record. The approvals were found to be composite for multiple years and thus not in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that since the CIT(A)/NFAC had proceeded ex-parte against the assessee, there was a possibility of communication gaps, especially with the newly introduced system of faceless hearings. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the assessee's appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. The appeal was to be adjudicated within three effective opportunities, with the rider that the taxpayer would plead and prove their case at their own risk and responsibility. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal for statistical purposes only. No specific issue was left undecided; the decision was to remand the matter for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had already significantly reduced the estimated gross profit from 8% to 5%. Given the assessee's failure to produce books of accounts, the Tribunal found no merit in the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had co-purchased the immovable property with his brother, Shri Abbas. Applying the principle that in the absence of contrary proof, co-purchasers are presumed to acquire property to the extent of their half share each, the addition was restricted to Rs. 8.36 lakhs (half of Rs. 16.73 lakhs). Regarding the quantification of the addition, the Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of accumulated past savings of the assessee and his family. In these peculiar facts, a lumpsum addition of Rs. 5 lakhs was deemed just and proper, with a clear rider that this would not be treated as a precedent. Consequently, the assessee received relief of Rs. 11.73 lakhs (Rs. 16.73 lakhs - Rs. 5 lakhs). The Tribunal directed that necessary computation shall follow as per law. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal observed that a regular assessment under section 143(3) had already been completed after scrutiny of share application money. As this fact was undisputed by the Revenue, the Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A) that the reopening constituted a mere change of opinion.
The Tribunal noted that the lands in question were previously treated by the Assessing Officer, following revision directions from the PCIT, as not being a "capital" asset under section 2(14) of the Act. This factual position remained unrebutted by the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was passed beyond the time limit prescribed under Section 144C(13) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed as invalid.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after a draft order. It reasoned that Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent stages, making the time windows within Section 144C effective and not redundant.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle with its own distinct timelines, operating independently of Section 153 for the period after the draft assessment order. The assessment orders were not barred by limitation as Section 144C provides a special mechanism for dispute resolution.
The Tribunal held that the learned lower authorities' action in making the impugned addition as unexplained investment in the assessee's hand would not be upheld, as the source of funds was established through banking channels from a trustee whose creditworthiness was not disputed.
The Tribunal held that Sections 144C and 153 of the Income Tax Act are mutually inclusive and the limitation period under Section 153 is applicable. Consequently, the final assessment orders for AYs 2010-11 and 2011-12 were found to be passed beyond the period of limitation, rendering them without jurisdiction.
The CIT(A) annulled the assessment order by following the Delhi High Court's judgment in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd., holding that the date of receipt of seized material by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person is the trigger for calculating the block period. The assessment year 2012-13 was found to be outside the permissible block period.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had duly explained the source of the impugned cash deposits. The reasoning was based on the admitted facts that the assessee owned 37 Bighas of agricultural land in Yamuna Nagar and had consistently shown cash withdrawals almost of Rs. 3.5 lakhs preceding the deposits in question. Faced with this evidence, the Tribunal concluded that the explanation provided by the assessee, attributing the deposits to both agricultural income and past savings, could not be denied. Consequently, the impugned addition of Rs. 18,80,500/- was deleted. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds as they were purely legal and did not require further verification. Citing various High Court and Tribunal judgments, the Tribunal found that the assessment order was indeed time-barred.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition. The assessee company received share premium of Rs.14,28,00,000/- and share capital of Rs.12,00,000/-. While copies of agreements were filed, the parties summoned by the Assessing Officer failed to appear. Based on irregularities found and the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method submitted by the Department, the assessee's position remained unsubstantiated and was rejected. The fair market value of the shares was assessed, leading to the addition. Consequently, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) was deemed not just, fair, reasonable, and legal. The ground of appeal by the Department was accepted. The operative direction was to set aside the CIT(A)'s order and allow the Department's appeal.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The impugned order was quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessment year in question was unabated. The addition in such cases must be based on relevant seized material. The satisfaction note for section 153C proceedings mentioned seized material pertaining to financial years 2012-13 and 2013-14, not the assessment year 2016-17. Therefore, the PCIT could not have directed re-framing of the assessment.
The Tribunal, following the ratio of the Madras High Court in Roca Bathroom Products and other coordinate bench decisions, held that the assessment order was barred by limitation. The Tribunal noted that a mere pendency of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court does not obliterate the binding nature of a High Court judgment.
The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had confirmed the additions made by the AO under Section 153A of the Act. However, in the absence of any supporting material, the grounds of appeal were found to be untenable.