DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CIRCLE 4(2), DELHI, I.P.ESTATE vs. BUREAU VERITAS CONSUMER PRODUCTS SERVICES(INDIA) PVT. LTD., LAJPAT NAGAR

The below mentioned appeals and cross appeals have been filed by the appellant Revenue and the assessee as per below mentioned details.

At the outset, it has been noted that the Registry has identified a delay of 49 days in the appeals of the Revenue filed vide and ITA No.3158/Chny/2017. The reasons given by the Revenue have been considered and found to be justified. The ld. Counsel for the assessee did not oppose the condonation of delay. Accordingly, we condone the delay in the appeals of the Revenue and proceed to adjudicate the same.

Both the contesting parties have informed that the appeals and the Cross objections in relevant years being AY 2013-14 and 2014-15, hover around common issues and hence for the purposes of convenience were heard and are being adjudicated by this common order. Upon consideration of various grounds of appeal raised by the appellant assessee and the appellant Revenue, the following is the factual matrix qua issues involved in AY 2013-14 and 2014-15 and corresponding grounds of appeal raised by the contesting parties.

Grounds of appeal raised by the assessee for Assessment Year 2013-14 in are as under:-

Ground of appeal raised by the Revenue for Assessment Year 2013-14 in are as under:-

At the outset, ld. Counsel for the appellant assessee submitted that grounds of appeal numbers 4, 5 and 7 raised by it vide and 5418/Del/2017 for AY’s 2013-14 & 2014-15 are not pressed. Accordingly, grounds of appeal numbers 4, 5 and 7 raised vide and 5418/Del/2017 are dismissed.

The appellant assessee through its grounds of appeal numbers 01 to 03 and the Revenue through its grounds of appeal numbers 01 is contesting the order of Ld CIT(A) for AY’s 2013-14 & 2014-15 respectively. Thus, the appellant assessee is contesting relief not granted to it and revenue is contesting part relief granted to the assessee. For the purpose of this order, we will consider the figures for AY 2013-14. As the facts for AY 2014-15 have been reported to be identical, the decision taken for AY 2013-14 shall apply mutatis mutandis in AY 2014-15 as well.

We will first consider the grounds of appeal 01 to 03 raised by assessee vide ITA No.5416/Del/2017. As per brief factual matrix of the case concerning AY 2013-14, during the year, the assessee had shown to have earned exempt dividend income u/s 10(34)/10(35) amounting to Rs. 19.11 Crs. In the Return of Income, the assessee had suo-moto offered a sum of Rs. 0.50 Crs. towards disallowance u/s 14A. Before the AO, , the assessee had also contended that since it had sufficient own funds out of which investments have been made, therefore the question of further disallowance u/s 14A do not arise. The Ld. AO invoking provisions of Rule 8D made an additional disallowance of Rs. 12.86 Crs. [Rule 8D(2)(ii) for interest – Rs. 5.99 Crs. & Rule 8D(2)(iii) for expenses - Rs. 7.37 Crs.). The Ld. CIT(A) gave partial relief by confirming the disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii) i.e., proportionate interest of Rs. 5.99 Crs. and directing the AO to recompute disallowance as per Rule 8D(2)(iii) after excluding investments which are strategic in nature while computing average value of investments for the purpose of computing disallowance u/s 14A.

The ld. Counsel for the assessee primarily argued that it had sufficient own funds for making investment. It was submitted that the investments in respect of which dividend has been received by the appellant during the year have been acquired by the appellant from its own funds. It was submitted that total interest free funds constituting Share Capital plus Free Reserves & Surplus amounted to Rs. 2,798 Crs. as on 31-03-2013 & Rs. 2,674 Crs. as on 31-03- 2012. On the other hand, the investment stood at Rs. 1,752 Crs. and Rs. 1,198 Crs. as on 31-03-2013 and 31-03-2012 respectively. Therefore, disallowance u/s 14A stated to be unwarranted. In support of its arguments, the ld. Counsel has placed on record a voluminous paper book indicating availability of surplus own funds. The appellant assessee has placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in South Indian Bank Ltd. -vs.- CIT (2021) 438 ITR 1 (SC) holding that in case interest free own funds available with assessee exceeds its Investments, it could be presumed that Investments were made through assessee own funds. Hence, no disallowance u/s 14A could be made. The said decision of Apex Court was stated to have been followed in the case of DCIT – vs.- Dalmia Bharat Sugar & Industries Limited of this Tribunal as it dated 14-11-2023 as well as a plethora of other decisions of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court, Hon’ble Bombay High Court and Ahmedabad Tribunal.

Per Contra, the ld. DR relied upon the order of the authorities below.

We have heard rival submissions in the light of material available on records. We have noted from para-7.4 and 7.5 of the order of the ld. CIT(A) that he has sustained the order of ld. Assessing Officer in cryptic and a summary manner without countering the evidences produced by the appellant. Even the appellant’s reliance upon judicial precedence has been summarily dismissed holding that ‘….the case laws relied upon by the appellant are distinguishable on facts and in law…..’. From the details submitted by the appellant, we have noted that the argument of availability of surplus own funds is made out in favour of the assessee. We have also noted that judicial precedents relied upon also support the view that no disallowance under section 14A read with Rule-8D(ii) is permissible in cases where the assessee had surplus own funds. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that no disallowance under section14A read with Rule-8D(ii) was required to be made. We therefore set-aside the order of the ld. CIT(A) and direct the ld. AO to delete the addition of Rs.5.99 Crores. The grounds of appeal nos. 01 to 03 raised by the appellant assessee in are therefore allowed.

Since, the facts of the case in AY 2013-14 are identical to those in AY 2014-15, decision therein shall apply mutatis mutandis. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal number 01 to 03 contested by the assessee through in are also allowed.

We now will consider the ground of appeal no.1 raised by the appellant revenue in its appeal at 3157/Chny/2017. The ld. AO had noted that during the year under consideration, the assessee had earned exempt dividend income of Rs.19.11 Crs. In the Return of Income, the assessee had suo-moto offered a sum of Rs.0.50 Crs. towards part salary and administrative expenses of the employees engaged in investment activities. Other than the above, no other expenditure was shown to have been incurred to earn exempt income. The ld. AO rejected the contentions of the assessee and proceeded to make a disallowance in the assessment order of Rs.12.86 Crores(13.36 Crores worked by the AO minus .050 Crores already offered by the assessee). The ld. CIT(A) after considering details and submissions in the light of contemporaneous judicial precedents proceeded in para 8.8 of his order to direct the AO to recompute the disallowance under Rule-8D(2)(iii).

The ld. Counsel for the assessee reiterated the arguments taken before the ld. First Appellate Authority, submitting that the order is based upon correct understanding the facts of the case.

The ld. CIT-DR Shri Srikant Namdeo placed reliance upon the order of ld. Assessing Officer. It was argued that the AO has made additions after understanding true facts of the case.

We have heard the rival submissions in the light of material available on records. Invocation of statutory provisions to make any disallowance under Rule-8D(2)(iii) necessarily entails recording of an objective satisfaction by the Assessing Officer before making any disturbance to assessee’s calculation. It is trite law that unavailability of any such objective satisfaction by the Assessing Officer would make any disallowance untenable in the eyes of law. We have noted from the impugned assessment order that recording of any such satisfaction is missing. In the case of Godrez & Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd. 394 ITR 449, Hon’ble Apex Court has held it is imperative for the AO to establish that based upon the accounts of the assessee, the disallowance made under section 14A by it is unacceptable. The impugned principle has been followed by this Tribunal in its decision in the case of Hindustan Times Ltd. Vide dated 31.01.2024. Accordingly, the decision of ld. CIT(A) directing the AO to recompute the disallowance is sustained and the ground of appeal no.01 raised by the appellant Revenue in appeal no.3157/Chny/2017 is dismissed.

Since, the facts of the case in AY 2013-14 are identical to those in AY 2014-15, decision therein shall apply mutatis mutandis. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal number 01 contested by the Revenue through in is also dismissed.

The appellant assessee has through grounds of appeal no.04 in and 5417/Del/2017 for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15 contested the confirmation of disallowance made by the ld. AO. As stated hereinabove, the said ground was not pressed and hence stands dismissed. It has however been noted that the appellant Revenue through its ground of appeal no.5 in for AY 2014-15, contesting that the decision of ld. CIT(A) shows that impugned liability is an unascertained liability and therefore it attracts provisions of Explanation-1(f) of Section 115JB. Unascertained liabilities fall within the preview of Explanation-1(f) of Section 115JB and therefore liable for inclusion qua calculation of book profits. Accordingly, in view of withdrawal of its contest by the assessee on the core issue of leave encashment, as well as statutory prescription of section 115JB, the ground of appeal no.5 raised by the Revenue is allowed.

The appellant assessee through its grounds of appeal number 06 and the Revenue through its grounds of appeal number 04 is contesting the order of Ld CIT(A) for AY’s 2013-14 & 2014-15 respectively. Thus, the appellant assessee is contesting relief not granted to it and revenue is contesting part relief granted to the assessee. For the purpose of this order, we will consider the figures for AY 2013-14. As the facts for AY 2014-15 have been reported to be identical, the decision taken for AY 2013-14 shall apply mutatis mutandis in AY 2014-15 as well.

We will first consider the grounds of appeal 06 raised by assessee vide ITA No.5416/Del/2017. As per factual matrix of the case available for AY 2013-14, the ld. AO had made an addition on account of Sales Tax subsidy, & Power subsidy while computing Book Profit u/s 115JB of Rs. 24,15,51,365/-. It was submitted that the assessee had set up a newly integrated cement plant of 2.5 MTPA at Chhinnakomeria in Kadappa district of Andhra Pradesh. The said plant has been set up with a fresh capital investment of Rs. 580 Crs. and has been commissioned on 21-03-2009. In terms of “Industrial Investment Promotion Policy 2005-2010” issued by Industries & Commerce Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, industrial units set up in specified areas with a capital investment of Rs. 100 Crs. or more for manufacturing/producing articles will qualify as “Mega Projects” and were eligible for following fiscal incentives for a period of five years. The incentives available included Sales Tax Subsidy in the nature of reimbursement of 25% of the sales tax paid, Power Subsidy in the nature of cost reimbursement at specified rate. During the year, the subsidy accrued to the assessee included Sales Tax Subsidy of Rs. 9.36 Crs. and power Subsidy of Rs. 14.80 Crs. [netted off with Power and Fuel]. In its return of income, the same was excluded under normal provision as well as while computing the Book Profit u/s 115JB, by the assessee holding it to be in the nature of capital receipts. The ld. A.O. disallowed the above claim on the contention that these incentives are production incentives as they are granted after the company commences production. Thus, as evident from Para 13.6 to 13.19 of the assessment order, it was concluded that the incentives were given to enable the assessee to run the business profitably and were operational subsidies. Further, apropos to Para 12.0 to 12.8 of the order the subsidy was not allowed by the ld. AO, as exclusion under MAT provisions on the contention that Explanation 1 to Sec. 115JB of the Act does not permit such specific deduction while computing Book Profit. In appeal, the Ld. CIT(A) granted partial relief by holding subsidy as capital receipts under normal provisions. However, regarding the claim of exclusion of Subsidy under MAT provisions, Ld. CIT(A) upheld the order of the A.O. while relying upon decision of Supreme Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. –vs.- CIT (2002) 122 Taxman 562 (SC).

Per Contra, the ld. DR would like to place reliance on the orders of the lower authorities.

We have heard the rival submission in the light of material placed on record. We have noted that the ld. AO has extensively dealt the issue in paras- 12 to 12.08 of his order vividly elaborating as to why the impugned amounts were liable for inclusion under section 115JB. The ld. First Appellate Authority has also examined the issue at length in paras-22 to 22.16 of his order. While doing so both the lower authorities have examined judicial precedents covering the subject. We have noted that the reliance placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Appolo Tyres (supra) is also based upon correct understanding and appreciation of the facts of the case. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that no case of any intervention to the order of the ld. CIT(A) is made out at this stage. We therefore confirm the order of ld. CIT(A) and dismiss ground of appeal no. 06 raised by the assessee.

Since, the facts of the case in AY 2013-14 are identical to those in AY 2014-15, decision therein shall apply mutatis mutandis. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal number 06 contested by the assessee through in is also dismissed.

Per Contra, the ld. CIT-DR placed reliance upon the order of Ld. AO. It was argued that the action of the AO is based upon correct understanding of the facts and reliance upon relevant judicial precedents.

It is the case of the assessee that the order of the ld. CIT(A) is based upon proper understanding of the issues involved. Arguments taken before the ld. CIT(A) were reiterated. The assessee has placed upon records a voluminous paper book, inter alia, containing government instructions for the subsidy, extracts of its financials, etc., in support of its arguments.

We have heard the rival submission in the light of material placed on record. We have noted that the ld. CIT(A) has concurred with the submissions of the assessee that the impugned amounts of subsidy were given not for encouragement of business but for the overall development and growth of State of Andhra Pradesh. We have noted that Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ponny Sugars & Chemical Ltd. held that nature of any subsidy is to be determined with respect to the purpose for which is granted. Time of disbursal and source/mode of subsidy is immaterial. We have noted that ld. CIT(A) has rightly distinguished the decision of Meghalaya Steels Ltd. (383 ITR 217) of Hon’ble Apex Court concluding that in the impugned case, the issue was as to whether subsidy is admissible for deduction under section 80IB/80IC or not. The issue of capital receipt vs revenue receipts was not agitated there. The ld. CIT(A) after examining various documents placed by the assessee held that the prime object of the impugned subsidies was to create employment, accelerate industrial growth, boost industrial investment in Andhra Pradesh for its wide spread economic development. Accordingly, we find that the decision of ld. CIT(A) is based upon correct understanding of the facts of the case. We therefore do not feel any need for any intervention in the order of the ld. CIT(A) at this stage. The same is therefore sustained and the ground of appeal no.4 raised by the Revenue in is dismissed.

Since, the facts of the case in AY 2013-14 are identical to those in AY 2014-15, decision therein shall apply mutatis mutandis. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal number 04 contested by the Revenue through in is also dismissed.

The next issue raised by Revenue through its ground of appeal no.02 in the above two ITAs for AY 2013-14 and 2014-15 respectively is regarding the decision of Ld. CIT(A) in allowing the appellant’s claim of additional deprecation under section 32(1)(iia). We have noted that the issue for the two years is based on identical facts and hence decision taken qua for AY 2013-14 shall apply mutatis mutandis to for AY 2014-15. For the purpose of this order, we consider the fact and figures for AY 2013-14. As per brief factual matrix of the case the assessee had claimed deduction towards additional depreciation amounting to Rs. 14,37,34,124/- i.e. @ 20% on all the eligible assets acquired on or after 01-04-2010 but before 31-03-2012, subject to the conditions specified in Sec. 32(1)(iia) and subject to overall criteria that total depreciation does not exceed the actual cost. Apropos to discussions in Para 7.2 – 7.4 of assessment order, the ld. AO disallowed the claim stating that Sec. 32(1)(iia) allows claim of additional depreciation in only the first year in which the asset is installed and put to use. Upon consideration, Ld. CIT(Appeals) allowed the claim relying on the decision of Hon’ble Kolkata Tribunal in DCIT –vs.- Gloster Jute Mills Ltd. (2017) 88 taxmann.com 738 (Kol – Trib.).

The ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that Sec. 32(1)(iia) states that additional depreciation shall be allowed @ 20% on ‘new’ plant & machinery acquired and installed after 31-03-2005 subject to conditions prescribed therein. It was contended that the appellant assessee duly satisfied all the conditions as mentioned in Sec 32(1)(iia). It was further argued that vide first proviso to Sec 32(1)(iia), the Act itself defines the limitations and specifies the conditions in which such claim of additional depreciation shall not be available. If the asset does not fall under the restrictive provisions of Sec. 32(1)(iia), the assets are eligible for claim of additional depreciation in subsequent years. It was argued that if the intention of the legislature was to allow the benefit only in the initial year then the provision of the Act would have expressly prescribed and that in absence of such specific provision, it can be said that the legislature has intended to provide the relief in subsequent years also. The ld. Counsel placed reliance upon a catena of decisions of Mumbai and Kolkata Tribunal holding that the provisions of Sec. 32(1)(iia) as amended by Finance Act, 2005 w.e.f. 01.04.2006 do not explicitly postulates allowance of depreciation in the first year only. It was accordingly requested that the order of the Ld. CIT(A) may be confirmed.

We have heard rival submissions in the light of materials placed on record. We have noted that, as observed by the ld. CIT(A), the issue is fairly covered in favour of the assessee vide its decision of the Hon’ble Co-ordinate Bench of Kolkata Tribunal in in the case of DCIT vs Gloster Jute Mills Ltd. (2017) 88 taxmann.com 738 (Kol - Trib.). We have noted that the decision of learned First Appellate Authority is based upon correct facts of the case and does not require any intervention at this stage. Accordingly, we confirm the order of the ld. CIT(A) and dismissed ground of appeal no. 02 raised by the Revenue in ITA No.3157/Chny/2017.

Since, the facts of the case in AY 2013-14 are identical to those in AY 2014-15, decision therein shall apply mutatis mutandis. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal number 02 contested by the Revenue through in is also dismissed.

The next issue raised by Revenue through its ground of appeal no.03 in the above two ITAs for AY 2013-14 and 2014-15 respectively is regarding the decision of Ld. CIT(A) in allowing the appellant’s claim of provision for bad debts under normal provision and under MAT under section 115JB amounting to Rs.1,34,34,000/-. We have noted that the issue for the two years is based on identical facts and hence decision taken qua for AY 2013-14 shall apply mutatis mutandis to for AY 2014-15. For the purpose of this order, we consider the fact and figures for AY 2013-14. As per brief factual matrix the assessee has debited in its P&L A/c provision for bad and doubtful debts of Rs. 1.34 Crs. The said provision was netted off with debtors in the Balance Sheet. The assessee held that as the same represents actual write off it was not added back under normal provisions & MAT. As evident from para 11.2 of the assessment order, the ld. A.O. disallowed the claim stating that deduction is available on actual bad debts written off and not on provision. Before the ld. CIT(A), the assessee placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble SC in Vijaya Bank –vs.- CIT 323 ITR 166 (SC) & Hon’ble Karnataka HC in CIT –vs.- Yokogawa India Ltd. (2012) 204 Taxman 305 (Kar.). Upon considering the same, ld. CIT(A) proceeded to delete the impugned addition.

Per Contra, the ld. CIT-DR argued in favour of the decision of ld. Assessing Officer.

The ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the issue is squarely covered by the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijaya Bank -vs.- CIT (2010) 323 ITR 166 (SC) wherein it has been held that the amount of provision for bad & doubtful debts is reduced from loans and advances or debtors from the asset side of the balance sheet. Such treatment amounts to actual write-off A provision for doubtful debt such presented in accounts would be regarded as an allowable expenditure u/s 36(1)(vii). Further reliance was placed upon the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Religare Finvest Ltd. –vs.- DCIT [I.T.A. No. 4796/Del/2017 dated 13.07.2023] and of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Vidres India Ceramics Pvt. Ltd. -vs.- DCIT [I.T.A No. 2521/Ahd/2017 dated 17.05.2019. On the issue of treatment under section 115JB reliance was placed upon the decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in CIT –vs.- Yokogawa India Ltd. (2012) 204 Taxman 305 (Kar.). which was stated to have been upheld in ACIT -vs.- Delhi State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. [ITA No.7265/Del/2019 dated 26.09.2023 of this Tribunal. It was accordingly requested that the decision of the ld. CIT(A) may be confirmed.

We have heard rival submissions in the light of material placed on record. We have noted that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Religare Finvest Ltd. as at while, inter alia, considering decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the Vijya Bank case held as under:-

By respectfully following the order of the Co-ordinate Bench in Assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2010-11 (supra), we find no merit in the Ground No. 2 of the Revenue, for A.Y. 2012-13, A.Y 2013-14 and A.Y 2015-16. Further we find merit in Assessee’s Ground No. 3 for A.Y. 2014-15, accordingly, Ground No. 2 of the Revenue in and ITA No. 7553/Del/2018 are dismissed and Assessee’s Appeal Ground No. 3 in I.T.A.7856/Del/2017 is allowed…..”. 39. We have noted that the facts of the present case are identical to those in the case of Religare Finvest (supra). Accordingly, in respectful compliance to the decision (supra) and also for the purposes of consistency, we do not feel any need to disturb the findings of the ld. CIT(A) at this stage, the same are therefore confirmed.

As regards the issue of treatment under section 115JB, we have noted that Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case Yokogava India Ltd. 204 taxman 305 have held that the provisions are not liable for addition under section 115JB. This view has been upheld by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Delhi State Industrial and Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. as at ITA No.7265/Del/2019. We have noted that the decision of ld. CIT(A) in para -20.4 of his order, following decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijaya Bank as well of this Tribunal in the case of Flex Foods, holding that the provisions for doubtful debts is an allowable deduction under section 115JB is also correct. Accordingly, on the issue of treatment of the provisions for doubtful debts under section 115JB also the arguments of the Revenue are non- maintainable. We therefore confirm the order of the ld. CIT(A) and dismiss the ground of appeal no.3 raised by the Revenue.

Since, the facts of the case in AY 2013-14 are identical to those in AY 2014-15, decision therein shall apply mutatis mutandis. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal number 03 contested by the Revenue through in is also dismissed.

The next issue raised by the Revenue vide ground of appeal no.5 in is regarding the carry forward and adjustment of Long Term Capital Loss of amalgamating company amounting to Rs.2,05,96,629/-. Brief facts of the case are that during the year, Dalmia Cement Ventures Limited (DCVL), 100% subsidiary company of the assessee company, got amalgamated with the assessee company w.e.f. 01-04-2012 vide order of Hon’ble High Court dated 13-11-2013. The assessee had contended that vide Para 5(f) of the Approved scheme DCVL was entitled to avail/claim all the benefits under the various laws, as applicable with respect to DCVL, as were being availed/ claimed by DCVL. Accordingly, the brought forward capital loss of DCVL available for set off amounting to Rs. 3,36,45,844/- was transferred to the assessee company. Out of the same, the assessee, during the year, had claimed set off of unabsorbed LTCL amounting to Rs. 2,05,96,629/- in its return of income for AY 2013-14. The ld. AO disallowed the claim on the contention that u/s 72A(1) only unabsorbed business loss & depreciation of the amalgamating company is available to amalgamated company. The Ld. CIT(A) allowed the claim holding that the Scheme as approved by Hon’ble High Court, all the assets & liabilities including the capital loss would be transferred to appellant company.

The ld. Counsel for the assessee argued that this issue is squarely covered by the decision of Hon’ble Pune Tribunal in ACIT –vs.- Capgemini Technology Services Limited [ITA No. 1857/PUN/2017 dated 30-08-2022] wherein it has been held that the benefit of carry forward and set off of long term capital loss is to be allowed to the amalgamated company. The Tribunal held that all the benefits under the Income Tax Act, due to the amalgamating company should devolve upon the amalgamated company because of principle of succession relying on the principle laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT –vs.- T Veerabhadra Rao (1985) 155 ITR 152 (SC). Similar view was reported to have been taken by the Hon’ble Kolkata ITAT in the case of Electrocast Sales India Ltd. –vs.- DCIT [ITA No. 2145/Kol/2014 dated 09-03-2018. It was argued that there is no bar under the Income Tax Act to deny the carry forward and set of capital loss of amalgamating company in the hands of amalgamated company.

We have heard the rival submissions in the light of material placed on record. The ld. CIT(A) has accorded relief to the assessee on the premise that in scheme of amalgamations approved by Hon’ble High Court, all the assets and liabilities are taken over by the company taking over and therefore the losses will have to be allowed to the assessee. We have noted from para-18 to 18.3 of the order of ld. CIT(A) that he has allowed relief after carefully considering the facts of the case in the light of material available before him as well as judicial precedents covering the matter. We have noted that there is no infirmity in the decision of ld. CIT(A). Accordingly, we confirm the order of the ld. CIT(A) and dismiss the grounds of appeal no.05 raised by the appellant Revenue in ITA No.3157/Chny/2017.

The assessee has raised Cross Objection Nos.63/Chny/2018 and 64/Chny/2018 for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15, respectively. The ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the impugned Cross Objections have been raised qua grounds of appeal no.02, 03 and 05 of Revenue’s appeal for & 3158/Chny/2017. Apropos to the discussions above, as we have dismissed the impugned grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue, the impugned Cross Objection Nos.63/Chny/2018 and 64/Chny/2018 for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15, respectively raised by the assessee have become infructuous and hence are dismissed.

In the Result the appeal of the Revenue in and 3158/Chny/2017 and appeal of the assessee in & 5417/Del/2017 are partly allowed. Further, Cross Objection Nos.63/Chny/2018 and 64/Chny/2018 filed by the assessee are dismissed.