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The High Court observed that the AO had misconstrued the income. The expenses claimed by the assessee were towards the heads mentioned and were not necessarily relatable to the subleasing of the property as contended by the AO. The Court noted that whether these expenses were purely relatable to the business of subleasing or incurred in the regular course of business was a matter of fact to be considered by the AO. Consequently, the Court held that the matter required to be remanded to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration of the available material to determine if the expenses were required to be allowed. All contentions were kept open. The issue regarding interest under Sections 234B and 234D was not expressly decided as the matter was remanded.
The High Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. The Court observed that none appeared for the appellant to press the appeal. It was further noted that the appellant seemed uninterested in pressing the appeal due to the smallness of the amount involved. Therefore, no decision was rendered on the substantial question of law regarding the applicability of Section 23(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, or the taxability of the Rs. 96,000/- as annual letting value. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the lower courts had concurrently found the suit promissory notes to be supported by consideration and that the defendant failed to prove his plea of no consideration. The defendant, as DW.1, admitted in his evidence that he borrowed the amount for his business and executed the promissory note. The sole contention raised in the second appeal was that the interest claimed was excessive because the defendant is an agriculturist. The Court referred to Section 3 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Agriculturist Relief Act, 1938, defining an agriculturist. The Court found that it was not suggested to the plaintiff's witness in cross-examination that the defendant was an agriculturist, and the defendant himself admitted borrowing for business. Crucially, the defendant did not produce any documents to support his claim of being an agriculturist, nor was this fact pleaded in the written statement. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the Act. The interest rate of 18% per annum was not considered excessive or usurious given the loan was for business purposes. The Court reiterated that the execution of the promissory note admitted, and the defendant's failure to discharge the initial burden of proving non-existence of consideration meant the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. Both appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law (i) to (ix) and (xi) were answered in light of the discussions. Specifically, the Court referred to the judgment in Excide Industries Ltd. (supra) which dealt with the constitutional validity of Section 43-B(f) of the Act. It was held that the judgment in Bharat Earth Movers was rendered under the then applicable statutory regime. The insertion of Section 43-B(f) with prospective effect from 1.4.2002 meant that the period prior to its enactment would be governed by Bharat Earth Movers, but the assessee could not derive benefit from it due to the obstacles raised by Section 43-B(f). The judgment in Textools (supra) was also distinguished as it related to gratuity fund under Section 36(1)(iv) and did not involve the implications of the proviso to Section 43-B(f). The Court reproduced paragraphs 39 and 40 of Excide Industries Ltd. to support the view that the liability incurred by the assessee did not qualify for Section 43-B(f) and was rightly disallowed by the revenue. The insertion of Section 43-B(f) regulated the deduction by linking it to the date of actual payment, deferring the benefit of deduction to the year of payment, even if it was a present liability under the mercantile system. The appeals were found to have no merit and were dismissed.
The High Court held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was not maintainable. The Court referred to CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024, which sets the monetary limit for filing an appeal before the High Court at Rs. 2.00 crore. The Court found that the tax effect in the instant appeal was well below this monetary limit. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The Court also noted that if the appeal fell within any exception provided in Circular No. 5 of 2024, the Income Tax Department could seek revival of the appeal. No order as to costs was made.
The High Court held that the primary issue was to verify whether the respective toll lessees had already paid taxes on their income/sale turnover. If the lessees had paid their taxes, the appellant (Excise & Taxation Department) could not be held liable to pay the tax again, even if TCS was not deducted. However, if the toll lessees had not paid the tax that ought to have been deducted as TCS, then the appellant would be liable. The Court directed the appellant to share details of toll lessees with the Assessing Officers. The Assessing Officers were then to verify the lessees' returns. If the lessees had paid tax, no tax would be levied on the appellant. Otherwise, the appellant would be liable. Additionally, the appellant was held liable to pay interest under Section 206C(7) of the Act for the period between the default in TCS deduction and the date the toll licensee actually paid income tax. The appeals were disposed of with these directions.
The Hon'ble Tribunal, per the submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department, allowed the appeal to be dismissed as withdrawn. The reasoning was based on the CBDT Circular No. 17 of 2019, which stipulates the withdrawal of appeals where the tax effect is below Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. The Tribunal granted the liberty sought by the Revenue to file an application for restoration of the appeal, should it be later determined that the subject matter falls within the exceptions outlined in the circular. No order was made as to the costs of the appeal. Any pending interlocutory applications in this appeal were also closed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal's order was unsustainable. Regarding the first substantial question of law, the Court found that the Tribunal's observation that the Commissioner's consideration of facts did not require further deliberation was inappropriate. The Tribunal was obligated to reassess the material and provide its own reasoning, rather than merely accepting the lower appellate authority's conclusion. For the second substantial question of law concerning the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147, the Court noted that the Tribunal failed to consider the assessee's plea on this issue. The failure to consider the question of jurisdiction led to a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, both questions of law were held in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh consideration on both issues, with all contentions kept open.
The High Court held that the Tribunal's order was unsustainable. Regarding the first substantial question of law, the Court found that the Tribunal's observation that the Commissioner's consideration of facts did not require further deliberation was inappropriate. The Tribunal was obligated to reassess the material and provide its own reasoning, rather than merely accepting the lower appellate authority's conclusion. For the second substantial question of law concerning the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147, the Court noted that the Tribunal failed to consider the assessee's plea on this issue. The failure to consider the question of jurisdiction led to a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, both questions of law were held in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh consideration on both issues, with all contentions kept open.
The High Court held that before imposing liability on the appellants for payment of tax, it was necessary to verify whether the respective toll lessees had already paid taxes on their income/sale turnover. The Court relied on the principle established in the cited cases (Eli Lilly, Singapore Airlines, Hindustan Coca Cola) where if the recipient of income had already paid taxes on that income, the assessee (from whom TDS/TCS was to be collected) could not be held liable for the shortfall. The Court directed the appellants to share details of toll lessees with the Assessing Officers. The Assessing Officers were then to verify if the toll lessees had paid their taxes. If they had, no tax would be levied on the appellants. If not, the appellants would be held liable. The appellants were also held liable to pay interest under Section 206C(7) of the Act for the period between the default in TCS deduction and the date the toll licensee actually paid income tax on the amount. The appeals were disposed of with these directions.
The High Court decided the issues as follows: Regarding bad debts (Question 1 in ITA No.37/2010), the Court found merit in the Revenue's argument, particularly concerning the Vijaya Bank judgment and the requirement to debit the P&L account and reduce loans/advances from the balance sheet. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of this judgment. Concerning foreign exchange loss (Question 2 in ITA No.37/2010), the Court upheld the Tribunal's view, finding that the AO's and CIT(A)'s assumption of investment from FCNR loans lacked material support. The Court relied on the Apex Court's decision in Woodward Governor India (P.) Ltd., holding that loss on foreign exchange difference as on the balance sheet date is an expenditure under Section 37(1). This question was answered in favor of the assessee. Regarding R&D expenses (Question 3 in ITA No.37/2010), the Court was not convinced with the Tribunal's reasoning for allowing the deduction solely on the basis that it was not a double or weighted deduction, finding a lack of material evidence and proper reasoning. This issue was also remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration. For ITA No.548/2015, the Court noted that the Tribunal had dismissed the Revenue's appeal by following its own decision for AY 2005-06. Given that the foreign exchange loss issue (Question 2 in ITA No.37/2010) was decided in favor of the assessee, this appeal was disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The Court found that the accused admitted his signature on the cheque, raising a presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge a debt or liability. The plea that the cheque was issued as security was contradicted by a notice sent through his counsel acknowledging liability. The Court also addressed the issue of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, clarifying that a violation of Section 269SS does not render a transaction illegal or void, and therefore, does not rebut the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. The Court found that the accused failed to rebut the presumption by leading evidence of payment. The argument regarding the absence of specific averments about being in charge of the company was also dismissed, as the accused was an admitted partner and authorized signatory. The Court concluded that the Appellate Court took a view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person and reversed the Trial Court's well-reasoned judgment. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the Appellate Court's judgment was set aside, and the Trial Court's judgment was restored.
The Delhi High Court held that in terms of Circular No. 3/2018, dated 11.7.2018, the substantial question of law need not be answered when the tax effect is below Rs. 50,00,000/-. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of without answering the substantial question of law, which was expressly left open. The Revenue was granted liberty to file an application for revival of the appeals if they fall under any exceptions to the circular. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below a certain threshold, as defined by revenue circulars, can be disposed of without adjudicating the merits of the substantial question of law.
The High Court permitted the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning was based on the Revenue's submission, supported by a written communication, that the appeal did not fall within any of the exceptions stipulated in Circular No. 3/2018 dated 11th July, 2018. The Court accepted this submission and allowed the withdrawal. The appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. No specific issue was decided on merits, and no ratio decidendi for future citation was established as the appeal was withdrawn.
The Tribunal decided all issues against the plaintiff. Regarding Issue No. 1, the Tribunal held that the agreement to sell dated January 27, 2007, was annulled by the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 and 2 on March 11, 2008, through an endorsement on the back of document Ext. D-2. This endorsement, admitted by the plaintiff, stated he received ₹21,00,000/- and the agreement was rendered ineffective. The Tribunal found the plaintiff's contention that the amount was ₹2,00,000/- unacceptable, especially since this fact was not mentioned in the plaint, and the plaintiff had concealed the fact that he had paid ₹21,00,000/-. The genuineness of Ext. D-2 was admitted by a witness. Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance or damages (Issue No. 3). On Issue No. 4, the Tribunal found no cogent evidence to prove defendant No. 3's knowledge of the prior agreement, except the plaintiff's bald statement. On Issue No. 5, the Tribunal held defendant No. 3 to be a bona fide purchaser for consideration, as the plaintiff failed to prove her knowledge or that the agreement was subsisting. On Issue No. 6, the Tribunal concluded that the plaintiff had not approached the court with clean hands, having concealed material facts, including the rescission of the agreement and the receipt of ₹21,00,000/-, and was therefore estopped from filing the suit. Issue No. 2 was not pressed as no evidence or arguments were advanced.
The Tribunal held that the appeal did not involve any substantial questions of law. The facts indicated that Kalinga Foundation Trust was treated as a benamidar of Late Biju Patnaik based on 14 witness statements. Following Supreme Court directions, the matter returned to the High Court, which directed the ITAT to pass consequential orders, noting that reasonable opportunity had not been given. The ITAT restored the matter to the AO with directions for a fresh order after providing a reasonable opportunity. However, due to the death, incapacity, or non-traceability of the witnesses, cross-examination became impossible. This was reported to the ITAT, and the matter was dropped. Consequently, there was no legal evidence to establish the Trust as a benamidar. The High Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Biju Patnaik (Deceased) by LR Prem Patnaik (2007) 289 ITR 406 and the Delhi High Court's decision in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Biju Patnaik (2008) 298 ITR 91 also noted this. Therefore, there was no misinterpretation of judgments by the ITAT. The appeal was dismissed.
The Court held that the market value of the acquired land in village Kilokari should be awarded at the rate of Rs. 2,07,500/- per Bigha. Following the principle in K. Periasami case, this compensation rate shall also apply to the land acquired in villages Khizrabad, Nangli Razapur, and Garhi Mendu, as they were acquired under the same notification and share similar characteristics. The appellants had already received Rs. 89,600/- per Bigha, and the balance amount, along with interest and statutory benefits, is to be paid. The Court also noted that Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act mandates that all persons whose land was similarly acquired under the same notification are entitled to the judicially determined compensation rate. The appeals were allowed on these grounds.
The High Court held that the first contention regarding the non-service of notice under Section 148 was not open for consideration after the remand order. The Court found the view taken by the Tribunal to be just and proper. Consequently, the question of law was answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The appeals were dismissed. The Court did not explicitly discuss the second issue regarding the disallowance of mustard trading loss in its final holding, implying it was either subsumed by the decision on the notice issue or not pressed further. The ratio decidendi is that an issue previously decided in an earlier round of litigation, especially after a remand order, cannot be re-agitated if the Tribunal has held it to be not open for consideration.
The High Court dismissed both Income Tax Tribunal Appeals (ITTAs) for want of prosecution. The court noted that the matters had been listed for dismissal for the last couple of hearings. The court observed that the appellants were not being represented on multiple occasions and appeared to be not interested in pursuing the appeals, as no fresh vakalat had been filed and no counsel was duly engaged. Consequently, the court found no other option but to dismiss the appeals for non-prosecution. As a sequel, any pending miscellaneous applications in these appeals were also ordered to stand closed. The operative direction was the dismissal of both appeals.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal. The Court referred to its previous judgment in M/s Amrit Rubber Industries Versus Commissioner of Income Tax, which interpreted "substantial part of the year" to mean more than six months. The High Court noted that the Assessing Officer's rejection of the claim was based on excluding the employment of foremen, which was found to be factually incorrect and based on surmise. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal had affirmed the assessee's claim, finding substantial compliance with the condition of employing ten or more workers. The Tribunal specifically held that foremen should be considered part of the manufacturing process and that the assessee had employed ten or more workers for a substantial part of the year. The High Court, citing various Supreme Court judgments on the scope of second appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, concluded that the case did not present a substantial question of law requiring its adjudication. Therefore, the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.
The Special Court held that the delay in filing the application for recall was condonable, particularly as the applicant appeared in person and the Special Court is not bound by the Limitation Act. The Court recalled the order dated September 27, 2013, and restored Misc. Application No. 32 of 2009 for decision on merits. Regarding the bona fide purchase of shares, the Court found that while the applicant had not produced all the documents typically required (contract note, proof of payment), there were contemporaneous documents and circumstances that supported his claim. Specifically, a communication dated October 14, 1992, from Reliance Consultancy Services Limited (Registrar and Share Transfer Agent) indicated that the applicant had lodged the shares for transfer, and these were returned due to attachment by the Custodian. This communication, along with the correspondence showing the applicant sought transfer within a reasonable time, vouched for the genuineness of the transaction and the applicant's bona fide. The transfer deed and the bill from the stockbroker further lent credence to the claim. Therefore, the Court was satisfied that the applicant was a bona fide purchaser of the subject shares. The prayer for certification of the shares was allowed, and the Custodian was directed to transfer the shares along with accruals and dividends to the applicant within eight weeks.
The Tribunal held that welding rods and electrodes used for the maintenance and repair of machinery are not entitled to CENVAT credit as capital goods. This decision was based on the Tribunal's earlier larger bench decision in Triveni Engg. & Industries Ltd. –v- CCE, Meerut, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal in the case of SAIL vs. CCE on a similar issue. The Tribunal found no error in its view, stating that it had considered the material and followed the earlier decision confirmed by the Supreme Court. While the appellant contended that credit for such items was allowed subsequently, the Tribunal opined that this would not make a difference as it had no occasion to consider those subsequent decisions. The appeal was disposed of without a fresh decision on the merits of the subsequent developments.
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed the Income Tax Tribunal Appeal No. 39 of 2009 for want of prosecution. The judgment states that there was no representation for the appellant. The matter pertains to the year 2009 and was listed in the Weekly Cause List. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. No order was made as to costs. As a sequel, any pending miscellaneous petitions were also ordered to stand closed. The High Court did not decide any issues on the merits of the case, as the dismissal was purely procedural due to the appellant's failure to prosecute the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the inclusion of unrealized interest by the Assessing Officer (AO) was not a mistake apparent from the record, thus not rectifiable under Section 17 of the Interest Tax Act. It further held that chargeability of unrealized interest, which is not realized in cash during the year, is neither chargeable interest nor liable to tax, in view of the cash system of accounting adopted by the assessee and accepted by the Department. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Kerala State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. (259 ITR 51), which observed that profits and gains of business are to be computed in accordance with the accounting system regularly employed by the assessee. Where the assessee follows the cash system, Section 5 of the Interest-tax Act allows computation of chargeable interest on the basis of interest actually received. Therefore, unrealized interest cannot be included in the computation of chargeable interest if the assessee has not accounted for it. The Tribunal found no question of law arising as facts and law were appropriately determined. The appeal was rejected.
The High Court held that the solitary issue was whether the payment received under the agreement was a capital or revenue receipt. It reiterated the principle that an agreement must be construed having regard to the intention of the parties, gathered from the language employed, and read as a whole. The Court noted that the Tribunal's finding that the Rs. 6 crores was a capital receipt was based on a meticulous appreciation of evidence. The Court found that the agreement involved the surrender of rights in a capital asset (patent and trademark), constituted a negative/restrictive covenant, and impaired the profit-making apparatus of the company. Clauses in the agreement indicated the assessee granted rights to market its product under PFIZER's brand, gave PFIZER an option to be an exclusive co-marketer for future vaccines, and restricted the assessee's right to grant rights to third parties. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's finding was not perverse and, in exercise of its powers under Section 260A, it could not interfere with such a finding of fact. Therefore, the substantial question of law was answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the payment made by the Assessee to AAI under the License Agreement was 'rent' within the meaning of Section 194-I of the Act. The Court reasoned that the Assessee's ability to operate the lounge was inseparable from the use of the space, making the payment for the use of space intrinsically linked to the royalty for the right to operate. The Court distinguished the present case from precedents like Japan Airlines Co. Limited v. CIT, CIT v. NIIT Limited, and TRIL Infopark Limited v. ITO, finding them not applicable. Therefore, Question (i) was answered in favour of the Revenue. Regarding Question (ii) on interest under Section 201(1A), the Court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage (P) Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax and a CBDT Circular, remanding the matter to the AO to compute interest liability in accordance with these pronouncements. For penalty under Section 271C (Question 3), the Court found merit in the Assessee's contention that the issue was debatable, allowing the Assessee to claim exemption under Section 273B due to bonafide reasonable grounds for not deducting tax at source. The penalty appeals were thus allowed in favour of the Assessee.
The High Court of Karnataka, in its judgment dated January 14, 2019, considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants. The appellants' counsel contended that the appeal was not maintainable due to monetary limits and in terms of Circular No. 3 of 2018. The Court accepted this submission. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. The reasoning is directly based on the counsel's submission regarding the non-maintainability of the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that appeals filed contrary to monetary limits or specific circulars issued by the CBDT are liable to be dismissed. No specific issue regarding the merits of the Wealth Tax Appeal No. 3/BANG/2007 was decided.
The High Court noted that a Miscellaneous Application was filed before the ITAT under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and that the impugned order, against which the substantial question of law was framed, had been recalled by the Tribunal. In light of this development, it was not disputed by the parties that the present appeal had become infructuous. Consequently, the High Court ordered that the appeal be disposed of as such, without deciding the substantial question of law on its merits. No finding was reached on the question of COD's approval, and no ratio decidendi was established for this specific legal point.
The High Court held that the partnership deed, Ex. PW-1/A, stipulated that any partner could only disassociate from the firm by giving one month's written notice. The court found no proof of such disassociation by the plaintiffs as per the partnership deed. Therefore, it could not be said that there was a dissolution of the firm. The suit for rendition of accounts was deemed not maintainable without a dissolved firm. The court also found that the demand for accounts by notice did not amount to dissolution. The lower courts correctly disallowed the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, as the additional documents were neither necessary nor required for adjudication. The non-consideration of additional documents under Order 7 Rule 14(3) CPC also called for no interference as the judgments were based on the existing record. The court concluded that the summons served in the suit for rendition of accounts had no bearing on the dissolution of the firm. Consequently, all substantial questions of law were answered against the appellant.
The High Court granted the Revenue's request to withdraw the appeals. The Court noted that Ms. Linhares, learned Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department, sought leave to withdraw the appeals based on written instructions dated 20.09.2019 from the Income Tax Department. Consequently, the Court granted the leave and disposed of all the aforementioned appeals as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of any of the underlying tax disputes. The ratio decidendi is that an appellant can withdraw their appeal if they provide proper instructions and obtain leave from the court.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The primary reason for dismissal was the tax effect of the appeal, which was found to be well below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024 (dated 17.09.2024, amending Circular No. 5 of 2024 dated 15.03.2024). This circular enhances monetary limits for filing appeals before Appellate Tribunals, High Courts, and the Supreme Court to reduce litigation. The revised monetary limit for filing an appeal before the High Court is Rs. 2.00 crore. The Court noted that if the appeal fell within any exception provided in Circular No. 5 of 2024, the Income Tax Department would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. No costs were awarded. Miscellaneous applications, if any, were closed.
The High Court decided to enhance the compensation. Regarding the claimant's income, the Tribunal's reliance on the ITR filed before the accident was deemed conservative. While the claim of Rs. 15,000 per month was not fully accepted, the Court found Rs. 5,000 too low. Considering the ITR and the admitted contracts from Bokaro Steel Limited, the Court determined the monthly income to be Rs. 10,000. For functional disability, the Court distinguished between medical and functional disability, citing Rajkumar (Supra). It held that the Tribunal's 30% assessment was conservative, given the claimant's role as a contractor requiring physical effort. The functional disability was determined at 50%. The compensation was recalculated based on these figures, including future prospects, a multiplier of 16, and enhanced amounts for medical expenses, loss of amenities, and pain and suffering, totaling Rs. 18,44,000. The owner's cross-objection succeeded; the Tribunal's finding of no valid license was set aside due to the investigation error and the production of the correct license, thus quashing the pay-and-recovery order. The appeal and cross-objection were disposed of by enhancing the compensation and setting aside the pay-and-recovery direction.
The High Court held that the transfer of trading assets (cars and spare parts) at cost price resulted in the transfer of the profit component to the outgoing Directors, which rightfully belonged to the company. This profit component would form part of the cost of acquisition for the shares, dealership rights, and goodwill. Since the transferee had to incur this extra cost, which is capital in nature, it is not an allowable expenditure. Therefore, the gross profit component on the transfer of trading assets at cost price is a profit liable to tax in the hands of the company. The Tribunal rightly applied the ratio in A.L.A. Firm (supra). Even if the AO made the addition in the hands of the Directors, it makes no difference as the income actually belongs to the assessee company and is taxable in its hands. The first substantial question of law was answered in the negative, the second in favour of taxing actual profits, and the third in favour of the Revenue.