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308 orders · Page 3 of 7
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) erred in passing the order ex-parte without hearing the assessee and without deciding all grounds on merits. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the Ld. CIT(A) for a fresh decision after providing an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) did not provide sufficient opportunity of being heard and did not decide all contentions on merits. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal set aside the orders of the Ld. CIT(E) and remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, with a direction to provide the assessee an opportunity of being heard and to allow it to produce any supporting documents.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was validly issued within the prescribed period, considering the participation of the assessee in the reassessment proceedings as per Section 292BB. It also found that the AO failed to discharge the onus to disprove the genuineness of the loans produced by the assessee.
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeal. It upheld additions related to bogus sales and cash found at the shop but deleted additions for stock differences and lottery income, finding them explained by disclosures under IDS-2016 and PMGKY.
The Tribunal held that the notices issued to the wrong address suffered from an "incorrigible defect," rendering the subsequent assessment order under Section 143(3) invalid. Since the jurisdictional foundation of the notice failed, the entire assessment order based on it collapsed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the Ld. CIT(A) by citing the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, emphasizing that justifiable reasons should lead to substantial justice. The matter was remanded to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not allowing exemption under Section 54F for investments made in the name of the assessee's son. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents stating that the new residential house need not be purchased exclusively in the assessee's name, provided the investment comes from sale proceeds.
The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities erred in treating the manpower supply agreement as attracting TDS deduction for technical services. The assessee's appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order was a non-speaking cryptic order and a violation of Section 250(6) of the Act. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that a common approval obtained for multiple assessment years under Section 153D vitiates the entire assessment. Consequently, all impugned assessments were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings and the assessment orders were bad in law because they were initiated against non-existent entities. The merger of the assessee companies was established by High Court orders.
The ITAT held that the assessments framed by the AO in the name of a non-existent company were bad in law and quashed them. The tribunal distinguished the present case from precedents where the assessee had not disclosed the amalgamation.
The ITAT held that the assessments framed by the AO in the name of a non-existent company were bad in law and quashed them. The tribunal distinguished the present case from precedents where the assessee had not disclosed the amalgamation.
The ITAT held that the assessments framed by the AO in the name of a non-existent company were bad in law and quashed them. The tribunal distinguished the present case from precedents where the assessee had not disclosed the amalgamation.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(Appeals)'s order, finding that the assessee's transactions constituted legitimate tax planning and not tax evasion. The Tribunal found no evidence to support the AO's doubts about the genuineness of the business or the transactions.
The Tribunal held that the Section 153C proceedings and the subsequent additions could not have been invoked in the assessee's case. This was because the seized material relevant to the additions did not relate to the assessee but to her HUF.
The Tribunal found prima facie merit in the assessee's case, noting that the assessee was added as an account holder in a succeeding financial year and thus could not have been assessed for deposits in the relevant year. The case was accepted in principle, allowing the Assessing Officer to verify the bank certificate.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had proceeded ex-parte and acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps due to the new faceless hearing system. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the appeal to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by a single approval for multiple assessees and assessment years without mentioning seized material. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment orders. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E was introduced w.e.f. 01.06.2015, and the levy of late fee for the quarter prior to this date was not applicable. The Tribunal also noted that in similar cases for the same year, the penalty was deleted by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps due to the virtual hearing mechanism and the lack of effective compliance with Section 250(6) of the Act in the lower appellate order. Therefore, the appeal was set aside to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal remitted the issue back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(E) is directed to consider the documents to be furnished by the assessee and grant an opportunity of being heard before passing orders.
The Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A)'s decision on several issues, including the treatment of provisions for doubtful debts under Section 115JB and the carry forward of long-term capital loss of an amalgamating company. The cross-objections filed by the assessee were dismissed as they became infructuous.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee sought withdrawal of the appeal under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and the Revenue had no objection. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to revive if the scheme application fails.
The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and restored the appeals back to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication, directing the assessee to participate and file necessary evidence. Ground of appeal No. 3 was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the AO had not independently examined the contracts for the assessment years in question and had wrongly relied on past assessments. It found that the offshore supply of equipment and design services were inextricably linked and not taxable in India if no PE existed.
The Tribunal noted that both the A.O. and Ld. CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders, and the Ld. CIT(A) did not decide all grounds on merits. In the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the A.O. for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to verify if the son had reflected the current account in his income tax return for the relevant assessment year. If so, the addition in the assessee's hands for deposits in that account cannot be made.
The Tribunal held that the mutual fund investments were made by the assessee's wife from her own bank account and were reflected in her DEMAT account, therefore, the addition in the hands of the assessee was incorrect. Similarly, the capital gains from the sale of the property were also primarily the wife's share, and her share of the capital gains should not have been added in the hands of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment orders. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that in the absence of incriminating material found during a search, additions cannot be sustained in unabated assessment years, following the Supreme Court decision in Abhisar Buildwell.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn due to the assessee's opting for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The assessee was granted liberty to revive the appeal if the scheme's benefits were not extended.
The tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal. Liberty was granted to revive the appeal if the VSVS application fails to mature.
The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. It directed the AO to verify the genuineness of the receipts and cash deposits, and the correctness of the exemption claim under Section 10(23AA), providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee's appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) to restrict the addition to 10% of the total addition on account of suppressed business receipts. This decision was based on the findings of a Coordinate Bench in similar cases, which found the 10% net profit ratio to be a rational basis derived from seized materials.
The Tribunal upheld the impugned order and dismissed the assessee's appeal. This decision was made due to the absence of any material on record to controvert the findings of the CIT(A) and the assessee's lack of participation.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution. It was an admitted position that the CIT(A) had not adjudicated the grounds of appeal on merits. The Tribunal emphasized that the CIT(A) has no power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution and is statutorily required to adjudicate appeals on merits by passing a speaking order, as per Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was deemed unsustainable. The Tribunal set aside the order and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to decide the appeal afresh on merits after providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The assessee was also directed to respond to notices from the CIT(A) without fail. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal decided that the entire addition of Rs. 30.23 lacs was not justified. Recognizing that the assessee had provided evidence of business turnover and that the Revenue could not dispute this entirely, the Tribunal deemed a lump sum addition of Rs. 2 lacs to be just and proper. This provides the assessee with relief of Rs. 28.23 lacs. The Tribunal explicitly stated that this reduction would not be treated as a precedent. Regarding the applicability of Section 115BBE, the Tribunal, relying on the decision in S.M.I.L.E Microfinance Limited Vs. The ACIT CC-1, held that Section 115BBE applies only to transactions done on or after April 1, 2017. Therefore, the assessee was directed to be assessed under normal provisions of the Act, implying that the income would not be taxed at the higher rate prescribed under Section 115BBE.
The Tribunal held that the interest paid on delayed payment for business acquisition was a revenue expenditure, not part of capital expenditure. The Tribunal allowed the appeal on this ground.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn based on the assessee's application. Liberty was granted to revive the appeal if the VSVS settlement fails.
The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds but rejected the plea regarding the invalidity of Section 153D approval, noting the assessee's non-cooperation in assessment proceedings. However, due to the ex-parte assessment and lack of proper opportunity, the matter was remitted for a fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that since the notice under Section 148 was issued on or after April 1, 2021, the reassessment proceedings should have followed the amended provisions, including Section 148A. Therefore, the reassessment order framed under the old provisions was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue's appeal was liable to be dismissed due to low tax effect, as the demand was less than the monetary limit for filing appeals as per Circular No. 9/2014. The assessee withdrew their cross-objections as the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that the relevant date for counting the ten assessment years is when the AO of the non-searched person receives the seized material. Since this date was in AY 2022-23, the assessments for AY 2010-11 to 2012-13 fell outside the permissible period.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue's appeal was not maintainable due to the low tax effect. The learned Departmental Representative fairly conceded that the total tax effect in the appeal was below the threshold of Rs. 60 lakhs prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 9/2024, dated 17.09.2024, which has retrospective effect. The Tribunal noted that this circular is applicable to all pending appeals. Therefore, based on the tax effect criterion stipulated in the CBDT circular, the Tribunal found no reason to entertain the appeal. The appeal was dismissed on this precise ground, subject to all just exceptions.
The Tribunal held that the receipts from domain name registration services do not fall within the definition of royalty under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act or Article 12(3)(a) of the India-USA DTAA. The Tribunal reasoned that domain name registration is a distinct service from web hosting and does not involve granting the right to use servers in a manner that would constitute royalty. The Tribunal also held that income from non-domain services, such as web hosting and web designing, does not 'make available' any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes to the users, and therefore, such consideration falls outside the ambit of FTS as per Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA DTAA. The Tribunal found that the AO erred in considering these services as FTS, as the users merely pay for customized services readily available, without any transfer of enduring technical knowledge. Ground No. 4 was sustained, and other grounds were allowed as consequential.
The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening the assessment was invalid as the prescribed authority had not applied its mind. Consequently, the reopening was quashed.