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955 orders · Page 11 of 20
The High Court held that the issue was covered by its previous decisions in similar cases involving the same assessee and the same legal proposition. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) has the power under Section 263 to direct the AO to conduct fresh assessment proceedings after proper inquiries if the original assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The time limit for assessment under Section 153(6) is extended when an order under Section 263 is passed.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court noted that the Supreme Court had dismissed appeals on similar grounds, holding that assessments under Section 153C are invalid without incriminating material. Since no incriminating material was found, the assessments would not stand.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 28.02.2025, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2017-18, is barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the six-year period from the end of AY 2017-18 expired on 31.03.2024. As the notice was issued after this date, it contravened the time limits prescribed under Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime, as interpreted in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal. The Court noted that the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime limits the retrospective operation of the ten-year period to protect assessees. The respondent's counsel concurred with this view. Consequently, the impugned notice was set aside, and the petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the judgment dated 13.05.2025 needed to be modified to accurately reflect the appearance of the counsels for the respondent. The court found merit in the application seeking modification. The reasoning was based on ensuring the record accurately reflects the proceedings. The court ordered that the judgment dated 13.05.2025 be modified to the extent of recording the presence of Mr. Ajay Vohra, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Gaurav Jain and Mr. Shubham Gupta, Advocates, who appeared in ITA 782/2023. No specific tax-related issues were decided, as this order only pertains to a procedural modification.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The Tribunal held that since the group company AMPPL had disclosed and paid tax on the inflated purchases which generated the cash used for unsecured loans, the amount should not be taxed again in the assessee's hands. The court agreed that the source of the unsecured loans was explained by AMPPL's disclosure and the funds were already taxed.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 28.02.2025, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2016-17, was barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the period of six years from the end of AY 2016-17 expired on 31.03.2023. As the impugned notice was issued after this date, it contravened the provisions of Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal. The Court noted that the respondent's counsel concurred with this view. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned notice and allowed the petition. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the arbitrator's mandate had not expired and that the awarded interest rate was reasonable and within the scope of arbitral review. The court found no illegality or perversity in the award.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the law clarified by the Supreme Court in Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT would apply prospectively. Therefore, assessments made prior to that ruling, where Section 142(2A) directions were invalid, would not be automatically quashed due to limitation, but the extended period of limitation under Explanation 1(iii) to Section 153(3) was not available. The court also found that the exclusion of time under Explanation (ix) to Section 153B was not applicable as the reference for exchange of information was not made in terms of the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
The High Court held that the ITAT erred in its premise that the assessment for AY 2006-07 had not abated. Since the assessment proceedings were pending and abated, the AO had the power to complete the assessment, and the absence of incriminating material did not invalidate it.
The High Court held that the time period for passing the assessment order had lapsed. Consequently, the return filed by the petitioner is required to be considered as accepted. The Court noted that this issue is covered by its previous decisions in Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd. v. Pr. CIT(LTU) New Delhi & Anr. and Aricent Technologies (Holdings) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. The Revenue was directed to process the petitioner's claim for refund in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within twelve weeks from the date of the order. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court held that the assessment proceedings for AY 2006-07 are indeed barred by limitation, as the time period for passing the assessment order has lapsed. The Court relied on its previous decisions in Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd. v. Pr. CIT(LTU) New Delhi & Anr. and Aricent Technologies (Holdings) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. The Court directed the Revenue to process the petitioner's claim for refund in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible, preferably within twelve weeks from the date of the order. The petition was disposed of in terms of this direction. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2016-17, dated 31.03.2024, is barred by limitation. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal, which clarified that a notice under the new regime cannot be issued if the time limit under the old regime has expired. In this case, the six-year period from the end of AY 2016-17 expired on 31.03.2023. Since the impugned notice was issued after this date, it is time-barred. Consequently, the Court set aside both the impugned notice and the assessment order dated 15.03.2025 passed under Section 147 of the Act. The ratio decidendi is that notices for reopening assessments must comply with the applicable limitation periods, and if the old regime's time limits have expired, new notices cannot be issued under the new regime if they are time-barred under the old regime's framework.
The High Court of Delhi, in its order dated May 8, 2025, condoned the delay in re-filing the appeals, ITA 135/2025 and ITA 136/2025, for the reasons stated in the applications. The applications seeking condonation of delay were disposed of. The court then directed that these appeals be listed on November 11, 2025, the same date on which a connected appeal, ITA 126/2025, is scheduled to be heard. No decision was made on the merits of the appeals themselves, as the proceedings were limited to procedural matters.
The High Court held that the tax effect should be computed strictly as per paragraph 5.1 of the CBDT circular, which does not contemplate including disallowed prior year losses for this purpose. Therefore, the tax effect was indeed below the threshold.
The Delhi High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, agreeing that the penalty notice was invalid due to vagueness. The court also noted that the issue of expenditure classification was debatable.
The High Court upheld the grant of ad-interim maintenance and its quantum, finding it reasonable. However, it modified the order regarding the payment date, holding that ad-interim maintenance is payable from the date of the order, not the date of filing the application.
The Delhi High Court held that the questions of law were covered by earlier decisions of the Court and previous judgments of the ITAT and CIT(A) in similar matters for earlier assessment years. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 31.08.2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2017-18, is barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year (AY 2017-18) expired on 31.03.2024. As the impugned notice was issued after this date, it contravenes the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal, which clarifies that notices under the new regime cannot be issued if the time limit under the old regime (specifically, the six-year period) has expired. The Court found that the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime limits its retrospective operation to protect assessees. Consequently, the impugned notice was set aside. The petition was allowed in these terms.
The High Court set aside the order striking off the appellants' defence, finding it impossible to produce the weeded-out documents. However, this was conditional on the appellants furnishing a bank guarantee or FDR to secure the respondents' shares.
The High Court dismissed the review petition. Regarding the first issue, the Court reiterated that the original writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the issue of the JAO's jurisdiction to issue a Section 148 notice under the faceless scheme was covered by the High Court's decision in T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Ward 25 (3) New Delhi. The Court noted that the notice in the writ petition was issued on July 16, 2024, limited to this jurisdictional question. Concerning the other two issues, the Court reproduced paragraphs from its earlier order dated July 16, 2024, which had already considered and rejected these contentions. The Court found that withdrawals of INR 1,87,95,000/- from the petitioner's HDFC bank account met the threshold of INR 50,00,000/- under Section 149(1)(b), and the Explanation to Section 149(1)(b) alludes to bank deposits as assets. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction could not be assailed on this ground. The Court also found no merit in the contention of a 'roving enquiry', stating that the AO's opportunity to the petitioner to produce evidence was preceded by a prima facie opinion duly recorded. As the petitioner had not availed any remedy against the July 16, 2024 order and no grounds for review were found, the review petition was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that no substantial question of law arose. The court also noted the low tax effect of the appeal, making it unsustainable.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated July 20, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2013-14 was beyond the period of limitation. The Court reasoned that while the initial notice was issued within the extended time limit granted by TOLA, the subsequent proceedings, including the exclusion of periods as per the Supreme Court's directions in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, and the time provided to the assessee to respond, pushed the effective date for the AO to pass an order under Section 148A(d) and issue a notice under Section 148 beyond the permissible period. The Court noted that the AO had only twenty-nine days of limitation left after the commencement of reassessment proceedings on June 1, 2021, and this period expired on July 12, 2022. Since the impugned notice was issued on July 20, 2022, it was beyond the period of limitation. The Court followed its own decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. The petition was allowed, and all proceedings were set aside.
The High Court heard arguments from both sides regarding whether a search was conducted in the assessee's case and which paragraph of the CBDT instructions applied. The court adjourned the hearing to allow the Revenue to take further instructions.