Loading High Court cases…
662 orders · Page 9 of 14
The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the notices issued under Section 148A(d) dated 04.04.2024 and notices under Section 148 dated 28.02.2023, 16.03.2023, and 30.03.2023, along with the order dated 30.03.2023. The Court found that these notices and orders were issued without conducting the faceless assessment as envisaged under Section 144B of the Act, 1961, and were contrary to the provisions of the Act. The reasoning was based on the binding precedent of the judgment in Jasjit Singh vs. Union of India and others, which held that statutory provisions must be followed strictly and that administrative instructions cannot override legislative enactments. The ratio decidendi is that any action taken by tax authorities that bypasses mandatory procedural requirements stipulated in the Act, especially concerning faceless assessments, is liable to be set aside for want of jurisdiction. The Revenue was granted liberty to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961, if so advised. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the petition. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. This fresh petition would also be permitted to challenge Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn with the liberty as prayed for. No specific finding was made on the merits of any potential challenge to Section 147A, as the petition was withdrawn before any such adjudication.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the petition. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Furthermore, the petitioner was granted liberty to challenge Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the fresh petition. The petition was dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty as prayed for. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh allowed the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Furthermore, the petitioner was granted liberty to challenge Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the subsequent petition. The court's decision was based on the petitioner's request to withdraw and pursue the matter with the aforementioned liberties. No decision was made on the merits of the original petition or the validity of Section 147A.
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Sibal and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Rupinderjit Chahal, considered the oral request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner sought to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action and to challenge Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court, in its order, granted the liberty as prayed for by the petitioner. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn.
The High Court allowed the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Furthermore, the petitioner was granted liberty to challenge Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the fresh petition. The Court's decision to dismiss the petition as withdrawn with liberty was based on the petitioner's request. No decision was made on the merits of the case or the validity of Section 147A.
The High Court held that the impugned draft assessment order dated 28.12.2019, the consequent notice of demand dated 28.02.2020, and the notice dated 28.02.2020 initiating penalty proceedings against the petitioner are set aside. The Court reasoned that the petitioner was not an "eligible assessee" in terms of Section 144C(15)(b) of the Act because the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) found no variation in the petitioner's income-tax return due to the existence of an Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) with the Central Board of Direct Taxes. Therefore, there was no occasion for the Assessing Officer to pass a draft assessment order under Section 144C(1). The Court relied on decisions from the Delhi High Court in Honda Cars India Ltd.'s case, the Gujarat High Court in Pankaj Extrusion Ltd.'s case, and the Bombay High Court in Classic Legends (P) Ltd.'s case, which held that if an assessee is not an "eligible assessee" under Section 144C(15)(b), the procedure for issuing a draft order under Section 144C would not apply. Consequently, the AO was not competent to pass the draft assessment order, and thus, there was no occasion to pass a final assessment order, leading to the quashing of the demand and penalty notices. Section 292B was deemed inapplicable as the issue was not a mere procedural irregularity but a fundamental lack of jurisdiction to pass a draft order.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the questions of law raised by the assessee stood conclusively decided against him by previous Division Bench judgments of this Court. The Court noted that the judgment in Bahadur Singh's case, which was similar to the present facts, was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court also distinguished the judgments cited by the assessee. Specifically, it found that the Delhi High Court judgment in Kamal Wahal's case was disagreed with by a Division Bench of this Court in Kamal Kant Kamboj's case, and the Court agreed with the latter. Gurnam Singh's case was also distinguished on facts. Jangpal Singh Tanwar's case was distinguished because the reinvestment was solely in the wife's name, whereas in Jangpal Singh Tanwar, it was jointly in the names of the assessee, his wife, and son, and the joint owners also invested. Furthermore, the Division Bench in Jangpal Singh Tanwar failed to notice earlier judgments of equal strength in Dinesh Verma's and Bahadur Singh's cases. Therefore, finding no merit, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court, at this stage, disposed of the writ petition without commenting on the merits of the case. It directed respondent No. 1 to take a decision on the representation dated 06.05.2024 (Annexure P-5) submitted by the petitioner. This decision was to be made by passing a speaking order and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The decision was to be communicated to the petitioner, who would be at liberty to challenge it if it was not to his satisfaction. The principle established is that in such circumstances, the court can direct the statutory authority to decide a pending representation expeditiously and in accordance with law, without adjudicating the underlying dispute.
The High Court held that the appeal was rendered infructuous. The reasoning was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the dispute had been settled under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as infructuous. The ratio decidendi is that if a dispute subject to an appeal is settled under a scheme like the Vivad Se Vishwas Act, the appeal becomes infructuous and should be disposed of accordingly. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, disposing of it in terms of the judgments passed in Jatinder Singh Bhangu's case (decided on 19.07.2024) and Jasjit Singh's case (decided on 29.07.2024). In those cited cases, similar writ petitions were allowed, granting liberty to the revenue to follow the procedure laid down under the Act, 1961, and proceed accordingly if so advised. The reasoning is that the issuing authority lacked jurisdiction due to the CBDT circular dated 29.03.2022, which designates the NFAC with exclusive power to issue Section 148 notices. The ratio decidendi is that notices issued by authorities without the prescribed jurisdiction, as per statutory circulars, are liable to be quashed. The operative direction is to dispose of the writ petition in terms of the aforementioned precedents, implying the quashing of the impugned notice and proceedings, with liberty to the revenue to initiate fresh proceedings if permissible under the law.
The High Court held that the impugned final assessment order dated 15.12.2023, the notice of demand under Section 156, and the penalty notice under Section 274 read with Section 270A are set aside. The matter is restored to the stage of Section 144C(13) of the Act. The Assessing Officer (AO) is directed to pass a fresh final assessment order in line with the directions of the DRP dated 27.08.2024 and the revised order of the TPO dated 17.09.2024. The Court reasoned that once objections are filed by an eligible assessee before the DRP within the time limit, the AO cannot proceed to pass the final assessment order until the DRP issues its directions. The Court relied on the scheme of Section 144C, emphasizing that the AO has no discretion but to act in conformity with the DRP's directions. The Court found that the petitioner's failure to intimate the AO about filing objections, while a lapse, should not lead to prejudice, especially when the DRP's directions were subsequently issued and modified the basis of the assessment. The Court noted that no prejudice would be caused to the revenue by setting aside the order and allowing the AO to pass a fresh order post-receipt of DRP directions. The Court found support in decisions from the Bombay and Karnataka High Courts.
The High Court allowed the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal under Section 246-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Furthermore, the Court directed that if the petitioner files his appeal within 10 days from the date of the order, the condonation of delay in filing the appeal should be considered sympathetically. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order itself.
The High Court allowed the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Furthermore, the petitioner was granted liberty to challenge Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the fresh petition. The petition was dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty as prayed for.
The High Court held that the adjustment of Rs.35,41,68,236/- made by the respondent authorities on 29.05.2025, against the income tax dues for assessment years 2011-12 to 2021-22, was in contravention of the stay order dated 28.05.2025, passed by the DCIT. The Court reasoned that once a stay on recovery was granted, the revenue could not proceed to collect the same amount by way of adjustment against a refund. Therefore, the adjustment could not be sustained. The Court directed that the sum of Rs.35,41,68,236/- be refunded forthwith to the petitioner, along with applicable interest as per law. The petition was allowed in these terms.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal available under Section 246-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court further directed that if the petitioner files his appeal within 10 days from the date of the order, the condonation of delay in its filing may be considered sympathetically. The reasoning is based on the petitioner's choice to pursue the statutory appellate remedy. No issue was decided on merits.
The High Court, at this stage, disposed of the writ petition without commenting on the merits of the case. The Court directed respondent No. 1, the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, to take a decision on the representation dated 06.03.2026 submitted by the petitioner. This decision was to be made by passing a speaking order and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The Court further directed that the decision should preferably be taken within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The petitioner was also informed that the decision, if not to their satisfaction, could be challenged in accordance with law. No specific issue was left undecided, as the court's action was procedural.
The High Court held that the present writ petition had become infructuous. This was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Commissioner, Income Tax Appeals, had passed separate orders finally deciding the petitioner's appeals against the assessment orders. Since the appellate authority had rendered its final decision, the need for the High Court to intervene through a writ petition was obviated. The High Court did not decide any substantive issues related to the income tax assessment or appeals. The operative direction was to dispose of the petition.
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Sibal and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Rupinderjit Chahal, dismissed the appeal. This decision was based on the appellant's counsel pleading 'no instructions'. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in default. No findings on any substantive legal issues were made, as the dismissal was procedural. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, in its oral order, noted that the learned counsel for the appellant sought to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. Any pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of. No substantive issues of income tax law were decided on merits. The principle derived from this judgment is that an appeal can be dismissed as withdrawn upon the request of the appellant.
The High Court observed that the appeal lacked complete particulars. Consequently, the learned counsel for the appellant-revenue sought permission to withdraw the appeal with the liberty to file a fresh one, rectifying the deficiencies in particulars. The High Court, accepting this request, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. Crucially, the Court granted the liberty as prayed for, allowing the revenue to refile the appeal after providing complete particulars. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn, with the specified liberty. No decision on the merits of the original appeal was made.
The High Court noted the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the petition had become infructuous due to the efflux of time. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petition. It explicitly clarified that the issue on law raised through this petition is kept open to be decided in an appropriate case. No specific findings were made on the merits of any tax dispute, and no operative directions for deletion or remand were issued. The judgment does not record any specific amount in dispute.
The High Court disposed of the petition as infructuous. The court explicitly stated that the issue on law raised through the petition was kept open to be decided in an appropriate case. This means that no decision was made on the merits of the legal question that the petitioner intended to raise. The operative direction was to dispose of the petition, acknowledging that it could no longer be pursued due to the passage of time. No specific relief was granted or denied on the substantive grounds of the petition.
The High Court disposed of the petition as infructuous, noting the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the matter had become so due to the efflux of time. The Court explicitly stated that the issue on law raised through this petition is kept open to be decided in an appropriate case. No decision on the merits of the underlying tax dispute was made. The operative direction was to dispose of the petition.
The High Court accepted the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the writ petition had become infructuous due to the efflux of time. Consequently, the petition was disposed of on this procedural ground. The court explicitly clarified that the issue of law raised through the petition was being kept open to be decided in an appropriate future case. No decision was made on the merits of the original dispute. The operative direction was to dispose of the petition as infructuous.
The High Court held that the impugned order dated 12.01.2023, passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Amritsar, was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the petitioner, in his reply dated 06.01.2023, had requested an adjournment to file a detailed representation after 16.01.2023, as his Chartered Accountant was on leave. However, the impugned order was passed on 12.01.2023, before the requested date and without affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present his case. The Court referred to Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which mandates giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard before transferring a case. Since this condition was not met, the order was not legally sustainable. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the respondent-authorities were directed to pass a fresh order after giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing. No observations were made on the merits of the case.
The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition. The Court observed that the petitioner had already availed the remedy of filing an appeal. Therefore, the petitioner would be better advised to prosecute the pending appeal before the competent authority. The Court directed the appellate authority to make all endeavors to dispose of the appeal expeditiously by passing a reasoned order. The Court did not decide the merits of the show cause notice or the appeal itself, as the petition was disposed of on the ground of alternative remedy.
The High Court declined to entertain the Civil Writ Petition. The Court observed that since an appeal had already been filed by the petitioner on the questions that were to be urged in the writ petition, the petitioner would be better advised to prosecute that appeal before the competent authority. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the appellate authority to make all endeavors to dispose of the appeal expeditiously by passing a reasoned order. No specific finding was made on the merits of the case as the petition was not entertained. The operative direction was to prosecute the pending appeal.
The High Court held that the writ petition should be disposed of in terms of the order passed in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Court noted that similar writ petitions challenging notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, had been disposed of by the Coordinate Bench based on the Supreme Court's judgment in Ashish Agarwal. Since the respondent did not oppose the petitioner's prayer, the Court found no impediment to disposing of the present petition in the same manner. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition in terms of the order in Ashish Agarwal (supra). Any pending applications were also to be disposed of accordingly. No specific issue was left undecided; the decision was based on the established precedent.
The High Court held that the writ petition should be disposed of in terms of the order passed in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Court noted that the petitioner's prayer was not opposed by the respondents. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of in terms of the order passed in Ashish Agarwal (supra). The Court also directed that any pending applications would stand disposed of accordingly. The judgment does not specify the exact terms of the order in Ashish Agarwal (supra) or the specific grounds on which the writ petition in 'Pure Milk Products Pvt. Ltd.' was dismissed, beyond stating it was on 'specific grounds'.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the present petition stands decided in favor of the petitioner by a recent judgment of a Division Bench of the same Court dated 06.05.2026 in CWP No.37049 of 2025 – H L Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and others. Based on this consensus between the parties, the Court allowed the present petition. Consequently, the impugned notices dated 12.04.2022 and the appellate order dated 28.10.2025, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-5, Ludhiana, were set aside. The ratio decidendi is that if a matter has been decided by a coordinate bench of the same High Court, subsequent petitions raising identical issues should follow the precedent, leading to the allowance of the petition.
The High Court noted that similar writ petitions challenging notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, have been disposed of by the Coordinate Bench, citing the Supreme Court's decision in 'Ashish Agarwal vs. Union of India and others'. The Court also observed that another writ petition, 'Pure Milk Products Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union Of India And Others', was dismissed on similar grounds. Given that the petitioner's prayer was not opposed by the respondents and in view of the consistent disposal of similar matters, the High Court decided to dispose of the present petition in terms of the order passed in 'Ashish Agarwal (supra)'. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition in terms of the aforementioned order.
The Tribunal decided to dispose of the present writ petitions in terms of the order passed in Ashish Agarwal vs. Union of India and others. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's submission that the present matter involved the same issue as that decided in Ashish Agarwal. The petitioner's prayer for disposal in terms of the said order was not opposed by the respondents. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of in terms of the order in Ashish Agarwal (supra). Any pending applications were also to be disposed of accordingly. The judgment did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made. The principle that can be cited is that a party has the right to withdraw their petition, and the court will typically grant such a request, leading to the dismissal of the case without prejudice to any future proceedings if applicable. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petition.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court granted the petitioner liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Crucially, the liberty also extended to challenging Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the subsequent petition. The court did not decide on the merits of any substantive issue related to the income tax assessment or the validity of Section 147A. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petition as withdrawn with the specified liberty.
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, through a detailed judgment of even date passed in CWP No. 15791 of 2024 (Jyoti Sareen Vs. Union of India and others), has disposed of the present writ petition. The operative directions and specific findings from the Jyoti Sareen judgment are not detailed in this excerpt, but it is implied that the decision in the connected case governs the outcome of this petition. The court has also disposed of all pending miscellaneous applications. The specific legal principles or ratio decidendi are not elaborated here, as the judgment relies on a separate, more detailed order.
The High Court noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn. There was no adjudication on the merits of the case. The principle that can be derived is that a party has the right to withdraw their petition, and upon such withdrawal, the court will dismiss the matter without deciding the substantive issues. No specific operative directions were issued other than the dismissal. No issues were expressly left undecided as the petition was withdrawn.
The High Court considered the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court noted that learned counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition. Following this request, the court passed an order dismissing the petition as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case, as the petition was disposed of based on the petitioner's volition to withdraw. The ratio of this decision would be that a party has the right to withdraw their petition, and upon such request, the court will dismiss it as withdrawn without addressing the substantive issues.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court granted the petitioner liberty to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Furthermore, the petitioner was granted liberty to challenge Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in the fresh petition. The court's decision was based on the petitioner's explicit request for withdrawal and the liberty sought. No adjudication on the merits of the case or the validity of Section 147A was made. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn with the liberty granted.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Furthermore, the petitioner was granted liberty to challenge Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the fresh petition. The petition was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty as prayed for. No decision on the merits of any substantive issue was made.
The High Court held that the present appeal is covered by the judgment dated 03.10.2024 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench in ITA-73-2024, which involved the same appellant and respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant fairly admitted this fact. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the present appeal in terms of the aforementioned judgment. The reasoning is based on the principle of judicial discipline and consistency, where a coordinate bench's decision on similar facts and issues is followed. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.