364 orders · Page 7 of 8
The High Court noted that the tax effect in the present case was below the revised monetary limit for High Court appeals. Consequently, the Revenue did not press the appeal.
The tribunal held that the Assessing Officer is bound to dispose of objections before proceeding with re-assessment proceedings. Failure to do so vitiates the assessment order and cannot be sustained.
The High Court held that the trial court failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly by not deciding the interim application within a reasonable time and by making adverse remarks. The court directed the trial court to hear and dispose of the injunction application on merits promptly.
The appellant filed a memo seeking withdrawal of the appeal. The court took the memo on record and consequently dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The tribunal held that persons working on ploughing or crushing machines attached to a tractor, or travelling on the mudguard of a tractor, are not covered by the statutory insurance as contemplated under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Such attachments are not considered motor vehicles or trailers for insurance purposes.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Income Tax Department. This was based on the fact that the questions of law raised had been decided against the appellants in prior cases.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was justified in allowing proportionate deduction under Section 80IB. The court dismissed the revenue's appeals, stating that the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee.
The High Court held that the amount paid towards compensatory afforestation management and planning agency is not a capital expenditure and is allowable. The second issue regarding deferred revenue expenditure was not considered a substantial question of law as it was remanded.
The High Court held that delayed payments of employee's contribution to PF and ESI are available for deduction as revenue expenditure. This decision was based on a prior ruling by the same court.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was justified in allowing proportionate deduction under Section 80IB. The court dismissed the revenue's appeals, stating that the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee.
The High Court held that the payment for the mining lease was a revenue expenditure. The Tribunal's decision, which was upheld by the High Court and had its SLP dismissed, was considered binding.
The Court disposed of the writ petitions in terms of a previous order passed in similar writ petitions. The parties agreed to this course of action.
The High Court acknowledged the joint memo filed by both parties, detailing the terms of their settlement. The court agreed to dispose of the writ petition in accordance with this settlement.
The High Court upheld the trial court's decision to discharge the accused, finding no prima facie case. The court agreed that the materials on record did not establish that the accused acquired properties disproportionate to his known source of income.
The High Court held that Order XXVI Rule 10A CPC is an enabling provision and referring a document to an expert is at the court's discretion. The court below can refer the document for expert opinion if doubt arises regarding the signature's genuineness before pronouncing judgment.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. The dismissal was based on a submission by the appellant's counsel that the appeal should not have been preferred in view of a specific circular.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer acted without jurisdiction in disallowing the Privilege Fee, as it was a statutory obligation. The disallowance was considered ultravires to the Assessing Officer's powers.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer acted without jurisdiction in disallowing the Privilege Fee, as it was a statutory obligation. The disallowance was considered ultravires to the Assessing Officer's powers.
The High Court held that since the substantial questions of law were already covered by its previous judgment in the assessee's own case, and no stay was granted by the Apex Court, no new substantial questions of law arose.
The High Court held that the learned Single Judge exceeded their jurisdiction by accepting the assessee's explanation and making a final conclusion. Judicial review under Article 226 is not an appellate power and the matter should have been remanded without pre-judging the outcome.
The Court directed the respondents to consider the petitioners' representation dated January 1, 2016, in light of the scheme dated January 11, 2016. The first respondent was ordered to comply within six months.
The High Court allowed the wife an opportunity to cross-examine PW1 and PW2, setting aside the lower court's order discharging them. It also partly allowed the application for summoning the husband's income tax returns, directing the husband to produce them.
The High Court held that the orders demanding 15% of the disputed demand were unsustainable as they were non-speaking orders and failed to properly consider the guidelines for granting stay, particularly regarding genuine hardship. The Court also noted the Prl. CIT's erroneous reliance on a precedent.
The High Court held that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law. The issue was a matter of estimation based on seized material and the assessee's statement regarding his income as a priest.
The High Court allowed the Revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The decision was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the Revenue, citing CBDT Circular No. 21/2015. This circular mandates that appeals should not be filed by the Revenue if the monetary limit of the dispute is below Rs. 20,00,000/-. Since the Revenue stated that the present appeal's monetary stake was less than this limit, and the assessee had no objection, the Court permitted the withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with no costs awarded.
The High Court modified the awards by reducing the rate of interest from 9% and 7% to 6% per annum. It also enhanced the compensation in one case while dismissing appeals by claimants seeking further enhancement.
The High Court held that cement used for civil works and foundations for plant and machinery constitutes a part of the 'plant' and thus 'Capital Goods'. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to claim input tax credit on such cement purchased prior to commercial production.
The High Court permitted the appellant (Revenue) to withdraw the appeal based on the revised monetary limits for filing appeals. Liberty was granted to revive the appeal if the case falls under specific exceptions.
The High Court held that the appeal would not be maintainable due to the reduced tax effect and subsequent developments, referencing a circular on revised monetary limits for appeals.
The High Court held that the trial court erred by considering materials placed by the accused while deciding a discharge application under Section 227 Cr.PC. The court should only consider materials placed by the prosecution.
The High Court held that the findings of the Tribunal and CIT(A) were based on questions of fact and that no substantial question of law arose. The court affirmed the ITAT's decision to dismiss the revenue's appeal.
The High Court found that the compromise decree was obtained fraudulently and was not binding on the plaintiffs. Consequently, the trial court's judgment dismissing the suit was set aside.
The High Court quashed the impugned order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision.
The High Court held that an assessment order is an appealable order before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Since an alternative efficacious remedy exists, the writ petition is not maintainable.
The Court granted the petitioner four weeks to comply with office objections. Failure to do so would result in the petition being automatically dismissed without further reference.
The High Court quashed the impugned order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision.
The High Court held that the plaintiff proved certain properties as ancestral joint family properties, but failed to prove others. The court also found that the defendants failed to prove a prior partition.
The High Court allowed the review petition, recalling its previous order. The Income Tax Appeal was restored to the file for fresh consideration.
The High Court held that the character of income depends on the activity generating it. It found that interest from investments with a registered co-operative bank is not eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d).
The High Court held that the grant money and the interest earned thereon cannot be termed as the income of the assessee. The assessee acted as a custodian, and the utilization of funds, including interest, remained under the full control of the government.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, granting liberty to the Revenue to revive it if they succeed before the Supreme Court on the same issue. This decision is binding inter-party regardless of the Supreme Court's outcome.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the issue to the AO to determine the peak of deposits after providing the assessee with a proper opportunity to be heard. The High Court found no substantial question of law in the Tribunal's remand order.
The petitioner's counsel submitted a memo to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the High Court took the memo on record and dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the determinability of beneficiaries' shares is the key test, not the date of the trust deed's execution. Since the shares were to be shared in proportion to investment, they were considered determinable, thus Section 164(1) was not applicable.
The court noted that the petitioner did not claim the vehicle was parked or run without proper transfer. Due to the efflux of time, the dispute became infructuous.
The Tribunal, relying on a High Court precedent, held that if the admitted tax liability is paid after the dismissal of an appeal due to non-payment, the CIT(A) should recall the dismissal order and decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal rightly deleted the addition as the assessee had provided plausible explanations and evidence regarding the source of investment during remand proceedings. The High Court found no perversity in the Tribunal's findings of fact.
The Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 41(1) were not attracted as the liability for unencashed demand drafts and pay orders remained in the bank's books and had not ceased or been remitted. The High Court agreed, citing previous judgments that such amounts do not constitute income under Section 41(1) as the liability does not cease in law.
The tribunal held that the petitioners failed to provide any documents to establish their ownership. Previous Supreme Court judgments on similar matters were considered binding and ruled out the petitioners' claims.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the review petitions. However, it found no valid grounds to review its earlier orders and therefore dismissed the review petitions on merits.