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158 tribunal orders from the Jabalpur bench in 2022.
Showing 40 of 158 orders. Use the months below for the rest.
The Tribunal is rectifying minor errors in its previous order to ensure accuracy and clarity. These corrections do not alter the substantive outcome of the appeal.
The Tribunal has corrected a minor typographical error in the date of hearing of the appeal. The substantive decision of the appeal, which was pronounced on 29/11/2022, remains unchanged.
The Principal Commissioner (PCIT) invoked revisionary powers under Section 263, finding that the AO had failed to verify the source of the cash deposit and that the IDS declaration did not explicitly mention cash. The Tribunal upheld the PCIT's order, finding that the AO's assessment lacked proper inquiry.
The Tribunal held that the AO had not conducted proper enquiry regarding Section 56(2)(vii)(b) and that the Principal CIT's order was justified in principle. However, the Tribunal modified the Principal CIT's order, stating that a de novo assessment was not required.
The Tribunal held that the Additional Commissioner had jurisdiction to act as the Assessing Officer, and challenges to jurisdiction must be raised through administrative routes, not appellate proceedings. Several additions made by the AO were upheld, while some relief was granted on specific disallowances.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to conduct necessary inquiries regarding the cash deposits and withdrawals, especially the purpose and subsequent return of funds to the firm. The Pr. CIT's order under Section 263 was therefore justified.
The Tribunal held that the addition under section 69 was not sustainable as the assessee had provided purchase bills and the source of payment was reflected in audited accounts. Regarding section 80-IA, the Tribunal held that the assessee was eligible for deduction as the power plant was used for captive consumption, but the quantum of deduction required determination by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the Additional Commissioner had jurisdiction to act as the Assessing Officer, as per statutory notifications and amendments. It also upheld additions related to soybean seed shortage, debit notes, hamali expenses, and disallowance of entry tax and penalties.
The tribunal decided to correct specific errors and omissions in its prior order to ensure accuracy. These corrections involve minor textual amendments to improve clarity and precision in the judgment.
The tribunal decided to correct specific errors and omissions in its prior order to ensure accuracy. These corrections involve minor textual amendments to improve clarity and precision in the judgment.
The Tribunal decided to correct minor errors and omissions in its previous order to ensure accuracy and clarity. These corrections do not alter the substantive findings or prejudice either party.
The Tribunal is rectifying minor clerical errors in its previous order to ensure accuracy. The corrections involve adding specific phrases and placing other words in parentheses to clarify the original intent of the judgment.
The Tribunal held that the remuneration paid to the retiring partner up to the date of retirement was allowable. The partnership deed incorporated the provisions of Section 40(b), and the remuneration was calculated based on book profits for the period the partner was active.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to communicate his changed address to the revenue, and therefore, notices were rightly sent to the last known address. The assessee was afforded sufficient opportunities to present his case, and his allegations of non-receipt of notices were found to be without merit.
The Tribunal held that Section 54F allows exemption for the purchase of a residential house, and the CIT(A) erred in allowing exemption only for the constructed area. The Tribunal remanded the matter for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found the factual determination of the land's distance from the municipality to be indeterminate. Therefore, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that additions under section 143(1) are limited in scope and cannot be made for debatable issues, especially in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court decision supporting the addition. The Explanations inserted by the Finance Act, 2021, were considered prospective, not retrospective, for the assessment years in question.
The Tribunal held that additions under section 143(1) are limited in scope and cannot be made for debatable issues, especially in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court decision supporting the addition. The Explanations inserted by the Finance Act, 2021, were considered prospective, not retrospective, for the assessment years in question.
The Tribunal held that the addition could not be made under section 143(1) as it involved a debatable issue and there was no decision by the jurisdictional High Court on the matter. The Explanations to sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were considered prospective and not applicable to the assessment year in question.
The Tribunal held that adjustments under Section 143(1)(a) are limited and debatable issues cannot be decided at this stage. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, inserted by the Finance Act, 2021, were intended as prospective amendments and do not apply retrospectively to the assessment years in question.
The Tribunal held that adjustments under Section 143(1)(a) are limited and debatable issues cannot be decided at this stage. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were intended as prospective amendments, not retrospective.
The Tribunal held that additions under Section 143(1) are limited to non-debatable issues. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were intended to be prospective, not retrospective, and therefore could not sustain the addition for the relevant assessment year.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late filing fee under Section 234E is valid, even for periods prior to the effective date of Section 200A, as Section 234E itself creates the charge. Since the statements in this case were filed after 01/06/2015, the processing under the amended Section 200A was permissible.
The Tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The charging section is Section 234E, and the fee could be levied even prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c). Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The Tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The charging section is Section 234E, and the fee could be levied even before the machinery provision came into effect. Since the statements were filed after June 1, 2015, the levy was upheld.
The Tribunal held that additions under Section 143(1) are not permissible for debatable issues, especially in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court decision. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were held to be prospective, not retrospective.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.