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The High Court found no infirmity in the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that since the beneficiaries were identified and taxed, the conduit company (assessee) could not be taxed for the same amounts, and no commission income was earned by the assessee.
The ITAT held that the services rendered did not involve the transfer of technology, know-how, or skill, and therefore did not meet the 'make available' test under Article 12(4) of the India-US DTAA. Consequently, the receipts were not taxable as FTS.
The High Court found no infirmity in the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that since the beneficiaries were identified and taxed, the conduit company (assessee) could not be taxed for the same amounts, and no commission income was earned by the assessee.
The High Court held that additions can be made based on documents found during search operations, including diaries, if they have a bearing on the assessee's income. The definition of 'books of account' is wide and can include diaries containing financial entries.
The High Court held that the notice dated 26.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto are quashed and set aside. The Court's decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754). The Court noted that paragraph 19(f) of the Rajeev Bansal decision explicitly states the Revenue's concession that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 must be dropped as they would not fall for completion within the period prescribed under TOLA. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. (decided on 02.04.2025), where the Supreme Court allowed appeals based on the same concession in Rajeev Bansal. The Court found that the controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. (2025:DHC:1892-DB). Consequently, the petition was allowed, and all proceedings were set aside.
The Delhi High Court held that the controversy in the petition is covered by its prior decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated that the liberty accorded by the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell to initiate reassessment proceedings, even in cases related to search where no incriminating material was found, was subject to the fulfillment of conditions mentioned in Sections 147/148 of the Act and compliance with the chapter pertaining to reassessment. The Court found the Revenue's contention that the time period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is not applicable, in the given facts, to be erroneous. The Supreme Court's observations in Abhisar Buildwell were intended to convey that the annulment of search assessments would not deprive the Revenue of its power to reassess, but such action must be in accordance with law and subject to statutory prescriptions, including the limitations under Section 149. Therefore, the impugned notice, which was beyond the period stipulated under Section 149, was set aside. The petition was allowed, and the pending applications were disposed of.
The Tribunal held that CAM charges are not rent under Section 194-I but are payments for services rendered for maintenance, falling under the definition of 'work' in Section 194-C. Therefore, the assessee was correct in deducting TDS under Section 194-C.
The Tribunal held that CAM charges are not rent under Section 194-I but are payments for services rendered for maintenance, falling under the definition of 'work' in Section 194-C. Therefore, the assessee was correct in deducting TDS under Section 194-C.
The Delhi High Court directed the concerned authorities to pass appeal effect orders and process the refund due to the petitioner along with applicable interest, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order. The Court noted the Revenue's concession that appeal effect orders were indeed required to be passed after the ITAT's decision. The primary issue was the delay in implementing the ITAT's order. The Court did not delve into the merits of the original assessment or the ITAT's decision, focusing solely on the procedural non-compliance of not passing the appeal effect order. The ratio decidendi is that statutory authorities must comply with appellate orders promptly and that courts will intervene through writs of mandamus to ensure such compliance and prevent undue hardship to taxpayers.
The Delhi High Court, in its order dated May 22, 2025, considered the applications for condonation of delay in filing and re-filing the appeal. For the reasons stated in those applications, the Court condoned the delays. The Court then issued notice of the appeal to the respondent, and the respondent's counsel accepted the notice. The appeal has been scheduled for further hearing on September 10, 2025. No decision on the merits of the appeal has been made at this stage.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 13.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings relating thereto, are required to be quashed and set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754), specifically paragraph 19(f), where the Revenue conceded that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion within the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also noted a similar decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.5177/2025), where the Supreme Court allowed appeals based on the same concession. The Court found that the controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own prior decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. The petition was allowed, and all proceedings were set aside.
The Delhi High Court held that the controversy was covered by its previous decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated that the observations in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Central-3 v. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. were not a carte blanche for the Revenue to override the restrictions in Section 149 of the Act. The Supreme Court's decision was intended to convey that the annulment of search assessments would not deprive the Revenue of its power to reassess, but such reassessment must independently comply with statutory prescriptions, including the conditions and time limits stipulated in Sections 147, 148, and 149 of the Act. Therefore, the contention that the time period under Section 149 of the Act is not applicable in the given facts was rejected as erroneous. The impugned notice was set aside.
The tribunal held that the wife's capability to earn does not disentitle her to maintenance if she is not actually earning. The court also considered the husband's income based on bank entries and ITRs, assessing his income to be Rs. 1,00,000 per month.
The High Court held that the ITAT and CIT(A) were correct in deleting the addition of ₹20,24,39,341/-. The AO erred by adding the net revenue from sales (sales less purchases) when this amount was already part of the declared income, leading to double taxation.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside all proceedings. The Court found that the initial notice under Section 148 for AY 2013-14 was issued on 27.06.2021, which was three days before the expiry of the limitation period extended by TOLA to 30.06.2021. Following the Supreme Court's directions in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal, this notice was treated as under Section 148A(b). The Court noted that the period from the issuance of the notice until 04.05.2022 (date of Ashish Agarwal judgment) and the time granted to the assessee to respond were to be excluded as per the fifth proviso to Section 149(1). The Court calculated that after the assessee's reply on 27.06.2022, the AO had only three days remaining to issue a notice under Section 148. However, the sixth proviso to Section 149(1) granted seven days in such cases, making the last date for issuing the notice 04.07.2022. Since the impugned notice was issued on 30.07.2022, it was beyond the extended period of limitation. The Court held that the controversy was covered by its own decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr.
The High Court held that the initiation of reassessment proceedings based solely on an audit objection, when the issue had already been examined and decided in the original assessment, is impermissible as it amounts to a review. The Court clarified that the purpose of an audit objection is not a command to issue a notice under Section 148A, but rather requires the AO to furnish the information to the assessee and consider their response before taking an informed decision. The expression 'escaped assessment' inherently means income that has not been subjected to assessment, not a case where the AO made an informed assessment. Furthermore, the Court found that the impugned notice was issued beyond the period of limitation. Following the decision in Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 19(1), Delhi & Ors.: 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2904, the Court held that by virtue of the first proviso of Section 149 of the Act, no notice could have been issued under Section 148 as no such notice could have been issued based on the reassessment provisions in force prior to 31.03.2021. The petition was allowed, and the impugned notice and further proceedings were set aside.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petitions and set aside the impugned notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that a plain reading of the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer (AO) indicated a lack of tangible material to form a belief that the Petitioners had a dependent PE or a Fixed Place PE in India during the relevant previous years. The Court noted that the question involved was covered in favour of the Petitioners by earlier decisions of the same court in similar cases, specifically citing Grid Solutions OY (Ltd.) v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and other related judgments. The ratio decidendi is that reassessment proceedings under Section 147 cannot be initiated based on a belief that is not supported by tangible material, especially when prior judicial pronouncements have established a similar lack of basis for such belief in comparable circumstances. The operative direction was to set aside the notices.
The High Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the Petitioner's contentions. Regarding the argument that the information was not verified, the Court noted that the Petitioner did not dispute entering into a transaction of purchase of goods from Sh. Shitij Malhotra. The Petitioner's admission of the transaction, coupled with Sh. Shitij Malhotra's admission that his entries were bogus, provided sufficient basis for the AO's conclusion. The Court found no merit in the contention that the information was only for AY 2016-17, as the STR Report indicated a similar fact pattern existed in FY 2017-18. The Court also rejected the argument that the AO lacked evidence, stating that the existence of an entry for purchase of goods amounting to ₹52,68,697/- in the Petitioner's books, which was admitted by Sh. Shitij Malhotra to be bogus, triggered the reassessment proceedings. The Petitioner's failure to provide evidence of goods transportation was also a significant factor.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court directed the respondents to pass an appeal effect order, if not already filed, and process any refund due to the petitioner, along with statutory interest under Section 244A of the Income Tax Act, in accordance with the law. If an appeal effect order had already been passed, the concerned authority was directed to ensure its implementation and process the refund with interest until the date of disbursal. The Court noted that the Revenue's counsel did not dispute the petitioner's entitlement to a refund if one was due, but lacked instructions on the status of the appeal effect order. The Court did not explicitly address the petitioner's prayer to restrain future adjustments, but the direction to process the refund implies that any such adjustments against a deleted/modified demand would be erroneous.
The High Court allowed the withdrawal of the appeal. It was clarified that all rights and contentions of the parties were reserved.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated July 22, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings relating thereto are required to be set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal, specifically paragraph 19(f), which stated that for assessment year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also noted the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors., where similar appeals were allowed based on this concession. The Court further referred to its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. as covering the controversy in favour of the petitioner. The ratio decidendi is that a concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court regarding the applicability of TOLA and the period of limitation for reassessment notices for specific assessment years is binding and must be followed by lower authorities and courts.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and quashed the notice dated 29.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all consequential proceedings. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754). Specifically, the Court noted paragraph 19(f) of the Rajeev Bansal judgment, wherein the Revenue conceded that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.5177/2025), which allowed appeals based on the same concession. The Court further noted that the controversy was covered by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. (Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:1892-DB).
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 22.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the proceedings relating thereto are required to be set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754). Specifically, paragraph 19(f) of that decision stated that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.5177/2025, decided on 02.04.2025), where similar concessions by the Revenue led to the allowance of appeals. The Court noted that the controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. (Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:1892-DB). Consequently, the petition was allowed, and all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice were set aside.
The High Court allowed the withdrawal of the present appeal. It was clarified that all rights and contentions of the parties were reserved.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated July 19, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Act, and all proceedings relating thereto, are liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court's reasoning was based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. The Court specifically referred to paragraph 19(f) of the Rajeev Bansal decision, where the Revenue conceded that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under TOLA. The Court also noted the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors., which allowed appeals based on this same concession. Therefore, the petition was allowed, and all initiated proceedings were set aside. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the impugned order and notices. The Court reasoned that the initial notice under Section 148, issued on 27.05.2021, was within the extended limitation period of 30.06.2021 due to TOLA. However, after being treated as a notice under Section 148A(b) and considering the exclusions mandated by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal (exclusion of period from notice issuance to 04.05.2022, time to provide material, and time for assessee's response), the final order under Section 148A(d) was passed beyond the permissible period. The Court calculated that the last day to issue the notice was 04.07.2022, whereas the impugned notice was issued on 27.07.2022. The Court found the controversy covered by its own decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. Consequently, all further proceedings pursuant to the notices and the reassessment order passed under Section 147 were set aside. The Court noted that an assessment order was passed despite a stay order.
The ITAT held that the Assessee's receipts were neither royalty nor FTS/FIS, as the services provided did not involve making technical knowledge available to the customers. The High Court found no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's fact-based conclusion.
The ITAT held that the Assessee's receipts were neither royalty nor FTS, as the services did not entail included services or make technical knowledge available. The High Court found no substantial question of law, agreeing that the ITAT's findings of fact were not perverse.
The High Court found no substantial question of law regarding the disallowance of business expenditure without revenue realization. However, it issued notice on the limited question of whether EDC was booked as an expenditure in the profit and loss account, referencing a recent contrary ruling.
The ITAT held that the Assessee's receipts were neither royalty nor FTS/FIS, as the services provided did not involve making technical knowledge available to the customers. The High Court found no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's fact-based conclusion.
The Court allowed the application, directing the bank to accept the identity of the Decree Holder despite minor abbreviation differences. This was based on the Decree Holder providing evidence like Income Tax Returns and the Judgment Debtors having no objection.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the impugned notices and the order passed under Section 148A(d), as well as any further proceedings undertaken by the Revenue pursuant to these. The Court reasoned that the initial notice under Section 148, issued on 29.06.2021, was one day before the extended limitation period expired. Following the Supreme Court's directions in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal, this notice was treated as a Section 148A(b) notice. The Court applied the exclusion periods stipulated in the fifth and third provisos to Section 149(1) of the Act, including the period from the issuance of the notice until 04.05.2022 (the date of the Ashish Agarwal judgment) and the time granted to the assessee to respond. The Court noted that after the assessee's response on 09.06.2022, the AO had only seven days to issue a notice under Section 148 as per the sixth proviso to Section 149(1), making the last day for issuance 16.06.2022. Since the impugned order under Section 148A(d) was passed on 26.07.2022, it was beyond the permissible period. The Court relied on its own decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr.
The High Court of Delhi disposed of the present appeal on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant/Revenue. The Revenue stated that the tax effect in the appeal was below the threshold limit of ₹2 crores as per the CBDT Circular dated 17.09.2024. Consequently, the Court found no reason to proceed with the appeal on merits. The pending applications were also disposed of. The principle derived is that appeals filed by the Revenue that do not meet the prescribed monetary threshold, as per CBDT circulars, are liable to be disposed of without adjudication on the substantive issues.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted that the Revenue, while presenting a screenshot of the ITBA Portal showing remarks about an adjournment to 22.08.2024, did not controvert the petitioner's claim that these remarks were not communicated to them. The learned counsel for the Revenue stated, on instructions, that due to a technical glitch, these remarks were not visible to the petitioner on its portal. Consequently, the Court found merit in the petitioner's grievance regarding the lack of proper communication and opportunity. The impugned order dated 29.08.2024 passed under Section 148A(d) was set aside. The notice under Section 148 and the consequential proceedings were also quashed. The petitioner was granted two weeks from the date of the order to respond to the notice dated 09.08.2024 issued under Section 148A(b), and the Assessing Officer was directed to consider the response and pass an appropriate order. The ratio decidendi is that a procedural defect, such as a technical glitch preventing communication of an adjournment to the assessee, can vitiate the subsequent order if it deprives the assessee of a fair opportunity to be heard.
The High Court noted that the Supreme Court had already held that assessments under Section 153C are unsustainable without incriminating material. Therefore, the appeals were disposed of with liberty to the Revenue to revive them if the Supreme Court's findings are clarified or recalled.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice. The Court found that the controversy was covered in favour of the assessee by its own decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. The reasoning followed the assessee's arguments regarding the computation of the limitation period. The initial notice under Section 148, deemed to be under Section 148A(b), was issued on the last day of the extended limitation period (30.06.2021). The Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal directed that the period from the notice issuance until 04.05.2022, and the time provided for the assessee's response, should be excluded from the limitation period for issuing a notice under Section 148. This exclusion meant that the AO had only seven days, as per the sixth proviso to Section 149(1), to issue the notice under Section 148 after the assessee's reply. This period expired on 04.06.2022. As the impugned notice was issued on 30.06.2022, it was beyond the permissible time limit. The operative direction was to set aside the notice and all consequential proceedings.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 29.06.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all subsequent proceedings are liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal, specifically paragraph 19(f), which stated that for AY 2015-16, notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion within the period prescribed under TOLA. The Court also noted the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors., which followed the same concession. The Court found that the controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. The petition was accordingly allowed, and all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice were set aside. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court allowed the Revenue's appeal and restored the assessee's appeal to the ITAT. The ITAT is now directed to decide the matter on its merits, as the assessee waived the procedural objection.
The assessee, on instructions, conceded the issue regarding the DRP directions not bearing an identification number. Consequently, the High Court allowed the Revenue's appeal and restored the assessee's appeal to the ITAT for decision on merits.
The High Court found no substantial questions of law, as the issue was covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence (P) Ltd. v. CIT. The Revenue's counsel could not controvert this.
The Delhi High Court admitted the appeals for hearing. The court framed a specific question of law regarding the initiation of reassessment proceedings after annulment of assessment proceedings.
The High Court noted that the Supreme Court decision in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence (P) Ltd. v. CIT likely covers the issue in favor of the assessee. Therefore, substantial questions of law do not appear to arise.
The High Court held that the question of whether the decision in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Central-3 v. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. constitutes a finding or direction for issuing notices under Section 148 beyond the period stipulated under Section 149 of the Act is no longer res integra. The Court referred to its own decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors., which had rejected a similar contention. The Court reiterated that the liberty granted by the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell to initiate reassessment proceedings was subject to the fulfillment of conditions mentioned in Sections 147/148 and compliance with the chapter pertaining to reassessment. The observations of the Supreme Court were not a carte blanche to override the restrictions in Section 149. Therefore, the contention that the time period under Section 149 is not applicable was rejected as erroneous. The petition was allowed, and the impugned notice was set aside.
The Tribunal held that income from sublicensing of standardized software products is not taxable in India if the assessee does not have a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India. This decision aligns with Supreme Court precedent.
The Tribunal held that income from sublicensing of standardized products is not taxable in India if the assessee has no Permanent Establishment (PE) in India. This decision aligns with Supreme Court rulings.
The High Court held that the issue was covered by its previous decisions in similar cases involving the same assessee and the same legal proposition. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated 30.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2017-18 is invalid. The Court reasoned that Section 151 of the Act, as amended, clearly specifies the authority whose approval is mandatory for issuing a notice under Section 148. Specifically, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, the approval must be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Director General. In this case, more than three years had elapsed from the end of AY 2017-18, and the notice was not issued with the approval of the authority specified in Section 151(ii). The Court reiterated its consistent view in several previous decisions, including Twylight Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Ward 25 3 Delhi & Ors. and Abhinav Jindal HUF v. Income Tax Officer Ward 54(1) Delhi & Ors., that the Time Limitation Act (TOLA) does not alter the distribution of powers for sanction and approval under Section 151. Consequently, the impugned notice and all proceedings initiated pursuant to it were quashed. The Revenue was granted liberty to commence reassessment proceedings afresh, if deemed necessary, as per law.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 02.05.2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2016-17, is barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the period of six years from the end of AY 2016-17 expired on 31.03.2023. Since the notice was issued after this date, it falls outside the permissible time limit. This conclusion was supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal, which clarified that a notice under the new regime cannot be issued if the time limit under the old regime (specifically, the six-year period under Section 149(1)(b)) has expired. The Court noted that the respondent's counsel concurred with this view. Consequently, the impugned notice was set aside, and the petition was allowed. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated 29.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is liable to be set aside on the ground that it was not issued with the prior approval of the specified authority under Section 151(ii) of the Act. The Court reiterated its consistent view, as expressed in cases like Twylight Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Abhinav Jindal HUF, that the specified authority for granting approval under Section 151 for issuing a notice under Section 148 depends on whether more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. In this case, since more than three years had elapsed, the approval ought to have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General, or Chief Commissioner or Director General, as stipulated in Section 151(ii). The approval obtained was from authorities specified in clause (i), which is applicable only when three years or less have elapsed. Consequently, the impugned notice and the proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were quashed. The Revenue was granted liberty to take steps afresh, if deemed necessary, as per law.
The High Court found no infirmity with the ITAT's decision. It held that if the Assessing Officer relied on verifiable information pointing to tax evasion (paragraph 1(vi) of Instruction No. 5/2017), prior approval was mandatory, which was admittedly not obtained.