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308 orders · Page 2 of 7
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's request for withdrawal of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue failed to demonstrate tangible material showing an international transaction involving AMP expenses between the assessee and its foreign AE. Consequently, the adjustment on account of AMP expenses was not sustained.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act on 30.06.2022 was barred by limitation, following the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, and a decision of the Jurisdictional High Court.
The Tribunal held that initiating proceedings against a dead person, after their demise, is not sustainable in law. The reopening was quashed on this ground.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) passed the final assessment order without waiting for the order giving effect from the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO). The TPO had passed the order giving effect on June 26, 2024, proposing nil adjustment, considering the assessee's margin was within the comparable range. The AO also passed the final assessment order on the same day, sustaining additions based on the original TPO order, which was a violation of Section 144C of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the AO did not act upon the assessee's rectification application. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the AO had not followed the DRP's directions and that there was no adjustment required relating to transfer pricing. Consequently, the Tribunal deleted the transfer pricing adjustments of Rs. 9,61,57,599/- proposed by the AO. Grounds 2 and 3 raised by the assessee were allowed. Ground 1 was general, and grounds 4 and 5 were premature and consequential.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had submitted all relevant reconciliation statements and supporting documents, which the lower authorities failed to consider. The difference in turnover was due to different computation mechanisms under Service Tax and Income Tax laws.
The Tribunal held that the reopening was invalid because the approval from the prescribed authority under Section 151(2) was mechanical and generic, covering multiple cases without specific application to the assessee's case. Consequently, the assessment was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) should have examined the objects and proposed activities of the trust, not just the cash transactions. The Tribunal granted the Section 12AA registration, subject to the AO examining the issues in appropriate proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) did not violate Rule 46A by admitting additional evidence, as the AO failed to provide a remand report. The Tribunal also found that the assessee had sufficiently proved the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the loan transaction.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction for initiating proceedings under Section 153C was not properly recorded. It was found that the AO failed to demonstrate how the seized material had a bearing on the determination of the total income for the specific assessment years in question.
The Tribunal held that the satisfaction note recorded by the AO for initiating proceedings under Section 153C was vague, generic, and lacked application of mind. Consequently, the notice and assessment order were vitiated.
The Tribunal quashed the reopening for AY 2006-07 as it was beyond four years without alleging non-disclosure. It also reversed the CIT(A)'s apportionment of the cost of acquisition and reclassification of gains to short-term, finding them contradictory and beyond enhancement powers.
The Tribunal quashed the reopening for AY 2006-07 as it was beyond four years without alleging non-disclosure. It also reversed the CIT(A)'s apportionment of the cost of acquisition and reclassification of gains to short-term, finding them contradictory and beyond enhancement powers.
The Tribunal decided the case ex-parte due to the consistent non-prosecution by the assessee. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the orders of the lower authorities.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention regarding the source of funds, acknowledging the family's socio-economic status. However, it held that a lump sum addition of Rs. 1,00,000/- would be just and proper, without it being treated as a precedent.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, following a co-ordinate bench decision. The assessee's plea regarding the calculation methodology for delayed deposits was also remitted for examination.
The Tribunal held that initiating reassessment proceedings under Section 148 while Section 154 proceedings were pending and had identical reasons was impermissible. Following the Supreme Court's decision in S.M. Overseas Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal quashed the Section 148 proceedings as bad in law.
The Tribunal quashed the reopening for AY 2006-07 as it was beyond four years without alleging non-disclosure. It also reversed the CIT(A)'s apportionment of the cost of acquisition and reclassification of gains to short-term, finding them contradictory and beyond enhancement powers.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. It found that no evidence was examined at the lower levels and set aside the impugned orders.
The Tribunal held that Section 69C cannot be invoked when purchases are already accounted for in the books and their source is not doubted. Since the assessee provided purchase details, sales, and bank statements, the addition was unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the satisfaction recorded by the AO for initiating proceedings under Section 153C was invalid as it did not demonstrate that the seized material had a bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C and the consequent assessment orders were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was a mechanical and perfunctory exercise, lacking application of mind and not specifying the subject matter of additions. A single approval was granted for multiple assessment years, which vitiates the assessment order.
The Tribunal found that several additions made by the lower authorities were not supported by the facts or pertained to amounts not credited in the relevant financial year. Consequently, these additions were directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under section 80IA(4)(iv) even for captively consumed power, as this issue was decided in its favor in preceding assessment years. The disallowance of expenditure under section 14A was also deleted due to the AO's failure to record dissatisfaction with the assessee's suo motu disallowance.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee had opted to settle the dispute under the DTVSVS scheme. Therefore, the appeal was treated as withdrawn and accordingly dismissed.
The Tribunal rejected the assessee's first and fourth grounds pertaining to income computation and the stated refund amount. The second and third grounds, concerning the short granting of interest under Section 244A and adjustments to refund amounts, were remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh computation and factual verification, as these required detailed examination rather than tribunal adjudication under Section 254(1).
The Tribunal held that the income from maintenance support and training services are intricately linked with the utilization of software and are not taxable as FTS. They also found that the 'make available' condition under Article 12(4)(b) of the DTAA was not satisfied, and the revenue did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate otherwise. The Tribunal relied on its previous decision in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal held that the exclusion of time for exchange of information under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B is applicable only if the reference is made in terms of Section 90/90A and the relevant DTAA. Since the reference was not in terms of the amended Indo-Swiss DTAA, the assessments were barred by limitation.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC decided the appeal ex parte without considering the assessee's submissions or entering into the merits. The Tribunal allowed the appeals for statistical purposes and set aside the NFAC's orders.
The Tribunal held that additions made for the former four assessment years were not strictly based on specific seized material, referencing a Supreme Court decision. The department's cross-appeal was dismissed as lacking substance. The assessee's last appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that Smt. Kaushalya Devi did not meet the criteria of a legal representative as per the Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, her application for substitution was declined.
The Tribunal noted that the issue of agricultural income exemption was identical to previous years' appeals. For other additions, the Tribunal found that the AO did not properly verify the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP).
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient interest-free funds in the shape of partners' capital to make the interest-free advance to the partner. Following the Supreme Court judgment in Hero Cycles and Reliance Industries Ltd., it was held that since mixed funds were available, the advance could be presumed to be out of interest-free funds.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the CIT(A) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claims. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the proceedings before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were validly initiated. Regarding the first ground, while the AO's initial reasons might have contained inaccuracies (e.g., stating no return was filed when one was), the subsequent analysis and the AIR information provided a basis for the belief of escaped income. The Tribunal did not explicitly address the procedural aspect of not providing reasons/approval or opportunity to object in detail, but the overall finding implies these were not fatal. On the second ground, the Tribunal did not specifically discuss the four-year period and the requirement of failure to disclose. On the third ground, the Tribunal allowed grounds 3, 5, and 6, implying that the additions/disallowances related to these grounds were incorrect. Specifically, regarding the indexed cost of improvement (Ground 5), the Tribunal directed its allowance, finding that the assessee's share of LTCG and indexed cost of improvement should be allowed. For the Section 54 deduction (Ground 6), the Tribunal allowed the exemption, finding that the assessee's failure to construct the residential property within the stipulated time was due to delays by YEIDA in registering and delivering possession of the plot, which was beyond the assessee's control. The Tribunal relied on precedents like Nutan Chopra, Sh. Sanjeev Lal, and Shri Varun Seth. The issue of Section 143(2) notice (Ground 4) was not explicitly discussed in the provided excerpt, nor was the specific amount of addition/disallowance in Ground 3 detailed beyond the aggregate figure.
The Tribunal quashed the impugned reopening proceedings. It found that the AO failed to demonstrate that the assessee had not fully and truly disclosed all material facts in the earlier assessment proceedings.
The Tribunal held that in non-abated assessment years, additions under Section 153A cannot be made in the absence of incriminating material found during the search. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell, the Tribunal found no such material was brought on record.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and ritualistic, lacking application of mind. Citing various High Court and Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal found that such a flawed approval vitiates the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that an assessment order passed in the name of a non-existing entity, after being informed of a merger, is not sustainable. The Department was aware of the merger, and the final assessment order should have been in the name of the transferee company.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order was time-barred as it was passed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Section 275(1)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal also noted inconsistencies in the penalty order regarding the grounds for levy.
The Tribunal noted that the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had approved a resolution plan and granted a moratorium. Relying on Supreme Court decisions regarding the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), the Tribunal decided to remand the appeals to the Assessing Officer to take necessary steps as per Section 156A of the Act.
The Tribunal held that additions u/s 68 of the Act cannot be made when the books of account are rejected and profit is estimated at a certain percentage, as this would account for all expenses. The Tribunal also noted that if books of account are rejected, no addition can be made u/s 68 in the absence of books of account.
The Tribunal noted that the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had approved a resolution plan and granted a moratorium. Relying on Supreme Court decisions regarding the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), the Tribunal decided to remand the appeals to the Assessing Officer to take necessary steps as per Section 156A of the Act.
The Tribunal held that protective assessments of amounts already confirmed as substantive additions in the hands of SCIPL would amount to double taxation. Therefore, such protective additions were to be deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had approved a resolution plan and granted a moratorium. Relying on Supreme Court decisions regarding the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), the Tribunal decided to remand the appeals to the Assessing Officer to take necessary steps as per Section 156A of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s findings were just, fair, reasonable, and legal. The assessee has a single PAN, and the income and losses have been assessed and treated consistently in prior years, with set-offs allowed. The DTAA does not prohibit the set-off of PE losses against HO income, and the previous orders of the Assessing Officers allowing such set-offs were in accordance with law.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's application for withdrawal of the appeal. Liberty was granted to revive the appeal if the VSVS settlement fails.
The Tribunal noted that the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had approved a resolution plan and granted a moratorium. Relying on Supreme Court decisions regarding the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), the Tribunal decided to remand the appeals to the Assessing Officer to take necessary steps as per Section 156A of the Act.
The Tribunal admitted the assessee's application under Rule 27 of the ITAT Rules. It held that assessment year 2008-09 was outside the block period for assessment under Section 153A, thus quashing the assessment.
The Tribunal noted that both the AO and CIT(A) passed ex-parte orders without deciding the grounds of appeal on merits. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the cases were restored to the AO for de-novo assessment.