Madhya Pradesh High Court Judgments — 2025

The High Court found the petitioner's submission regarding the delay to be valid. The court acknowledged the mandate of Section 250(6A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which requires appeals to be decided within a specified timeframe. Consequently, the court deemed it expedient to dispose of the writ petition by issuing a direction to respondent no. 2. The operative direction is that respondent no. 2 shall decide the pending appeal, in accordance with law, within a period of 90 days from the date of filing of a copy of the court's order. The court did not decide on the merits of the original appeal itself, but rather on the procedural delay.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that Instruction No. 1984 came into operation on 09.06.2000, but the notice under Section 147 was issued prior to this date. The Court also observed that the petitioner had an alternate remedy of appeal before the Commissioner of Appeals and subsequently before the Central Board of Direct Taxes, and even after that, they could approach the High Court. Therefore, the Court found no case to interfere with the impugned orders. On the second issue, the Court acknowledged that while the VDIS protects from disclosing the source of income, it does not imply that the declared income is always correct, and the correct income is liable to be disclosed. The Court also noted that Section 151 of the Act provides for sanction for issuing notices under Section 148 and that the petitioner could raise objections regarding sanction during assessment proceedings. The Court concluded that the petitioner was not remediless and that the assessment proceedings should continue. The third issue was implicitly addressed by the dismissal of the petition, as the order under Section 144A was upheld by not interfering with the assessment proceedings.

The High Court held that while there is no absolute bar for exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 against a show-cause notice, interference is permissible only when the notice is null and void for want of jurisdiction. In this case, the Court found no evidence that the impugned notice was issued by an incompetent authority or that the authority lacked inherent jurisdiction. The points raised by the petitioner could be addressed by the competent authority. Citing the judgment in Special Director & Anr. vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Anr., the Court concluded that the writ petition against the show-cause notice was not maintainable. The petition was disposed of without entertaining it on merits. The authority was directed to grant the petitioner a reasonable time, not exceeding 15 days, to file a reply if not already filed, and thereafter decide the case in accordance with the law after affording an opportunity of hearing.

The High Court, considering the submissions, deemed it expedient to dispose of the writ petition without entering into the merits of the case. The Court issued a direction to Respondent No. 2 to consider and decide the pending appeal of the petitioner within a period of 2 months from the date of filing of a copy of the order passed by the High Court. The principle established is that when a statutory appeal is pending for an inordinate period, the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, can direct the appellate authority to decide the appeal within a specified timeframe, without adjudicating the underlying merits of the appeal itself. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the court focused solely on the procedural aspect of directing the decision of the pending appeal.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Regarding the direction to release the bank account, the Court held that no such direction can be given in a writ petition under Article 226. Similarly, the Court stated that it cannot direct the Police Department to register a criminal case in a writ petition. The Court found that the petitioner's allegations were unsubstantiated by any documents. It noted that if the accounts were opened without proper KYC and using forged documents, the petitioner could have obtained documents from the bank under the Right to Information Act or complained to the Ombudsman. The Court also observed that if the police did not entertain the complaint, the petitioner could have filed a criminal complaint before the Competent Court of Magistrate. The petition was dismissed due to a lack of supporting documents and delay and latches.

The High Court held that the writ petition was rendered infructuous. The Court noted that the petitioner had filed appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) against the reassessment orders, and these appeals had been dismissed on merit. Given this procedural history, the Court found that the petitioner's available remedy was to approach the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous. No decision was made on the merits of the reassessment orders themselves.

The High Court held that in view of the letter dated 3.11.2025, wherein the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax informed that the tax effect for the assessment year 2006-07 is below Rs.2 Crores, and in light of CBDT Circular No.5/2024 dated 15.03.2024, the appeal should be withdrawn. The court accepted the revenue's submission that the appeal was filed in 2018 and at that time, it did not fall under any exceptions of Instruction No. 21 of 2015 dated 10.12.2015. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT order.

The High Court held that there was a typographical error in its order dated 30.10.2025. The application for correction (I.A. No. 20910/2025) was allowed. The Court clarified that the petitioner is granted liberty to furnish the bank guarantee within four weeks from 30.10.2025. Crucially, it was further clarified that the undertaking given by M/s HEG Limited would be subject to such remedies as may be permissible in law, in case the petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate authority. This ensures that the petitioner's right to challenge the appellate order through appropriate legal channels is explicitly preserved. The corrected order is to be read in conjunction with the order dated 30.10.2025.

The High Court held that the matter requires reconsideration. It noted that the father's demise in 2019, followed by the Covid-19 pandemic, constituted a force majeure event that led to a genuine hardship for the petitioner. The Court found that the impugned orders, which rejected the petitioner's prayer to submit returns for AY 2020-21 to 2023-24, should be set aside. The respondents were directed to reconsider the petitioner's case in light of the peculiar facts and circumstances and the Court's observations. The respondents were also granted liberty to impose appropriate fine/penalty for the delay. The Court allowed the petition and directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 10,000/- as costs in favour of the Juvenile Justice Fund within one month. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The High Court held that since an assessment order dated 14-12-2023 under Section 144 read with Section 147 of the Income Tax Act had already been passed, keeping the writ petition pending would serve no useful purpose. The Court reasoned that the challenge was initially to the reassessment proceedings, and with the final assessment order in place, the appropriate course of action would be for the petitioner to challenge the assessment order itself, if advised. Therefore, the petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to pursue legal remedies against the assessment order. No specific finding was made on the merits of the reassessment proceedings or the assessment order.

The High Court held in favour of the assessee on all substantial questions of law. It ruled that White Petroleum Jelly of IP grade, manufactured and sold under a valid drug license, is liable to be classified as a 'drug and medicine' under Entry 19-A of Part II, Schedule II of the MP VAT Act, 2002. The Court found the Commercial Tax Appellate Board was not justified in not following the Apex Court's decision in Ponds India Ltd. The reasoning was that the product's composition and manufacturing under a drug license align with the description in Entry 19A, which includes 'medicated ointments produced under drug license and light liquid paraffin of IP grade'. The Court also noted that the product's primary use is therapeutic or mitigating. Consequently, the assessee is not liable to pay interest under Section 18(1)(a) of the MP VAT Act. The impugned order of the Appellate Board was quashed, and the questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee. The appeals and tax references were disposed of accordingly.

The High Court allowed the prayer of the Revenue to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted that the Revenue submitted that the tax effect in the present appeal was below the enhanced monetary limit of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- as per CBDT Circular No. 09 of 2024, and consequently prayed for withdrawal. The Court accepted this submission and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made. Any pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of.

The High Court allowed the writ petitions, directing the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central – 2, to release the jewellery consignments. The Court found that the Static Surveillance Team (SST) of the Election Commission of India, the District Election Officer, and the Director General of Income Tax had not conducted the proceedings in accordance with the SOPs/Circulars issued by the Election Commission of India, which led to the seizure and caused losses. The Court reasoned that the application for release of goods by Arihant Jewellers ought to have been entertained by the Assessing Officer under the authorization of Section 127 of the Income Tax Act. It was emphasized that the first proviso to Section 132B(1) requires the person concerned to make an application to the Assessing Officer who is dealing with the asset and in whose possession the assets are. Therefore, the application filed by Arihant Jewellers was liable to be considered by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central – 2. The Court also noted that the proceedings under Section 148 had not been concluded for two years, and valuable jewellery had been lying with the Income Tax Department. The Court awarded costs of Rs. 50,000/- to the writ petitioners, payable severally and jointly by the respondents.

The High Court allowed the writ petitions, directing the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central – 2, to release the jewellery consignments. The Court found that the Static Surveillance Team (SST) of the Election Commission of India, the District Election Officer, and the Director General of Income Tax had not conducted the proceedings in accordance with the SOPs/Circulars issued by the Election Commission of India, which led to the seizure and caused losses. The Court reasoned that the application for release of goods by Arihant Jewellers ought to have been entertained by the Assessing Officer under the authorization of Section 127 of the Income Tax Act. It was emphasized that the first proviso to Section 132B(1) requires the person concerned to make an application to the Assessing Officer who is dealing with the asset and in whose possession the assets are. Therefore, the application filed by Arihant Jewellers was liable to be considered by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central – 2. The Court also noted that the proceedings under Section 148 had not been concluded for two years, and valuable jewellery had been lying with the Income Tax Department. The Court awarded costs of Rs. 50,000/- to the writ petitioners, payable severally and jointly by the respondents.

The High Court held that the Income Tax Department's approach in the present cases was not appreciable. It found that the application filed by Arihant Jewellers ought to have been entertained by the Assessing Officer under the authorization of Section 127 of the Income Tax Act for the release of the goods. The Court noted that the second proviso to Section 132B(1) mandates that assets requisitioned under Section 132A shall be released within 120 days. It clarified that the 'Assessing Officer' referred to in the first proviso to Section 132B(1) means the Assessing Officer dealing with the seized asset, not the Assessing Officer of the person concerned. The Court observed that the proceedings under Section 148 had not been concluded even after two years, and valuable jewellery had been lying with the department. Therefore, the Court allowed the writ petitions with a direction to the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central – 2, to release the jewellery consignments. The Court also awarded costs of Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioners.

The High Court held that all substantial questions of law proposed by the appellant (Revenue) were, in fact, questions of fact. It noted the concurrent findings of the CIT(A) and the ITAT, which were against the Revenue. The Court observed that the CIT(A) had called for a remand report from the AO, which was given in favor of the assessee, effectively superseding the AO's earlier order. The Court found that the CIT had the power to call for such a report under Rule 64A of the Income Tax Rules. The assessee had produced documents before the CIT(A), who directed the AO to examine creditworthiness and genuineness. Consequently, the Court found no substantial question of law involved in the appeal and dismissed it. The ITAT had affirmed the deletion of amounts related to business advances, sales, genuine advances, loans, and advances against sale orders, finding them properly accounted for and supported by evidence. It also upheld the deletion of the short-term capital gain, noting it was declared as such and supported by documentation.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the order of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Indore. The Court relied on the Apex Court's directions concerning the extension of limitation periods during the COVID-19 pandemic, which were also considered in the cited Writ Petition No.19747 of 2022. The Court noted that the period for depositing the settled amount under the Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020, extended up to 31.10.2021, which fell within the period affected by the pandemic. Consequently, the petitioner was held entitled to condonation of delay. The Court directed that the amount be deposited within four weeks from the date of the order. The operative part of the judgment in the cited case, which allowed condonation of delay for filing forms and ITR, was reproduced and applied.

The High Court allowed the prayer of the appellant. The Court noted that the tax effect involved in the appeal was below the enhanced monetary limit of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- for filing appeals by the Department before the High Court, as stipulated by CBDT Circular No. 09 of 2024 dated 17th September, 2024. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The application for condonation of delay (IA No. 129 of 2021) and any pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court found that while the scheme of merger was approved by the NCLT on 13.11.2020, there were financial transactions by the petitioner (M/s Nivedan Commerce Pvt. Ltd.) during the assessment year 2020-2021, amounting to Rs. 11,64,12,993/-, which escaped tax. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the company ceased to exist from 01.04.2018, noting that M/s Snehal Commercial Pvt. Ltd. (the transferee company) showed 'Nil' income for AY 2020-2021 and accepted a 'Nil' return after considering procedural aspects of amalgamation. However, the petitioner company continued to conduct business during the merger process. The Court held that there were no grounds to interfere with the impugned order and notices, deeming the petition misconceived.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, per Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Anuradha Shukla, dismissed both Income Tax Appeal No. 139 of 2022 and Income Tax Appeal No. 141 of 2022 as withdrawn. This decision was based on the request made by the learned counsel for the appellant/department, who indicated their intention to withdraw the appeals in furtherance of a letter received from the Income Tax Officer (Tech), for Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Bhopal. No decision on the merits of the appeals was made.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, comprising Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Anuradha Shukla, has decided to dismiss the appeals as withdrawn. This decision is based on a letter dated 10.07.2025 received by the learned counsel for the appellant/department from the Income Tax Officer (Tech), for Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Bhopal, indicating the department's wish to withdraw these appeals. The court has accepted this request and consequently disposed of both Income Tax Appeal No. 139 of 2022 and Income Tax Appeal No. 141 of 2022 as withdrawn. No specific findings on the merits of the original dispute have been made, as the appeals were disposed of on a procedural ground.

The Tribunal held that the loose papers containing entries of money receipts, found during the survey and corroborated by bank statements, were rightly treated as books of account by the Assessing Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax, and ITAT. The Tribunal distinguished the present case from the V.C. Shukla case, stating that in the latter, the evidentiary value of materials was examined under the Prevention of Corruption Act and Indian Evidence Act, whereas here, the survey was conducted by Income Tax authorities concerning the company's affairs. The appellants failed to produce concrete material to rebut the findings and did not file income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, questions 1 and 2 were answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Tribunal found that the appellants were provided with ample opportunity to produce documents and rebut the findings. The respondents confirmed that all seized documents were supplied in compliance with the High Court's interim order, and the petitioners never alleged non-compliance thereafter. Thus, question 3 was also answered against the appellants. Concerning questions 4 and 5, the Tribunal clarified that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in cases of search under Section 132, not in cases of survey under Section 133A. The letter relied upon by the appellants did not admit to a search operation; the word 'search' was introduced by the appellants in their own letter. Consequently, questions 4 and 5 were also answered against the appellants. All Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the facts and law involved in the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) are different from the present case. In this case, the materials collected from the premises of Lunkad Media & Entertainment were examined and verified against the bank account statements by the Assessing Officer. The appellants were given ample opportunity to produce rebutting material but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, the loose scraps of paper containing money entries, corroborated by bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT and treated as books of account. Thus, questions 1 and 2 are answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Court found that the appellants had not filed any application alleging non-compliance with the order for supply of documents, and the respondents had stated that all documents were supplied. Therefore, question 3 is also answered against the appellants. Concerning questions 4 and 5, the Court held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in cases of search under Section 132, not in cases of survey under Section 133A. Therefore, questions 4 and 5 are also answered against the appellants. Consequently, all Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the facts and law involved in the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) are different from the present case. In this case, the materials collected from the premises of Lunkad Media & Entertainment were examined and verified against the bank account statements by the Assessing Officer. The appellants were given ample opportunity to produce rebutting material but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, the loose scraps of paper containing money entries, corroborated by bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT and treated as books of account. Thus, questions 1 and 2 are answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Court found that the appellants had not filed any application alleging non-compliance with the order for supply of documents, and the respondents had stated that all documents were supplied. Therefore, question 3 is also answered against the appellants. Concerning questions 4 and 5, the Court held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in cases of search under Section 132, not in cases of survey under Section 133A. Therefore, questions 4 and 5 are also answered against the appellants. Consequently, all Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the facts and law involved in the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) are different from the present case. In this case, the materials collected from the premises of Lunkad Media & Entertainment were examined and verified against the bank account statements by the Assessing Officer. The appellants were given ample opportunity to produce rebutting material but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, the loose scraps of paper containing money entries, corroborated by bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT and treated as books of account. Thus, questions 1 and 2 are answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Court found that the appellants had not filed any application alleging non-compliance with the order for supply of documents, and the respondents had stated that all documents were supplied. Therefore, question 3 is also answered against the appellants. Concerning questions 4 and 5, the Court held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in cases of search under Section 132, not in cases of survey under Section 133A. Therefore, questions 4 and 5 are also answered against the appellants. Consequently, all Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the facts and law involved in the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) are different from the present case. In this case, the materials collected from the premises were examined and verified against bank account statements by the Assessing Officer, and the appellants were given ample opportunity to rebut the findings but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, the loose papers containing entries of money, corroborated with bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT and treated as books of account. Regarding the opportunity to produce documents, the Tribunal noted that the appellants had not filed any application alleging non-compliance with the order for supplying certified copies of seized documents, implying all materials were provided. The Tribunal further held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in case of search under Section 132, not in case of a survey under Section 133A. Consequently, all questions were answered against the petitioners/appellants.

The Tribunal held that the facts and law involved in the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) are different from the present case. In this case, the materials collected from the premises were examined and verified against bank account statements by the Assessing Officer, and the appellants were given ample opportunity to rebut the findings but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, the loose papers containing entries of money, corroborated with bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT and treated as books of account. Regarding the opportunity to produce documents, the Tribunal noted that the appellants had not filed any application alleging non-compliance with the order for supplying certified copies of seized documents, implying all materials were provided. The Tribunal further held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in case of search under Section 132, not in case of a survey under Section 133A. Consequently, all questions were answered against the petitioners/appellants.

The Tribunal held that the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) is distinguishable from the present case. In the present case, the materials collected from the premises were examined and verified against bank account statements by the Assessing Officer. The appellants were given ample opportunity to produce rebuttal material but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. The seized materials, found in corroboration with bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT as books of account. Therefore, questions 1 and 2 were answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Tribunal found that the appellants could not produce any document to show non-compliance with the court's order for supplying certified copies of seized documents, and the respondents stated that all documents were supplied. Thus, question 3 was also answered against the appellants. For questions 4 and 5, the Tribunal held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in case of a search under Section 132, not in case of a survey under Section 133A. Therefore, questions 4 and 5 were also answered against the appellants. Consequently, all Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the facts and law involved in the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) are different from the present case. In this case, the materials collected from the premises were examined and verified against bank account statements by the Assessing Officer, and the appellants were given ample opportunity to rebut the findings but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, the loose papers containing entries of money, corroborated with bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT and treated as books of account. Regarding the opportunity to produce documents, the Tribunal noted that the appellants had not filed any application alleging non-compliance with the order for supplying certified copies of seized documents, implying all materials were provided. The Tribunal further held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in case of search under Section 132, not in case of a survey under Section 133A. Consequently, all questions were answered against the petitioners/appellants.

The Tribunal held that the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) is distinguishable from the present case. In the present case, the materials collected from the premises were examined and verified against bank account statements by the Assessing Officer. The appellants were given ample opportunity to produce rebuttal material but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. The seized materials, found in corroboration with bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT as books of account. Therefore, questions 1 and 2 were answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Tribunal found that the appellants could not produce any document to show non-compliance with the court's order for supplying certified copies of seized documents, and the respondents stated that all documents were supplied. Thus, question 3 was also answered against the appellants. For questions 4 and 5, the Tribunal held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in case of a search under Section 132, not in case of a survey under Section 133A. Therefore, questions 4 and 5 were also answered against the appellants. Consequently, all Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the facts and law involved in the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) are different from the present case. In this case, the materials collected from the premises were examined and verified against bank account statements by the Assessing Officer, and the appellants were given ample opportunity to rebut the findings but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, the loose papers containing entries of money, corroborated with bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT and treated as books of account. Regarding the opportunity to produce documents, the Tribunal noted that the appellants had not filed any application alleging non-compliance with the order for supplying certified copies of seized documents, implying all materials were provided. The Tribunal further held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in case of search under Section 132, not in case of a survey under Section 133A. Consequently, all questions were answered against the petitioners/appellants.

The Tribunal held that the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) is distinguishable from the present case. In the present case, the materials collected from the premises were examined and verified against bank account statements by the Assessing Officer. The appellants were given ample opportunity to produce rebuttal material but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. The seized materials, found in corroboration with bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT as books of account. Therefore, questions 1 and 2 were answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Tribunal found that the appellants could not produce any document to show non-compliance with the court's order for supplying certified copies of seized documents, and the respondents stated that all documents were supplied. Thus, question 3 was also answered against the appellants. For questions 4 and 5, the Tribunal held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in case of a search under Section 132, not in case of a survey under Section 133A. Therefore, questions 4 and 5 were also answered against the appellants. Consequently, all Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the loose papers containing entries of money receipts, found during the survey and corroborated by bank statements, were rightly treated as books of account by the Assessing Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax, and ITAT. The Tribunal distinguished the present case from the V.C. Shukla case, stating that in the latter, the evidentiary value of materials was examined under the Prevention of Corruption Act and Indian Evidence Act, whereas here, the survey was conducted by Income Tax authorities concerning the company's affairs. The appellants failed to produce concrete material to rebut the findings and did not file income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, questions 1 and 2 were answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Tribunal found that the appellants were provided with ample opportunity to produce documents and rebut the findings. The respondents confirmed that all seized documents were supplied in compliance with the High Court's interim order, and the petitioners never alleged non-compliance thereafter. Thus, question 3 was also answered against the appellants. Concerning questions 4 and 5, the Tribunal clarified that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in cases of search under Section 132, not in cases of survey under Section 133A. The letter relied upon by the appellants did not admit to a search operation; the word 'search' was introduced by the appellants in their own letter. Consequently, questions 4 and 5 were also answered against the appellants. All Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the loose papers containing entries of money receipts, found during the survey and corroborated by bank statements, were rightly treated as books of account by the Assessing Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax, and ITAT. The Tribunal distinguished the present case from the V.C. Shukla case, stating that in the latter, the evidentiary value of materials was examined under the Prevention of Corruption Act and Indian Evidence Act, whereas here, the survey was conducted by Income Tax authorities concerning the company's affairs. The appellants failed to produce concrete material to rebut the findings and did not file income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, questions 1 and 2 were answered against the petitioners/appellants. Regarding question 3, the Tribunal found that the appellants were provided with ample opportunity to produce documents and rebut the findings. The respondents confirmed that all seized documents were supplied in compliance with the High Court's interim order, and the petitioners never alleged non-compliance thereafter. Thus, question 3 was also answered against the appellants. Concerning questions 4 and 5, the Tribunal clarified that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in cases of search under Section 132, not in cases of survey under Section 133A. The letter relied upon by the appellants did not admit to a search operation; the word 'search' was introduced by the appellants in their own letter. Consequently, questions 4 and 5 were also answered against the appellants. All Income Tax Appeals were dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the facts and law involved in the "hawala" case (V.C. Shukla) are different from the present case. In this case, the materials collected from the premises were examined and verified against bank account statements by the Assessing Officer, and the appellants were given ample opportunity to rebut the findings but failed to do so, not even filing income tax returns to explain the money receipts. Therefore, the loose papers containing entries of money, corroborated with bank statements, were rightly appreciated by the Assessing Officer, CIT, and ITAT and treated as books of account. Regarding the opportunity to produce documents, the Tribunal noted that the appellants had not filed any application alleging non-compliance with the order for supplying certified copies of seized documents, implying all materials were provided. The Tribunal further held that the provisions of Sections 153A to 153D of the Act apply in case of search under Section 132, not in case of a survey under Section 133A. Consequently, all questions were answered against the petitioners/appellants.