Delhi High Court Judgments — 2017

The Tribunal held that for proceedings under Section 153C to be initiated, seized documents must 'belong' to the assessee, not merely 'pertain' to them. This position was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and the amendment to Section 153C with prospective effect does not apply.

The High Court held that the interim award was contrary to Clause 29 of the agreement, which allowed the respondent to withhold payments due to counter-claims. Therefore, the interim award was rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge.

The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Government, holding them responsible for the deaths due to negligence. It also computed enhanced compensation for the victims' families based on a specific formula, considering income and age.

The High Court held that the PCIT erred in exercising jurisdiction under Section 263 without conducting a proper inquiry. The PCIT's reliance solely on a CBDT circular without independent verification was insufficient to deem the AO's order erroneous and prejudicial.

The High Court determined that the market value of the acquired land should be Rs. 2,07,500 per Bigha. This enhanced compensation was to be applied uniformly to all similarly acquired land in the four villages mentioned, including those who had not initially applied for enhanced compensation.

The Tribunal held that the expenditure was incurred to defend the title over land already acquired and was therefore revenue expenditure, not capital expenditure. The High Court agreed with the ITAT's decision.

The High Court, after perusing the impugned order of the ITAT, was of the view that no substantial question of law arises from the ITAT's order in the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed. The Court noted that the question of law is left open to be urged in an appropriate case. The specific reasoning of the ITAT for excluding comparables or the method applied is not detailed in this High Court order, but the High Court found no substantial question of law warranting its interference. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal.

The High Court noted that the explanation offered by the Assessee regarding repayment to the creditors in subsequent years was accepted by the Revenue. Consequently, the Court stated it was not inclined to examine the question as urged by the Revenue. However, the Court explicitly left the question open for consideration in an appropriate case. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals and pending applications.

The High Court, in view of its order passed on the same day in ITA No. 407/2009, answered the framed question of law in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue. The reasoning for this decision is not detailed in this excerpt but is stated to be based on the related order. The operative direction is that the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed. No issue was expressly left undecided. The principle derived from this decision is that depreciation on the self-occupied portion of a property is allowable, aligning with the Assessee's position.

The High Court noted that the explanation offered by the Assessee regarding repayment to the creditors in subsequent years was accepted by the Revenue. Consequently, the Court stated it was not inclined to examine the question as urged by the Revenue. However, the Court explicitly left the question open for consideration in an appropriate case. The appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals and pending applications.

The High Court found that the Revenue did not specifically plead perversity and that the exclusion/inclusion of comparables is largely a factual exercise. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.

The Tribunal erred in not deducting income tax and in adding 100% for future prospects. Compensation under non-pecuniary heads was also reduced, and the interest rate was adjusted.

The High Court modified the compensation by recalculating the loss of dependency using a lower multiplier, deducting income tax, and adjusting non-pecuniary damages. The interest rate was also reduced from 10% to 9%.

The Tribunal ordered the winding up and dissolution of the company. The company is deemed to be dissolved from the date of filing the petition.

The ITAT confirmed the deletion of additions because the Revenue had failed to challenge a similar deletion in a prior assessment year, and in a subsequent assessment year, the AO had indirectly taxed the sundry creditors by disallowing their adjustment against debit balances.

The Tribunal held that the corporate veil could be pierced when a company is a mere camouflage or sham, especially when the accused holds a significant majority of shares and the company conducts no business. The attachment of the company's property was deemed justified in such circumstances.

The High Court upheld the trial court's order, finding no infirmity in the award of interim maintenance. It concluded that the petitioner had deliberately tried to reduce his declared income to evade maintenance payments.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The High Court held that Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, prevails over other laws. Section 14 of the Code imposes a moratorium on suits and proceedings against a corporate debtor once insolvency proceedings commence.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The Court held that Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, prevails over other laws, and Section 14 imposes a moratorium on suits and proceedings against the corporate debtor. Therefore, the appeals could not continue.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The Tribunal held that proceedings under Section 153C could not be initiated as the seized documents did not belong to the assessees and were not incriminating for the assessment years in question. The High Court upheld this decision.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The Tribunal held that the respondent had raised a probable defense by showing that the signatures on the cheque did not match his specimen signatures and that the complainant lacked the financial means to advance the loan. Consequently, the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was rebutted.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The High Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, imposes a moratorium on the continuation of pending suits or proceedings against a corporate debtor. This moratorium applies notwithstanding anything inconsistent in other laws, including the Income Tax Act.

The High Court of Delhi addressed the two questions of law presented by the Revenue. Regarding the first question concerning the quashing of the order under Section 153C, the Court noted that this issue was covered against the Revenue by its prior decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. RRJ Securities Ltd. (2016) 380 ITR 612 (Del). Consequently, the Court was not inclined to frame an issue on this point. Concerning the second question regarding the allowance of the application under Rule 27, the Court was of the view that, in the present facts, this question did not require examination and could be considered in an appropriate future case. The Court did not provide a ratio decidendi for either issue, as it did not delve into the merits of the arguments. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.

The High Court held that the ITAT had not erred in concurring with the CIT(A) in deleting the addition of Rs. 5.20 crores. The Court found that a detailed analysis of the materials placed on record had been undertaken by both the CIT(A) and the ITAT. It was concurrently held that the Assessee had successfully discharged its burden of proving the identity and creditworthiness of the creditors and the genuineness of the transactions. The Court was not persuaded that the order of the ITAT suffered from perversity warranting interference, and therefore, no substantial question of law arose. The appeal was dismissed.

The High Court held that the mandatory requirement under Section 151(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as it stood at the relevant time, was not fulfilled. The Court reasoned that when the original assessment was processed under Section 143(1) and reopening was sought after four years from the end of the relevant AY, the approval must be by an officer of the rank of Joint Commissioner (in this case, the Addl. DIT), and not by a superior officer. The Court noted that the Addl. DIT merely "put up for approval" the file and did not himself accord approval. The Court relied on its previous decisions in Commissioner of Income Tax v. SPL’s Siddhartha Ltd. and Commissioner of Income Tax-8 v. Soyuz Industrial Resources Ltd., which categorically held that approval by a superior officer does not satisfy the mandate of Section 151(2) and that if a statute mandates a particular manner of action, it must be done in that manner or not at all. Therefore, the reopening of the assessment for AY 2005-06 by the impugned notice was held to be bad in law. The notice dated March 28, 2012, and the order dated January 25, 2013, rejecting the petitioner's objections were quashed. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The High Court held that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the merits of the case, finding that the assessee had shown reasonable cause for not deducting TDS. Therefore, the present appeals could not contradict the Supreme Court's judgment.

The High Court held that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the merits of the case, finding that the assessee had shown reasonable cause for not deducting TDS. Therefore, the present appeals could not contradict the Supreme Court's judgment.

The High Court held that the television news software produced and exported by the assessee qualified as 'customized electronic data' under the Explanation to Section 80HHE. Therefore, it was eligible for deduction.

The High Court held that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the merits of the case, finding that the assessee had shown reasonable cause for not deducting TDS. Therefore, the present appeals could not contradict the Supreme Court's judgment.

The High Court held that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the merits of the case, finding that the assessee had shown reasonable cause for not deducting TDS. Therefore, the present appeals could not contradict the Supreme Court's judgment.

The High Court dismissed the appeals, stating that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the merits of the case, holding that the assessee had shown reasonable cause for not deducting TDS. Therefore, the High Court could not pass an order contradicting the Supreme Court's judgment.

The High Court held that the Supreme Court had already ruled on the merits of the case, finding that the assessee had shown reasonable cause for not deducting TDS. Therefore, the present appeals could not contradict the Supreme Court's judgment.

The High Court quashed the notice dated March 28, 2013, issued by the AO under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2006-07, and set aside the AO's order dated December 26, 2013, rejecting the petitioner's objections. The Court found a clear non-application of mind by the AO, the Additional DIT, and the DIT. The AO incorrectly recorded in his note that the original assessment was not a first-time assessment, implying it was a scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3), when in fact it was processed under Section 143(1). This error was compounded by the Additional DIT and the DIT, who concurred with the reasons for reopening without verifying the factual position regarding the original assessment. The Court emphasized that Section 151 of the Act is intended to introduce a supervisory check, and the failure of the superior officers to apply their minds to the correct facts vitiated the reopening proceedings. The revenue's explanation that it was unclear from the records whether a scrutiny assessment was done was found inexplicable and further underscored the lack of due diligence.

The Tribunal held that the failure of the AO to furnish the reasons for reopening the assessment under Section 148 of the Act to the Assessee vitiated the reassessment proceedings. The High Court concurred with this view.

The Tribunal held that the failure of the AO to furnish the reasons for reopening the assessment under Section 148 of the Act to the Assessee vitiated the reassessment proceedings. The High Court concurred with this view.

The Tribunal held that the failure of the AO to furnish the reasons for reopening the assessment under Section 148 of the Act to the Assessee vitiated the reassessment proceedings. The High Court concurred with this view.

The Tribunal held that the failure of the AO to furnish the reasons for reopening the assessment under Section 148 of the Act to the Assessee vitiated the reassessment proceedings. The High Court concurred with this view.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was justified as the assessee had an opportunity to object to the DVO's valuation but failed to do so. The additions made by the AO were confirmed.

The High Court of Delhi held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's reasoning was based on its prior decision dated 20th August 2014 in ITA Nos. 121/2002 (The Director of I.T. (Exemption) v. Sobha Singh Public Charitable Trust). In that earlier case, the High Court had addressed an identical question concerning the same assessee for AY 1992-93 and had ruled in favor of the assessee. Crucially, the Revenue had not challenged that earlier decision. Therefore, following its own precedent, the High Court answered the framed question in the affirmative, in favor of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.