ITAT Delhi Judgments — January 2026

The Tribunal noted that the assessment year in question was unabated. The addition in such cases must be based on relevant seized material. The satisfaction note for section 153C proceedings mentioned seized material pertaining to financial years 2012-13 and 2013-14, not the assessment year 2016-17. Therefore, the PCIT could not have directed re-framing of the assessment.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had duly explained the source of the impugned cash deposits. The reasoning was based on the admitted facts that the assessee owned 37 Bighas of agricultural land in Yamuna Nagar and had consistently shown cash withdrawals almost of Rs. 3.5 lakhs preceding the deposits in question. Faced with this evidence, the Tribunal concluded that the explanation provided by the assessee, attributing the deposits to both agricultural income and past savings, could not be denied. Consequently, the impugned addition of Rs. 18,80,500/- was deleted. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal.

The tribunal noted that the appeal had a tax effect less than Rs.60 lakhs, categorizing it as a low tax effect appeal according to CBDT circulars. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on this ground.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) passed a non-speaking order, which is not sustainable in law. Therefore, the issues were sent back to the CIT(A) to adjudicate on merits by passing a speaking order and to decide the legal issue regarding common approval under section 153D.

The Tribunal restored the matters back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration after giving the assessee an opportunity to be heard and to make the requisite compliance. The assessee was also directed to remain vigilant.

The Tribunal noted that the tent house was booked by the assessee's father, Late Shri Narinder Kumar Garg. Since the assessee's name did not appear in the recipient's books for the payment, it was assumed that the father made the remaining payment.

The Tribunal held that the appellant had not established himself as a legal representative according to the statutory definitions. Therefore, the appeal was not maintainable at this stage.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee did not comply with the notices issued by the CIT(A) and also failed to provide requisite documents before the AO. However, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and remanded the matter to the AO.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had passed a cryptic order relying solely on the assessee's submissions without independent findings on the documentary evidence. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal found that the AO failed to establish that the sales were not genuine, despite the assessee providing documentary evidence. The addition was considered arbitrary and potentially leading to double taxation. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had complied with all tax obligations.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) passed a non-speaking order, which is not sustainable in law. Therefore, the issues were sent back to the CIT(A) to adjudicate on merits by passing a speaking order and to decide the legal issue regarding common approval under section 153D.

The Tribunal restored the matters back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration after giving the assessee an opportunity to be heard and to make the requisite compliance. The assessee was also directed to remain vigilant.

The Tribunal held that the notice for reassessment was not validly issued either under the "old" scheme (on or before 01.04.2021) or the "new" scheme. Consequently, the impugned reopening was quashed.

The Tribunal noted that while the nature of the assessee's business might allow for cash transactions, the issue of bogus purchases has been decided with divergent views by various judicial precedents. Considering the peculiar facts and the interest of justice, a lumpsum disallowance of 5% of the alleged bogus purchases or the assessee's regular GP, whichever is higher, is deemed appropriate.

The Tribunal noted that while the nature of the assessee's business might allow for cash transactions, the issue of bogus purchases has been decided with divergent views by various judicial precedents. Considering the peculiar facts and the interest of justice, a lumpsum disallowance of 5% of the alleged bogus purchases or the assessee's regular GP, whichever is higher, is deemed appropriate.

The Tribunal observed that a regular assessment under section 143(3) had already been completed after scrutiny of share application money. As this fact was undisputed by the Revenue, the Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A) that the reopening constituted a mere change of opinion.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals. On the primary issue concerning the validity of Section 153C proceedings, the Tribunal, following the Delhi High Court's decision in Saksham Commodities (supra), held that the satisfaction note recorded by the AO was invalid. The AO had failed to record satisfaction that the entries in the seized diary "pertained to the assessee" and "have the bearing on the determination of the income of the assessee." Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were quashed. The Tribunal noted that the same diary and common satisfaction note were used for all three assessment years. Since the legal grounds were allowed, the remaining grounds required no adjudication. The operative direction was to quash the proceedings under Section 153C and allow the appeals.

The Tribunal noted that while the nature of the assessee's business might allow for cash transactions, the issue of bogus purchases has been decided with divergent views by various judicial precedents. Considering the peculiar facts and the interest of justice, a lumpsum disallowance of 5% of the alleged bogus purchases or the assessee's regular GP, whichever is higher, is deemed appropriate.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after a draft order. It reasoned that Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent stages, making the time windows within Section 144C effective and not redundant.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals. On the primary issue concerning the validity of Section 153C proceedings, the Tribunal, following the Delhi High Court's decision in Saksham Commodities (supra), held that the satisfaction note recorded by the AO was invalid. The AO had failed to record satisfaction that the entries in the seized diary "pertained to the assessee" and "have the bearing on the determination of the income of the assessee." Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were quashed. The Tribunal noted that the same diary and common satisfaction note were used for all three assessment years. Since the legal grounds were allowed, the remaining grounds required no adjudication. The operative direction was to quash the proceedings under Section 153C and allow the appeals.

The Tribunal, following the ratio of the Madras High Court in Roca Bathroom Products and other coordinate bench decisions, held that the assessment order was barred by limitation. The Tribunal noted that a mere pendency of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court does not obliterate the binding nature of a High Court judgment.

The Tribunal held that the learned lower authorities' action in making the impugned addition as unexplained investment in the assessee's hand would not be upheld, as the source of funds was established through banking channels from a trustee whose creditworthiness was not disputed.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee's appeal was dismissed ex-parte by the CIT(A) due to persistent non-compliance. The assessee's counsel requested another opportunity for the assessee to present their case before the AO, which was not objected to by the DR.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeals. On the primary issue concerning the validity of Section 153C proceedings, the Tribunal, following the Delhi High Court's decision in Saksham Commodities (supra), held that the satisfaction note recorded by the AO was invalid. The AO had failed to record satisfaction that the entries in the seized diary "pertained to the assessee" and "have the bearing on the determination of the income of the assessee." Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were quashed. The Tribunal noted that the same diary and common satisfaction note were used for all three assessment years. Since the legal grounds were allowed, the remaining grounds required no adjudication. The operative direction was to quash the proceedings under Section 153C and allow the appeals.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had co-purchased the immovable property with his brother, Shri Abbas. Applying the principle that in the absence of contrary proof, co-purchasers are presumed to acquire property to the extent of their half share each, the addition was restricted to Rs. 8.36 lakhs (half of Rs. 16.73 lakhs). Regarding the quantification of the addition, the Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of accumulated past savings of the assessee and his family. In these peculiar facts, a lumpsum addition of Rs. 5 lakhs was deemed just and proper, with a clear rider that this would not be treated as a precedent. Consequently, the assessee received relief of Rs. 11.73 lakhs (Rs. 16.73 lakhs - Rs. 5 lakhs). The Tribunal directed that necessary computation shall follow as per law. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal noted that the section 148 notice was signed on 31.03.2021 but issued on 01.04.2021, and delivered on 01.04.2021 AM. This timing meant the proceedings were neither initiated under the "old" scheme before 01.04.2021 nor under the "new" scheme. Therefore, the reopening was found to be without merit.

The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal regarding limitation. Following precedents, it held that the assessment order was time-barred and quashed it.

The Tribunal held that the disallowance of CSR expenses under Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) applies only to the computation of business income. This explanation cannot be extended to deny deductions under Section 80G if the donations are otherwise eligible. Therefore, the deduction under Section 80G is allowed.

The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer, despite reopening for cash deposits, ended up disallowing/adding commission income. The addition made was not related to the sole reason for reopening. The Tribunal relied on precedents to quash the reopening.

The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds as they were purely legal and did not require further verification. Citing various High Court and Tribunal judgments, the Tribunal found that the assessment order was indeed time-barred.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after the draft order stage. Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent stages, ensuring the process remains workable and achieves the legislative intent of expeditious dispute resolution.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition. The assessee company received share premium of Rs.14,28,00,000/- and share capital of Rs.12,00,000/-. While copies of agreements were filed, the parties summoned by the Assessing Officer failed to appear. Based on irregularities found and the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method submitted by the Department, the assessee's position remained unsubstantiated and was rejected. The fair market value of the shares was assessed, leading to the addition. Consequently, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) was deemed not just, fair, reasonable, and legal. The ground of appeal by the Department was accepted. The operative direction was to set aside the CIT(A)'s order and allow the Department's appeal.

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the impugned assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had confirmed the additions made by the AO under Section 153A of the Act. However, in the absence of any supporting material, the grounds of appeal were found to be untenable.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after a draft order. Therefore, Section 153's general limitation period does not apply to the final assessment order passed under Section 144C(13).

The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The impugned order was quashed.

The Tribunal, following the ratio laid down in CIT vs. Roca Bathroom Products P. Ltd., found that the final assessment orders for the assessment years 2010-11 and 2011-12 were passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Consequently, these assessment orders were deemed to be without jurisdiction and were quashed.

The Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration, allowing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to submit details. The cancellation orders were set aside for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee could not make proper compliance before the lower authorities due to preoccupation with her spouse's medical treatment, supported by medical reports. The Ld. DR did not object to restoring the matter.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee was consistently assessed by ITO, Ward 72(1), Delhi, indicating that the Assessing Officer in Gurgaon lacked jurisdiction. Therefore, the reopening initiated by the Gurgaon officer was not sustainable.

The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a special statutory mechanism with its own timelines for completing assessments after the draft order stage. It reasoned that Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent process, including DRP proceedings and final order, to ensure expeditious dispute resolution.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's decision to make additions on a protective basis was dependent on substantive additions made in another case. The Tribunal also observed that for AY 2020-21, the assessment should have been under Section 153C. It was held that sustaining protective additions without substantive additions lacks legal sanctity.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's decision to make additions on a protective basis was dependent on substantive additions made in another case. The Tribunal also observed that for AY 2020-21, the assessment should have been under Section 153C. It was held that sustaining protective additions without substantive additions lacks legal sanctity.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's decision to make additions on a protective basis was dependent on substantive additions made in another case. The Tribunal also observed that for AY 2020-21, the assessment should have been under Section 153C. It was held that sustaining protective additions without substantive additions lacks legal sanctity.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's decision to make additions on a protective basis was dependent on substantive additions made in another case. The Tribunal also observed that for AY 2020-21, the assessment should have been under Section 153C. It was held that sustaining protective additions without substantive additions lacks legal sanctity.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's decision to make additions on a protective basis was dependent on substantive additions made in another case. The Tribunal also observed that for AY 2020-21, the assessment should have been under Section 153C. It was held that sustaining protective additions without substantive additions lacks legal sanctity.

The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 144C and Section 153 of the Act are not mutually exclusive but are mutually inclusive and that the limitation period prescribed under Section 153 is applicable. The Tribunal found that the final assessment orders for the impugned assessment years were passed beyond the period of limitation.