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308 orders · Page 4 of 7
The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening the assessment was invalid as the prescribed authority had not applied its mind. Consequently, the reopening was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the receipts from domain name registration services do not fall within the definition of royalty under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act or Article 12(3)(a) of the India-USA DTAA. The Tribunal reasoned that domain name registration is a distinct service from web hosting and does not involve granting the right to use servers in a manner that would constitute royalty. The Tribunal also held that income from non-domain services, such as web hosting and web designing, does not 'make available' any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes to the users, and therefore, such consideration falls outside the ambit of FTS as per Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA DTAA. The Tribunal found that the AO erred in considering these services as FTS, as the users merely pay for customized services readily available, without any transfer of enduring technical knowledge. Ground No. 4 was sustained, and other grounds were allowed as consequential.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was invalid. The Judicial Member, relying on the fact that the prescribed authority's approval for reopening under section 151 was a mere mechanical "yes, I am satisfied" and that this fact was unrebutted by the Revenue, found the reopening to be bad in law. The Tribunal quoted CIT Vs. S. Goyanka Lime and Chemical Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 64 taxmann.com 313 (SC) to support its decision to quash the impugned reopening. Consequently, all other pleadings on merits were rendered academic. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed, and the impugned order was quashed. No specific issue was left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the development agreements did not constitute a transfer of land for the purpose of capital gains or business income in the intervening assessment years. Advances received were not taxable until the project's completion.
The Tribunal held that the development agreements did not constitute a transfer of land for the purpose of capital gains or business income in the intervening assessment years. Advances received were not taxable until the project's completion.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) rightly deleted the addition. Since the assessee was a registered society under Section 12A and eligible for exemption under Section 11(1)(d), the benefit of exemption could not be denied due to a mistake in filing the return. The grounds raised by the Revenue were rejected.
The Tribunal decided that while the rejection of books under section 145(3) and profit estimation were the subject of the appeal, a detailed factual matrix was not extensively required. The Tribunal noted that in the preceding assessment year 2017-18, the assessee's profit rate was assessed at 2.06% for retail loan business agent activity, and in AY 2016-17, it was 1.82%, both under section 143(3) assessments. Considering these past figures and in the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to estimate a lumpsum profit rate of 2.25% for the current assessment year. This rate is to be applied with the specific rider that it shall not be treated as a precedent. Necessary computation shall follow as per law. No other ground or argument was pressed by either party.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 45 days in filing the appeal, citing the decision in Collector Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC) and in the larger interest of justice. The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps, especially with the newly introduced virtual hearing mechanism, which could have prevented the assessee from presenting their case effectively. Therefore, in the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the assessee's appeal back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The Assessing Officer was directed to provide three effective opportunities of hearing to the appellant, at the appellant's risk and responsibility, for consequential proceedings. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed grounds related to stock valuation loss and royalty expenses, relying on previous decisions in the assessee's own case. The ground related to Dividend Distribution Tax was dismissed, following a Special Bench decision. One ground was restored to the DRP for a speaking order.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction for initiating proceedings under Section 153C was not properly recorded. It was found that the AO failed to demonstrate how the seized material had a bearing on the determination of the total income for the specific assessment years in question.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the disallowance of depreciation. The Tribunal found no change in circumstances from prior assessment years where similar disallowances were not made, and the CIT(A) had already ruled in favor of the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 263 days in filing the appeal, finding the explanation provided by the assessee to be well-explained. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee was not served notices in due course of events by the lower appellate authority. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes. The issues on merits and law raised by the assessee were restored to the files of the learned CIT(A). The learned CIT(A) was directed to issue a fresh notice to the assessee and decide the appeal afresh. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the case.
The Tribunal rejected the additional ground regarding the non-issuance of a Section 143(2) notice. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal confirmed an addition of Rs.2,00,000/- out of Rs.12,68,000/-, with a rider that this shall not be a precedent, granting relief of Rs.10,68,000/- to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and without due application of mind, rendering the assessment proceedings illegal. Consequently, the penalty orders, being consequential, were also set aside.
The CIT(A) admitted the additional evidence and held that the AO had wrongly invoked sections 68 and 69. The tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding that the credits in question pertained to opening balances, sale proceeds of ESOPs taxed in prior years, and rental income from the USA, which was also taxed in the USA. The tribunal found no valid reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings.
The Tribunal held that blank letterheads, without any content, cannot be considered incriminating material to form the basis for any addition under Section 153A. Following the landmark decision in Abhisar Buildwell, the assessments were quashed as the foundation itself did not exist.
The Tribunal restored the appeal to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication, stating that the CIT(A) decided the issue ex-parte without giving an independent finding on merits. The assessee was directed to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee consistently followed its accounting method and incurred the expenditure wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The Assessing Officer's ad-hoc disallowance of 90% of the expenditure was considered arbitrary, especially since he himself allowed 10%.
The Tribunal held that the appellant, Union of India, failed to establish its locus standi to institute the appeals. Since the appellant could not satisfactorily explain how it was an aggrieved party, the appeals were rejected on this ground alone.
The Tribunal held that the allocation of expenses in the ratio of sales to eligible projects was upheld, consistent with previous decisions. For the Notional Annual Letting Value issue, the matter was partly allowed, remanding the issue of farm lands to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Ld. CIT(A) allowing the Section 54 deduction. It confirmed that a registered sale deed is not mandatory, a flat buyer agreement is sufficient, payments through a verifiable third party are permissible, and the builder's accounting treatment is irrelevant to the assessee's claim. The Tribunal noted that the project was under construction, and substantial payments were made within the stipulated period.
The Tribunal held that the AO made the reference to the DVO on a wrong premise that the assessees had sold the property, whereas they had purchased it. Furthermore, the variation between the sale consideration and the DVO's valuation was only 1.71%, which is a minor variation. The Tribunal also noted that the approval granted by the JCIT for the assessment was mechanical and without application of mind.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) should be condoned. The matter was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) to decide afresh after giving the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and not in compliance with the provisions of the Act, as it was granted for multiple assessment years in a single day without proper application of mind.
The Tribunal held that additions made for the former four assessment years were not strictly based on specific seized material, referencing a Supreme Court decision. The department's cross-appeal was dismissed as lacking substance. The assessee's last appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal for AY 2004-05, finding the assessee's explanation to be reasonable and bona fide. The appeal was admitted for hearing, and the grounds of appeal were to be considered.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal for AY 2004-05, finding the assessee's explanation to be reasonable and bona fide. The appeal was admitted for hearing, and the grounds of appeal were to be considered.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the Assessing Officer failed to establish that Ms. Ira Wasson was the legal representative as per Section 2(29) of the IT Act (read with Section 2(11) of CPC) or that she had inherited any estate from her deceased husband. Citing a co-ordinate bench decision in Ms. Wasson's own case, the Tribunal concluded that the assessments were invalid in her name and dismissed the Revenue's appeals.
The Tribunal held that the interest income derived from parking surplus funds in fixed deposits with scheduled/nationalized banks cannot be considered as derived from an eligible business activity under Section 80P(2).
The Tribunal held that the debit notes, which indicated 'Nil' markup despite being labeled as BSS, indicated that the amounts were indeed reimbursements of expenses incurred on behalf of AEs and not BSS. Therefore, no transfer pricing adjustment was warranted.
The Tribunal held that the jurisdictional High Court has settled the issue regarding JAO's authority to issue notices u/s 148, confirming its validity. However, on merits, the Tribunal found that the AO failed to provide sufficient justification for treating the opening stock as unexplained investment, especially since the sales were accepted as genuine.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the CCM transactions were within the permissible limits as per exchange guidelines and that the assessee had indeed earned a profit on the sale of shares, which was duly offered to tax. The AO's assumptions were found to be erroneous.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and admitted it for decision on merits. The Tribunal decided to restore the issue back to the AO to verify the documents furnished by the assessee. If the assessee substantiates their contentions with documentary evidence, the AO shall delete the remaining additions.
The Tribunal held that the approval process under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked application of mind, rendering the assessment orders illegal and liable to be quashed. Similar issues were adjudicated by coordinate benches, upholding the assessee's grounds.
The Tribunal held that the 'protective' assessments must await the final outcome of the 'substantive' appeals pending before the CIT(A) to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and contradictory findings. Consequently, the assessee's appeals were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after the finalization of the substantive assessments, keeping all other legal and factual issues open.
The Tribunal found that the additional evidence submitted by the assessee was crucial and required factual verification by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the Assessing Officer for a fresh adjudication, providing the assessee with three effective opportunities to present and prove their case. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted a difference of opinion between the members regarding whether the addition was sustainable on merits under Section 68 or if it constituted double taxation. The matter was remanded for a fresh hearing on the merits of the addition.
The tribunal partly allowed the appeal against the cash deposits, restricting the addition to Rs. 1,00,000, considering the assessee's economic status. It also allowed the appeal against the penalty, noting that the non-cooperation was justifiable as most hearings occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic.
The Tribunal found that the lower authorities had not adjudicated the case on merits, which is contrary to Section 250(6). Therefore, it restored the appeal to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication, providing the assessee three opportunities to present their case. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to produce necessary documents to prove genuineness and creditworthiness of parties involved in share capital and unsecured loans. Despite opportunities, the assessee did not comply. The Tribunal, in the interest of justice, remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer to re-examine the additional evidences filed by the assessee. The grounds of appeal were partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal observed that the tax effect in the appeal was Rs. 2,35,670/-, which was below the monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT circular. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was not maintainable.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in not adjudicating the additional ground regarding sales tax incentives. The appellate authorities' powers are not fettered by the ruling in Goetz India Ltd. The Tribunal admitted the ground for adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the entire purchase disallowance could not be upheld in principle, especially when sales figures were not disturbed. A lump sum disallowance of 10% representing the gross profit component was deemed just and proper.
The ITAT found that the CIT(A) relied on additional evidence without giving the AO an opportunity to examine it. Therefore, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for reconsideration after obtaining a remand report from the AO.
The Tribunal noted a previous order in a similar appeal for a different AY, which allowed the foreign tax credit despite the late filing of Form 67. The Tribunal decided to follow judicial consistency.
The Tribunal held that since the primary addition for unexplained cash credits was already deleted by a co-ordinate bench, the penalty arising from it also cannot sustain. The Tribunal relied on the precedent set in K. C. Builders Vs. ACIT (2004).
The Tribunal restored both the quantum and penalty appeals to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee three effective opportunities to present her case. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal restored both the quantum and penalty appeals to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee three effective opportunities to present her case. Both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal falls within the Covid-19 pandemic period and the assessee had provided reasons for the delay beyond its control. Therefore, the CIT(A)/NFAC's refusal to condone the delay was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal falls within the Covid-19 pandemic period and the assessee had provided reasons for the delay beyond its control. Therefore, the CIT(A)/NFAC's refusal to condone the delay was not sustainable.