Telangana High Court Judgments — 2022

The High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay (IA No: GA/1/2022) on the grounds that sufficient cause was not shown for the inordinate delay of 1090 days. The Court also noted that the decision to file the appeal was taken much after the High Court's own decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-5, Kolkata Vs. Swati Bajaj & Ors. Consequently, the appeal itself (ITAT/236/2022) was rejected, and the application for stay (IA: GA/2/2022) was also dismissed. No specific findings were made on the merits of the ITAT's order as the appeal was not admitted.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court noted that the assessment order stated that notices under Section 142(1) were issued and served on the petitioner, and that a verification unit confirmed delivery on February 10, 2022, despite which the petitioner did not comply or reply. The Court held a general presumption of correctness for statements made in government orders and found no reason to disbelieve the assessing authority's statement of facts. Crucially, the Court observed that the assessment order was appealable under Section 246A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, with the first appeal lying before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), followed by further appeals to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and potentially the High Court. Since an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy was available, the High Court declined to entertain the writ petition.

The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition. It reasoned that the scheme of Section 148A of the Act is to provide an opportunity for notice and hearing to the assessee before a formal notice under Section 148 is issued. Therefore, a proceeding under Section 148A(d) is at a stage prior to the issuance of the statutory notice under Section 148. The Court noted that the petitioner had a host of remedies available to put up her defence, including the contention regarding the jurisdictional embargo under Section 149(1)(b)(iii) of the Act. The assessing authority would be obligated to deal with such objections. However, having regard to the scheme of Section 148A and the decision in Ashish Agarwal's case, the Court was not inclined to entertain the writ petition and interdict the proceedings at this stage. All contentions were left open to the petitioner.

The High Court noted that subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, there had been a development where the respondents were contemplating withdrawing the attachment on payment of outstanding dues by installments. In light of this development, the learned counsel for the petitioner, on instructions, submitted that the petitioner may be permitted to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the Writ Petition was disposed of on withdrawal. The Court stated that there would be no order as to costs. Any miscellaneous applications pending in this Writ Petition were also ordered to stand closed.

The High Court disposed of the writ petition in terms of the judgment delivered on 09.06.2022 in W.P.No.33919 of 2021 and batch (M/s.GSR Cold Storage Private Limited v. Income Tax Officer), which was based on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal (2022 SCC Online SC 543). The court did not separately address the legality or vires of the Explanations in the notifications. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition in terms of the cited judgment. Miscellaneous applications, if any, were to stand closed. There was no order as to costs.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court noted that the appeals before the ITAT, namely ITA Nos. 186-189/Hyd/2018 for the Assessment Years 2009-10 to 2012-13, had already been disposed of by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad 'B' Bench, vide an order dated 28.02.2022. Given this fact, the Court held that the petitioner would have an adequate remedy in the form of filing an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed as no live issue survived for adjudication. The impleadment petition was also disposed of as no order was required to be passed. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue their remedies under Section 260A.

The parties have settled the matter under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, and the respondent has paid the full and final settlement dues. Consequently, the appellant wishes to withdraw the appeal.

The High Court noted that the matter had been settled between the parties under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and full settlement dues were paid. Consequently, the appellant (Income Tax Department) wished to withdraw the appeal.

The appellant, the Income Tax Department, sought to withdraw the appeal due to the settlement reached under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The High Court allowed the withdrawal.

The High Court noted that the dispute between the parties had been settled under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, and the respondent had paid the full and final settlement dues. Consequently, the appellant wished to withdraw the appeal.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the order under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is at a stage prior to the issuance of the notice under Section 148. The Court stated that unless glaring omissions or non-compliance with conditions precedent for reopening are demonstrated, a writ court would not ordinarily interfere at this nascent stage. The Court further opined that the contentions raised by the petitioner could be raised in the reply to the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act. Preempting the authorities from proceeding further on the grounds urged in the writ petition was deemed improper. Therefore, the Court declined to interfere. The issue regarding the faceless assessment proceedings was implicitly not decided on merits due to the dismissal of the petition at the preliminary stage.

The High Court noted that there was a consensus between the parties that the impugned assessment order dated October 7, 2021, and the consequential demand notice dated October 7, 2021, should be set aside and the matter remanded back to the assessing officer. This consensus was based on the non-compliance of the procedure laid down under Sections 144B and 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the Court set aside the assessment order and the demand notice. The matter was remanded back to the first respondent (National Faceless Assessment Centre) for passing a fresh assessment order in accordance with the law, after affording the petitioner due opportunity of hearing. The Court also directed that the Dispute Resolution Panel may issue necessary directions within six months from the date of receipt of the order. The writ petition was disposed of without costs.

The Tribunal accepted the Official Liquidator's proposal to close the recovery proceedings due to the meagre amounts involved, the difficulty in tracing debtors, and the time-consuming nature of the process. Any recovered amounts would be deposited in the Common Pool Fund after expenses.

The High Court disposed of the writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court's decision, passed under Article 142 of the Constitution, held that notices issued under the unamended Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after April 1, 2021, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be treated as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The Assessing Officer was directed to provide information and material relied upon by the Revenue within thirty days, allowing assessees two weeks to reply. Subsequently, orders under Section 148A(d) were to be passed, followed by notices under the substituted Section 148 if required. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and rights of the Revenue under the Finance Act, 2021, were preserved. The Supreme Court's order was made applicable PAN India and would govern all similar notices set aside by High Courts or pending adjudication.

The Tribunal agreed to close the recovery proceedings, noting the meagre recovery amounts, the time and effort involved, and the absence of pending claims against the company. Any recovered amount would be deposited in the Common Pool Fund after expenses.

The Revenue's counsel submitted written instructions to withdraw the appeal. This was because the issue was covered under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme.

The Tribunal accepted the Official Liquidator's proposal to close the recovery proceedings due to the meagre amount involved, the difficulty in locating debtors, and the time-consuming nature of the process. Any recovered amount was to be deposited in the Common Pool Fund after expenses.

The High Court allowed the withdrawal of the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

The High Court allowed the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The withdrawal was permitted as the issue was covered under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court disposed of the writ petitions in terms of the Supreme Court's judgment in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had held that notices issued under the unamended Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, from 01.04.2021 onwards, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the Act, as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be treated as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The Assessing Officer was directed to provide the revenue's relied-upon material to the assessees within thirty days, allowing assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an inquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for these notices. The Assessing Officers were then to pass orders under Section 148A(d) and, thereafter, issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision, passed under Article 142 of the Constitution, was declared applicable pan-India to similar notices set aside or pending adjudication.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the Supreme Court's judgment in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court, in its order passed under Article 142 of the Constitution, had directed that all Section 148 notices issued under the unamended provisions of the Income Tax Act from April 1, 2021, onwards, which were subject to challenge before High Courts or had been set aside, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the Act. These would be treated as show-cause notices, and the Assessing Officer would have to provide the material relied upon to the assessees for their reply. The requirement of prior approval for enquiry under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure. The Assessing Officer would then pass orders under Section 148A(d) and, if necessary, issue a fresh notice under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees and the Revenue would remain preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable across India.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Supreme Court had directed that the impugned Section 148 notices, issued under the unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, would be deemed to have been issued under Section 148A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021. These notices were to be construed as show-cause notices under Section 148A(b). The assessing officer was directed to provide the information and material relied upon by the revenue to the assessees within thirty days, allowing the assessees two weeks to reply. The requirement of conducting an enquiry with prior approval under Section 148A(a) was dispensed with as a one-time measure for notices issued from April 1, 2021, till the date of the order. The assessing officers were to thereafter pass orders under Section 148A(d) and then issue notices under the substituted Section 148. All defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149, and all rights and contentions under the Finance Act, 2021, and in law, were preserved. The Supreme Court's decision was declared applicable pan-India, modifying judgments of various High Courts and governing pending writ petitions.

The High Court held that the Supreme Court's orders extending the period of limitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic are not applicable to the filing of declarations under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020. The Court reasoned that these orders were intended for regular judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and could not be stretched to cover a one-time amnesty scheme like the Vivad se Vishwas Act. The Court emphasized that filing a declaration under the Act is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial act, but a voluntary act by an eligible declarant within a prescribed period. Since the petitioners filed their declarations in the third week of June 2021, long after the last date of 31.03.2021, they were not eligible for the scheme's benefits. The Court also clarified that extensions granted by the CBDT for the payment of dues under the scheme were distinct from the deadline for filing the initial declaration and could not be used to extend the latter. Consequently, the declarations were rightly rejected. The writ petitions were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Supreme Court's orders extending limitation periods due to the COVID-19 pandemic were applicable to regular judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, such as filing income tax returns or appeals, but could not be stretched to a one-time amnesty scheme like the Vivad se Vishwas Act. The Court reasoned that filing a declaration under the Vivad se Vishwas Act is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial act; it is a voluntary act by an eligible declarant to settle pending litigation within a prescribed period. The Act was introduced when the pandemic had already broken out, and its objective was to provide a one-time settlement. The Court found that the petitioners filed their declarations in June 2021, long after the last date for filing, which was March 31, 2021. Therefore, they were not eligible to claim any benefit under the Act, and their declarations were rightly not accepted. The Court clarified that extensions granted by the CBDT for the payment of dues after the declaration was filed within time could not be used to extend the deadline for filing the declaration itself. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed.

The High Court held that the Income Tax Officer, while dealing with a stay petition under Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, acts as a quasi-judicial authority and is expected to apply its own mind and pass a reasoned order. The impugned intimation was found to be devoid of reasons, merely stating that the Principal Commissioner had informed about a CBDT circular. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. L.G. Electronics India Pvt Ltd., the Court clarified that administrative circulars do not fetter quasi-judicial authorities and that authorities can grant stay orders with lesser deposit amounts based on individual case facts. Consequently, the impugned intimation was set aside and quashed. The matter was remanded back to the Income Tax Officer for a fresh decision on the stay petition, in accordance with law and after hearing the petitioner, within thirty days. During this period, no coercive steps were to be taken against the petitioner. The attachment of bank accounts was made subject to the fresh order to be passed by the ITO.

The High Court considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Due to a subsequent development, the petitioner expressed a desire to withdraw the present writ petition and file a fresh one. In light of this submission, the High Court dismissed the writ petition on withdrawal. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh writ petition. There was no order as to costs. The court also noted that any miscellaneous applications pending in this writ petition would stand closed.

The Bombay High Court held that all the writ petitions would be covered by the judgment of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 3(2)(1), Mumbai & Ors. Consequently, the impugned orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act in the respective petitions were quashed and set aside. The Court also quashed and set aside any consequential notices or orders. The reasoning is based on the agreement of both parties that the present cases are squarely covered by the precedent set in the New India Assurance case. The ratio decidendi is that if a set of cases are identical to a previously decided precedent, the same outcome should follow. All other rights and contentions raised in the petitions were kept open.

The High Court, in view of the Supreme Court's decision in C.K.N. Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, did not delve into the merits of the reasons recorded for issuing the notice at that stage. Instead, the Court directed that since the reasons have now been furnished to the petitioner, the petitioner shall file objections to the impugned notice within fifteen days from the date of the order. Upon receipt of these objections, respondent No. 1 shall dispose of them by passing a speaking order within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the objections, and this order should be communicated to the petitioner. All contentions of both parties are kept open. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.

The High Court, while acknowledging that the reasons for the Section 148 notice had now been furnished to the petitioner, chose not to examine them at that stage. Instead, the Court directed that the petitioner should file objections to the impugned notice within fifteen days from the date of the order. Following the receipt of these objections, respondent No. 1 (the assessing officer) was mandated to dispose of the objections by passing a speaking order within fifteen days of receiving them. This speaking order was to be communicated to the petitioner. The Court explicitly stated that all contentions were kept open. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions, and no costs were imposed. The ratio decidendi is that procedural fairness, including the opportunity to object to the reasons for reassessment and receive a reasoned order, must be afforded to the assessee before proceeding further with reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 148.

The High Court held that Section 2(9)(A) and Section 2(9)(C) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, are substantive provisions that significantly widen the definition of a benami transaction compared to the unamended Act. Consequently, these provisions can only have prospective effect and cannot be applied to transactions that took place before November 1, 2016, the notified date for the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 2016. Since the transaction in question was dated December 14, 2011, the show cause notice, provisional attachment order, and the impugned order dated March 30, 2021, were deemed null and void for being without jurisdiction. The Court found the revenue's reliance on the Madras High Court decision to be of little assistance. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside and quashed. The writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

The High Court held that Section 2(9)(A) and Section 2(9)(C) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, are substantive provisions that significantly widen the definition of a benami transaction compared to the unamended Act. Consequently, these provisions can only have prospective effect and cannot be applied to transactions that took place before November 1, 2016, the notified date for the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 2016. Since the transaction in question was dated December 14, 2011, the show cause notice, provisional attachment order, and the impugned order dated March 30, 2021, were deemed null and void for being without jurisdiction. The Court found the revenue's reliance on the Madras High Court decision to be of little assistance. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside and quashed. The writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

The High Court held that Section 2(9)(A) and Section 2(9)(C) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, are substantive provisions that significantly widen the definition of a benami transaction compared to the unamended Act. Consequently, these provisions can only have prospective effect and cannot be applied to transactions that took place before November 1, 2016, the notified date for the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 2016. Since the transaction in question was dated December 14, 2011, the show cause notice, provisional attachment order, and the impugned order dated March 30, 2021, were deemed null and void for being without jurisdiction. The Court found the revenue's reliance on the Madras High Court decision to be of little assistance. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside and quashed. The writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

The High Court held that Section 2(9)(A) and Section 2(9)(C) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, are substantive provisions that significantly widen the definition of a benami transaction compared to the unamended Act. Consequently, these provisions can only have prospective effect and cannot be applied to transactions that took place before November 1, 2016, the notified date for the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 2016. Since the transaction in question was dated December 14, 2011, the show cause notice, provisional attachment order, and the impugned order dated March 30, 2021, were deemed null and void for being without jurisdiction. The Court found the revenue's reliance on the Madras High Court decision to be of little assistance. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside and quashed. The writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

The High Court held that Section 2(9)(A) and Section 2(9)(C) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, are substantive provisions that significantly widen the definition of a benami transaction compared to the unamended Act. Consequently, these provisions can only have prospective effect and cannot be applied to transactions that took place before November 1, 2016, the notified date for the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 2016. Since the transaction in question was dated December 14, 2011, the show cause notice, provisional attachment order, and the impugned order dated March 30, 2021, were deemed null and void for being without jurisdiction. The Court found the revenue's reliance on the Madras High Court decision to be of little assistance. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside and quashed. The writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

The High Court held that Section 2(9)(A) and Section 2(9)(C) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, as amended, are substantive provisions that create an offense by widening the definition of a benami transaction. Consequently, these provisions cannot have retrospective effect. The Court found that these provisions were significantly broader than the definition of a benami transaction under the unamended 1988 Act. Therefore, they can only have prospective effect from the date the Amendment Act, 2016, was notified, which is November 1, 2016. Since the transaction in question occurred on December 14, 2011, prior to this date, the amended provisions could not be applied. The Court concluded that the show cause notice dated December 30, 2019, the provisional attachment order dated December 31, 2019, and the impugned order dated March 30, 2021, were null and void for being without jurisdiction. The impugned order was set aside and quashed. The Court allowed all the writ petitions, with no order as to costs.

The High Court held that Section 2(9)(A) and Section 2(9)(C) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, as amended, are substantive provisions that create an offense by widening the definition of a benami transaction. Consequently, these provisions cannot have retrospective effect. The Court found that these provisions were significantly broader than the definition of a benami transaction under the unamended 1988 Act. Therefore, they can only have prospective effect from the date the Amendment Act, 2016, was notified, which is November 1, 2016. Since the transaction in question occurred on December 14, 2011, prior to this date, the amended provisions could not be applied. The Court concluded that the show cause notice dated December 30, 2019, the provisional attachment order dated December 31, 2019, and the impugned order dated March 30, 2021, were null and void for being without jurisdiction. The impugned order was set aside and quashed. The Court allowed all the writ petitions, with no order as to costs.