GANESAN VIJAYALAKSHMI,ATTUR vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, HASTHAMPATTI

आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण ‘बी’ न्यायपीठ, चेन्नई। IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL ‘B’ BENCH: CHENNAI माननीय श्री जॉजज जॉजज के., उपाध्यक्ष एवं श्री गगन गोयल लेखा सदस्य के समक्ष BEFORE HONOURABLE GEORGE GEORGE K, VICE PRESIDENT AND SHRI GAGAN GOYAL, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER आयकर अपील सं./ITA No. 3771/Chny/2025 ननिाजरण वर्ज /Assessment Years: 2011-12 Ganesan Vijayalakshmi, v. Income Tax Officer, No.172, Amman Nagar, Ward-2(3), Rasipuram Main Road, Narasingapuram, Salem. Attur Taluk, Salem District, Tamil Nadu-636 102. [PAN: ADRPV0122A] (अपीलार्थी/Appellant) (प्रत्यर्थी/Respondent) अपीलार्थी की ओर से/ Assessee by : Mr. R. Joseph Richard, Advocate, Ld. AR प्रत्यर्थी की ओर से /Revenue by : Mr. Biplab Gangopadhyay, JCIT, Ld. DR सुनवाईकीतारीख/Date of Hearing : 02.07.2026 घोषणाकीतारीख /Date of Pronouncement : 07.08.2026 आदेश / O R D E R PER GAGAN GOYAL, AM: This is an appeal preferred by the assessee against the order of Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (A), / NFAC, (hereinafter referred as the ‘Ld. CIT(A)’), Delhi dated 27.11.2025 for the Assessment Year (hereinafter referred as the ‘AY’) 2011-12.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL (1) The Learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) is not justified in confirming Assessing Officers action of increasing interest of Rs. 16,597/- admitted to Rs. 1,09,018/-, while no bank account statement pertaining to assessee reflected such increased amount. (2) Interest of Rs. 12,964/- (on Fixed Deposit of Rs. 8 lakhs for its period from 29.12.2010 till 31.03.2021), Rs. 3,463/- from savings account with IDBI Bank (Copy of Bank’s account statement attached (Attachment-1) and Rs. 170/- for savings account with ICICI Bank all

ITA No.3771/Chny/2025 (2011-12) Ganesan Vijayalakshmi totaling Rs. 16,597/- having been admitted, Learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) ought not to have confirmed adopting the amount at Rs. 1,09,018/-, which amount was not actually found from any statement.

(3) No interest was derived from loan of Rs. 7 lakhs advanced to others.

(4) Learned Commissioner (Appeals) is not justified in holding that Rs. 23,458/- alone as cash that could have been saved and requiring documents for balance of Rs. 10,00,000, while sales were Rs. 32,79,076/- during year ended 31.03.2010 and Rs. 28,12,000/- during year ended 31.03.211, and sales-tax registration was obtained for the period from 02-04-1997.

(5) Learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) ought to have deleted addition of trade advance of Rs. 39,000/- made during the course of business in Purchase and Sale of agricultural harvesting machinery spares.

(6) As no addition of Rs. 10 lakhs, deposited into bank was made, to consider which notice under section 148 was issued, no other addition should have been made, as contended by Ground No. 8 of appeal, omitted to be discussed by Learned Commissioner Income-tax (Appeals).

(7) For these and other reasons, which may be stated at the time of hearing of the appeal, the Honourable Income Tax Appellate Tribunal may kindly direct Assessing Officer to accept income of Rs. 2, 42,400/- returned.

ITA No.3771/Chny/2025 (2011-12) Ganesan Vijayalakshmi that in addition to the regular grounds on merits the assessee has taken additional ground of appeal vide dated 15.06.2026 as under:

i) The assessment order purported by dated 30.12.2018 passed u/s. 147 of the IT Act was issued beyond the period of limitation mandated u/s. 153 of IT Act and therefore the assessment order is liable to be set aside and the proceedings culminated from said order stands vitiated. ii) The assessment order u/s. 147 of the IT Act passed manually on 30.12.2018 in violation of CBDT instruction No.01/2018 dated 12.02.2018 is illegal, erroneous and bad in law as is liable to be quashed. 4. Before we touch upon the regular grounds raised by the assessee on merits of the case, we deem it fit to adjudicate the additional grounds raised by the assessee, legal in nature and challenged the sanctity of the assessment order itself. Now, for sake of ready reference and better analysis we are reproducing herein below the provisions of section 153(1) of the Act as under:

Time limit for completion of assessment, reassessment and recomputation. 153. (1) No order of assessment shall be made under section 143 or section 144 at any time after the expiry of twenty-one months from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable: Provided that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 2018, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words “twenty-one months”, the words “eighteen months” had been substituted: Provided further that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on— (i) the 1st day of April, 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words “twenty-one months”, the words “twelve months” had been substituted; (ii) the 1st day of April, 2020, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words “twenty-one months”, the words “eighteen months” had been substituted: Provided also that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 2021, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words “twenty-one months”, the words “nine months” had been substituted: Provided also that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2022, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words “twenty-one months”, the words “twelve months” had been substituted. (1A) notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a return under sub-section (8A) of section 139 is furnished, an order of assessment under section 143 or section 144 may be made at any time before the expiry of twelve months from the end of the financial year in which such return was furnished.

ITA No.3771/Chny/2025 (2011-12) Ganesan Vijayalakshmi (1B) notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), where a return is furnished in consequence of an order under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 119, an order of assessment under section 143 or section 144 may be made at any time before the expiry of twelve months from the end of the financial year in which such return was furnished. (2) No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made under section 147 after the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice under section 148 was served: Provided that where the notice under section 148 is served on or after the 1st day of April, 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words “nine months”, the words “twelve months” had been substituted. 5. In this matter, notice u/s. 148 of the Act was issued on 25.03.2018, i.e. before the 1st day of April, 2018, hence time available as per section 153(2) of the Act was nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice under section 148 of the Act was served. Although, the assessee relied upon section 153(1) of the Act while raising additional grounds as mentioned (supra), but as the proceedings in the case of the assessee were concluded u/s. 147 of the Act, hence the matter of the assessee will be covered by section 153(2) of the Act as underlined and reproduced in bold (supra).

“…5. As per the provisions of Section 153(1) of the Act as amended by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.06.2016, the time limit for completion of assessment proceedings for the Asst. Year 2014-15 u/s 143(3) or 144 of the Act would be 21 months from the end of the assessment year in which income was first assessable i.e. from 01.04.2015. Accordingly, the

ITA No.3771/Chny/2025 (2011-12) Ganesan Vijayalakshmi time limit for completion of assessment would be 31.12.2016. In the instant case, the assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act has been signed by the ld. AO on 31.12.2016 as mentioned in the assessment order. But the same is dispatched only on 02.01.2017 which is evident from the screenshot of the consignment tracking taken from the India Post website. The said screenshot shows that consignment sent by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Special Range 7, CR Building, has been booked at Indraprastha HO on 02.01.2017 at 11 hrs 6 minutes and 57 seconds with the caption ‘Item Booked’. The said order has been received by the assessee on 03.01.2017. 6. Now the short point that arises for our consideration is that whether in these facts and circumstances, the assessment could be construed to have been framed within the time limit prescribed u/s 153(1) of the Act. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the ld. AO had made the booking of the consignment (i.e. assessment order dated 31.12.2016) only 02.01.2017 as is evident from India Post screen shot enclosed in page 36 & 37 of the paper book. In this regard, we hold that an order could be said to be issued / passed by the 4 ITA No.1885/Del/2018 ld. AO when the same leaves the hand of the ld. AO or goes out of the control of the ld. AO. It is trite law that to make the order complete in all aspects, it should be issued, so as to go beyond the control of the authority concerned, for any possible change or modification therein. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Qualimax Electronics Pvt ltd vs Union of India reported in 2010 257 Excise Law Times (ELT) 42 (Del) had held that the date of dispatch from the adjudicating officer is relevant for determining the limitation period. We find that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise vs M.M. Rubber & Co. reported in AIR 1991 SC 2141 in Civil Appeal No. 6071 (NM) of 1990 dated 04.09.1991 had held as under:- “12. It may be seen therefore, that, if an authority is authorised to exercise a power or do an act affecting the rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within the period of limitation prescribed therefor. The order or decision of such authority comes into force or becomes operative or becomes an effective order or decision on and from the date when it is signed by him. The date of such order or decision is the date on which the order or decision was passed or made: that is to say when he ceases to have any authority to tear it off and draft a different order and when he ceases to have any locus paetentiae. Normally that happens when the order or decision is made public or notified in some form or when it can be said to have left his hand. The date of communication of the order to the party whose rights are affected is not the relevant date for purposes of determining whether the power has been exercised within the prescribed time.” 7. Similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case of Government Wood Works vs State of Kerala reported in 69 STC 62 in T.R.C. No. 90 of 1986 dated 14.01.1987 while dealing with the issue of necessity of communication of any order had held as under:- “14. The order of any authority cannot be said to be passed unless it is in some way

ITA No.3771/Chny/2025 (2011-12) Ganesan Vijayalakshmi pronounced or published or the party affected has the means of knowing it. It is not enough if the order is made, signed, and kept in the 5 ITA No.1885/Del/2018 file, because such order may be liable to change at the hands of the authority who may modify it or even destroy it, before it is made known, based on subsequent information, thinking or change of opinion. To make the order complete and effective, it should be issued, so as to be beyond the control of the authority concerned, for any possible change or modification therein. This should be done within the prescribed period, though the actual service of the order may be beyond that period. This aspect of the matter had not come up for consideration in the cases of Viswanaihan Chettiar [1954] 25 ITR 79 (Mad.) and Laxmidas & Co. [1969] 72 ITR 88 (Bom.) where the only question dealt with was whether service of the order after the prescribed period rendered it invalid. Unless, therefore, the order of the Deputy Commissioner in this case had been so issued from his office within the period prescribed, it has to be held that the proceedings are barred by limitation. This question has not been considered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, which passed the order, apparently did not have the benefit of the decision in Malayil Mills’ case (T. R. C. Nos. 15 and 16 of 1981 decided on 7th June, 1982-Kerala High Court) which, so far as we could see, remains, unreported. The matter has therefore to go back to the Tribunal for an examination of the records to ascertain whether the order of the Deputy Commissioner had been issued from his office within the period of four years prescribed in Section 35(2) of the Act. The Tribunal will adjudicate the matter in the light of the observations contained herein and in the judgment in the case of Malayil Mills (T. R. C. Nos. 15 and 16 of 1981 decided on 7th June, 1982-Kerala High Court) extracted earlier.” 7.1. Though the aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Kerala High Court was rendered in the context of sales tax law, the legal principles enunciated therein for passing of an order within the limitation period would be squarely applicable to the facts of the appeal before us in the instant case. 8. Similarly in the context of issuance of notice u/s 148 of the Act, the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Kanubhai M Patel (HUF) vs Hiren Bhatt reported in 334 ITR 25 (Guj) had held that the notice u/s 148 of the Act was dated 31.3.2010 but was sent to the speed post centre for booking only on 07.04.2010. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court held that considering the definition of the word ‘issue’ , it is apparent that merely signing the notices on 31.03.2010, 6 ITA No.1885/Del/2018 cannot be equated with issuance of notice as contemplated under section 149 of the Act. The date of issue would be the date on which the same were handed over for service to the proper officer, which in the facts of the present case would be the date on which the said notices were actually handed over to the post office for the purpose of booking for the purpose of effecting service on the petitioners. Till the point of time the envelopes are properly stamped with adequate value of postal stamps, it cannot be stated that the process of issue is complete. In the facts of the present case, the impugned notices having been sent for booking to the Speed Post Centre only on 07.04.2010, the date of issue

ITA No.3771/Chny/2025 (2011-12) Ganesan Vijayalakshmi of the said notices would be 07.04.2010 and not 31.03.2010 as contended on behalf of the revenue. In the circumstances, impugned notices under section 148 in relation to assessment year 2003-04, having been issued on 07.04.2010 which is clearly beyond the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year, are clearly barred by limitation and as such, cannot be sustained. 9. Respectfully following the aforesaid decisions, we hold that the assessment order, though passed on 31.12.2016, was dispatched to the Speed Post Centre by the office of the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Special Range -7, C R Building, New Delhi -110002 on 02.01.2017 would have to be construed as assessment framed beyond the time limit prescribed u/s 153(1) of the Act for the Asst. Year 2014-15 and hence is hereby declared as barred by limitation. Accordingly, the assessment order is liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. The Ground Nos. 1 & 1.1. Raised by the assessee are allowed…”

Sd/- Sd/ (जॉजज जॉजज के.) (गगन गोयल) (GAGAN GOYAL) (GEORGE GEORGE K.) लेखा सदस्य/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER उपाध्यक्ष /VICE PRESIDENT चेन्नई/Chennai, ददनाांक/Dated: 7th August, 2026. KB आदेश की प्रततललपप अग्रेपषत/Copy to: 1. अपीलार्थी/Appellant 2. प्रत्यर्थी/Respondent 3. आयकर आयुक्त/CIT, Chennai /Madurai/Coimbatore/Salem K Digitally signed 4. पवभागीय प्रतततनधि/DR by K BABU BABU Date: 2026.08.12 5. गार्ड फाईल/GF 09:21:25 +05'30'

ITA No.3771/Chny/2025 (2011-12) Ganesan Vijayalakshmi