228 orders · Page 3 of 5
The Tribunal held that ESOP expenses are allowable as business expenditure, following High Court and Tribunal precedents. Similarly, broken period interest was also held to be an allowable business expense, relying on prior decisions in the assessee's own case.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to levy late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, for periods prior to this date, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy such fees.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to levy late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, for periods prior to this date, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy such fees.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to levy late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, for periods prior to this date, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy such fees.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(1) of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to levy late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, for periods prior to this date, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy such fees.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to levy late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, for periods prior to this date, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy such fees.
The Tribunal held that the belated filing of Form 3CLA is not a fatal flaw if the DSIR has subsequently verified the expenditure and issued Form 3CL. The deduction should be allowed to the extent certified by DSIR.
The Tribunal restored the penalty issue to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. This was done because the quantum proceedings related to the same assessment year had been restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC.
The Tribunal held that the excess stock offered for taxation represents undisclosed business income and is derived from the business. Therefore, Section 115BBE, which applies to unexplained income, is not applicable. The additional income should be taxed at normal rates.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by a reasonable and genuine cause for the delay in obtaining the tax audit report. The penalty levied under Section 271B was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal found that for the loan from the father, the source of funds was sufficiently explained through additional evidence. For the loan from the HUF, the Tribunal directed the AO to verify the facts afresh in light of additional evidence produced.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned from investments in co-operative banks. The Tribunal followed its own earlier decision in the assessee's case for preceding assessment years.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to levy late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, for periods prior to this date, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy such fees.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to levy late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, for periods prior to this date, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy such fees.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which empowers the Assessing Officer to levy late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, for periods prior to this date, the Assessing Officer was not empowered to levy such fees.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had a reasonable cause for non-compliance due to corporate restructuring and IT system changes. The CIT(A)'s order was silent on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal found that the present appeal was a duplicate of a previously adjudicated appeal. Therefore, the appeal was rendered infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC erred by dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without addressing the merits of the case. The matter was remitted to the NFAC for a fresh disposal on merits.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC should have decided the appeal on merits even if it was an ex-parte order. The dismissal for non-prosecution without addressing the merits was contrary to established law.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) with a direction to allow the assessee to file an application for admission of additional evidence under Rule 46A and decide the issue afresh after providing an opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal condoned the significant delay in filing the appeal, citing the assessee's circumstances and judicial precedents emphasizing substantial justice over technicalities. However, on merits, the Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the employees' contribution to ESI and EPF due to late deposit, following a co-ordinate bench's decision.
The Tribunal held that Section 164(2) of the Income-tax Act, read with its proviso, mandates that MMR applies only to the portion of income that has forfeited exemption due to contravention of Section 13(1)(d). Since this was not the case here, the entire income should not be taxed at MMR.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society on its surplus funds invested in Fixed Deposits with cooperative/nationalized banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, as it partakes the character of business income.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had indeed filed a return of income, contrary to the CIT(A)'s finding. Therefore, the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits, including the additional grounds challenging the reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 was not valid as the information originated from seized documents in another person's search, making Section 153C applicable. Consequently, the assessment made under Section 147 was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the cooperative society on its fixed deposits with a bank is attributable to its business activities and is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the exemption.
The Tribunal held that an assessee cannot make a fresh claim in a return filed under Section 153A for an unabated assessment year, especially when no incriminating material was found during the search. Such a claim, which reduces the taxable income, is not permissible.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of an appeal on merits, even in an ex-parte order, and cannot dismiss it solely for non-prosecution without considering the substance of the additions.
The Tribunal held that the AO's reopening was based on vague and non-specific information without independent verification. The addition was made without positive evidence to prove the assessee had an account or made deposits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC should have provided an opportunity to the assessee to explain the delay before dismissing the appeal. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh disposal.
The Tribunal held that an assessee cannot make a fresh claim in a return filed under Section 153A for an unabated assessment year, especially when no incriminating material was found during the search. Such a claim, which reduces the taxable income, is not permissible.
The Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction to direct the appeals to the 'Faceless Regime' as the assessee's cases were already centralized under Section 127 of the Act. The CIT(A) was directed to re-decide the appeals.
The Tribunal held that an assessee cannot make a fresh claim in a return filed under Section 153A for an unabated assessment year, especially when no incriminating material was found during the search. Such a claim, which reduces the taxable income, is not permissible.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from its surplus invested in FDs with cooperative/scheduled banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)/NFAC should have decided the appeal on merits, even if ex-parte, and not dismissed it in limine. The matter was remitted back for fresh disposal on merits.
The tribunal held that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of appeals on merits, even in ex-parte cases. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for a fresh disposal on merits.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned by the cooperative society on its surplus funds deposited in nationalized banks is attributable to its banking business and eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The order of the CIT(A) deleting the addition was upheld.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the AO, directing that the assessee be granted one more opportunity to substantiate its case by providing details regarding the source of cash deposits. The AO was instructed to decide the issue afresh on merits.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities failed to provide concrete material to prove the land was a capital asset. Since the land was proven to be agricultural, the addition of long-term capital gains was not sustainable.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the CIT(E) to reconsider the assessee's application for registration. The CIT(E) was directed to decide the matter on merits after providing an adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the interest paid on borrowed funds for acquiring possession from a statutory tenant is not deductible under Section 24(b) of the Income Tax Act. This is because the property was already acquired by the assessee in 2001, and the payment was for relinquishing tenancy rights, not for acquiring the property itself.
The Tribunal held that the interest paid on borrowed funds for acquiring possession from a statutory tenant is not deductible under Section 24(b) of the Income Tax Act. This is because the property was already acquired by the assessee in 2001, and the payment was for relinquishing tenancy rights, not for acquiring the property itself.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer reopened the assessment merely on the basis of information received from the DDIT (Inv.) without applying his own mind. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings initiated were quashed.
The Tribunal found sufficient reasons for the delay in filing the appeal, noting no evidence of service of the assessment order. Furthermore, based on a remand report and comparison with an earlier assessment year, the Tribunal concluded that the ICICI bank account did not belong to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to direct the appeals to the 'Faceless Regime' as the assessee's cases were already centralized under Section 127. The appeals were to be re-decided by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction to direct the appeals to the 'Faceless Regime' as the assessee's cases were already centralized under Section 127 of the Act. The CIT(A) was directed to re-decide the appeals.
The Tribunal held that the reopening notice issued in July 2022 for AY 2013-14 was time-barred, as the limitation period, extended by TOLA, expired on March 31, 2021. The Revenue's argument for restoration was rejected.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society on Fixed Deposits with a bank is attributable to its business activities and is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). Therefore, the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the exemption.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC with a direction to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to present its case. The CIT(A)/NFAC was instructed to pass a speaking order after considering the facts and law.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A)/NFAC with a direction to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to present its case. The CIT(A)/NFAC was instructed to pass a speaking order after considering the facts and law.