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430 orders · Page 5 of 9
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the cash deposits were explained by the realization of sundry debtors/advances outstanding from earlier years, which were duly reflected in the balance sheet before demonetisation. The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence and that the books of account were not rejected.
The Tribunal noted that the jurisdictional High Court had quashed notices under Section 148 issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) as invalid, citing CBDT notifications. Due to a Supreme Court order setting aside similar High Court decisions for fresh consideration, the matter was remanded.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) disposed of the appeal ex parte without the assessee's explanation and supporting documents. Therefore, the Tribunal granted one final opportunity to the assessee to present their case before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the assessee was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the impugned order of the CIT(A) and the assessment were set aside, and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had not effectively adjudicated the factual and legal contentions of the assessee. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was invalid because it was issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year without obtaining approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT) as required by Section 151(ii). Consequently, the assessment proceedings were vitiated.
The Tribunal decided the issues based on previous pronouncements in the assessee's own case for earlier assessment years. For Ground 3 (disallowance of excess depreciation on software), the Tribunal dismissed the revenue's ground, following a coordinate bench's decision which relied on the jurisdictional High Court's ruling in CIT Vs Computer Age Management Services P. Ltd, holding that software applications are eligible for 60% depreciation. For Ground 4, 4.1, and 4.2 (disallowance of secondment payments to AEs), the Tribunal also dismissed the revenue's grounds. It was held that since tax was deducted under section 192 on salary payments to seconded employees, reimbursements to AEs were merely in the nature of reimbursements without any element of income, and thus, no disallowance under section 40(a)(i) was warranted. The Tribunal noted that the arguments raised by the revenue, including reliance on the Centrica Offshore judgment, had already been considered and rejected in the assessee's own case. The Tribunal's decision on the other grounds raised by the assessee concerning economic adjustments, provisions, miscellaneous receipts, and business support service income is not explicitly detailed in the provided text, but the concluding remark states that 'all the grounds raised by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes only, whereas the grounds raised by the Revenue are dismissed.'
The Tribunal allowed the grounds raised by the assessee for statistical purposes and dismissed the grounds raised by the Revenue. This decision was based on previous rulings in the assessee's own case for earlier assessment years, which were found to be squarely applicable.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was passed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 153(2) of the Income Tax Act, as it was dispatched after the permissible timeframe. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that a mere change in accounting classification of an existing liability does not attract Section 68 if there is no fresh credit during the year. The AO and CIT(A) failed to verify foundational facts like the books of account and accounting entries.
The Tribunal noted the lower authorities' reason for addition was the lack of evidence for agricultural operations and sales. Considering the assessee's circumstances and the need for natural justice, the Tribunal decided to give one more opportunity.
The Tribunal held that while the initial burden is on the assessee to prove identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness, the lower authorities did not conduct a comprehensive verification of the substantial primary evidence submitted. The Tribunal found that the assessee possessed further crucial documentary evidence like bank statements that needed examination.
The Tribunal observed that the total withdrawals before the cash payments for construction were Rs. 15.80 Lacs, and the CIT(A) had already granted relief of Rs. 8 Lacs. Considering the lack of other income allegations, the Tribunal directed a further deletion of Rs. 7 Lacs.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 4220 days in filing the appeal before the FAA, citing the assessee's bona fide belief and diligent pursuit of the matter. The FAA's order dismissing the appeal in limine was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the applications on grounds not within the scope of Section 12AB(1)(b), which primarily concerns the genuineness of charitable activities. The Tribunal also found that Section 12A(1)(ac)(v) was not applicable as the amended objects remained charitable and the microfinance activities had ceased.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the application purely on the ground of delay without considering the merits. The Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to treat the application as within time and decide the matter on merits, excluding the issue of the time limit.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271B is leviable only when there are existing books of account that have not been audited. Since the Assessing Officer himself proceeded on the basis that no books of account were produced or maintained, the penalty under Section 271B was not sustainable.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the CIT(A) for reconsideration, granting the assessee another opportunity to be heard. This was done because the assessee had participated before the AO, but was absent before the CIT(A).
The tribunal allowed brokerage and incidental expenses, and the entire cost of improvement for AY 2009-10, considering the difficulty in furnishing old evidence. For the current year's cost of improvement, a 50% disallowance was deemed reasonable.
The Tribunal held that since the registration under Section 12AB was granted for AY 2022-23, the assessee is entitled to claim exemption under Section 11. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal decided to remand the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration on merits. The revenue's appeal was also set aside based on a Supreme Court decision regarding amendments to the Income-tax Act.
The Tribunal upheld the addition of 5% of the bogus sale transactions as income from other sources. The assessee failed to provide satisfactory explanations or documentary evidence to counter the findings.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) erred in rejecting the applications on grounds not within the scope of Section 12AB(1)(b), which primarily concerns the genuineness of charitable activities. The Tribunal also found that Section 12A(1)(ac)(v) was not applicable as the amended objects remained charitable and the microfinance activities had ceased.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the CIT(A) for reconsideration, granting the assessee another opportunity to be heard. This was done because the assessee had participated before the AO, but was absent before the CIT(A).
The Tribunal, noting the assessee's non-compliance and the lack of a substantive order on merits, decided to give the assessee one last opportunity. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for de-novo assessment after providing a proper opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal, considering the interest of justice and the large addition made by the AO, decided to remand the matter back to the CIT(A). This allows the assessee to file a delay condonation petition and present their case on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) due to the confidential nature of the assessee's business and the need for natural justice. The appeal was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal, considering the interest of justice and the large addition made by the AO, decided to remand the matter back to the CIT(A). This allows the assessee to file a delay condonation petition and present their case on merits.
The Tribunal held that the initiation of penalty proceedings was invalid as the notices under Section 274 were issued after the assessment orders were finalized. The lack of recorded satisfaction in the assessment orders and the delayed issuance of notices rendered the penalty orders legally unsustainable.
The Tribunal found that the Ld.CIT(A) passed the order without issuing notice to the assessee, violating principles of natural justice. The impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) due to sufficient cause and set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The quantum assessments and penalties were restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment, as the assessee was not given a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee claimed not to have received any notices, and in the interest of natural justice, an opportunity to be heard should be provided. The impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred by admitting additional evidence without providing the AO an opportunity to examine and comment on it, violating Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice, decided to give the assessee another opportunity. The appeal was remitted back to the AO to consider the additional evidence and further details required.
The Tribunal held that the assessee claimed not to have received any notices, and in the interest of natural justice, an opportunity to be heard should be provided. The impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the lease agreements were not registered and lacked details of produce delivery. Since no proof of agricultural activity was produced, the explanation for the cash deposits was not plausible. Therefore, the addition was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 on April 5, 2022, for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation. The subsequent actions taken by the AO based on this invalid notice were deemed non-est in the eyes of the law.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) due to sufficient cause and set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The quantum assessments and penalties were restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment, as the assessee was not given a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) due to sufficient cause and set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The quantum assessments and penalties were restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment, as the assessee was not given a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) due to sufficient cause and set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The quantum assessments and penalties were restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment, as the assessee was not given a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that unrealized MTM gains on forward contracts, as per ICDS VI and Section 43AA of the Income Tax Act, are recognized only at the time of settlement and not merely because they are accounted for in the books as per AS-11. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was incorrect.
The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court had set aside the High Court judgments relied upon by the CIT(A) and allowed taxpayers to challenge retrospective amendments. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeals to the CIT(A) to await the Supreme Court's decision on the validity of the notice.
The Tribunal held that the AO's satisfaction for invoking Rule 8D was not valid as it was based on an incorrect assumption that borrowed funds were used for investments. The Tribunal found that the assessee had sufficient own funds for investments, thus the disallowance under Rule 8D was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the AO had conducted a plausible enquiry and adopted a legally permissible view based on the statutory provisions applicable for the assessment year. The CIT(E)'s assumption of jurisdiction under Section 263 was therefore unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the enhanced threshold of Rs.3 crores for cooperative societies, introduced by Finance Act, 2023, should be applied retrospectively. It also noted that withdrawals related to government schemes and by business correspondents should not attract TDS under Section 194N.
The Tribunal held that the enhanced threshold of Rs.3 crores for cooperative societies, introduced by Finance Act, 2023, should be applied retrospectively. It also noted that withdrawals related to government schemes and by business correspondents should not attract TDS under Section 194N.
The Tribunal held that the enhanced threshold of Rs.3 crores for cooperative societies, introduced by Finance Act, 2023, should be applied retrospectively. It also noted that withdrawals related to government schemes and by business correspondents should not attract TDS under Section 194N.
The Tribunal held that the enhanced threshold of Rs.3 crores for cooperative societies, introduced by Finance Act, 2023, should be applied retrospectively. It also noted that withdrawals related to government schemes and by business correspondents should not attract TDS under Section 194N.
The Tribunal held that the enhanced threshold of Rs.3 crores for cooperative societies, introduced by Finance Act, 2023, should be applied retrospectively. It also noted that withdrawals related to government schemes and by business correspondents should not attract TDS under Section 194N.