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734 orders · Page 14 of 15
The Tribunal held that the interest earned from investment in co-operative banks by a co-operative society is an allowable deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal relied on various High Court and Supreme Court judgments which established that a co-operative bank is considered a co-operative society for the purpose of Section 80P and Section 80P(4) is not applicable in such cases.
The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148 of the Income Tax Act was issued beyond the limitation period prescribed under section 149, making the reassessment proceedings void ab initio. Consequently, the reassessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was not wilful and was due to genuine reasons such as severe financial crunch and operational difficulties. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, the Tribunal emphasized preferring substantial justice over technical considerations.
The Tribunal held that the notice u/s 148 was issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 149 read with its first proviso. Therefore, the reopening of the assessment was bad in law.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee has opted for settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and has paid the settlement amount. The Tribunal accordingly dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found that the appellate authority passed a cryptic order without properly considering the documents submitted by the assessee. The assessee's justification for non-compliance was reasonable given the short timeframe. The Tribunal set aside the assessment proceedings and remanded the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the ESOP expenses and Section 14A disallowances, finding no infirmity. The Tribunal also directed the AO to allow the CSR deduction under Section 80G, subject to verification.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench had previously set aside the order rejecting the Section 12AB registration and restored it for denovo adjudication. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the Section 80G application to the CIT(E) for a fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the payment was made as per the terms of the agreement entered during the course of business and was a commercial exigency. It was not a colourable device or bogus transaction. The Tribunal found that Section 69C could not be invoked as the expenditure was duly accounted for. Therefore, the addition was set aside.
The Tribunal held that Section 269SS applies to the acceptance of money, not mere book entries creating a liability. Since the loan was disbursed through banking channels and recorded via journal entry, it falls outside the purview of Section 269SS. Therefore, the penalty under Section 271D was not leviable.
The Tribunal held that additions made by the AO were unsustainable as the revenue failed to provide the information relied upon for the additions, and the AO had misinterpreted loan infusions as capital. The Tribunal upheld the deletion of additions by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal held that additions made by the AO were unsustainable as the revenue failed to provide the information relied upon for the additions, and the AO had misinterpreted loan infusions as capital. The Tribunal upheld the deletion of additions by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn, granting liberty to the assessee to revive it if the settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme was not completed.
The tribunal noted that the assessee had filed an application to withdraw the appeal. Considering the submissions, the appeal was allowed to be withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the interest income earned by the assessee cooperative housing society from its investments in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, as cooperative banks fall within the definition of cooperative societies.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the deletion of disallowance for interest cost and advertisement expenses, agreeing that the project was completed and expenses were revenue in nature. The cross-objection regarding Section 43CA additions was remanded for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to provide documentary proof connecting the assessee with the scrip or the alleged transactions. The assessee had consistently denied dealing in the scrip. Therefore, the additions made by the AO were deleted.
The Tribunal held that the policy in question was not a life insurance policy, thus not eligible for deduction under Section 10(10D). However, the addition was deleted as the surrender proceeds were received in the subsequent financial year (AY 2015-16), and the assessee is not required to maintain books of account.
The Tribunal held that the document in question was not a hundi. It was written in English, bilateral, and not in oriental language, thus lacking essential ingredients of a hundi. Consequently, the disallowance made under Section 69D of the Act was unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the provisions of section 194LBC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Tribunal noted that the originator had neither subscribed to PTCs nor made any investment in the securitisation trust, but had only provided cash collateral. The Tribunal found the facts to be identical to the case of M/s Vivriti Cibus 013 2017 v. ITO (TDS)- 2(3)(3) Mumbai [ITA No. 3171/Mum/2022]. Following this precedent, the Tribunal reasoned that for section 194LBC to apply, the income must be payable to an investor and in respect of investment in the securitisation trust. Since the originator was not an investor (as it did not hold any PTC/SDI) and the EIS was a residual amount not in respect of any investment, the conditions for TDS deduction were not met. Consequently, the assessee was held not to be under an obligation to withhold tax from the payment of EIS to the originator. The demand under section 201(1)/201(1A) of the Act was deleted. The issue regarding the invalid delivery of the CIT(A) order was implicitly addressed by proceeding to decide the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals were dismissed ex-parte due to the assessee's non-appearance. Considering the submissions and in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on the second issue. It held that the CIT(A) had misconceived the judgment in Vivek Jain vs. ACIT. The Tribunal reasoned that the phrase 'Property is let' in Section 23(1)(c) of the Act, unlike 'house is actually let' in other sub-sections, allows for vacancy allowance even if the property was not let out in the current year, provided it was let out in prior periods and remained vacant without being occupied by the assessee for self-use. The Tribunal found that the 12 units had remained vacant for the entire year under consideration due to the need for repairs and non-availability of tenants, and were not under self-occupation. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1)(c), and the addition of Rs. 40,57,200/- was directed to be deleted. The Tribunal did not explicitly address the first issue regarding the validity of reassessment proceedings in the provided excerpt, but the allowance of the appeal on the substantive issue implies that the grounds related to reassessment were either not pressed or were implicitly decided in favour of the assessee by virtue of the substantive relief granted.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals were dismissed ex-parte due to the assessee's non-appearance. Considering the submissions and in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing the principles of substantial justice over technicalities and the management's lack of awareness. The appeal was then remitted back to the CIT(A) for a detailed order on merits.
The Tribunal held that both the AO and CIT(A) failed to pass reasoned orders as they did not examine the material submitted by the assessee. The matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication after examining the evidence and providing an opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was valid as the Assessing Officer had a reasonable belief based on information received from another department officer. However, the Tribunal found that the addition on merits was not sustainable as the Assessing Officer failed to establish that the assessee had taken accommodation entries.
The tribunal noted the assessee's application and compliance with the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme and ordered the withdrawal of the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the appeal was filed within the extended limitation period granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was condoned, and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not attracted in this case. The Tribunal noted that while the stamp duty valuation authorities and the Valuation Officer determined a higher fair market value (FMV) for the property, there was no material on record to establish that the assessee had actually received consideration exceeding the Rs. 4 crores stated in the sale agreement. The Tribunal relied on the ratio of the Bombay High Court in *Fortune Hotels and Estates (P.) Ltd.*, which held that a registered sale deed with a stated consideration, and a reference to the Valuer for determination of value, does not by itself amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *CIT vs. Reliance Petro Products (P) Ltd.*. Therefore, the lower authorities were misconceived in resorting to section 50C for imposing penalty in the absence of evidence of actual receipt of higher consideration. The penalty imposed by the AO was deleted, and the CIT(A)'s order was set aside. The issue of exemption under section 54F was not expressly left undecided but was implicitly accepted as a factor by the assessee's AR.
The Tribunal noted the submission that the appeal was a duplicate and was being withdrawn. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) deleted the additions partly relying on technical defects in the assessment order, such as lack of details regarding statements and absence of cross-examination opportunity. However, the Tribunal held that additions cannot be deleted solely due to such irregularities and restored the matter to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The tribunal held that penalty under Section 271G can only be levied if there is a failure to furnish information or documents as required by a specific notice under Section 92D(3). Since no such specific notice was issued and the Revenue failed to point out specific documents not furnished, the penalty was unjustified.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before both the CIT(A) and ITAT, acknowledging the reasonable cause shown by the assessee. The Tribunal restored the issues to the file of the AO for fresh examination, allowing the assessee one more opportunity to present their case and relevant documents.
The Tribunal held that cooperative banks fall within the definition of cooperative societies. Therefore, interest income earned by a cooperative society from its investment in a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was due to a technical issue arising from having two PANs, which prevented electronic uploading. The Tribunal considered the steps taken by the assessee to rectify the issue and found the justification for the delay to be bona fide.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal in limine for delay, as the assessee's claim of receiving the assessment order on 22-01-2019 was plausible and not sufficiently rebutted by the Department. The case was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the genuineness of the transaction was not in dispute in the first round of litigation. The assessee provided purchase invoices, sales invoices, delivery challans, and bank statements. One of the directors of the purchasing party also attended and confirmed the transaction.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals were dismissed ex-parte due to the assessee's non-appearance. Considering the submissions and in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeals to the file of the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that a cooperative bank falls within the definition of a cooperative society. Therefore, interest earned by the assessee (a cooperative society) from its investments in cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The orders of the lower authorities were reversed.
The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for denovo adjudication, allowing reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not furnish sufficient details to prove the source of Rs. 6 lakhs, which was explained as past savings and gifts. Considering the interest of natural justice, the assessee was granted one more opportunity to present the case.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the initial burden by providing relevant documentary evidence for the cash sales. The AO failed to disprove these documents, relying instead on assumptions and presumptions.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not afforded adequate opportunity to furnish necessary documents before the CIT(A). Therefore, the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after allowing the assessee to present evidence.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should be given one more opportunity to present their case, admitting additional evidence. The CIT(A) was directed to consider the additional evidence and decide the issue on merits. A cost of Rs. 5,000 was imposed on the assessee for non-compliance.
The Tribunal found that while the assessee failed to submit all required documents before the AO and CIT(A), documents were submitted before the Tribunal. The Tribunal deemed it appropriate to remit the matter back to the CIT(A) to provide the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal decided that the appeals filed by the assessee for assessment years 2008-09 and 2009-10 are to be dismissed as withdrawn. The reasoning is based on the assessee's voluntary decision to opt for the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, and the subsequent filing of a declaration under Form No. 1. The assessee formally requested the withdrawal of the appeals on this ground. The revenue did not raise any objection to this request. Therefore, the Tribunal acceded to the assessee's request. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeals as withdrawn. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the NFAC dismissed the appeal ex-parte due to the assessee's failure to attend hearings, despite the assessee providing an affidavit explaining that notices were not sent to the updated email address. The Tribunal found it appropriate to remit the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's ground regarding additions under Section 69, finding that the CIT(A) correctly held the transactions were recorded in books. Regarding depreciation, the Tribunal found the assessee provided supporting documents and the CIT(A)'s deletion was justified.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had settled the dispute under the VSVS Scheme and made the required payment. Consequently, the appeal was treated as withdrawn and dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law as they were initiated on a re-appraisal of existing facts and without any allegation of failure to disclose material facts. The reassessment notice and the subsequent assessment order were quashed.