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784 orders · Page 4 of 16
The ITAT held that the activities of the LOs were preparatory and auxiliary, not constituting a PE. The High Court agreed that the evidence did not show the LOs carried on business activities in India and upheld the ITAT's decision.
The High Court held that the ITAT was not in error in its approach. The Court observed that the remaining grounds urged by the assessee also pertained to the comparability analysis. Consequently, since the ITAT had already remanded the matter for a fresh determination of the arm's length price (ALP) in accordance with law, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to decide the remaining grounds at that stage. The High Court found that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. The appeal filed by the assessee was therefore dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding the explanation for the delay insufficient and also observing that no substantial question of law arose on the merits of the case.
The High Court found the reasons for the delay unacceptable, stating that the practice directions for e-filing were issued after consultation and with sufficient time for adaptation. The court also noted the provision of scanning machines to facilitate the transition.
The Tribunal held that the proviso to Section 112(1) was applicable, allowing the assessee to benefit from a lower tax rate on long-term capital gains from listed company shares. The excess tax beyond 10% of the capital gain (before indexation) was to be ignored.
The High Court held that Section 14A and Rule 8D cannot be interpreted to disallow expenditure exceeding the tax-exempt income. The disallowance must be in relation to the expenditure incurred for earning tax-exempt income.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition, agreeing that the Revenue failed to provide evidence of any understatement of consideration or payment of on-money for the land exchange. The High Court found no substantial question of law as the factual findings of the lower authorities were not perverse.
The High Court of Delhi held that the appeal could not be entertained due to the moratorium ordered by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on 3rd July, 2017, under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court reasoned that the moratorium order prevented the appeal from being proceeded with at that time. The Revenue was granted the liberty to revive the appeal at a later stage, subject to the orders that would be passed by the NCLT. No decision was made on the merits of the appeal itself, as it was disposed of on a procedural ground. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal, with the possibility of revival.
The High Court held that the question of whether payments for software supply constitute royalty is no longer res integra. Citing its own previous decisions in Director of Income Tax v. Infrasoft Ltd. (2014) and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. M.Tech India (P) Ltd. (2016), the Court reiterated that such payments for software supply cannot be taxed as royalty. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's impugned order. The appeal filed by the Revenue was accordingly dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the questions urged by the Revenue stood answered against them by its previous orders dated December 14, 2016, and December 23, 2016, in appeals involving the same assessee. Consequently, the Court found that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The specific reasoning of the ITAT that led to the setting aside of the assessment or its interpretation of Sections 153 and 153C is not detailed in this High Court judgment, as the High Court's decision is based on its prior pronouncements. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The tribunal held that the defendant was a licensee whose license was validly revoked. The defendant's claims of ownership and adverse possession were unsubstantiated by evidence. The court upheld the lower court's decree for possession and mesne profits.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore, forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the WTA. The Court applied the rule of consistency, stating that even for AYs earlier to AY 1990-91, the property cannot be considered stock-in-trade. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the Karnataka High Court's view in CWA v. Prakashi Talkies Pvt. Ltd. and concurred with the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd., finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective. Consequently, the impugned orders of the ITAT were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT (A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court applied the rule of consistency, stating that even for AYs earlier to AY 1990-91, the property cannot be considered stock-in-trade. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the Finance Act, 1983 by the Finance Act, 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored. The appeals were allowed, with no orders as to costs.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the Scindia House property of the Assessee is not its ‘business asset/stock-in-trade’ and therefore forms part of its ‘net wealth’ for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's earlier decisions were based on a misunderstanding of the facts, particularly the change in ownership from AY 1981-82 onwards. The Court found that the Assessee's primary intention was not to trade in the property but to earn rental income, which was not sufficient to classify it as stock-in-trade. The rule of consistency was not applied to AYs prior to AY 1990-91, as the Court found the earlier classification to be erroneous. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the amendment to Section 40(3) of the FA 1983 by the FA 1988 is not retrospective and will not apply to a period prior to April 1, 1989. The Court disagreed with the High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, finding the amendment to be substantive and prospective, citing the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres (P) Ltd. as persuasive. Consequently, the impugned ITAT orders were set aside, and the orders of the WTO and CWT(A) were restored.
The High Court held that the penalty proceedings were time-barred as they were initiated beyond six months from the date the ITAT order was received by the CIT (Judicial). The court affirmed that the decision in Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. applied to the present case.
The High Court held that the penalty proceedings were time-barred as they were initiated beyond six months from the date the ITAT order was received by the CIT (Judicial). The court affirmed that the decision in Odeon Builders Pvt. Ltd. applied to the present case.
The High Court held that an application before the ITAT under Section 254(2) is not an alternate remedy to an appeal under Section 260A. The pendency of such an application does not suspend the time for filing an appeal.
The High Court held that the issue raised by the Revenue had already been decided against the Revenue and in favour of the Assessee by a previous order of the same Court dated 10th July, 2017, in ITA No. 380/2017 (Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-8 v. Steria India Ltd.). This previous order concerned the very same Assessee and dealt with the same issue for Assessment Year 2011-12. Therefore, the present appeals were dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that a consistent view taken by the High Court on a specific issue concerning a particular assessee for a particular assessment year binds subsequent appeals by the Revenue on the same issue for the same assessee, especially when the legal principles are identical.
The Delhi High Court held that questions A and B were already decided against the Revenue in a previous case involving the same assessee. For questions C and D, the court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's factual findings.
The High Court declined to frame questions on both issues raised by the Revenue. Regarding the first issue, the Court found that the ITAT's exclusion of Celestial Labs Ltd. was based on a detailed analysis and cogent reasoning, and the finding was not perverse. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose. Regarding the second issue, the Court held that the expenditure incurred on software licenses as revenue expenditure was a settled matter, citing the High Court's own decision in CIT v. Asahi India Safety Glass Ltd. and the dismissal of the Revenue's SLP by the Supreme Court. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose on this issue either. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the issue raised by the Revenue had already been decided against the Revenue and in favour of the Assessee by a previous order of the same Court dated 10th July, 2017, in ITA No. 380/2017 (Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-8 v. Steria India Ltd.). This previous order concerned the very same Assessee and dealt with the same issue for Assessment Year 2011-12. Therefore, the present appeals were dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that a consistent view taken by the High Court on a specific issue concerning a particular assessee for a particular assessment year binds subsequent appeals by the Revenue on the same issue for the same assessee, especially when the legal principles are identical.
The High Court held that the ITAT erred in remanding the matter to the TPO for a fresh transfer pricing study. The ITAT should have adjudicated the issue of the correctness of the selection of comparables.
The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeals, stating that similar questions for other assessment years were decided in favour of the assessee. The court also declined to frame questions on specific issues where the ITAT's findings were concurrent with the CIT(A).
The High Court held that the ITAT's deletion of additions related to amortization of premium on securities and depreciation on securities was correct, being covered by a previous decision. The court also upheld the ITAT's deletion of additions for pension fund contributions, following Bombay High Court precedents.
The Delhi High Court accepted the modified terms of reference for the special audit and directed that the audit would commence sequentially from AY 2008-2009. Interim orders staying proceedings would continue until the audit for the preceding year is completed.
The ITAT concurred with the CIT(A) that the expenses on crockery, cutlery, and utensils were revenue expenditure, and that the addition based on retrieved documents was not sustainable due to reconciliation and lack of discrepancies. The High Court found no substantial question of law.
The High Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 2nd September, 2016, passed by the ITAT for AY 2009-10. The reasoning was based on the fact that the Assessee's position had been accepted by the ITAT in the two immediately preceding assessment years (AY 2007-08 and AY 2008-09). For AY 2007-08, the Revenue had not challenged the ITAT's favourable order. For AY 2008-09, the Revenue chose not to appeal due to low tax effect. Given this consistent favourable treatment for the Assessee in prior years, the Court concluded that there was no basis to disturb the ITAT's decision for AY 2009-10. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided.
The High Court found no legal infirmity in the ITAT's order deleting the additions. The court was satisfied that the ITAT's decision was correct and no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that the ITAT had overlooked crucial grounds raised by the Assessee. Consequently, the appeals were restored to the ITAT for adjudication of these specific grounds.
The High Court held that the ITAT had overlooked crucial grounds raised by the Assessee. Consequently, the appeals were restored to the ITAT for adjudication of these specific grounds.
The Tribunal's award for Satish Kumar's legal heirs was reduced, while the award for Rajni's legal heirs was enhanced. Compensation for non-pecuniary heads was adjusted according to Supreme Court decisions.
The Delhi High Court held that payments made before the due date of filing the return are considered within the 'due date' for the purpose of Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 43B. The court followed its previous decision in CIT v. AIMIL Ltd.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court's decision was based on its prior order dated 16th August 2017, which dismissed a similar appeal (ITA No. 818/2016) filed by the Revenue for Assessment Year 2009-10. In that prior order, the Court had concluded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Applying the same reasoning to the present appeal for AY 2008-09, the High Court held that no substantial question of law arises in this case either. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed on this procedural ground without delving into the merits of the ITAT's decision. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was dismissed on the preliminary ground of no substantial question of law.
The Tribunal held that the issue of advance against depreciation was debatable and did not warrant a penalty. For transmission charges, adequate disclosure was made by the assessee, negating any failure to disclose.
The High Court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's orders, especially after the ITAT rectified its earlier order to align with its decision in the assessee's own appeal for a different assessment year where the disallowance was deleted.
The High Court found the ITAT's view on both issues to be plausible. However, it left both questions open for consideration in an appropriate future case.
The ITAT found that the Assessee-Society's activities were for the benefit of the public at large and not a particular religious community or caste. The High Court agreed with the ITAT's factual findings, which were not shown to be perverse.
The Tribunal held that for proceedings under Section 153C to be initiated, seized documents must 'belong' to the assessee, not merely 'pertain' to them. This position was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and the amendment to Section 153C with prospective effect does not apply.
The High Court found no contributory negligence and upheld the Tribunal's finding on negligence. However, it modified the compensation by reassessing future prospects, non-pecuniary damages, and reducing the interest rate.
The High Court found no reason to discard CBI's status reports, which closed the preliminary inquiry. The court directed BSNL to initiate departmental action against its officers as suggested by CBI.
The High Court held that since the findings of the lower appellate authorities (CIT(A) and ITAT) were concurrent on facts, no substantial question of law arose. The AO's assumption that expenditure must drop after selling a business was not justified without considering other factors.
The High Court held that since the findings of the lower appellate authorities (CIT(A) and ITAT) were concurrent on facts, no substantial question of law arose. The AO's assumption that expenditure must drop after selling a business was not justified without considering other factors.