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630 orders · Page 12 of 13
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO under Section 68 were uncalled for. The CIT(A) had made a categorical finding that the assessee had fully discharged the onus under Section 68 by proving the identity of the creditor, the creditworthiness of the creditor, and the genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal noted that the AO solely relied on statements recorded under Section 131, which were subsequently retracted before the completion of assessment proceedings, and that the AO failed to discharge the burden shifted to him under Section 68. Consequently, the deletion of the addition of Rs. 2.60 crores by the CIT(A) was upheld. Since the addition of the loan amount was deleted, the disallowance of interest expenditure made by the AO was also deemed unjustified. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the disallowance of interest expenses amounting to Rs. 5,39,384/-. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the impugned appellate order and upheld the findings of the CIT(A).
The Tribunal noted that the assessees had provided documents like PAN cards, ITRs, financial statements, and bank statements of the investors. The AO's additions were based on statements from parties admitting to providing accommodation entries, but the Tribunal found that the assessees had discharged their onus under Section 68.
The Tribunal noted that the assessees had provided documents like PAN cards, ITRs, financial statements, and bank statements of the investors. The AO's additions were based on statements from parties admitting to providing accommodation entries, but the Tribunal found that the assessees had discharged their onus under Section 68.
The Tribunal held that income earned by a cooperative society from investments with another cooperative society, including cooperative banks, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The lower authorities' orders were reversed.
The Tribunal observed that the assessee's failure to report the members' contribution in Schedule EI was an inadvertent mistake. Citing judicial precedents, the Tribunal held that technical errors should not deny an otherwise allowable exemption. Therefore, the issue was remitted back to the Assessing Officer (AO) to examine the claim and grant exemption in accordance with the law, ensuring a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the addition was based on surmises and conjectures as no incriminating material was found during the search to support the claim of accommodation loans. Since the assessment year was unabated, the addition could only be made if there was incriminating material unearthed during the search.
The Tribunal found that the issue of labour charges required reconciliation and verification and restored it to the AO. Similarly, for the rental income addition, the Tribunal noted the assessee's inability to substantiate with evidence and restored the matter to the AO for reconciliation and verification.
The Tribunal deleted the addition made under Section 68. It held that the assessee had discharged the burden by submitting relevant documentary evidence, and the AO's conclusion was based on conjectures without cogent material or corroboration.
The Tribunal decided to restore the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits, providing one more opportunity to the assessee. The Tribunal emphasized that this decision should not be construed as a reflection on the merits of the dispute.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of ESOP expenses was not justified, following its own previous decisions in the assessee's own case. Similarly, the issue regarding the recognition of time share income was also decided in favor of the assessee based on prior rulings.
The Tribunal, relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents, held that the CIT(A) possesses the power to entertain and adjudicate additional legal grounds if all relevant facts are on record, even without a revised return. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) to adjudicate the additional ground regarding the tax rate on dividend income on its merits.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's auditor revised the Tax Audit Report (Form 3CD) on 10/05/2022, rectifying typographical errors in the due dates for payment of employees' contribution to Provident Fund. The assessee had submitted this rectified annexure to the learned CIT(A) on 15/03/2023. However, the learned CIT(A) upheld the entire disallowance of ₹8,40,462 without considering these submissions. The Tribunal noted that the learned Departmental Representative requested verification of the rectified annexure. Therefore, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the issue to the file of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication. The AO is directed to verify the details in the revised annexure and grant the assessee an adequate opportunity of hearing. The impugned order was set aside, and the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. No specific finding was made on the merits of the disallowance itself, as it was remanded for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were uncalled for. The ITAT noted that the CIT(A) had made a categorical finding that the assessee had fully discharged the onus placed upon it under Section 68 by proving the identity of the creditor, the creditworthiness of the creditor, and the genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal observed that the AO had solely relied on statements recorded under Section 131 of the Act, which were subsequently retracted before the completion of assessment proceedings. Therefore, the AO had not discharged the burden shifted to him under Section 68. Consequently, the deletion of the addition of Rs. 2.60 crores by the CIT(A) was upheld. Since the addition of the loan amount was deleted, the disallowance of interest expenses made by the AO was also deemed unjustified. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order deleting the disallowance of interest expenses amounting to Rs. 5,39,384/-. The appeals of the revenue were dismissed, and the appeals of the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for AY 2018-19 and 2020-21, citing the principles laid down by the Supreme Court regarding condoning delay in the interest of justice. The issue of the claim raised by the assessee in respect of 80P was remitted to the AO for a detailed order on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the principle of substantial justice over technicalities. The appeal was admitted, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was invalid due to non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 151(2) of the Act, as the necessary sanction was not obtained from the competent authority. Consequently, the additions made by the AO were deleted.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals for AY 2018-19 and 2020-21, citing the principles laid down by the Supreme Court regarding condoning delay in the interest of justice. The issue of the claim raised by the assessee in respect of 80P was remitted to the AO for a detailed order on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee discharged the initial onus for most creditors by providing identity, creditworthiness, and transaction genuineness, except for Shri Anil Jadhav. The AO failed to disprove the submissions for the deleted additions.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient documentary evidence for the share transactions, routed through a Demat account and NRE account. The Assessing Officer failed to establish a direct nexus between the assessee and any alleged price rigging, and the additions were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of ESOP expenses was not justified, following its own previous decisions in the assessee's own case. Similarly, the issue regarding the recognition of time share income was also decided in favor of the assessee based on prior rulings.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had filed submissions, albeit with a slight delay, and the e-filing window was open. The applications were rejected at the threshold without a decision on merits.
The Tribunal restored both matters (Section 12AB registration and Section 80G approval) to the respective authorities (CIT(E) and CIT(A)) for fresh adjudication on merits, granting the assessee another opportunity to submit relevant documents. A cost of Rs. 2000 was imposed on the assessee for non-cooperation, to be deposited in the Prime Minister Relief Fund.
The Tribunal restored both matters (Section 12AB registration and Section 80G approval) to the respective authorities (CIT(E) and CIT(A)) for fresh adjudication on merits, granting the assessee another opportunity to submit relevant documents. A cost of Rs. 2000 was imposed on the assessee for non-cooperation, to be deposited in the Prime Minister Relief Fund.
Considering that the present penalty appeal stems from the same assessment order whose quantum additions are already under fresh adjudication by the CIT(A), the Tribunal decided to restore this penalty appeal to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The decision to restore does not reflect on the merits of the dispute, which the CIT(A) will adjudicate independently. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the case is factually dissimilar to the High Court's judgment relied upon by the revenue. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had proved transactions through banking channels and the Assessing Officer himself had estimated profit at 12.5%, not 100%. Considering the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal restricted the addition to 5%.
The Tribunal held that the purchase of shares was for investment purposes and not for trading, as evidenced by the facts on record. Therefore, Section 56(2)(viia) was applicable, and the addition made by the Assessing Officer was confirmed.
The Tribunal found that since the assessee had already been granted registration under Section 12AB based on its objects, and the objects remained the same, there was no reason to deny registration under Section 80G. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant registration under Section 80G.
The Tribunal decided the legal ground concerning the limitation of the notice under Section 148 in favour of the assessee. Following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Jurisdictional Bombay High Court in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. Vs. ACIT (supra), the Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 of the Act dated April 4, 2022, for AY 2015-16, is clearly barred by limitation. The Court's reasoning, as extracted and applied, indicated that for AY 2015-16, the erstwhile time limit of six years expired on March 31, 2022. The notice issued on April 4, 2022, falls beyond this period and is therefore restricted by the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 147 read with Section 144B were bad in law due to the invalid notice. Consequently, the consequential additions made by the AO were held to be not legally sustainable. The impugned order confirming the assessment order was also set aside. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition made.
The Tribunal held that the revision proceedings initiated by the PCIT under section 263 of the Act were misplaced. The Tribunal found that the issue of contribution to the Core SGF was specifically raised by the AO during the assessment proceedings, and the assessee had provided a detailed response, including the relevant SEBI circular. Therefore, the PCIT's finding that the AO failed to conduct proper inquiry and verification was incorrect. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that a Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, in the assessee's own case for subsequent assessment years (2016-17 and 2017-18), had held that the statutory contribution made by the assessee to the Core SGF is allowable under section 37(1) of the Act, as it was made exclusively during the course of carrying on its business as a stock exchange. This decision affirmed the AO's view. Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that the PCIT erred in concluding that the assessment order was based on a wrong assumption of facts and a wrong application of law, and therefore erred in invoking section 263. The impugned order passed under section 263 was set aside, and the grounds raised by the assessee were allowed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the dismissal of the appeal by the CIT(A) on grounds of non-prosecution was contrary to natural justice, as the appeal should have been decided on merits. The Tribunal condoned the delay in appearance and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal, following its own precedent in a similar case, held that the assessee was entitled to the full deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income derived from investments with other co-operative societies.
The Tribunal found that the assessment order was passed without considering the assessee's submissions and that the CIT(A) also passed the order without providing adequate opportunity. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) NFAC wrongly assumed jurisdiction as the appeals involved transfer pricing adjustments under Chapter-X of the Act, which were excluded from the purview of the Faceless Appeal Scheme. Consequently, the appeals were restored to the file of the jurisdictional CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had reasonable cause for not attending the proceedings before the CIT(A). The levy of penalty was found to be without merit and directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the AO had reopened the assessment after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. The AO had also raised the same queries during the original assessment, and the assessee had provided clarifications. Therefore, it was a case of change of opinion and not a failure to disclose material facts.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had repeatedly requested to remand the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The revenue did not object to this. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh hearing.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's application for registration was filed within the extended due date as per CBDT Circular No. 16/2021. Therefore, the rejection of exemption by the CPC and the NFAC was an error.
The Tribunal held that the issue pertinent to the limited scrutiny was to verify the genuinity of the 'share application money' and whether it was from disclosed sources, which falls under Section 68 of the Act. In contrast, the PCIT invoked Section 263 on the ground that the premium received for equity shares was in excess of the market value, which should be taxed under Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that Section 56(2)(viib) pertains to the determination of the valuation of shares and is distinct from the genuinity and source of money. The Tribunal concluded that the issue for limited scrutiny and the issue in the revisionary proceedings were not one and the same. An AO cannot go beyond the reasons for which limited scrutiny was initiated unless it is converted to complete scrutiny. While the assessment order was not a speaking order, the PCIT's direction to reassess income on the issue of excess premium could not be undertaken when it did not form part of the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the revenue with regard to the issue raised by the PCIT. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed, and the order of the PCIT passed under section 263 was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the case is factually dissimilar to the High Court's judgment relied upon by the revenue. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had proved transactions through banking channels and the Assessing Officer himself had estimated profit at 12.5%, not 100%. Considering the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal restricted the addition to 5%.
The Tribunal held that the case is factually dissimilar to the High Court's judgment relied upon by the revenue. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had proved transactions through banking channels and the Assessing Officer himself had estimated profit at 12.5%, not 100%. Considering the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal restricted the addition to 5%.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) NFAC wrongly assumed jurisdiction as the appeals involved transfer pricing adjustments under Chapter-X of the Act, which were excluded from the purview of the Faceless Appeal Scheme. Consequently, the appeals were restored to the file of the jurisdictional CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's application for registration under section 80G was rejected by the CIT(E) primarily because one of the objects in the Trust Deed/MOA suggested the intention to apply or receive funds outside India. The assessee contended that this was for collaboration with reputable institutions for the benefit of Indian students in India. The CIT(E) was not satisfied that the assessee had amended its MOA/Trust Deed to align with the provisions of the Act. The Tribunal considered the submissions of both sides. While the judgment does not explicitly state a finding on the violation of principles of natural justice regarding the personal hearing, it focuses on the substantive issue of the Trust's objects. The Tribunal decided to restore the matter to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The operative direction is to restore the matter to the CIT(E).
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions regarding the admission of additional evidence. The assessee filed an application for additional evidence, including the purchase agreement of the residential property and bank statements highlighting advances paid. The assessee argued that these documents could not be filed before the CIT(A) due to reasonable cause and were crucial for the appeal. The Tribunal examined Rule 29 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, which allows for additional evidence if the Tribunal requires it for substantial cause or if the assessee was not given a sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence. Relying on the judgment in Smt. Prabhavati S. Shah Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's application. The Tribunal noted that the revenue authorities had not presented anything contrary to the assessee's claim for additional evidence. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the additional evidence to be filed, stating that it could help the assessee justify the exemption claim under Section 54F. In accordance with Rule 30 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, the case was restored to the file of the AO, who was directed to consider the additional evidence to be filed by the assessee within 60 days and decide the case afresh. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the statutory notices were not sent to the registered email addresses as per Explanation (t) to Section 144B of the Act. The assessee's explanation for non-response was considered a 'reasonable cause' under Section 273B.
The Tribunal held that the dismissal of the appeal by the CIT(A) solely on the ground of non-prosecution, without deciding on merits, was contrary to the principles of natural justice. It is the duty of the appellate authority to dispose of an appeal on merits, even if the appellant fails to appear. While the assessee has a duty to diligently pursue the appeal, the CIT(A)'s action was not in line with established legal principles. The Tribunal condoned the delay of 177 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) in the larger interest of fair play and justice, considering the assessee's explanation of miscommunication via the e-portal and lack of awareness of subsequent notices. The Tribunal proposed, and the Revenue did not object, to give the assessee one more opportunity. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on merits, after affording sufficient opportunity of being heard to the assessee. A token cost of Rs. 5,000/- was imposed on the assessee for non-compliance and lack of diligence.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had made out a sufficient cause for not producing the evidence before the AO due to the assessment proceedings being completed during the Covid pandemic period and potential issues with notice service. The Tribunal found no reason to disbelieve the assessee's claim for producing additional evidence, which was deemed crucial for adjudicating the matter. The Tribunal was not convinced by the CIT(A)'s denial of additional evidence, considering the strong case made by the assessee and the sufficient cause shown. Invoking Rule 29A of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, and Rule 30, the Tribunal restored the case to the file of the AO. The AO is directed to consider the additional evidence to be filed by the assessee within 60 days and decide the case afresh. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside as not legally sustainable. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the issue had been decided in favour of the assessee in previous years by the High Court and ITAT. However, since the CIT(A) order was passed ex-parte and the assessee missed a reasonable opportunity to present its case, the matter was remanded.
The Tribunal held that GST, being an indirect tax collected on behalf of the government and shown separately in invoices, should not be included in the gross receipts for the purpose of presumptive income computation under Section 44BB. The Tribunal relied on its own prior decision in a similar case for the preceding assessment year.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed an application under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme to settle the dispute. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the assessee's severe medical condition (cancer) and the death of his wife as sufficient cause, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. MST. Katiji & Ors. The Tribunal noted that the impugned order was passed ex-parte and that the assessee was not given an effective opportunity of hearing as mandated by Section 250(2) of the Act and principles of natural justice. The Tribunal found that the reasons provided by the assessee for not presenting their case before the CIT(A) were justified. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) with directions to decide the same afresh after giving an effective opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was directed to present its case before the Ld. CIT(A) within 90 days of the order. The issue of addition on account of non-genuine purchases and the applicability of the Mohammed Haji judgment were not decided on merits, as the matter was remanded.