527 orders · Page 1 of 11
The High Court held that the impugned awards and demands were vitiated and violative of the principles of natural justice. The Single Judge's order was also found to be erroneous.
The High Court enhanced the monthly income to Rs. 30,000/-, reassessed the disability at 15%, and increased compensation under various heads. The total enhanced compensation awarded was Rs. 13,15,933/-.
The High Court held that the matter requires appreciation of evidence regarding facts, which can be done before the Appellate Authority. It also noted that in some cases, show cause notices were challenged, and it was appropriate to reply to them and await assessment orders.
The High Court held that TDS is not required on year-end provisions that are reversed and where the payees are not identified. The existence of entries in books of accounts is not decisive if no income has accrued to the payee.
The High Court held that there was no requirement for a pre-deposit before filing an appeal as per the IT Act or the cited CBDT circular. Consequently, the impugned demand and the freezing of the bank account were quashed.
The High Court held that the expenses incurred for professional services had an inextricable nexus with the transfer of shares, as these services were essential for identifying investors, negotiating value, and structuring the transaction. Therefore, the expenditure is deductible under Section 48(i) of the Income Tax Act.
The High Court quashed the provisional attachment order, finding it illegal and arbitrary. However, it imposed conditions on the petitioner, prohibiting royalty payments to foreign entities and allowing withdrawals via overdrafts, while directing the revenue to expedite assessment proceedings.
The High Court directed the respondents to consider the petitioner's representations and pass appropriate orders within six weeks. The court emphasized that the disposal should be in accordance with law and consider the material on record.
The High Court quashed the impugned assessment and penalty orders. The matter was remitted back to the respondents for reconsideration, granting the petitioner one more opportunity to file their reply and participate in the proceedings.
The High Court declared the Company as the owner of the 'Yezdi' trademark and held that trademark registrations in favor of Mr. Boman Irani were null and void. The Court also restrained Mr. Irani and associated entities from using the mark and directed them to account for profits made from its use.
The High Court held that the impugned order violated the principles of natural justice by not providing a personal hearing. Consequently, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the respondent for fresh consideration.
The High Court held that the impugned communication from the respondents were un-reasoned, non-speaking, and laconic, violating the principles of natural justice. The court quashed these communications and remitted the matter back for reconsideration.
The tribunal held that the denial of the passport renewal was illegal and contrary to Passport Rules and previous High Court judgments. It directed the Regional Passport Officer to consider the petitioner's application for the minor's passport.
The High Court reviewed its earlier order and deleted the sentence stating the respondent employee was not entitled to back wages. It was directed that the respondent employee shall be entitled to all consequential benefits.
The High Court held that the CRE Cell's power to initiate proceedings is limited to cases referred by the District Caste Verification Committee. Since no such reference was made, the impugned notices were issued without jurisdiction and were therefore nullities.
The tribunal held that the CRE Cell does not have the power to initiate independent proceedings for caste verification. Their role is limited to conducting investigations when a matter is referred to them by a Caste Verification Committee.
The High Court held that the CRE Cell's power to act is derived from a reference made by the District Caste Verification Committee. Since no such reference was made, the impugned notices were issued without jurisdiction and were therefore nullities.
The Court held that the CRE Cell's power to initiate proceedings is limited to cases referred by a Caste Verification Committee. Since no such reference was made, the impugned notices were issued without jurisdiction and were therefore nullities.
The High Court held that the assessment order passed in the name of a merged company, which had ceased to exist prior to the assessment order, was invalid. The court followed its previous decision in the case of Logica Pvt. Ltd.
The High Court modified the ITAT's order, remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer (AO) instead of the CIT(A). This was to allow the AO to examine whether the deposits were from own funds or borrowed funds and apply the relevant case law.
The Court held that the CRE Cell can only initiate proceedings upon a reference from the District Caste Verification Committee. Since no such reference was made, the impugned notices were issued without jurisdiction and were therefore nullities.
The tribunal held that the CRE Cell has no independent power to initiate proceedings for caste verification. Their role is limited to conducting investigations only when a matter is referred to them by a Caste Verification Committee.
The Court held that the CRE Cell's power to initiate proceedings is limited to cases referred by a Caste Verification Committee. Since no such reference was made, the impugned notices were issued without jurisdiction and were therefore nullities.
The High Court clarified that the Assessing Officer shall pass the order wholly uninfluenced by the order passed by either the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The High Court held that the AO's reasoning for not relying on the Apex Court judgment was misconceived. The assessment order was set aside because the AO failed to consider the petitioner's reply and the binding precedent.
The High Court directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal expeditiously. The Assessing Officer was also directed to consider and pass orders on the stay application within three months.
The High Court directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal expeditiously. It also directed the Assessing Officer to consider and pass orders on the stay application within three months.
The Court found that the review petition did not present any ground for review based on an error apparent on the face of the record. The Court considered entertaining the review petition as a re-hearing of the matter.
The High Court directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal expeditiously. It also directed the Assessing Officer to consider and pass orders on the stay application within three months.
The High Court directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal expeditiously and the Assessing Officer to consider and pass orders on the Section 220(6) application within three months. No coercive steps are to be taken against the petitioner until the application is decided.
The High Court found no infirmity or error apparent on the face of the record in the impugned judgment. Therefore, the Court held that no interference was warranted in its review jurisdiction.
The High Court directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal expeditiously. It also directed the Assessing Officer to consider and pass orders on the stay application within three months, and restrained coercive steps until then.
The High Court found no infirmity or error apparent on the face of the record in the original order. Therefore, the court decided not to interfere with its previous judgment.
The High Court directed the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal expeditiously. The Assessing Officer was also directed to consider and pass orders on the stay application within three months, and no coercive steps were to be taken against the petitioner until then.
The High Court found no infirmity or error apparent on the face of the record in the previous judgment. Therefore, the court decided not to interfere with its earlier order in the exercise of its review jurisdiction.
The High Court quashed the impugned general awards and directed the Reference Court to dispose of pending reference proceedings within six months. The KIADB was also directed to deposit the package compensation offered by BMRCL before the Reference Court.
The High Court set aside the impugned awards and directed the Reference Court to dispose of the pending proceedings. The court also ordered KIADB to deposit the package compensation with accrued interest before the Reference Court.
The High Court of Karnataka noted that the learned counsel for the respondents had filed a memo dated 08.12.2022, accompanied by a communication dated 17.11.2022. This communication indicated that the impugned proceedings initiated by the notice dated 28.03.2019 had been dropped by the revenue. Consequently, the Court found that the writ petition had become infructuous. The Court ordered that the memo and the communication be placed on record and disposed of the writ petition as having become infructuous, without deciding on the merits of the jurisdictional or limitation arguments.
The High Court set aside the ex-parte assessment and penalty orders. The matter was remitted back to the respondent for reconsideration, allowing the petitioner an opportunity to submit replies and contest the proceedings.
The High Court found that the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity to present their case. Therefore, the court set aside the ex-parte assessment and penalty orders and remitted the matter back for fresh consideration.
The High Court quashed the ex-parte assessment order and demand notice. The matter was remitted back to the respondent for reconsideration, granting the petitioner an opportunity to submit their reply and documents.
The High Court disposed of the petition based on a memo filed by the petitioner, setting aside the impugned general awards. The court directed the Reference Court to dispose of pending proceedings and ordered the KIADB to deposit the package compensation.
The High Court held that an appeal filed by the Income Tax Department against the inadequacy of a sentence is not maintainable. The court dismissed the appeal on these grounds.
The High Court held that the provisions of the Benami Amendment Act, 2016, have been declared prospective by the Supreme Court. Therefore, proceedings initiated based on a retrospective application of these provisions are void.
The High Court held that the relevant regulations concerning electrical installation work do not apply to manpower agencies. It found that the tenders were for hiring personnel for operation and maintenance under supervision, not for electrical installation work, and thus did not violate any rules or constitutional provisions.
The High Court held that the relevant regulations concerning electrical installation work do not apply to manpower agencies. It found that the tenders were for hiring personnel for operation and maintenance under supervision, not for electrical installation work, and thus did not violate any rules or constitutional provisions.
The High Court held that the relevant regulations concerning electrical installation work do not apply to manpower agencies. It found that the tenders were for hiring personnel for operation and maintenance under supervision, not for electrical installation work, and thus did not violate any rules or constitutional provisions.
The High Court held that questions 2 and 3, concerning additions under Section 36(1)(iii), were already decided in favour of the assessee in a previous case. Questions 1 and 4 were kept open to be considered in a related appeal.
The High Court held that the relevant regulations concerning electrical installation work do not apply to manpower agencies. It found that the tenders were for hiring personnel for operation and maintenance under supervision, not for electrical installation work, and thus did not violate any rules or constitutional provisions.
The High Court held that the relevant regulations concerning electrical installation work do not apply to manpower agencies. It found that the tenders were for hiring personnel for operation and maintenance under supervision, not for electrical installation work, and thus did not violate any rules or constitutional provisions.