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1,215 orders · Page 6 of 25
The Tribunal held that the deletion of addition on account of unsecured loans was justified as the assessee provided sufficient evidence, including bank statements and confirmations, to support the repayment of loans from sale of stock and introduction of fresh loans. Similarly, the addition on account of unexplained cash sales was deleted as the assessee furnished complete documentation, including sales invoices, stock records, and audited accounts, which the AO failed to controvert.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a self-contained statutory mechanism with its own timelines for completing assessments post-draft order. The general limitation period under Section 153 applies up to the draft order stage, while Section 144C governs the subsequent process, making the assessment orders not barred by limitation.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessment post-draft order, operating independently of the general limitation period in Section 153. The time consumed in DRP proceedings is statutorily created for the benefit of the assessee and does not render the assessment void.
The CIT(A) allowed the assessee's appeal, holding that the AO had not commented on the documentary evidence filed by the assessee and had relied solely on the statement of Ashok Kumar Gupta. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee had provided sales invoices, transporter certificates, bank statements, ledger accounts, and stock registers to support the transactions. The CIT(A) found that the AO did not make efforts to cross-verify the genuineness of the sales and purchases, and the addition was not justified.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a complete statutory cycle for assessment orders involving draft orders and directions from the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). The time limits within Section 144C are specific to this process and operate notwithstanding the general limitation period in Section 153.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Therefore, the assessment orders were quashed for being without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism for completing assessments after the draft order stage, operating independently of the general limitation period under Section 153. The timelines within Section 144C are intended to facilitate an alternate dispute resolution mechanism and are not rendered redundant by Section 153.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act, quashing the impugned orders. Liberty was granted to revive the appeal if the Supreme Court's decision necessitates modification.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a special statutory mechanism with its own timelines for completing assessments after the draft order stage. It reasoned that Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent stages, making the assessment process workable and achieving the objective of expeditious dispute resolution.
The Tribunal held that agricultural land, if excluded from the definition of capital asset under Section 2(14), is outside the scope of Section 56(2)(vii)(b). The land in question was located beyond 6 km from municipal limits and the town's population was less than 10 lakhs, thus qualifying for exclusion.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was bad in law as it was a common approval for multiple assessees and assessment years, indicating a lack of application of mind. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under section 153C r.w.s. 153A were quashed.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing assessments after the draft order stage. Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the post-draft stage, making the latter's timelines non-redundant.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue should follow the procedure under Section 158AB when an identical question of law is pending before a higher court. It also noted that a mere stay order does not obliterate the binding nature of a judgment, and a High Court's decision is binding on the Tribunal until a contrary decision is given by another competent High Court.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was not mala fide and therefore condoned the delay. It was observed that the CIT(A) passed an ex parte order as the assessee failed to file submissions in support of the grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders in all eight cases were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed as being barred by limitation.
The Tribunal held that the impugned final assessment orders were barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was passed beyond the prescribed limitation period and was liable to be quashed. However, other issues raised by the assessee were kept open pending the Supreme Court's decision.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessments involving eligible assessees, and its timelines operate independently of Section 153. The time consumed in DRP proceedings is statutorily created for the benefit of the assessee and does not render the assessment void.
The Tribunal noted that identical appeals for other AYs were restored to the CIT(A) by a coordinate bench due to ex-parte orders. Following this precedent and in the interest of justice, the current appeals were also restored.
The Tribunal found reasonable cause for the delay and condoned it. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's contention that the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the applications without proper opportunity and directed the CIT(E) to reconsider the issues afresh.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were barred by limitation, quashing them. It followed the Madras High Court's ruling in Roca Bathroom Products and Hyderabad Bench orders, while granting liberty to revive the appeal if the Supreme Court's decision necessitates modification.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal, referencing a previous co-ordinate bench decision, rejected the revenue's request to defer adjudication. It held that the assessment proceedings, including DRP proceedings, must conclude within prescribed time limits.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act, quashing the order. The appeal challenging the TPO's order was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal held that since a co-ordinate bench had already decided similar issues based on the same ledger account and evidence in the assessee's own case for other assessment years, and no new material was presented by the revenue, the addition made was not sustainable.
The provided excerpt does not contain the Tribunal's decision or reasoning on the merits of the appeals. It only lists the parties, assessment years, and the procedural context of the appeals being before the ITAT. Therefore, the Tribunal's findings on any specific issues, the reasoning leading to those findings, and the operative directions are not available in this portion of the judgment. No issue has been expressly left undecided as the substantive part of the judgment is missing. The ratio decidendi cannot be determined from the given text.
The Tribunal held that the impugned Final Assessment Order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 r.w. Section 144C of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal quashed the assessment order. Liberty was granted to the parties to revive the appeal if a Supreme Court decision necessitates modification.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessment after a draft order, with its own timelines. Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the subsequent stages, ensuring expeditious disposal and an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition for unsecured loans, finding the lender's creditworthiness was sufficiently proven by its substantial assets and revenue, despite accounting losses due to depreciation. The Tribunal also deleted the disallowance of finance costs, accepting it as a legitimate revenue expenditure based on the project sale agreement and the assessee's mercantile accounting.
The Tribunal, following precedents from the Madras High Court and its own coordinate benches, ruled that the assessment orders were indeed barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. Consequently, the impugned orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that while purchases could not be entirely dismissed as bogus given the suppliers, they were not sufficiently substantiated. Therefore, 1% of the purchase amount was confirmed as an addition. The disallowance of 5% on unverified expenses was also sustained.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment orders in all five cases were passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessment orders involving eligible assessees and the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). The time taken for this process under Section 144C is not subject to the general limitation period prescribed under Section 153.
The Tribunal held that the assessee filed returns for AY 2013-14 and 2015-16 within the extended due dates, hence, the benefit of set off of brought forward losses should be allowed. For the deductions under Sections 80G and 80GGA, the Tribunal noted that CBDT circulars extended approvals in perpetuity and that the provided documentation was sufficient for allowing the deductions.
The Tribunal held that at the stage of registration under Section 12AB, the CIT(E)'s scope is limited to examining if the objects of the society are charitable. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) did not doubt the charitable nature of the objects but rather the application of funds. It was further observed that any concerns about the genuineness of activities can be addressed by the Assessing Officer at a later stage.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders in all five cases were passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Act. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction note did not indicate that the seized material had any bearing on the determination of the assessee's income. Citing the High Court's decision in Saksham Commodities Ltd. v. ITO, the Tribunal held that the satisfaction note must explicitly state the bearing of seized material on total income.
The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction note did not indicate that the seized material had any bearing on the determination of the assessee's income. Citing the High Court's decision in Saksham Commodities Ltd. v. ITO, the Tribunal held that the satisfaction note must explicitly state the bearing of seized material on total income.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C provides a complete statutory cycle for assessment orders involving the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). The time limits prescribed within Section 144C for post-draft finalization are to be followed independently and do not get overridden by the general limitation period in Section 153.
The Tribunal noted that a moratorium had been ordered by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for 180 days, during which no legal action could be initiated against the applicants. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the present appeals could not be proceeded with.
The Tribunal noted an order from the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) which admitted Personal Insolvency Resolution Process (PIRP) for the assessees and imposed a moratorium on all debts. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the pending appeals could not be proceeded with due to this moratorium.
The Tribunal held that the issuance of a Section 153C notice in the name of the deceased assessee, without it being subsequently re-issued in the name of the legal heir after being duly intimated of the death, renders the entire proceedings void. Reliance was placed on various judicial precedents establishing that such a procedural lapse is fatal to the jurisdiction.
The Tribunal observed that the notice u/s 143(2) was issued beyond the limitation period. Therefore, the assessment completed by the AO without issuing the notice u/s 143(2) within the limitation period is void ab initio, making the assessment order bad in law.
The Tribunal observed that the notice u/s 143(2) was issued beyond the limitation period. Therefore, the assessment completed by the AO without issuing the notice u/s 143(2) within the limitation period is void ab initio, making the assessment order bad in law.
The Tribunal held that Section 144C prescribes a complete statutory cycle for assessments involving eligible assessees, with its own distinct timelines. It reasoned that Section 153 governs the period up to the draft order, while Section 144C governs the process thereafter, and that the assessment orders were not barred by limitation.
The Tribunal noted that a moratorium had been ordered by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for 180 days, during which no legal action could be initiated against the applicants. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the present appeals could not be proceeded with.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order was barred by limitation as per Section 153 read with Section 144C of the Act. The assessment order was quashed on this limited legal issue.
The Tribunal admitted the assessee's application under Rule 27. The issue of whether the assessment year 2013-14 was beyond the block period was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The grounds raised by the Revenue on merits were also restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.