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955 orders · Page 9 of 20
The High Court held that the proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice dated 28.07.2022 are required to be set aside. This decision is based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754). Specifically, paragraph 19(f) of that judgment records the Revenue's concession that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, will have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under TOLA. The Court also noted the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.5177/2025), which allowed appeals based on the same concession. Consequently, the impugned notice dated 28.07.2022 under Section 148 of the Act was quashed and set aside, and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were also set aside. The controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by the High Court's own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr.
The High Court of Delhi considered the applications filed by the appellant, Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-7, for exemption and condonation of delay in re-filing the appeals ITA 188/2025 and ITA 191/2025. The court allowed the exemptions, subject to all just exceptions, and disposed of the exemption applications. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in the applications, the court condoned the delay in re-filing the appeals and disposed of those applications. The court then issued notice to the respondent, Suzuki Motorcycle India Pvt Ltd, making it returnable on September 23, 2025. No decision was made on the merits of the substantive appeals, as the focus was on procedural matters.
The High Court has not yet delivered a final decision on the merits of the appeal. The matter has been adjourned to allow the Revenue to refer to relevant Supreme Court decisions.
The High Court held that the Special Committee's order rejecting NCM International's claim was beyond its jurisdiction as its mandate had not been extended. The court also found no merit in arguments regarding the invocation of specific regulations and rules for winding up.
The High Court has not made any decision on the merits of the appeal. The order primarily deals with procedural matters. The Court has granted exemption for certain applications and condoned the delay in re-filing the appeal. The appeal has been listed for a future hearing date, indicating that the substantive issues of the case have yet to be addressed. Therefore, no findings, reasoning, ratio decidendi, or operative directions have been provided in this excerpt.
The High Court allowed the applications for exemption, subject to all just exceptions, and disposed of them. Subsequently, the court condoned the delay in re-filing the appeals, accepting the reasons provided in the applications, and disposed of those applications. Following these procedural orders, the High Court issued notice to the respondent, Suzuki Motorcycle India Pvt Ltd, directing them to appear on September 23, 2025. The court did not delve into the merits of the appeals themselves, as the proceedings were at the stage of admitting the appeals and setting a date for the respondent's appearance. Therefore, no findings on the substantive tax disputes were made.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue was concluded against the assessee by its prior decision in Puri Construction (P.) Ltd. v. Additional CIT. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2014-15 is set aside. The Court found that the information received from the Investigation Wing and the statement of Mr. Anil Kedia were general in nature and did not point towards the petitioner's involvement in any arrangement for providing accommodation entries or generating bogus short-term capital loss. The Court noted that while the AO concluded that the petitioner created bogus short-term capital loss by trading in shares of IISL and SRK, this conclusion was based on suspicion arising from the fact that these were penny stocks. However, the Court emphasized that this general information lacked specific material regarding the petitioner's income escaping assessment and did not establish a live nexus to the petitioner's alleged involvement. Relying on the principles laid down in CNB FINWIZ LTD. v. DCIT and ITO & Ors. v. Lakhmani Mewal Das, the Court held that the "reason to believe" cannot be conflated with "reason to suspect." As there was no tangible material to form a "reason to believe" that the petitioner's income had escaped assessment, the reopening was not justified. The appeal was allowed.
The High Court noted that the controversy centered on the application of Section 149(1)(c) of the Act, introduced by the Finance Act, 2012, which extended the period for re-opening assessments to sixteen years for income escaping assessment related to assets outside India. The Assessee argued this provision should not apply if the limitation had already expired, while the Revenue contended for retrospective application. The Court referred to the Explanation added to Section 149 by the Finance Act, 2012, clarifying that the amended provisions would apply to "any assessment year" beginning on or before April 1, 2012. Similarly, Explanation 4 to Section 147, also added by the Finance Act, 2012, stated that the amended provisions would apply to any assessment year beginning on or before April 1, 2012. The Court observed that a previous decision in Brahm Datt v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax & Others did not consider these explanations or the legislative intent behind the amendments as evidenced by the Notes on Clauses of the Finance Bill, 2012. Consequently, the Court expressed doubt regarding the correctness of the Brahm Datt decision and directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice to constitute a larger bench for reconsideration.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 23.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Act, along with all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, are quashed and set aside. The Court's reasoning was based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754). Specifically, paragraph 19(f) of that judgment recorded the Revenue's concession that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under TOLA. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.5177/2025), where the Supreme Court allowed appeals based on this same concession. The Court noted that the controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. The operative direction was to quash the notice and set aside all proceedings. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the issue was concluded against the assessee by a previous decision of the same court. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The Delhi High Court took the submissions of the counsels on record. For the Revenue/applicant, Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Special Counsel for the Income Tax Department, along with Mr. Sanjeev Menon, Jr. Standing Counsel, submitted that they, along with Mr. Indruj Singh Rai and Mr. Rahul Singh, Jr. Standing Counsel, had appeared for the respondents before the Court on 29.05.2025. The Court accepted these submissions. Similarly, Ms. Tara Elizabeth Kurien, Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that Mr. Abishek Jebaraj, Advocate, had appeared on behalf of the petitioner on the same date. The Court took this submission on record as well. The application was disposed of with the clarification that when the certified copy of the order dated 29.05.2025 is issued, a copy of this order shall also be issued. The core decision was to acknowledge and record the correct appearances as submitted by the respective counsels.
The High Court agreed with the ITAT's conclusion that the payments received by the Assessee were not in the nature of royalties or fees for included services. The Court found that the Assessee's customers did not acquire any right to use the infrastructure or software for commercial exploitation, and the charges were for availing services, not for using equipment or intellectual property.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the impugned order and notice. The Court found merit in the petitioner's contention that the impugned notice was issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 149(1)(a) of the Act. The Court also held that the conditions for attracting the provisions of Section 149(1)(b) were not satisfied. The reasoning was that the AO's assumption that purchase consideration paid through banking channels was received back in cash was ex facie erroneous. The Court noted that the purchase consideration of ₹9,08,887/- was paid through banking channels and reflected in the prior period (FY 2011-12 for AY 2012-13). Even if the purchase consideration was not paid, there was no material to indicate that such a transaction occurred in FY 2012-13 (AY 2013-14). The only transaction in the relevant previous year was the sale of shares. Therefore, the only income that could have escaped assessment was the net LTCG of ₹42,97,299/-, which was below the ₹50.00 Lacs threshold for Section 149(1)(b). The ratio decidendi is that for reassessment proceedings under Section 148A/148, the AO must demonstrate that the alleged escaped income exceeds the specified threshold, and the limitation period must be strictly adhered to, with assumptions about cash refunds not substituting for concrete evidence.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice and proceedings. The Court noted that the satisfaction note for AY 2014-15 was recorded on 27.08.2024. Citing the decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd., the Court reiterated that the ten-year block period for reassessment under Section 153A/153C is to be reckoned from the end of the AY relevant to the financial year in which the search was conducted. In this case, the search occurred in FY 2021-22, making AY 2022-23 the relevant AY. The ten-year block period, computed backward from the end of AY 2022-23 (i.e., 31.03.2023), includes AYs from 2013-14 to 2022-23. The Assessee's tabular statement, which was accepted by the Court, clearly showed that AY 2014-15 falls beyond this ten-year block period. Therefore, the AO could not proceed with the assessment for AY 2014-15 as it was barred by limitation. The operative direction was to set aside the notice and proceedings.
The High Court of Delhi, comprising Justices Vibhu Bakhru and Tejas Karia, held that the delay in filing the appeal by Rockwell Automation India Pvt. Ltd. should be condoned. The court granted the exemption application and disposed of the application for condonation of delay. The reasoning for condoning the delay is based on the reasons stated in the application, which were found to be satisfactory by the court. The court has issued notice to the respondent, indicating that the appeal will proceed to be heard on merits on a future date. No decision has been made on the substantive grounds of the appeal, as this order is solely concerned with the procedural aspect of condoning the delay.
The High Court of Delhi, in its order dated May 29, 2025, decided to condone the delay in re-filing the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS)-1, New Delhi. The Court found the reasons stated in the Appellant's application for condonation of delay to be sufficient. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was disposed of. The appeal itself (ITA 183/2025) was then re-listed for further hearing on July 23, 2025. No decision on the substantive merits of the appeal has been made at this stage.
The High Court of Delhi condoned the delay in re-filing the appeal by the appellant (Revenue) for the reasons stated in the application. The application for condonation of delay was disposed of. The appeal itself (ITA 182/2025) was re-listed for further hearing on 16.07.2025. No decision on the merits of the appeal was made at this stage, as the hearing was only for procedural matters and to set a future date for substantive arguments. The High Court did not decide any substantive issue of income tax law or fact, nor did it provide any ratio decidendi for future citation. The operative direction was to re-list the matter.
The High Court held that the assessee had discharged its onus by explaining the identity, capacity, and genuineness of the loan transaction. The court found that any doubts regarding the source of funds in the director's account were irrelevant to the assessee's explanation of the loan.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 28.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto are liable to be quashed and set aside. This decision is based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. The Court referred to paragraph 19(f) of the Rajeev Bansal judgment, wherein the Revenue conceded that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also noted the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors., which allowed appeals based on this concession. The Court found the present controversy covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. The petition was accordingly allowed, and all proceedings were set aside.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice and order. The Court reasoned that the initial notice under Section 148, issued on 23.06.2021, was seven days before the extended limitation period of 30.06.2021 expired. However, after considering the directions in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal and the exclusions under the fifth proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act, including the period from the notice issuance until 04.05.2022 and the time granted for the Assessee's reply (until 18.06.2022), the last day for the AO to issue a notice was calculated as 25.06.2022 (seven days after the Assessee's reply). Since the impugned notice was issued on 29.07.2022, it was beyond the permissible time limit. The Court noted that the controversy was covered by its earlier decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. The operative direction was to set aside the proceedings.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated 19.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Act and the proceedings relating thereto are required to be quashed and set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754), specifically paragraph 19(f), wherein the Revenue conceded that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.5177/2025, decided on 02.04.2025), which allowed appeals based on the same concession. The Court noted that the controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. (Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:1892-DB). The petition was accordingly allowed, and all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice were set aside.
The High Court of Delhi considered the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The Court granted the liberty sought by the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. Any pending applications associated with the appeal were also disposed of. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The ratio of this decision would be that an appellant has the right to withdraw their appeal at any stage, and the court will typically grant such a request.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice and order. The Court reasoned that the initial notice under Section 148, deemed to be under Section 148A(b) by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal, was issued five days before the expiry of the limitation period (25.06.2021, with the original period expiring on 31.03.2021, extended to 30.06.2021 by TOLA). The Court applied the fifth proviso to Section 149(1) of the Act, which mandates exclusion of the period from the notice's issuance until 04.05.2022 (date of Ashish Agarwal judgment), and the time granted to the assessee to respond. It further considered the sixth proviso to Section 149(1), which grants seven days for the AO to issue notice under Section 148 if the remaining period is less than seven days after the assessee's reply. Calculating these exclusions, the last day for issuing the notice was determined to be 21.06.2022. Since the impugned notice was issued on 29.07.2022, it was beyond the permissible time limit. The Court noted that the controversy was covered by its earlier decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside all proceedings. The Court reasoned that the initial notice under Section 148, deemed a notice under Section 148A(b), was issued four days before the expiry of the limitation period. After accounting for exclusions as per the fifth proviso to Section 149(1) (period from notice issuance to the Ashish Agarwal decision, and time granted to the assessee to reply), and considering the sixth proviso to Section 149(1) which grants seven days for the AO to issue notice if less than seven days are available after the assessee's reply, the last day to issue notice was 14.06.2022. The impugned notice dated 31.07.2022 was therefore issued beyond this extended period. The Court noted that this controversy was covered in favour of the Assessee by its own decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. Consequently, all proceedings were quashed.
The High Court disposed of the appeals as the respondent had opted for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The Revenue was granted liberty to revive the appeals if the disputes were not settled under the scheme.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned order and notice were issued beyond the period of limitation. The Court reasoned that the initial notice under Section 148, deemed to be under Section 148A(b) as per the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal, was issued on the last day of the extended limitation period (30.06.2021). The Court applied the principle from Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, stating that the period from the notice issuance until 04.05.2022, and the time provided to the Assessee to respond, must be excluded from the limitation period under the fifth proviso to Section 149(1). Furthermore, the sixth proviso to Section 149(1) mandates seven days for the AO to issue notice after the Assessee's reply. Since the Assessee replied on 08.06.2022, the AO had until 16.06.2022 to issue the notice. As the impugned notice was issued on 22.07.2022, it was beyond the statutory time limit. The Court found the controversy covered by its own decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income-Tax Officer and Anr. The petition was allowed, and all proceedings were set aside.
The High Court held that the date of issuance of the notice is crucial for determining the rights of the parties and must be ascertained based on the precise steps for issuance. Citing its own decision in Suman Jeet Agarwal v. Income Tax Officer and Ors., the Court stated that for electronically sent notices, the date of dispatch of the email is considered the date of issue. Therefore, the notice dated 31.03.2021 was to be taken as issued on 01.04.2021. Consequently, the Court found that this notice was required to be treated as a notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act, in terms of the Supreme Court's directions in Union of India and Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal. The Court reasoned that a Section 148 notice is jurisdictional, and if invalid, vitiates proceedings. However, subsequent steps taken by the Revenue in conformity with the Supreme Court and High Court decisions, even if based on an initial misconception, would not invalidate those steps. The Court concluded that the petitioner's challenge could not be sustained.
The High Court disposed of the appeals as the respondent had opted for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The Revenue was granted liberty to revive the appeals if the disputes were not settled under the scheme.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 29.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, are quashed and set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754), particularly paragraph 19(f). This concession stated that for Assessment Year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion within the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors., which allowed appeals based on the same concession. The Court found the controversy covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. The petition was accordingly allowed, and all proceedings set aside.
The High Court, while acknowledging that the petitioner's challenge to the Section 148 notice appeared prima facie merited and was covered by a previous decision of the Court in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr., did not decide the issue on merits. Instead, considering the peculiar facts and the pending appeal before the CIT(A), the Court disposed of the writ petition with liberty to the petitioner to raise the objection regarding the Section 148 notice before the CIT(A). The Court directed the CIT(A) to consider such an application, if filed within two weeks, expeditiously and within eight weeks of its filing. No decision was made on the validity of the Section 148 notice itself.
The High Court held that the proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice dated 28.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Act are required to be set aside. This decision is based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. The Supreme Court, in that case, conceded that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under TOLA. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors., which allowed appeals based on the same concession. Consequently, the notice dated 28.07.2022 under Section 148 of the Act was quashed and set aside. The Court noted that this controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. The petition was allowed, and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were set aside.
The Delhi High Court held that the proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice dated 27.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2015-16 are liable to be set aside. This decision is based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. The Court noted that paragraph 19(f) of the Rajeev Bansal judgment explicitly states the Revenue's concession that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 will have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors., which allowed appeals based on this same concession. Consequently, the notice dated 27.07.2022 and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were quashed and set aside. The Court found the controversy covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 30.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto are required to be quashed and set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754), specifically paragraph 19(f). This concession stated that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after 1st April 2021 would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also noted a similar decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.5177/2025, decided on 02.04.2025), where the Supreme Court allowed appeals based on the same concession. The Court further referenced its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. The petition was accordingly allowed, and all proceedings were set aside.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the appeals as the respondent has opted for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. Liberty was granted to the Revenue to revive the appeals if the disputes are not settled under the scheme.
The High Court found no reason to interfere with the Family Court's order, noting that the appellant's income was substantial and that they could seek modification of the order later. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court relied on its earlier decisions in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Ors. and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax- Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The Court reiterated that for searches conducted after 31.03.2021, the reassessment action must satisfy the foundational tests specified in the First Proviso to Section 149(1), which requires considering the timeframes as they stood prior to the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021, including those under Sections 149, 153A, and 153C. The Court applied the principle that for the purpose of Section 153C, the commencement date for computing the six or ten-year block is the date of receipt of books of accounts by the jurisdictional AO. In this case, the block of ten assessment years was reckoned from the end of AY 2025-26, making AY 2014-15 barred by limitation. The revenue's counsel concurred with this proposition.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal and the delay in re-filing the appeal based on the reasons provided in the applications. The Court also granted the Revenue's request for an adjournment to enable them to file the pending documents on record. The matter was adjourned to a future date for further hearing. No decision was made on the substantive issues of the appeal as the hearing was adjourned. The specific amount in dispute and the assessment year(s) are not recorded in this order.
The High Court allowed the petition. It directed the Revenue to correct its records and reflect the TDS deposited by the buyers to the petitioner's credit, even though it was filed under Form 26QB. The correction was to be effective from the date the amount was deposited. The Court further directed the Revenue to compute any refund due to the petitioner in accordance with the law. All orders and communications not in conformity with these directions were deemed set aside. The Court found that the demand raised by the AO was ex facie erroneous as it was on account of non-deposit of TDS, when in fact, the TDS was deducted and deposited by the deductor. The sole ground for denying credit was the erroneous form used by the deductor. The Court noted that the Revenue's inability to correct the error was due to procedural hurdles requiring buyer consent, which the Court found unnecessary for rectifying the petitioner's credit. The Court emphasized that the TDS was deposited, and the issue was merely one of accounting and credit.
The High Court held that the petitioner failed to prove his defence that the loan was not disbursed and that the cheque was only for security. The court also found that the bank return memo and legal notice were sufficiently proved and served.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 30.06.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings relating thereto are liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal, specifically paragraph 19(f), which stated that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors., where similar concessions led to the allowance of appeals. The Court noted that the controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and all proceedings were set aside.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition, holding that the impugned notice dated 31.08.2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for reopening the assessment for AY 2015-16, was barred by limitation. The Court relied on its previous judgments in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax- Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. These decisions clarified that for the purpose of computing the limitation period for reopening assessments, particularly in search-related cases governed by Sections 153A and 153C, the starting point for reckoning the block of years is crucial. The Court emphasized that the First Proviso to Section 153C introduces a legal fiction where the commencement date for computing the six or ten-year block is deemed to be the date of receipt of books of accounts by the jurisdictional AO. In this case, the block of ten assessment years was reckoned from AY 2025-26, being the AY relevant to the financial year in which the impugned notice was issued. Consequently, AY 2015-16 fell outside this permissible period. The impugned notice was set aside as being time-barred.
The High Court found no infirmity in the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that since the beneficiaries were identified and taxed, the conduit company (assessee) could not be taxed for the same amounts, and no commission income was earned by the assessee.
The High Court found no infirmity in the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that since the beneficiaries were identified and taxed, the conduit company (assessee) could not be taxed for the same amounts, and no commission income was earned by the assessee.
The High Court found no infirmity in the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that since the beneficiaries were identified and taxed, the conduit company (assessee) could not be taxed for the same amounts, and no commission income was earned by the assessee.
The High Court found no infirmity in the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that since the beneficiaries were identified and taxed, the conduit company (assessee) could not be taxed for the same amounts, and no commission income was earned by the assessee.
The High Court found no infirmity in the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that since the beneficiaries were identified and taxed, the conduit company (assessee) could not be taxed for the same amounts, and no commission income was earned by the assessee.
The High Court found no infirmity in the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that since the beneficiaries were identified and taxed, the conduit company (assessee) could not be taxed for the same amounts, and no commission income was earned by the assessee.
The Tribunal considered the application filed by the appellant seeking to withdraw the captioned appeal. The application was allowed. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. Any pending applications, if any, were also disposed of. The hearing scheduled for 04.08.2025 was cancelled. The principle derived is that an appellant has the right to withdraw their appeal, and upon allowing such an application, the appeal is dismissed as withdrawn without adjudication on merits.