Delhi High Court Judgments — 2025

The High Court held that the appeal is not liable to be continued due to the low tax effect, which is below INR 2 Crores, in light of Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17 September 2024. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on this ground. The Court explicitly stated that the proposed questions of law are kept open to be urged and addressed in an appropriate case, indicating no decision on the merits of the underlying tax dispute. No specific relief was granted or denied on the substantive issues.

The High Court of Delhi held that the appeal would not survive for consideration in light of the provisions of Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17 September 2024. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on the ground of low tax effect. The court explicitly stated that the question of law was kept open to be addressed in an appropriate case. No specific findings were made on the merits of the case, as the dismissal was procedural. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.

The Delhi High Court held that the controversy in the present petition is covered by its earlier decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated the principle from ARN Infrastructures, which itself relied on Supreme Court observations in Abhisar Buildwell, stating that while the Revenue has a remedy of reassessment under Sections 147/148, this power is strictly subject to the fulfillment of the conditions stipulated in those sections, particularly Section 149. The Court explicitly rejected the contention that the time period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is not applicable in the given facts. Consequently, the impugned notice dated March 28, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2010-11 was set aside. The petition was allowed, and the pending application was also disposed of.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court found that the controversy in the present petition was covered by its earlier decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated the principle from the ARN Infrastructures case, which itself relied on Supreme Court observations in Abhisar Buildwell. The core reasoning was that while the Supreme Court acknowledged the Revenue's right to reassess in certain situations (like when search assessments are annulled), this power is strictly subject to the fulfillment of conditions laid down in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act. Crucially, the Court emphasized that these observations do not grant a carte blanche to override the restrictions imposed by Section 149 of the Act, which governs the time limits for issuing such notices. Therefore, the contention that the time period stipulated under Section 149 was not applicable was rejected as erroneous. The operative direction was to set aside the notice.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court referred to its decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors., which interpreted the Supreme Court's observations in Abhisar Buildwell. The High Court clarified that while the Supreme Court saved the Revenue's power to reassess in cases where search assessments were annulled, this power is strictly subject to the fulfillment of conditions stipulated in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act, and importantly, Section 149. The Court rejected the contention that the time-period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act was not applicable in the given facts. Since the respondent revenue concurred with the petitioner's submission that the matter was covered by the ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. judgment, the petition was allowed.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court found that the controversy was covered by its prior decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. In that judgment, the Court had clarified that while the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell observed that reassessment is a remedy when search assessments are annulled, this power is strictly subject to the fulfillment of conditions laid down in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act. The Court emphasized that the Supreme Court's observations were not a carte blanche to override the restrictions in Section 149 of the Act. The contention that the time-period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is not applicable was rejected as erroneous. The operative direction was to set aside the notice.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court found that the controversy in the present petition was covered by its prior decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court specifically rejected the contention that the time period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act was not applicable in the given facts. The reasoning relied on the ARN Infrastructures judgment, which interpreted the Supreme Court's observations in Abhisar Buildwell. The High Court reiterated that the liberty granted to the Revenue to initiate reassessment is subject to fulfillment of conditions under Sections 147 and 148, and cannot override restrictions in Section 149. The operative direction was to set aside the notice.

The Delhi High Court held that the controversy in the present petition is covered by its decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated the principle from the ARN Infrastructures case, which relied on the Supreme Court's observations in Abhisar Buildwell. It was clarified that while the Supreme Court acknowledged the Revenue's right to reassess when search assessments are annulled, this power is not a carte blanche and must be exercised subject to the fulfillment of conditions prescribed in Sections 147, 148, and specifically Section 149 of the Act. The contention that the time period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is not applicable in the given facts was rejected as erroneous. Consequently, the impugned notice was set aside.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court referred to its decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated that while the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell observed that reassessment is a remedy available to the Revenue when search assessments are annulled, this power is subject to the fulfillment of conditions mentioned in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act. The Court emphasized that the Supreme Court's observations do not grant a carte blanche to override restrictions like those in Section 149 of the Act. Therefore, the contention that the time-period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is not applicable was rejected as erroneous. The revenue's concurrence with this view led to the allowance of the petition.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court relied on its previous decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated that while the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell observed that reassessment is a remedy available to the Revenue when search assessments are annulled, this power is subject to the fulfillment of conditions mentioned in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act. The Court clarified that the Supreme Court's observations do not grant a carte blanche to override the restrictions in Section 149 of the Act. Therefore, the contention that the time-period stipulated under Section 149 is not applicable was rejected as erroneous. The ratio decidendi is that the power to initiate reassessment under Sections 147/148 is saved but must comply with all statutory prescriptions, including the limitations under Section 149.

The Delhi High Court held that the controversy in the present petition was covered by its prior decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court rejected the contention that the time-period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act was not applicable in the given facts. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice dated December 28, 2023. The reasoning relied on the principle that the liberty granted to the Revenue to initiate reassessment is subject to the fulfillment of conditions prescribed under Sections 147 and 148, and cannot override the restrictions in Section 149. The ratio decidendi is that reassessment proceedings must strictly comply with the statutory limitations, including time limits, as laid down in the Act, even when relying on Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the Revenue's power to reassess.

The Delhi High Court held that the controversy in the present petition is covered by its prior decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated that the liberty accorded to the Revenue to initiate reassessment, even after annulment of search assessments, is subject to the fulfillment of conditions prescribed in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act, and cannot override the restrictions in Section 149. The contention that the time-period stipulated under Section 149 is not applicable in the given facts was rejected as erroneous. Consequently, the impugned notice issued under Section 148 was set aside. The ratio decidendi is that reassessment powers are not a carte blanche and must comply with statutory prescriptions, including time limitations under Section 149, even in post-search annulment scenarios.

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court found that the controversy in the present petition was covered by its prior decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. In that judgment, the Court had clarified that while the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell had held that reassessment proceedings could be initiated if no incriminating material was found during a search, this power was subject to the fulfillment of conditions mentioned in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act. Crucially, the Court emphasized that such reassessment powers could not override the restrictions imposed by Section 149 of the Act. The Court rejected the contention that the time period stipulated under Section 149 was not applicable in the given facts. The operative direction was to set aside the notice. The pending application was also disposed of.

The Delhi High Court held that the controversy in the present petition was covered by its decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated the principle that while the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell observed that reassessment is a remedy available to the revenue when search assessments are annulled, this power is strictly subject to the fulfillment of conditions mentioned in Sections 147/148 of the Act. The Court emphasized that these observations do not grant a carte blanche to the revenue to override the restrictions, particularly those appearing in Section 149 of the Act. The contention that the time-period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is not applicable was found to be erroneous and was rejected. Consequently, the impugned notice was set aside. The petition was allowed.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court of Delhi allowed the application for correction of typographical errors. The name of the counsel for the respondent was corrected from Mr. Ankit Goyal to Mr. Ankul Goyal. The appearance of Mr. Deepak Chopra, Mr. Ankul Goyal, and Mr. Priyam Bhatnagar, Advocates, was duly marked against ITA No. 883/2019. The court found the disclosures made in the application to be sufficient for granting the correction. The application was disposed of accordingly. No substantive issues related to the income tax appeal itself were decided in this order.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court directed that the order dated 26.06.2015 passed by the ITAT be given appeal effect to. Consequential benefits, along with statutory interest if applicable, were to be released forthwith in accordance with the law. The Court noted the submission of the Revenue's counsel that only the Section 10A issue remained pending and that appeal effect orders for other settled issues should be passed. The Court's direction effectively mandates the implementation of the ITAT's order, which included setting aside the assessment order on transfer pricing and remanding the Section 10A issue, while also deleting the addition on depreciation. The primary relief granted was the implementation of the ITAT's order, leading to the deletion of the disputed demand and release of consequential benefits.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court held that NIPL did not constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) for Nokia OY as it operated independently and generated its own income. The court also ruled that software supply revenue was taxable as per Supreme Court precedent.

The High Court held that the Tribunal erred by relying on the Fifth Proviso to Section 32(1) for assessment years 2015-16 and 2016-17, as it was not germane to those years. The matter was remitted for fresh examination.

The High Court noted the submission of the appellant's counsel that a settlement had been reached under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024. Consequently, the court found the appeal to be infructuous. The Tribunal's decision was to dispose of the appeal as such, without delving into the merits of the original dispute. No specific findings were made on any substantive tax issues, and no operative directions other than the disposal of the appeal were issued. The ratio decidendi is that an appeal rendered infructuous by a settlement scheme will be disposed of accordingly.

The High Court of Delhi granted the appellant's prayer to withdraw the appeal. The Court reasoned that the appellant was pursuing a settlement under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2024, which necessitated the withdrawal of the current appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court also reserved the rights of the appellant to seek revival of the appeal if circumstances warranted it. No substantive issues were decided on merits.

The High Court held that the Tribunal erred by relying on the Fifth Proviso to Section 32(1) for assessment years 2015-16 and 2016-17, as it was not germane to those years. The matter was remitted for fresh examination.

The High Court held that the transaction was an international transaction, following its previous judgment in Dabur India Limited. It also affirmed that the explanation to Section 92B, concerning guarantees, has retrospective effect from April 1, 2002.

The Delhi High Court held that a corporate guarantee furnished for the benefit of a foreign subsidiary is an international transaction as per the Explanation to Section 92B of the Income Tax Act. The Court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's view.

The High Court held that the transaction was an international transaction, following its previous judgment in Dabur India Limited. It also held that the explanation to Section 92B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2012, had retrospective effect from April 1, 2002, and was clarificatory in nature.

The Delhi High Court admitted the appeals and framed questions of law. The court will decide if the ITAT correctly held the trusts' activities as charitable and if the CIT(E) should have granted registration under Section 12AA, considering provisions for gratuity fund approval.

The High Court admitted the appeals and framed questions of law regarding whether the ITAT correctly held the assessee's activities as charitable under Section 2(15) and if the ITAT erred in directing the CIT(E) to grant registration under Section 12AA.

The High Court held that an action under Section 153C is premised solely on the discovery of incriminating material that is likely to have an impact or bearing on the assessed income of a non-searched entity. The statute does not obligate the Assessing Officer to establish a relationship or association between the searched and non-searched persons. The provision is concerned with evaluating unearthed material and assessing its potential bearing on the income of a non-searched entity. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that a relationship must exist, stating that such an interpretation would render the AO powerless to act even if incriminating material is found. The Court found the challenge to be misconceived, referencing the 2015 amendments to Section 153C as clarificatory and applicable retrospectively. The Court also noted that the issue of Section 69C was academic as the proceedings under Section 153C were not upheld.

The High Court held that the impugned order and certificate were unsustainable. The Court found that the petitioner's claim that SFDC India was empowered to enter into binding contracts on its behalf was not supported by the unambiguous terms of the Reseller Agreement. The contention that SFDC India had a role in price determination was also deemed without sufficient foundation, as standardized products were involved and any input from SFDC India would not render it a dependent PE. The revenue model providing a margin to SFDC India and the indemnification clause were not sufficient to establish a PE. The Court noted that the AO had not returned any findings indicating a PE or providing sufficient grounds to substantiate such an assumption. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the AO to issue a certificate under Section 197(1) for nil withholding tax, clarifying that this decision was confined to the issuance of the certificate and would not preclude the AO from examining and framing an assessment in accordance with law.

The High Court held that the Tribunal erred in its approach for AY 2014-15. While the Tribunal correctly followed its previous decision for AY 2012-13, it failed to consider the DRP's subsequent and contradictory finding dated June 14, 2017, pertaining specifically to AY 2014-15. This DRP order had concluded that the three contracts with TATA STEEL Jamshedpur were interwoven, linked, and interdependent, forming a single composite contract, which implied the existence of a PE. The Court found that the Tribunal's decision for AY 2014-15 was based solely on the DRP's view for AY 2012-13, ignoring the more relevant DRP finding for AY 2014-15. Consequently, ITA 446/2023 (AY 2014-15) was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, bearing in mind the DRP's order dated June 14, 2017. For ITA 542/2023 (AY 2012-13), where the DRP's view favored the assessee, the appeal was dismissed.

The High Court held that the Tribunal erred in relying solely on the AY 2012-13 DRP decision for AY 2014-15, ignoring the contrary findings for the latter year. The matter for AY 2014-15 was remitted for fresh consideration.

The Delhi High Court took on record the statements made by the learned counsel for the revenue. The revenue assured that the order under Section 244A(1A) of the Act in respect of AY 2017-18 has been passed and similar orders would be passed in respect of other AYs within a period of two weeks from the date of the order. Furthermore, the revenue stated that refunds would be made in respect of AY 2018-19 and 2021-22 within the same two-week period. Based on these assurances, the applications filed by the petitioner were disposed of. The court did not explicitly decide on the merits of the claims but relied on the statements of the parties for resolution. The ratio decidendi is that when the revenue makes specific assurances regarding compliance with statutory provisions and court directions within a stipulated timeframe, the court may dispose of the matter based on those assurances.

The High Court took on record the statements made by both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue. The petitioner's counsel stated that while refunds and interest under Section 244A(1) have been granted for AYs 2017-18, 2018-19, 2020-21, and 2021-22, the benefit of Section 244A(1A) was not universally applied. The Revenue's counsel confirmed that an order under Section 244A(1A) for AY 2017-18 had been passed and assured that similar orders for other AYs and the refunds for AY 2018-19 and 2021-22 would be processed within two weeks. Based on these assurances, the Court disposed of the pending applications.

The High Court held that the services rendered by the assessee did not fall within the purview of managerial, consultancy, or technical services as they did not involve a transfer of technical skills or knowledge that would be 'made available' to the recipient. The court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

The Tribunal was justified in annulling the assessment as the seized provisional Balance Sheet, dated September 30, 2005, could not be considered incriminating or relevant to the assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06.

The High Court held that the services rendered by the assessee did not fall within the purview of managerial, consultancy, or technical services as they did not involve a transfer of technical skills or knowledge that would be 'made available' to the recipient. The court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

The High Court held that the services rendered by the assessee did not fall within the purview of managerial, consultancy, or technical services as they did not involve a transfer of technical skills or knowledge that would be 'made available' to the recipient. The court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

The High Court held that the services rendered by the assessee did not fall within the purview of managerial, consultancy, or technical services as they did not involve a transfer of technical skills or knowledge that would be 'made available' to the recipient. The court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

The High Court held that the services rendered by the assessee did not fall within the purview of managerial, consultancy, or technical services as they did not involve a transfer of technical skills or knowledge that would be 'made available' to the recipient. The court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

The High Court held that the services rendered by the assessee did not fall within the purview of managerial, consultancy, or technical services as they did not involve a transfer of technical skills or knowledge that would be 'made available' to the recipient. The court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

The High Court held that the services rendered by the assessee did not fall within the purview of managerial, consultancy, or technical services as they did not involve a transfer of technical skills or knowledge that would be 'made available' to the recipient. The court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's decision.

The High Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notices issued under Section 148. The Court held that the reassessment action was based solely on past surveys conducted in 2007 and 2019, and there was a failure on the part of the Assessing Officer (AO) to record any finding on how the material gathered in those surveys would impact the assessment of income for the years in question. The Court reiterated its observation in Grid Solutions OY that PE is a fact-specific issue and facts gathered in a survey cannot be mechanically adopted for an unconnected assessment year. The AO also failed to record any satisfaction that the facts gathered in past surveys were, on a prima facie evaluation, found to exist in the assessment years under review. The Court found the reliance on Raymond Wollen Mills misplaced, as the decision was founded on specific facts of undervaluation of inventories and understatement of profits "during the year," which was not the case here. The Court concluded that the purported belief of the AO was merely a suspicion, not a belief based on reasons. Therefore, the reassessment action was liable to be set aside.