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1,215 orders · Page 7 of 25
The Tribunal held that the payment made by the assessee to Cube Highways Trust was not in the nature of royalty or fees for technical services. The Tribunal observed that the payment was for the acquisition of infrastructure assets, which was a capital expenditure. The Tribunal distinguished the present case from situations where payments are made for the use of intellectual property or for technical know-how. It was reasoned that the transaction was essentially an asset purchase, and the consideration paid was for the ownership and control of these assets. Therefore, the provisions of Section 40(a)(i) were not applicable as there was no obligation to deduct TDS on such a capital payment. The addition made by the AO and upheld by the CIT(A) was deleted. The ratio decidendi is that payments for the acquisition of tangible assets, even if they involve rights associated with those assets, do not constitute royalty or fees for technical services unless they specifically fall within those defined categories.
The Tribunal held that the issuance of a Section 153C notice in the name of the deceased assessee, without it being subsequently re-issued in the name of the legal heir after being duly intimated of the death, renders the entire proceedings void. Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents establishing that such a procedural lapse is fatal to the jurisdiction.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete most of the additions made by the AO. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had properly considered the documentary evidence and submissions made by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the Learned First Appellate Authority (NFAC) had dismissed the assessee's appeal in limine, observing that the appeal was not liable to be admitted because the appellant had not filed a return of income and had not paid an amount equal to the advance tax payable. The Tribunal, however, noted that the assessee's case could not be finalized due to the lack of submissions from the assessee. To prevent a miscarriage of justice, the Bench decided to grant the assessee an opportunity of being heard. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the file of the Learned First Appellate Authority to adjudicate the matter afresh. The NFAC was directed to grant an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and consider the evidence on record or any other evidence the assessee might file. The Tribunal also clarified that if the assessee did not cooperate, the NFAC could proceed to finalize the matter in accordance with the law. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal observed that the notice u/s 143(2) was issued beyond the limitation period. Therefore, the assessment completed by the AO without issuing the notice u/s 143(2) within the limitation period is void ab initio, making the assessment order bad in law.
The appeals were preferred by the Revenue, and the cross-objections by the assessee. The primary issue was the sustainability of the CIT(Appeals) order in quashing the assessment order due to a lack of valid prior approval under Section 153D of the Act. The assessment order was passed without prior approval, making it bad in law.
The Tribunal observed that the notice u/s 143(2) was issued beyond the limitation period. Therefore, the assessment completed by the AO without issuing the notice u/s 143(2) within the limitation period is void ab initio, making the assessment order bad in law.
The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds of appeal regarding limitation, relying on established jurisprudence that allows examination of legal issues arising from facts. It noted that no further evidence was required for these grounds.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders in all eight cases were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed as being barred by limitation.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessments involving eligible assessees, with its own distinct timelines. It reasoned that Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the process thereafter, and that the assessment orders were not barred by limitation.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was bad in law as it was a common approval for multiple assessees and assessment years, indicating a lack of application of mind. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under section 153C r.w.s. 153A were quashed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(Appeals)'s decision, finding that the assessment order was passed without the required prior approval under Section 153D of the Act. This procedural lapse rendered the assessment order bad in law.
The Tribunal held that the date of recording satisfaction by the AO of the non-searched person is considered the date of search. Based on Supreme Court and High Court decisions, the assessment proceedings for AYs 2008-09 to 2010-11 were found to be beyond the permissible ten-year block.
The Tribunal held that the date of recording satisfaction by the AO of the non-searched person is considered the date of search. Based on Supreme Court and High Court decisions, the assessment proceedings for AYs 2008-09 to 2010-11 were found to be beyond the permissible ten-year block.
The appeals were preferred by the Revenue, and the cross-objections by the assessee. The primary issue was the sustainability of the CIT(Appeals) order in quashing the assessment order due to a lack of valid prior approval under Section 153D of the Act. The assessment order was passed without prior approval, making it bad in law.
The Tribunal, relying on decisions from the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and other High Courts, held that the assessment order dated 27.03.2025 was indeed passed beyond the time limit prescribed under Section 144C(13) of the Act. The uploading of DRP directions on the ITBA portal was considered the effective date for computing the limitation period.
The Tribunal admitted the assessee's application under Rule 27. The issue of whether the assessment year 2013-14 was beyond the block period was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The grounds raised by the Revenue on merits were also restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was vitiated as it was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, considering the draft assessment orders were forwarded without the complete assessment record. The approvals were found to be composite for multiple years and thus not in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the assessee could not be penalized for the delay in depositing employees' contribution to PF & ESI due to the complete/partial lockdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, both the AO's and CIT(A)'s orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that while purchases could not be entirely dismissed as bogus given the suppliers, they were not sufficiently substantiated. Therefore, 1% of the purchase amount was confirmed as an addition. The disallowance of 5% on unverified expenses was also sustained.
The Tribunal held that at the stage of registration under Section 12AB, the CIT(E)'s scope is limited to examining if the objects of the society are charitable. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) did not doubt the charitable nature of the objects but rather the application of funds. It was further observed that any concerns about the genuineness of activities can be addressed by the Assessing Officer at a later stage.
The Tribunal held that the issuance of a Section 153C notice in the name of the deceased assessee, without it being subsequently re-issued in the name of the legal heir after being duly intimated of the death, renders the entire proceedings void. Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents establishing that such a procedural lapse is fatal to the jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that there was no record of the ITO issuing the section 143(2) notice having the assessment jurisdiction, nor was there any section 127 transfer order. Citing relevant case laws, the Tribunal concluded that an inherent lack of jurisdiction in issuing the notice could not be subsequently validated.
The Tribunal held that the impugned final assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal noted an order from the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) which admitted Personal Insolvency Resolution Process (PIRP) for the assessees and imposed a moratorium on all debts. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the pending appeals could not be proceeded with due to this moratorium.
The Tribunal noted that a moratorium had been ordered by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for 180 days, during which no legal action could be initiated against the applicants. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the present appeals could not be proceeded with.
The Tribunal, relying on the judgment of the Madras High Court in CIT Vs. Roca Bathroom Products (P.) Ltd. and other co-ordinate bench decisions, held that the impugned final assessment orders were barred by limitation. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the said orders.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and material on record. Citing the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PCIT vs. Rajeev Bansal, the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Southern Gujarat Chamber Trade and Industrial Development Centre vs. ITO, and the ITAT Mumbai Bench in DCIT vs. Prasad Shetty, the Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was indeed barred by limitation. The Tribunal found that the reassessment proceedings were not completed within the surviving time limit as stipulated by the law and judicial pronouncements.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the issuance of a Section 153C notice in the name of the deceased assessee, without it being subsequently re-issued in the name of the legal heir after being duly intimated of the death, renders the entire proceedings void. Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents establishing that such a procedural lapse is fatal to the jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessment post-draft order, operating independently of the general limitation period in Section 153. The time consumed in DRP proceedings is statutorily created for the benefit of the assessee and does not render the assessment void.
The Tribunal held that the issuance of a Section 153C notice in the name of the deceased assessee, without it being subsequently re-issued in the name of the legal heir after being duly intimated of the death, renders the entire proceedings void. Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents establishing that such a procedural lapse is fatal to the jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was passed beyond the prescribed limitation period and was liable to be quashed. However, other issues raised by the assessee were kept open pending the Supreme Court's decision.
The Tribunal held that since a co-ordinate bench had already decided similar issues based on the same ledger account and evidence in the assessee's own case for other assessment years, and no new material was presented by the revenue, the addition made was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the issuance of a Section 153C notice in the name of the deceased assessee, without it being subsequently re-issued in the name of the legal heir after being duly intimated of the death, renders the entire proceedings void. Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents establishing that such a procedural lapse is fatal to the jurisdiction.
The appeals were preferred by the Revenue, and the cross-objections by the assessee. The primary issue was the sustainability of the CIT(Appeals) order in quashing the assessment order due to a lack of valid prior approval under Section 153D of the Act. The assessment order was passed without prior approval, making it bad in law.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special regime for the period from the draft order to the final assessment order, operating notwithstanding the general limitation in Section 153. The special provisions of Section 144C are intended to facilitate an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's order was passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The primary issue was the allowability of certain expenses claimed by the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer had disallowed these expenses on the grounds that they were not substantiated or were not incurred for the purpose of business. The assessee contended that sufficient evidence was provided and that the disallowance was arbitrary. The Tribunal, after considering the submissions of both parties and the material on record, found that the Assessing Officer had not properly examined the evidence submitted by the assessee. The Tribunal held that the disallowance of expenses was premature and lacked proper reasoning. Therefore, the Tribunal decided to set aside the order of the Assessing Officer and remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after considering all the evidence and providing a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to pass a speaking order after due verification.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the additions without a remand report from the AO was not sustainable. In the interest of justice, the case was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after considering the additional evidence and providing the assessee with an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a self-contained statutory mechanism with its own timelines for completing assessments post-draft order. The general limitation period under Section 153 applies up to the draft order stage, while Section 144C governs the subsequent process, making the assessment orders not barred by limitation.
The Tribunal observed that in the assessment proceedings, the assessee had not provided adequate details, with the counsel submitting that notices were not received. It was also noted that the CIT(A) sustained the additions in the absence of any submissions from the assessee. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore all appeals to the file of the AO for a fresh assessment. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the appeals were restored to the AO for deciding the issues afresh after providing an adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee for statistical purposes. No specific finding was given on the merits of the grounds raised, as the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the issuance of a Section 153C notice in the name of the deceased assessee, without it being subsequently re-issued in the name of the legal heir after being duly intimated of the death, renders the entire proceedings void. Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents establishing that such a procedural lapse is fatal to the jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was vitiated as it was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind, considering the draft assessment orders were forwarded without the complete assessment record. The approvals were found to be composite for multiple years and thus not in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D is administrative in nature and does not require the approving authority to adjudicate the merits of the additions. The assessee failed to provide corroborating evidence to prove non-application of mind by the approving authority.
The Tribunal, following the ratio of the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Roca Bathroom Products (P) Ltd. and numerous orders of co-ordinate benches, held that the impugned Final Assessment Orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that Section 153D approval is not a mere formality but requires an independent application of mind. It found the impugned approvals to be vitiated for not being granted in accordance with law and for being a composite approval for multiple years.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, holding that the AO had not commented on the documentary evidence filed by the assessee and had relied solely on the statement of Ashok Kumar Gupta. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee had provided sales invoices, transporter certificates, bank statements, ledger accounts, and stock registers to support the transactions. The CIT(A) found that the AO did not make efforts to cross-verify the genuineness of the sales and purchases, and the addition was not justified.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle with its own timelines, operating notwithstanding the general limitation period in Section 153. The special regime of Section 144C governs the time from the draft order to the final assessment order, and its timelines are not redundant.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act, quashing the impugned orders. Liberty was granted to revive the appeal if the Supreme Court's decision necessitates modification.