Karnataka High Court Judgments — 2025

The High Court allowed the petition. It held that a perusal of the material indicated that the petitioners' detailed replies, including documents explaining the delay in TDS payment and the reasons for it, were not considered by the respondents in their proper perspective. The Court also noted the petitioners' assertion that they would submit additional documents if given another opportunity. Adopting a justice-oriented approach, the Court set aside the impugned order dated June 18, 2024, and remitted the matter back to the first respondent for reconsideration. Liberty was granted to the petitioners to submit additional pleadings and documents, which would be considered by the respondent, who was directed to provide sufficient opportunity, including a personal hearing, and proceed in accordance with law.

The High Court allowed the petition. It observed that while the petitioners had submitted detailed replies and documents explaining the delay in TDS payment and offering reasons for it, these submissions had not been properly considered by the respondents. The Court also noted the petitioners' specific assertion that they would submit additional documents if given another opportunity. Adopting a justice-oriented approach, the Court set aside the impugned order dated 31.05.2024. The matter was remitted back to the first respondent for reconsideration. Liberty was granted to the petitioners to submit additional pleadings and documents, which the respondent was directed to consider. The respondent was also directed to provide a reasonable opportunity for a personal hearing before proceeding in accordance with the law. The Court expressly did not decide on the merits of the case but remanded it for fresh consideration.

The High Court allowed the petition. It held that a perusal of the material on record, including the impugned order, indicated that the detailed replies and documents submitted by the petitioners, explaining the delay in TDS payment and demonstrating subsequent payment with penal interest, were not considered by the respondents in their proper perspective. Further, considering the petitioners' assertion that they could submit additional documents if given another opportunity, the Court adopted a justice-oriented approach. Consequently, the impugned order dated May 22, 2024, was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the first respondent for reconsideration. The petitioners were granted liberty to submit additional pleadings and documents, and the respondent was directed to provide sufficient opportunity, including a personal hearing, before proceeding in accordance with the law.

The Tribunal held that the activity of the appellant is 'education' under Section 2(15) of the Act, and the surplus generated was used for educational purposes. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to exemption under Section 11.

The High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the impugned order dated May 22, 2024, and remitting the matter back to the first respondent for reconsideration. The Court found that while the petitioners had submitted detailed replies and documents explaining the delay in TDS payment and offered reasons for it, these explanations were not considered by the respondents in their proper perspective. The Court noted the petitioners' assertion that they would submit additional documents if given another opportunity. Adopting a justice-oriented approach, the Court deemed it appropriate to set aside the order and grant liberty to the petitioners to submit additional pleadings and documents. The first respondent was directed to consider these submissions, provide a reasonable opportunity, including a personal hearing, and then proceed in accordance with the law. The Court expressly left undecided the merits of the petitioners' explanation for the delay.

The High Court allowed the petition. It held that while the petitioners had submitted detailed replies and documents explaining the delay in TDS payment and had paid the amount with penal interest, these explanations were not considered by the respondents in their proper perspective. The Court noted the petitioners' assertion that they could submit additional documents if given another opportunity. Adopting a justice-oriented approach, the Court set aside the impugned order dated May 31, 2024, and remitted the matter back to the first respondent for fresh reconsideration. The petitioners were granted liberty to submit additional pleadings and documents, and the respondent was directed to provide sufficient opportunity, including a personal hearing, before proceeding in accordance with the law.

The High Court held that the TDS deducted on gratuity, if below the taxable limit, can be claimed as a refund by the employee by filing income tax returns. The Court allowed the employee to file returns with a delay condonation application for expeditious processing.

The High Court noted that both parties stated the appeals had become infructuous due to a settlement under the 'Vivad se Vishwas Scheme'. Therefore, the appeals were disposed of.

The Tribunal held that the assessment order was invalid because the approval obtained from the Additional Commissioner was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by errors in the checklist provided.

The High Court disposed of the appeal in light of a CBDT Circular and the tax effect being less than Rs. 2 Crores. This was done without prejudice to the Revenue's contentions.

The Tribunal held that additions based on unsigned loose sheets and uncorroborated statements from employees were not sustainable. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's findings, stating there were no substantial questions of law.

The High Court accepted the memo filed by the assessee stating that the tax liability has been discharged under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The appeal was disposed of as infructuous, with liberty reserved for the Revenue to seek revival if necessary.

The High Court addressed several procedural aspects concerning the listed writ petitions. For WP Nos. 9006/2022, 9033/2022, and 19127/2022, the court accepted the submission that the petitioners had not challenged the vires of Section 147A and directed the office to de-tag these petitions and list them individually on August 18, 2026, continuing interim orders. Similarly, for WP No. 17282/2022, the court accepted the petitioner's request to limit the challenge and de-tagged the petition for separate listing on July 28, 2026. WP No. 32672/2025 was restored and directed to be listed separately on July 29, 2026, with the petitioner choosing to challenge Section 147A on grounds other than its vires. For the remaining petitions in List No. 6, the court granted liberty to file amended pleadings by the next date of hearing. It directed the office to identify and de-tag petitions pertaining to Assessment Year 2015-16 for separate listing on July 15, 2026. Mr. Hemant Venkatray Pai was appointed to file a synopsis of arguments and list of authorities by July 15, 2026. The court also noted that some petitions were disposed of due to inadvertence or by separate orders, and no further action was required for them.

The High Court accepted the memo filed by the respondent, acknowledging the discharge certificate under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme. The appeal was disposed of as infructuous, with liberty reserved for the appellants to seek revival if necessary.

The High Court held that the substantial questions of law raised by the Revenue did not survive for consideration, as they were answered by previous judgments of coordinate benches.

The Tribunal confirmed the deletion of additions, finding that the amounts were either reflected in the books as advances or were part of a transaction with a developer where disputes were pending. The High Court found no perversity in the Tribunal's order.

The High Court noted the submission regarding the tax effect and disposed of the appeal in light of the circular. The appeal was disposed of based on the monetary limit specified in the circular.

The High Court held that the TPO did not claim any right for extended time, and the ITAT's correction of its order due to an apparent error was valid. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.

The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeals, stating that similar issues had already been decided by the court based on a Supreme Court judgment. The court found no open questions for consideration.

The Tribunal's decision was upheld, stating that a notice under Section 143(2) must be issued by the jurisdictional AO within the prescribed time limit. A notice issued by an officer lacking jurisdiction, even if transferred later, cannot be cured under Section 292B of the Income Tax Act.

The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, following a previous decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2013-14 on identical questions. The court found parity of reasoning and held the substantial questions of law in favor of the assessee.

The High Court held that the substantial questions of law proposed by the Revenue were not sustainable. The court relied on previous judgments of co-ordinate benches that had already decided similar issues against the Revenue.

The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, following its previous decision in a similar case for the same assessee. The court held that the substantial questions of law were to be answered in favor of the assessee.

The High Court held that for parity of reasoning, the present appeal must also be dismissed. The substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee, following the precedent set in a prior appeal.

The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that for parity of reasoning with a previous identical appeal (ITA No. 2/2020 for AY 2013-14), the substantial questions of law should be answered in favour of the Assessee.

The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, following a previous decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2013-14 on identical issues. The court found parity of reasoning warranted the dismissal.

The High Court disposed of the appeals, acknowledging the pending Supreme Court case. The court observed that the outcome of these appeals would be modulated by the Supreme Court's decision. The application for condonation of delay in one appeal was allowed.

The High Court disposed of the appellant's appeal as withdrawn, granting liberty to revive it under specific circumstances. This was based on the fact that the Revenue's appeal against the same ITAT order had already been dismissed.

The High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, considered the memo filed by the learned counsel for the appellant seeking withdrawal of the appeal. The memo requested liberty to avail appropriate remedies in accordance with law. The Court acknowledged the memo and placed it on record. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court granted the appellant liberty to avail appropriate remedies as per law. No decision was made on the substantial questions of law or the merits of the ITAT's order, as the appeal was withdrawn by the appellant.

The Tribunal held that the receipt was salary income as no professional services were proven, and the interest expenditure was not allowable as it lacked a nexus to the assessee's business. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's findings.

The High Court held that the decision of the Apex Court in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited would apply to the sale of software as well. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The Tribunal was justified in adding 15% towards future prospects as the deceased was in permanent employment. The finding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending car driver was also upheld.

The Tribunal should have examined the assessee's case for condonation of delay and decided the appeals on merits. The High Court found that the Tribunal failed to consider the circumstances that would have enabled a complete adjudication of the assessee's grievance.

The High Court held that the Tribunal, as the last fact-finding authority, should have examined the available documents and decided the matter on merits rather than remanding it. Remand should be used sparingly and not routinely when sufficient material is on record.

The High Court held that the questions of law raised by the Revenue were already answered by its coordinate benches in previous cases. These prior judgments established that similar technical services fall within the employer-employee relationship and are in the nature of reimbursement.

The Tribunal held that if a reassessment is made after four years without prior sanction from the Jurisdictional Commissioner, it cannot be sustained. Consequently, the reassessment order and all subsequent appellate orders are set aside.

The High Court noted the submission regarding the tax effect being below the monetary limit. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of on this basis.

The High Court held that since the Revenue failed to demonstrate any difference in facts or law for the current assessment year compared to previous years, the appeal should be dismissed. This decision aligns with a coordinate bench's ruling on similar matters.

The Tribunal held that medical reimbursements below Rs. 15,000 to employees, even for treatment in unapproved hospitals, are not liable for FBT. This is because such amounts are exempt in the hands of the employees under Section 17 of the Act, and Section 115WB(3) excludes perquisites on which tax is paid or payable by employees.

The High Court held that the Tribunal's remand of the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration was just and proper. The Revenue's contention that the Tribunal erred in not adjudicating the quantum of deduction was found to be without merit.

The High Court held that the orders passed by CIT(A)-11 after June 18, 2018, were erroneous, illegal, and without jurisdiction. The ITAT's decision to set aside these orders and remand the matters was affirmed.

The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, reiterating that the assessee cannot be called upon to pay royalty. The court noted that similar matters have been decided against the Revenue, even when review petitions were pending.

The High Court found no reason to differ from the Tribunal's conclusion, as the facts were similar to a previously decided case. Therefore, the appeal was disposed of in line with the prior judgment.

The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, stating that if similar matters for the assessee's own case and other assessment years were decided similarly based on Supreme Court precedent, there was no reason for a different conclusion.

The High Court noted that a co-ordinate bench had already decided the issue in favor of the assessee for a prior assessment year, citing the Supreme Court judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence (P) Ltd. The court found no difference in facts or law presented by the Revenue.

The High Court disposed of the appeal, noting that the substantial questions of law were already answered by a co-ordinate bench in a similar case. The appeal was decided in light of the previous judgment.

The High Court observed that this issue had already been decided in favor of the assessee in previous cases for other relevant years. Therefore, the appeal was rejected based on prior rulings.

The Tribunal correctly held that the final assessment order was beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 144C(13) of the Act. The Assessing Officer failed to exercise due diligence to ascertain the actual date of service of the draft order.

The High Court found that the consideration of the appeal had become academic as the Assessing Officer had not passed a fresh assessment order within the stipulated time limit. Therefore, the appeal was meritless.

The High Court held that the first substantial question of law was squarely covered by its previous judgment in the assessee's case. Consequently, the second question also did not arise for consideration, and the appeal was dismissed.