ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MADURAI vs. RAMCO INDUSTRIES LIMITED, RAJAPALAYAM

The assessee filed its Return of Income for AY 2018-19 on 31-10-2018 declaring a total income of Rs. 15,38,59,210/-. The case was selected for complete scrutiny. The company had earned exempt income of Rs. 15,23,36,353/-in the form of dividends from domestic companies. The assessee had identified a sum of Rs. 1770/- as expenditure related to the earning of the exempt income and disallowed the same u/s 14A in the Return of Income. The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) on 06.04.2021 making a further addition of Rs.1,98,73,040/ u/s 14A read with the amended Rule 8D(2)(ii) as under: (a) An amount equal to one percent of the annual average of the monthly averages of the opening and closing balances of the value of investments, income from which does not or shall not form part of total income - Rs. 1,98,73,040/-. Further, the ld. Assessing Officer made disallowance u/s 14A of the Act and added the same to the assessee's Book Profits computed u/s 115JB of the Act. Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal before the ld. CIT(A).

The ld. CIT(A) vide his order dated 31.08.2024 has directed the AO to re- compute the disallowance under section 14A of the Act by excluding the investments that did not yield any exempt income during the relevant year. The ld.CIT(A) further held that the AO’s addition to the book profits under section 115JB is not in accordance with the law. Accordingly, he directed the deletion of the addition made to book profits. Aggrieved, the Revenue is in appeal before us.

This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2022.

It is also proposed to amend sub-section (1) of the said section, so as to include a non-obstante clause in respect of other provisions of the Income-tax Act and provide that no deduction shall be allowed in relation to exempt income, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act.

This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2022 and will accordingly apply in relation to the assessment year 2022-23 and subsequent assessment years." (emphasis supplied) 6. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. v. CIT [2005] 149 Taxman 352/279 ITR 310 has held that a retrospective provision in a tax act which is "for the removal of doubts" cannot be presumed to be retrospective, even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood. The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: '9. The High Court did not refer to the 1999 Explanation in upholding the inclusion of salary for the field break periods in the assessable income of the employees of the appellant. However, the respondents have urged the point before us.

In our view the 1999 Explanation could not apply to assessment years for the simple reason that it had not come into effect then. Prior to introducing the 1999 Explanation, the decision in CIT v. S.G. Pgnatale [(1980) 124 ITR 391 (Guj.)] was followed in 1989 by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in CIT v. Goslino Mario [(2000) 241 ITR 314 (Gau.)]. It found that the 1983 Explanation had been given effect from 1-4-1979 whereas the year in question in that case was 1976-77 and said: (ITR p. 318) "[I]t is settled law that assessment has to be made with reference to the law which is in existence at the relevant time. The mere fact that the assessments in question has (sic) somehow remained pending on 1-4-1979, cannot be cogent reason to make the Explanation applicable to the cases of the present assessees. This fortuitous circumstance cannot take away the vested rights of the assessees at hand. "

In this state of the law, on 27-2-1999 the Finance Bill, 1999 substituted the Explanation to Section 9(1)(ii) (or what has been referred to by us as the 1999 Explanation). Section 5 of the Bill expressly stated that with effect from 1-4- 2000, the substituted Explanation would read: "Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the income of the nature referred to in this clause payable for— (a) service rendered in India; and (b) the rest period or leave period which is preceded and succeeded by services rendered in India and forms part of the service contract of employment, shall be regarded as income earned in India." The Finance Act, 1999 which followed the Bill incorporated the substituted Explanation to Section 9(1)(ii) without any change.

The Explanation as introduced in 1983 was construed by the Kerala High Court in CIT v. S.R. Patton [(1992) 193 ITR 49 (Ker.)] while following the Gujarat High Court's decision in S.G. Pgnatale [(1980) 124 ITR 391 (Guj.)] to hold that the Explanation was not declaratory but widened the scope of Section 9(1)(ii). It was further held that even if it were assumed to be clarificatory or that it removed whatever ambiguity there was in Section 9(1)(ii) of the Act, it did not operate in respect of periods which were prior to 1-4-1979. It was held that since the Explanation came into force from 1-4-1979, it could not be relied on for any purpose for an anterior period.

In the appeal preferred from the decision by the Revenue before this Court, the Revenue did not question this reading of the Explanation by the Kerala High Court, but restricted itself to a question of fact viz. whether the Tribunal had correctly found that the salary of the assessee was paid by a foreign company. This Court dismissed the appeal holding that it was a question of fact. (CIT v. SR Patton [(1998) 8 SCC 608] .) 15. Given this legislative history of Section 9(1)(ii), we can only assume that it was deliberately introduced with effect from 1-4-2000 and therefore intended to apply prospectively [See CIT v. Patel Bros. & Co. Ltd., (1995) 4 SCC 485, 494 (para 18) : (1995) 215 ITR 165]. It was also understood as such by CBDT which issued Circular No. 779 dated 14-9-1999 containing Explanatory Notes on the provisions of the Finance Act, 1999 insofar as it related to direct taxes. It said in paras 5.2 and 5.3. "5.2 The Act has expanded the existing Explanation which states that salary paid for services rendered in India shall be regarded as income earned in India, so as to specifically provide that any salary payable for the rest period or leave period which is both preceded and succeeded by service in India and forms part of the service contract of employment will also be regarded as income earned in India. 5.3 This amendment will take effect from 1-4-2000, and will accordingly, apply in relation to Assessment Year 2000-2001 and subsequent years".

The departmental understanding of the effect of the 1999 Amendment even if it were assumed not to bind the respondents under section 119 of the Act, nevertheless affords a reasonable construction of it, and there is no reason why we should not adopt it.

As was affirmed by this Court in Goslino Mario [(2000) 10 SCC 165 : (2000) 241 ITR 312] a cardinal principle of the tax law is that the law to be applied is that which is in force in the relevant assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. (See also Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CIT [(1980) 1 SCC 139 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 67].) An Explanation to a statutory provision may fulfil the purpose of clearing up an ambiguity in the main provision or an Explanation can add to and widen the scope of the main section [See Sonia Bhatia v. State of UP., (1981) 2 SCC 585, 598 : AIR 1981 SC 1274, 1282 para 24]. If it is in its nature clarificatory then the Explanation must be read into the main provision with effect from the time that the main provision came into force [See Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24 (para 44); Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das v. CIT, (1997) 1 SCC 352, 354; CIT v. Podar Cement (P.) Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 482, 506]. But if it changes the law it is not presumed to be retrospective, irrespective of the fact that the phrases used are "it is declared" or "for the removal of doubts".' (emphasis supplied) 7. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in M.M. Aqua Technologies Ltd. v. CIT [2021] 129 taxmann.com 145/282 Taxman 281/436 ITR 582. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:— "22. Second, a retrospective provision in a tax act which is "for the removal of doubts" cannot be presumed to be retrospective, even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood. This was stated in Sedco Forex International Drill Inc. v. CIT, (2005) 12 SCC 717 as follows : 17. As was affirmed by this Court in Goslino Mario [(2000) 10 SCC 165] a cardinal principle of the tax law is that the law to be applied is that which is in force in the relevant assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. (See also Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CIT [(1980) 1 SCC 139].) An Explanation to a statutory provision may fulfil the purpose of clearing up an ambiguity in the main provision or an Explanation can add to and widen the scope of the main section [See Sonia Bhatia v. State of UP., (1981) 2 SCC 585]. If it is in its nature clarificatory then the Explanation must be read into the main provision with effect from the time that the main provision came into force [See Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24; Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das v. CIT, (1997) 1 SCC 352; CIT v. Podar Cement (P.) Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 482]. But if it changes the law it is not presumed to be retrospective, irrespective of the fact that the phrases used are "it is declared" or "for the removal of doubts".

There was and is no ambiguity in the main provision of section 9(1)(ii). It includes salaries in the total income of an assessee if the assessee has earned it in India. The word "earned" had been judicially defined in SG. Pgnatale [(1980) 124 ITR 391 (Guj.)] by the High Court of Gujarat, in our view, correctly, to mean as income "arising or accruing in India". The amendment to the section by way of an Explanation in 1983 effected a change in the scope of that judicial definition so as to include with effect from 1979, "income payable for service rendered in India".

When the Explanation seeks to give an artificial meaning to "earned in India" and brings about a change effectively in the existing law and in addition is stated to come into force with effect from a future date, there is no principle of interpretation which would justify reading the Explanation as operating retrospectively." (emphasis supplied) 8. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the amendment of section 14A, which is "for removal of doubts" cannot be presumed to be retrospective even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood.

Though the judgment of this Court has been challenged and is pending adjudication before the Supreme Court, yet there is no stay of the said judgment till date. Consequently, in view of the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] 113 Taxman 470/245 ITR 360 and Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association [1992] 3 SCC 1, the present appeal is dismissed being covered by the judgment passed by the learned predecessor Division Bench in IL & FS Energy Development Co. Ltd. (supra) and Cheminvest Ltd. v. CIT [2015] 61 taxmann.com 118/234 Taxman 761/378 ITR 33 (Delhi).

The Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vireet Investment [2017] 82 taxmann.com 415 (Delhi-Trib.)(SB) held as under: ‘’6.22 In view of above discussion, we answer the question referred to us in favour of asssessee by holding that the computation under clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2). is to be made without resorting to the computation as contemplated u/s 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. …………………………….. ………………………………….. 11.16 Therefore, in our considered opinion, no contrary view can be taken under these circumstances. We, accordingly, hold that only those investments are to be considered for computing average value of investment which yielded exempt income during the year’’.