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228 orders · Page 4 of 5
The Tribunal held that the ex-gratia payment was voluntary and not in the nature of compensation for termination of employment. Therefore, it was not taxable as profit in lieu of salary.
The Tribunal held that the ex-gratia payment received by the assessee was voluntary and not in the nature of compensation for termination of employment. Therefore, it was not taxable as 'profit in lieu of salary'.
The Tribunal partly allowed the Revenue's appeal. It restricted the disallowance under Section 14A to the actual dividend income received. The disallowance for unsupported expenses and depreciation on luxury cars were dismissed. The deduction under Section 80IA(4) was allowed, following previous ITAT decisions in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, finding no infirmity in quashing the reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal agreed that reassessment initiated solely on an audit objection without any failure by the assessee to disclose material facts is not valid.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that the relationship between the buyer and seller is immaterial for Section 54F deduction. It found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s view that the property acquisition by the husband was an independent transfer and the assessee's purchase met the conditions for the deduction.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(Exemption) to grant one last opportunity to the assessee to submit the required details. The assessee is directed to comply without seeking adjournments.
The assessee requested to withdraw the appeal as the new application for 80G registration was admitted. The Department had no objection to the withdrawal.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing the Supreme Court's emphasis on substantial justice over technicalities. The case was restored to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(Exemption) had granted only three days to the assessee to furnish specific details, which was insufficient. The Tribunal agreed that the principle of natural justice was violated and set aside the CIT's order.
The Tribunal restored the assessee's registration application back to the CIT(Exemption) for a fresh examination. This was done considering the possibility of communication gaps and insufficient time for compliance.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) did not grant sufficient time for response and that communication gaps might have occurred. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee from fixed deposits with cooperative banks was eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal followed the jurisdictional ITAT's decision in the assessee's own case and distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Totgars Cooperative Sale Society.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) order failed to provide points for determination and a detailed adjudication as required. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order did not decide the substantive grounds of appeal on merits as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that capital contributions to a partnership firm by its partners cannot be added in the hands of the firm under Section 68. Such additions, if any, should be made in the hands of the concerned partners.
The Tribunal held that the application was not time-barred, interpreting the phrase 'within six months of commencement of its activities' to apply only to institutions that had not yet started charitable activities at the time of provisional registration. The application was filed before the expiry of the provisional approval.
The Tribunal held that furnishing evidence of payment is a procedural requirement. Since the bonus was paid before the extended due date for filing the return, the disallowance was not justified.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee to withdraw the appeal. The grounds raised by the assessee were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution and is obliged to decide the appeal on merits. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO and upheld by the CIT(A) was not sustainable. Following previous decisions, the Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs. 12,47,000/-.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) has no power to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution without discussing the merits of the case, as per Section 250(4) and 250(6) of the Act. The impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the delay, finding the reasons provided by the assessee to be sufficient cause. The case was then remitted back to the NFAC for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to follow the mandatory procedure under the first proviso to Section 143(3) by not intimating the prescribed authority about the alleged contravention of exemption conditions before making the assessment. Therefore, the assessment order was invalid.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the full Section 54F deduction as the capital gains were reinvested in his name, and his son was merely a proforma purchaser. The Tribunal also allowed stamp duty and registration fees as part of the deduction, but restricted other miscellaneous construction expenses to a lump sum amount.
The Tribunal noted the lack of communication and the CIT's discussion of Section 80G registration, which was not relevant to Section 12A proceedings. It was decided that the CIT(Exemption) should re-examine the application with a few opportunities for the assessee to present their case.
The Tribunal held that since the excess stock was explained as arising from business activities and was offered to tax under the head 'Income from business', Section 115BBE was not applicable. The income should be taxed at normal rates.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the full Section 54F deduction as the capital gains were reinvested in his name, and his son was merely a proforma purchaser. The Tribunal also allowed stamp duty and registration fees as part of the deduction, but restricted other miscellaneous construction expenses to a lump sum amount.
The Tribunal, respectfully following its own co-ordinate bench decisions and in the absence of contrary jurisdictional High Court judgment, set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The Tribunal allowed the deduction claimed by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not given reasonable time to produce documents to substantiate the estimated project cost versus actual incurred cost. Therefore, the impugned order was unjust.
The Tribunal held that Section 80P(4) does not bar a housing co-operative society from claiming deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned from investments in other co-operative societies. The payer society's status as a co-operative bank under the Banking Regulation Act is crucial for the application of Section 80P(4).
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed when income is determined on an estimated basis, citing precedent. It also held that mere disallowances, even if confirmed, do not automatically warrant a penalty if all facts were disclosed and there was no concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Therefore, the penalty was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) is not leviable on an estimated disallowance of expenses, especially when the major part of the addition was deleted by the CIT(A). Relying on Supreme Court and other High Court decisions, the Tribunal found no basis for penalty.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the NFAC, citing the larger interest of justice and the principle that no litigant should be deprived of adjudication on merits due to an undeliberate delay. The ex-parte assessment order and the NFAC's order were set aside.
The Tribunal held that for Assessment Year 2016-17, there was no specific provision to tax deemed rental income on property held as stock-in-trade. Section 23(5) of the IT Act, which allows such taxation, was introduced later and was not retrospective.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the CIT(Exemption), directing him to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its case by filing the requisite details. The CIT(Exemption) is to decide the matter after due opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal followed its own earlier decision for a subsequent assessment year where identical facts led to the allowance of deduction. It held that interest earned from co-operative societies is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) violated the principle of natural justice by dismissing the appeal ex-parte prematurely without affording a reasonable opportunity to the assessee. The assessee was deprived of a real and effective opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC had not followed the due procedure by passing a speaking order and had not clearly indicated the opportunities granted. Therefore, the case was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for a final opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had made necessary inquiries and considered the assessee's replies. The PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 as the AO's assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanations for the property sale consideration, PF/ESI deposits, and loan transactions to be valid.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had examined the issue and taken a possible view, and the revisionary proceedings under Section 263 were not warranted. The Tribunal also noted that the revision was based on an audit objection.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had examined the issue and taken a possible view, and the revisionary proceedings under Section 263 were not warranted. The Tribunal also noted that the revision was based on an audit objection.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) prematurely dismissed the assessee's appeals ex-parte without waiting for submissions, violating the principle of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee had sufficient interest-free own funds (capital and reserves) which were greater than the interest-free advance given, the advance was presumed to be out of own funds. Therefore, the disallowance of interest was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) prematurely dismissed the assessee's appeals ex-parte without waiting for submissions, violating the principle of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had examined the issue and taken a possible view, and the revisionary proceedings under Section 263 were not warranted. The Tribunal also noted that the revision was based on an audit objection.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in directing the AO to re-compute the income, as this amounted to setting aside the assessment. The Tribunal also noted that the AO made two additions on the same amount and the CIT(A) raised a new ground not considered by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the cooperative society had a reasonable cause for non-compliance with Section 269SS, as its members were largely illiterate agriculturists in a rural area without easy access to banking facilities. The society acted under a bona fide belief that its transactions were permissible.
The Tribunal held that the cooperative society had a reasonable cause for non-compliance with Section 269SS, as its members were largely illiterate agriculturists in a rural area without easy access to banking facilities. The society acted under a bona fide belief that its transactions were permissible.
The Tribunal held that the cooperative society had a reasonable cause for non-compliance with Section 269SS, as its members were largely illiterate agriculturists in a rural area without easy access to banking facilities. The society acted under a bona fide belief that its transactions were permissible.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that adding the amount in AY 2011-12 without adjusting it in AY 2012-13 would lead to double taxation. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification and to decide on the issue of double taxation.