630 orders · Page 13 of 13
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee were standard services using software and did not make available technical knowledge, skills, or know-how to the recipient, nor did they involve the development or transfer of a technical plan. Therefore, they do not qualify as 'Fees for Included Services' under Article 12 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee were standard services using software and did not make available technical knowledge, skills, or know-how to the recipient, nor did they involve the development or transfer of a technical plan. Therefore, they do not qualify as 'Fees for Included Services' under Article 12 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal held that the Assessee's income did not exceed the monetary limit of Rs. 50,00,000/- for surcharge levy. Although the Ld. Commissioner accepted this, they dismissed the appeal for statistical purposes inadvertently. The Tribunal allowed the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee were standard services using software and did not make available technical knowledge, skills, or know-how to the recipient, nor did they involve the development or transfer of a technical plan. Therefore, they do not qualify as 'Fees for Included Services' under Article 12 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee were standard services using software and did not make available technical knowledge, skills, or know-how to the recipient, nor did they involve the development or transfer of a technical plan. Therefore, they do not qualify as 'Fees for Included Services' under Article 12 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal found that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) referred to sufficient material to justify the addition. The CIT(A)'s order was also considered cryptic. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders and restored the issues to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the objects of the assessee allowing for potential expenditure outside India do not automatically disqualify it for registration under Section 12AB, as Section 11 only restricts exemption for income applied outside India. The Tribunal also found merit in the assessee's plea regarding the justification of expenses and admitted additional evidence.
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee were standard services using software and did not make available technical knowledge, skills, or know-how to the recipient, nor did they involve the development or transfer of a technical plan. Therefore, they do not qualify as 'Fees for Included Services' under Article 12 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal found that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) referred to sufficient material to justify the addition. The CIT(A)'s order was also considered cryptic. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders and restored the issues to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal found that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) referred to sufficient material to justify the addition. The CIT(A)'s order was also considered cryptic. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders and restored the issues to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee were standard services using software and did not make available technical knowledge, skills, or know-how to the recipient, nor did they involve the development or transfer of a technical plan. Therefore, they do not qualify as 'Fees for Included Services' under Article 12 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal found that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) referred to sufficient material to justify the addition. The CIT(A)'s order was also considered cryptic. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the orders and restored the issues to the AO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a Co-operative Society from investments with other Co-operative Banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d), even after the insertion of Section 80P(4). The Tribunal relied on Supreme Court and Tribunal precedents.
The Tribunal held that the objects of the assessee allowing for potential expenditure outside India do not automatically disqualify it for registration under Section 12AB, as Section 11 only restricts exemption for income applied outside India. The Tribunal also found merit in the assessee's plea regarding the justification of expenses and admitted additional evidence.
The Tribunal held that the services rendered by the assessee were standard services using software and did not make available technical knowledge, skills, or know-how to the recipient, nor did they involve the development or transfer of a technical plan. Therefore, they do not qualify as 'Fees for Included Services' under Article 12 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal found inconsistencies in the assessee's stand and noted her failure to provide supporting evidence. The Tribunal remanded the appeal back to the CIT(A) for substantive adjudication, citing principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not appear even before the CIT(A). However, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to furnish necessary documents relating to the cost of acquisition. The issues were restored to the file of the AO for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that dividend income is taxable in the hands of the registered owner and that estimated dividend income cannot be taxed. It also allowed deduction for interest expenses, following a previous co-ordinate bench decision.
The Tribunal held that for the addition on account of unexplained income from sale of shares, the CIT(A) had reconciled differences to the extent of Rs. 2,13,89,367/-, leaving Rs. 3,82,018/- as unexplained. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s findings on this issue, thus dismissing the revenue's appeal on this ground. Regarding dividend and interest income, the Tribunal noted that the Hon'ble High Court held dividend income is taxable in the hands of the registered owner. The AO's action of considering previous year-end shareholding and website information for dividend declaration was not a valid basis. The CIT(A)'s estimation of dividend income based on the assessee's husband's shareholding was also not sustainable. The Tribunal directed the deletion of the entire addition made towards dividend income, allowing the assessee's ground and dismissing the revenue's ground. For deduction on account of interest payable, the Tribunal, following its Co-ordinate Bench's decision in the assessee's own case (ITA No. 1455/M/2016 dated 05.04.2021), directed the AO to allow the deduction claimed by the assessee towards interest expenses. The issue of interest under Sections 234A and 234B was held to be consequential and not warranting separate adjudication. The revenue's Ground 3 was general and not requiring separate adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in upholding the addition for cash deposits, as the assessee had demonstrated sufficient cash withdrawals and sales prior to the deposit. For the interest on refund, the Tribunal found the addition was made without proper verification and opportunity for the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove sufficient cause for the inordinate delay. Relying on Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal emphasized that delay due to negligence or lack of due diligence cannot be condoned, even if the merits of the case are otherwise strong.
The Tribunal held that the AO's approach of disallowing expenses based on general information without independent inquiry or proper proof of bogus purchases was incorrect. The CIT(A)'s estimation of profit on purchases was also not endorsed as a legally sound method.
The Tribunal held that the AO's addition was based solely on suspicion from an investigation report without independent inquiry. The confirmation of transactions by suppliers, despite the AO's doubts, meant the purchases were not to be treated as bogus.
The Tribunal decided the issues as follows: 1. Regarding the disallowance of franchisee fees (Ground No. 5), the Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the assessee's own case for AY 2016-17. Therefore, the adjustment proposed in relation to franchise fees was directed to be deleted. The appeal on this ground was allowed. 2. For the adjustment on account of disallowance of intra-group service charges (Grounds No. 6 & 7), the Tribunal noted that this issue had already been adjudicated and the adjustment was deleted for contravention of Section 144C(10) read with Section 144C(13) of the Act, as addressed in Ground No. 2. Accordingly, the assessee's appeal on these grounds was allowed. 3. The alternative ground concerning the disallowance of franchisee fee and intra-group service charges under Section 37(1) (Ground No. 8) was rendered unnecessary as both primary issues were decided in favor of the assessee. The appeal on this ground was treated as dismissed. 4. On the issue of disallowance of deduction under Section 80G (Ground No. 9), the Tribunal observed that the provisions of Section 80G permit deduction for contributions to specified funds and institutions. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance (No.2) Bill, 2014 clarifies that CSR expenditure is not allowable under Section 37(1) as business expenditure, but it makes no reference to ineligibility or restriction in claiming deductions under Section 80G for donations made pursuant to Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013. Relying on judicial precedents, including an order of a coordinate bench in M/s Naik Seafoods Pvt. Ltd. v. Pr. CIT, the Tribunal held that CSR expenditure is eligible for deduction under Section 80G subject to satisfaction of its conditions. The matter was remanded to the Ld. AO with a direction to allow the deduction of Rs.1,925,834/- subject to fulfillment of requisite conditions. The appeal on this ground was allowed for statistical purpose. 5. Grounds No. 10 and 11 were considered consequential and not requiring adjudication, hence dismissed. The operative direction was to allow the appeal in part.
The assessee filed a letter stating that the assessment proceedings have been completed in their favour, making the appeal infructuous. The Tribunal noted the contents of the letter.
The Tribunal held that the basis for the addition under section 69A of the Act did not survive as the assessee retracted his statement and the Revenue could not produce the loan confirmation. Consequently, the addition of the principal amount and interest was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the basis for the addition under section 69A of the Act did not survive as the assessee retracted his statement and the Revenue could not produce the loan confirmation. Consequently, the addition of the principal amount and interest was deleted.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had submitted that the appeal should be treated as withdrawn. Considering the submissions, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, with liberty to revive it if the DTVSV application did not go through.
The Tribunal held that additions in unabated assessment years under Section 153A can only be made on the basis of incriminating material found during the search. Information available with the AO prior to the search, without being unearthed during the search, cannot form the basis for such additions.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was not legally correct in making additions to the income under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in respect of the peak credit of alleged accommodation loans for the unabated assessment years 2015-16 and 2016-17. The primary reasoning was the absence of any incriminating material found during the search proceedings conducted in the hands of the assessee that supported the revenue's claim that the loans were bogus or accommodation entries. The Tribunal noted that while pre-search information existed, the search itself did not yield any material to substantiate the AO's view. The Tribunal relied on a co-ordinate bench's decision in a similar case of a group company, Annapurna Buildcon Infra Private Ltd. vs. DCIT, which held that information available with the AO prior to the search, if not unearthed during the search in the assessee's hands, cannot be the basis for additions in unabated assessment years. The Tribunal also observed that the suspicion of the revenue could not be termed as 'incriminating information' and, even if considered as such, it was not unearthed during the search in the assessee's hands. The alternative contention regarding the applicability of Section 153C was rendered academic as the primary issue of lack of incriminating material was decided in favour of the assessee. Consequently, the orders of the CIT(A) were set aside, and the AO was directed to delete the impugned additions.