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MUFG BANK LTD,NEW DELHI vs ACIT, CIRCLE 2(2)(1), INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, NEW DELHI | BharatTax

MUFG BANK LTD,NEW DELHI vs. ACIT, CIRCLE 2(2)(1), INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, NEW DELHI

ITA 134/DEL/2023Status: DisposedITAT Delhi27 January 2026AY 2019-2018 pages

AI SummaryAllowed

Facts

A batch of five appeals were filed by MUFG Bank Limited for assessment years 2016-17 to 2020-21, challenging the validity of assessment orders on the ground of limitation under Section 144C(13) read with Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee contended that the final assessment orders were passed beyond the prescribed time limits.

Held

The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 144C and Section 153 are mutually inclusive and overlapping, and the period of limitation for passing the final assessment order is to be reckoned with reference to both sections. Based on the dates provided, which were not disputed by the Revenue, the Tribunal found that the final assessment orders for all five assessment years were passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation.

Key Issues

Whether the assessment orders passed under Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were barred by limitation when read in conjunction with Section 153 of the Act.

Sections Cited

144C, 153, 92CA, 153(2A), 153(3), 153(1)

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH “I”NEW DELHI

Before: SHRI VIKAS AWASTHY & SHRI SANJAY AWASTHI

For Appellant: Shri Kshitij Bansal, CA

For Respondent: Shri Dharm Veer Singh, CIT DR

Hearing: 27.01.2026

सुनवाईक�तारीख/ Date of hearing: 27.01.2026 27.01.2026 उ�ोषणाक�तारीख/Pronouncement on आदेश /O R D E R PERSANJAY AWASTHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:

1.

Right at the outset, it was pointed out that (AY 2016-17) was time barred by 56 days. In this respect, the Ld. AR pointed out that while the time limit for filing the appeal was expiring on 17.05.2021 but on account of the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court [Misc. Application No.665/2021], the limitation for filing appeals was extended. We have considered the submissions in this regard and find merit in the same. The delay is hereby condoned.

1.1 The present adjudication involves a batch of five appeals pertaining to the same assessee for AYs 2016-17, 2017-18 & 2018- 19, 2019-20 and 2020-21. In all these appeals the assessee has MUFG BANK LIMITED challenged the validity of the assessment order on the ground of limitation considering the provisions of section 144C(13) r.w.s. 153 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter as “the Act”). This challenge to the validity of the impugned order arises from the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Roca Bathroom Products (P) ltd. reported in 445 ITR 537 (Mad.), Sections 144C and 153 are mutually inclusive and not mutually exclusive as both contain provisions relating to section 92CA and are interdependent and overlapping and hence, period of limitation prescribed under section 153(2A) or 153(3) of the Act are applicable only.The specific grounds raised by the assessee are as under: -

1. AY 2019-20:Additional ground of appeal

no.17 filed vide letter received on 24.04.2023.

2. AY 2020-21:Additional ground no.13 filed vide letter dated 20.03.2025.

3. The Ld. DR objected to the adjudication of these appeals and submitted that the issue was sub-judice before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He also filed detailed written submissions. It was argued that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. reported in 177 taxmann.com 262 (SC), has examined this issue but due to divergent opinions expressed by the Hon’ble Judges, the issue is now referred for constituting a larger Bench. It was pointed out that even otherwise the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. has held, vide interim order dated 22.09.2023, that the operative portion of the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Bombay High court [153 taxmann.com 162 (Bom)] would not be cited as a precedent. This interim order dated 22.09.2023 was placed before us for perusal. It was the further submission that in light of the said order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court it would not be in the interest of judicial propriety to proceed with an identical matter. The Ld. DR further pointed out that the judgment of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of PayPal Payments P. Ltd. in Writ Petition (L) No.30944 of 2023 decided on 13.08.2024, that the Hon’ble Bombay High Court refused to entertain the writ petition involving identical issue after taking note of the fact that the Hon’ble Apex Court stayed the operative part of the judgment in the case of Shelf Drilling (supra). The Ld. DR further referred to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of UP Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad Lucknow vs. State of U.P. & Others reported as (1995) AIR SC 2148, to argue that when an issue is referred to a larger Bench then during the pendency of such reference, matters involving identical issues should not be taken up for adjudication. Thereafter the Ld. DR read out from his detailed written submissions as under: - "A. Introductory submission "2. The present appeals raise the issue as to whether in cases governed by section 144C of the I.T. Act, the time consumed in the proceedings undertaken after draft assessment order under section 144Cof the I. T. Act before the Dispute Resolution Panel ("DRP") and the Assessing officer get subsumed within the time limitation prescribed under section 153 of the I.T. Act or whether section 144C operates as a special statutory mechanism with its own distinct timelines for completing the assessment after passing of the draft assessment order.

7.

From the language used by Hon'ble Supreme Court in its interim order, it is evident that it is the ration, reasoning or basis of judgement of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in case of Shelf Drilling (supra) which cannot form basis for decision on the same issue in any other case including instant appeals. In other words, it is not only that above judgment in case of Shelf Drilling cannot be used as precedent in any other case, but also the reasoning given in judgement of Bombay High Court in case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd or similar reasoning given in any other case including in the judgment of Madras High Court in case of Roca Bathroom Products (P.) Ltd cannot form basis for deciding the above issue of time limitation. Any such reliance would also be contrary to sound principles of judicial proprietary and institutional respect. This argument is duly supported by the judicious view taken by Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Pay pa! Payments Pvt. Ltd as discussed in subsequent paragraph. (iii) Bombay High Court decision in case of Paypal Payments Pvt. Ltd. (WPL (L) No.30944 of 2023, order dated 07.08.2024) 8. The Revenue further places reliance on the order dated 07.08.2024 passed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in case of Paypal Payments Private Limited v. ACIT (Writ Petition (L)No.30944 of 2023). In the said order, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court, while considering the very issue of interpretation of section 144C(1), 144C(4) and 144C(13) vis-a-vis section 153, recorded that the Supreme Court had, on 22.09.2023, directed that the Shelf Drilling judgment shall not be cited as precedent and clarified that the operative portion applies only inter parties. The Hon'ble High Court further noted that there was "quite a debate" on what one is permitted to do with the Shelf Drilling decision in view of the Supreme Court restraint. After hearing both parties in detail and after taking into consideration judgementof Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Roca Bathroom, Hon'ble Bombay HC, in its f wisdom, has not quashed the assessment order and gave the parties the liberty to apply in the event of rendering a final order by Hon'ble Supreme Court on the impugned issue. The said view was again reiterated in the case of same assessee i.e. Paypal Payments Private Limited for another year in Writ petition (I) no. 27849 of 2024 vide judgement dated September 9, 2024 reported at [2024] 166 taxmann.com 521 (Bombay).

5.

At this stage it deserves to be mentioned that in a Coordinate Bench decision rendered by this very same combination, in and in the case of Li & Fung (India) P. Ltd., vide order dated 21.01.2026, the arguments of the Ld. DR and from the assessee’s side have been discussed and recorded at length. Since the surrounding facts and circumstances are similar, hence, the operative portion of this Coordinate Bench order deserves to be extracted as under: - “5. Both sides heard. The issue which arises for consideration before us at the preliminary stage is whether we can proceed with the hearing of issue in appeal when on a similar issue the operative portion of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd. (supra) has been stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. In the present case, the appellant/assessee has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Roca Bathroom Products P. Ltd. (supra). The identical objection now raised by the ld. DR was examined by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of PayPal Payments P. Ltd. (supra). The Hon’ble High Court deferred hearing of the issue for the reason that the hearing may not bring about any concrete conclusion as the similar question of law is pending determination before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon’ble Court further observed that similarly placed assessees who have succeeded before the Hon’ble Madras High Court inter alia in Roca Bathroom Products P. Ltd. (supra) as also before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Nokia India P. Ltd. (supra), the proceedings arising from said decisions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court and the Hon’ble Delhi High Court are pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The said orders of the Hon’ble High Courts setting aside the assessment orders are not stayed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Thus, it is evident that in so far as the decision rendered in the case of Roca Bathroom Products P. Ltd. (supra) by the Hon’ble Madras High Court, the same is not stayed. It is a well settled legal proposition that when the operation of a specific order is stayed by the Higher Court, then its enforcement is stayed but the ratio decidendi of such order/judgment is not nullified unless explicitly set aside. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust (supra) has held that an order of interim stay does not result in quashing of the impugned order. It only means that the order will not be operative from the date that it is stayed. In the case of Govt of AP vs. N. Rami Reddy& Others 2011 AIR-AP 226,one of the issue for consideration before the Hon’ble High Court was; Whether the interim stay of a High Court order by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has the effect of wiping out the ratio of the High Court’s order or otherwise nullifying the precedent relied upon by the petitioner? The Hon’ble High Court held that the ratio of judgment represents the reasons assigned in support of the conclusion. An order of interim stay actually stays the operative part of the decision, but does not wipe out its ratio decidendi.

18. In case, interpretation provided by the assessee is accepted, then it would lead to many absurdities in operation of 144C provisions. Firstly, at the stage of passing of draft assessment order, it is not known to the A.O. as to whether the assessee would choose DRP route or not. If the interpretation furthered by the assessee is accepted, then in every case of eligible assessee, which involved issue of draft assessment order, the AO would be required to pass draft assessment order at least 11 months before the time barring date prescribed under section 153 of the Act irrespective of the fact whether the assessee chooses DRP route or not. If Assessee does not choose DRP route, then while on one hand, such early finalization of assessment cuts down time available with the AO to pass assessment order affecting level of inquiries/verifications, on the other hand the DRP route would go unutilized. This contradiction itself shows that interpretation of section 144C of the Act relied upon by the assessee is required to be discarded. Secondly, with the overall time limits for completing assessments as prescribed under section 153 of the Act ever decreasing as an effort by the legislature to cut down overall time, if period of 11 months is counted backward from such shortened time limit allowed under section 153, then in many cases (such as not involving TP reference), the draft assessment order would be required to be issued even before end of the relevant assessment year. In many cases even involving Transfer Pricing Reference, such time available with the A.O. and T.P.O will be only few months, effectively scuttling possibility of any meaningful verification or scrutiny of details frustrating very purpose of entire scrutiny assessment related provisions under the I.T. Act. Such a situation will be hit by doctrine of impossibility or doctrine of frustration and courts should avoid any interpretation of 144C and 153 provisions of the Act which leads to such situations as 'Law does not compel the impossible'. This aspect having serious repercussions has not been considered while interpreting the interplay between section 153 and 144C of the Act. This again creates a very absurd situation which could never have been contemplated by the Legislature. Thirdly, it needs to be appreciated that overall mandate to reduce time lines for completing the assessment is being achieved by the Legislature over the years by way of shortening time lines given in section 153 of the Act. Section 144C is not meant for that as it has already very shortened and stiff timelines prescribed. Section 144C is meant for providing the alternate dispute resolution mechanism to eligible assessee and for doing away with one appellate level i.e. CIT(A) from entire chain of tax litigation. This objective requires to be appreciated for interpretation of section 144C of the Act.

21.

In view of the above, it is submitted that time limits prescribed under section 144C are in addition to the time limit prescribed under section 153 of the I.T. Act. In present appeals, the final assessment order has been passed within the time limit prescribed under section 144C of the Act. Further the case of Roca Bathroom is distinguishable on facts and hence, no applicable to present appeals. Hence, the assessee's contention is required to be rejected on merit on this count.” 8. We have considered the submissions made by rival sides on merits of the issue before us for adjudication. The crux of submissions on merits by the department is, thatlimitation for passing the final assessment order under section 144C(13) of the Act is to be seen only with reference to the timeline specified u/s. 144C of the Act only without referring to provisions of section 153 of the Act. We find that identical submissions were made by the Department before the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Roca Bathroom Products P. Ltd. (supra). The Hon’ble High Court rejected the arguments of the Department and held that provisions of section 144C and 153 of the Act are mutually inclusive as both contain provisions relating to section 92CA of the Act and are inter- dependent and are overlapping. Hence, the period of limitation for passing the final assessment order u/s.144C(13) of the Act has to be determined with reference to section 144C r.w.s 153 of the Act. For the sake of completeness, the relevant excerpts from the judgment rendered in the case of Roca Bathroom ProductsP. Ltd. (supra) are reproduced herein below:- “18. The main contentions of the Department, through their counsel are that Section 144C is a code in itself and hence on remand by the ITAT, the power of DRP to take up the dispute on additions by TPO, is not circumscribed by Section 153 and that in the absence of any express time limits contemplated under the Act, the time limits under Section 153 for reassessment cannot be read into Section 144C more particularly when the provisions of Section 153 are excluded by the non-obstante clause in section 144C(13) and hence the proceedings are not barred by limitation. Per contra, it has been contended by the learned senior counsels appearing for the respondent(s)/assessees that the outer time limit under Section 153 is applicable to every proceedings on remand and the department having slept over the issue for several years, cannot now redo the proceedings afresh, after certain rights have vested with the assessees. Even if specific provisions are not there to deal with this situation, the proceedings must be concluded within a reasonable time and hence the impugned proceedings are liable to be struck down and rightly done so by the learned Judge. 19. Admittedly, the facts including the dates are not under dispute. As regards the appeal in W.A.No.1854 of 2021, even though the remand was on 24-1-2013 and the assessee had received the order on 8-2-2013, the first notice by the DRP was issued on 19-2-2014 and the first hearing in the Chennai office was on 10-3- 2014. Therefore, it is lucid that the DRP had the knowledge of the order before 19-2-2014. The matter was heard on various dates in Chennai office and written submissions were also filed. Thereafter, the files have been transferred to Bengaluru by the CBDT notification dated 31.12.2014. The Learned Judge relying upon the findings in the batch of cases which was decided first and rendered additional findings, which have been extracted in paragraphs 10 and 11 above, has allowed the writ petitions holding that the time limit under Section 153 (2A) was not adhered to and in any case, the proceedings have not been concluded within a reasonable time.

21. As held above, the assessment has to be concluded within 21 months when there is no reference and when there is a reference, it has to be concluded within 33 months. In the additional 12 months, the draft order is to be passed, the objections have to be filed, the DRP has to issue the directions and the final order is to be passed. The provisions under section 144C and section 153 are not mutually exclusive as both contain provisions relating to Section 92CA and are inter-dependent and overlapping. On remand, prior to amendment as per Section 153 (2A), the Assessing officer is given 12 months to pass a fresh assessment order. Therefore, it is incumbent on him to do so, irrespective of the fact that DRP has completed the hearing and issued the directions or not. As rightly held by the learned judge, we are of the view that the DRP ought to have concluded the proceedings within 9 months from the date of receipt of the Tribunal's order, when it had 14 issued a notice on 19-2-2014 and conducted the hearing as early as on 10-3-2014 and on several dates. The DRP at Chennai, in fact ought to have passed orders before 19-11-2014, even if the date of receipt of the notice is taken as 19-2-2014. In that event, the assessing officer ought to have passed the order before 31-12-2014 or at the latest before 31-3-2015 considering that the order was received during the Financial year 2013-14. The transfer of the files to Bengaluru, after the lapse of the time, will not indefinitely extend the time and can have no impact on the time lines. It is an inter-department arrangement and it cannot defeat the rights of the assessee.”[Emphasized by us] 9. The stand of the Revenue is that section 144C of the Act is a complete code in itself for completing the assessments where reference is made to Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) and in sub section (1) to section 144C of the Act there is “non obstante” clause which mandates exclusion of all other provisions contained in the Act.The Hon’ble Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of Roca Bathroom Products (P.) Ltd. vs. Dispute Resolution Panel-2, 127 taxman.com 332 (Madras) while dealing with aforesaid arguments made on behalf of the Department in a lucid manner explained the reason for reading section 144C & 153 of the Act together for determining limitation for passing the final assessment order, and held:- “15. No doubt, section 144C is a self contained code of assessment and time limits are inbuilt each stage of the procedure contemplated. Section 144C envisions a special assessment, one which includes the determination of Arms Length Price (ALP) of international transactions engaged in by the assessee. The DRP was constituted bearing in mind the necessity for an expert body to look into intricate matters concerning valuation and transfer pricing and it is for this reason that specific timelines have been drawn within the framework of section 144C to ensure prompt and expeditious finalisation of this special assessment.

18.

Barring this, I find nothing in the language of sections 144C or 153 to lead me to the conclusion that the latter is operated from the operation of the former. The specific exclusion of section 153 from section 144C(13) can be read only in the context of that specific sub- section and once again, reiterates the urgency that sets the tone for the interpretation of section 144C itself.” The Division Bench affirmed aforesaid findings of the Hon’ble Single Judge and further after considering various decisions viz.Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain [1997] 1 SCC 373; CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers [2023] 126 Taxman 321/259 ITR 449; & Franklin Templeton Trustee Services (P.) Ltd. vs Amruta Garg 124 taxmann.com 326, held as under:- “23. Further, similar non-obstante clause is also used in section 144C(4) with a same limited purpose to imply, even though there might be a larger time limit under Section 153, once the order of TPO is accepted or not objected to, causing a deeming fiction of acceptance, the final order is to be passed immediately. The object is to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible and the authority need not wait for the last date to pass the orders. The limitation prescribed under the statute is for the assessing officer and therefore, it is his duty to pass order in time irrespective of whether the directions are received from DRP or not. As held by us above, the DRP will have no authority to issue directions after nine months and a further period of one month as per section 144C (13) and three months under section 153 (2A) is available, within which period no orders have been passed in the present cases. The reference made by the learned senior counsels on the judgments in Nokia India (P.) Ltd. (supra) and Vedanta Ltd. (Supra) is well founded. The timeline given under the Act is to be strictly followed.”[Emphasized by us] Thus, the Hon’ble High Court negatived the arguments made by the Department on ‘non obstante’ clause used in section 144C of the Act. The Hon’ble High Court thus, concluded:- “27. For the reasons set out herein before, we conclude as under: (a) The provisions of Sections 144C and 153 are not mutually exclusive, but are rather mutually inclusive. The period of limitation prescribed under Section 153 (2A) or 153 (3) is applicable, when the matters are remanded back irrespective of whether it is to the Assessing Officer or TPO or the DRP, the duty is on the assessing officer to pass orders. (b) Even in case of remand, the TPO or the DRP have to follow the time limits as provided under the Act. The entire proceedings including the hearing and directions have to be issued by the DRP within 9 months as contemplated under section 144C(12) of the Income-tax Act, (c) Irrespective of whether the DRP concludes the proceedings and issues directions or not, within 9 months, the Assessing officer is to pass orders within the stipulated time, (d) In matter involving transfer pricing, upon remand to DRP, the Assessing officer is to pass a denovo draft order and the entire proceedings as in the original assessment, would have 16 to be completed within 12 months, as the very purpose of extension is to ensure that orders are passed within the extended period, as otherwise the extension becomes meaningless. (e) The outer time limit of 33 months in case of reference to TPO under Section 153, would not refer to draft order, but only to final order and hence, the entire proceedings would have to be concluded within the time limits prescribed, (f) The non-obstante clause would not exclude the operation of Section 153 as a whole. It only implies that irrespective of availability of larger time to conclude the proceedings, final orders are to be passed within one month in line with the scheme of the Act, (g) When no period of limitation is prescribed, orders are to be passed within a reasonable time, which in any case cannot be beyond 3 years. However, when the statute prescribes a particular period within which orders are to be passed, then such period, irrespective of whether it is short or long, shall be applicable.”