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969 tribunal orders from the Jabalpur bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
The exercise of a power must be referable to a jurisdiction that validates it, not one that would render it nugatory. Provisions concerning the machinery for assessment must be interpreted to make the tax charge effective.
Taxing statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless a clear contrary intention for retrospective application is evident. The law applicable for determining tax liability is that which stands on the first day of the assessment year, following the principle that law looks forward, not backward (lex prospicit non respicit).
The Madras High Court has upheld the validity of the levy of fees under Section 234E and penalties under Section 271H, finding the charging provision to be Section 234E, with the power to levy existing from 01/07/2012.
Section 271 of the Income-tax Act, being a penal provision, must be construed strictly and narrowly. The case also initially held that a clarificatory amendment was not retrospectively applicable, a view later reversed by a larger bench.
The fee under Section 234E for late filing of TDS/TCS statements cannot be levied retrospectively by processing an intimation under Section 200A for defaults occurring before the amendment allowing such processing.
The imposition of fees for late filing of TDS/TCS returns prior to the Finance Act, 2015 amendments was not illegal, and the Rajasthan High Court found no justification to interfere with such compensatory fees.
The law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India, and decisions of a High Court are binding on subordinate courts and tribunals within its jurisdiction but not on courts or tribunals outside its jurisdiction.
An Income-tax Tribunal, operating anywhere in the country, must respect and follow the law laid down by any High Court, even if it is a non-jurisdictional High Court, as long as there is no contrary decision from another High Court on that specific legal point. The law declared by such a High Court is considered the final law of the land for the Tribunal.
The rule of strict construction applies to a taxing provision that creates a charge for tax, but machinery provisions for making assessments are interpreted liberally. This distinction ensures that while the tax burden is clearly established, procedural aspects are construed to facilitate tax collection.
The strict rule of construction applies only to taxing provisions that create a charge for tax liability. It does not apply to machinery provisions that facilitate the assessment, collection, and recovery of tax.
Substantive law is concerned with the ends of justice, while procedural law deals with the means to attain them. Procedural changes do not affect substantive rights.
For income-tax notices, particularly under Section 34(1) of the 1922 Act (corresponding to Sections 147/148 of the 1961 Act), there is no real distinction between the 'issue' and 'service' of a notice. The word 'issued' must be given a wider meaning, effectively encompassing 'served'.
Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which levies a fee for delayed filing of TDS statements, is intra vires the Constitution. However, this fee cannot be levied for statements filed prior to June 1, 2015.
The Income-Tax Act, 1961, as amended on April 1, of any financial year, applies to the assessment of that year, and amendments coming into force after April 1 would not apply.
A non-jurisdictional High Court judgment is generally binding on the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, even if it conflicts with a Special Bench decision.
Machinery provisions in tax law are interpreted to give effect to legislative intent and make the charge effective. The view that appeals to judicial conscience prevails.
Non-consideration of a decision by a jurisdictional High Court or the Supreme Court constitutes a mistake apparent from the record. However, non-consideration of a non-jurisdictional High Court decision does not typically amount to such a mistake.
Rectification under Section 154 is permissible based on a subsequent judgment of the Jurisdictional High Court or the Supreme Court. Such a judgment clarifies the law as it always stood, thereby revealing a mistake apparent from the record.
Employees' contributions to welfare funds, such as provident fund, are not allowable as a deduction under section 36(1)(va) if deposited beyond the due date prescribed under the respective welfare statutes, even by a single day. Such delayed deposits are not cured even if made before the income-tax return filing due date.
Belated remittance of employees' contribution to ESI and PF, even if deposited before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1), is not allowed as a deduction. This disallowance falls under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x), as Section 43B applies only to employer's contributions.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal held that the addition based on estimated differential production/sales for the block period of six assessment years (AY 2009-10 to 2014-15) was not permissible. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in 'PCIT Vs Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd.' (2023) 454 ITR 212 (SC), which held that assessments stemming from search actions must be grounded on incriminating material with a direct, year-wise connection. In the absence of such material for each of the six assessment years, the extrapolation of incriminating material to multiple years was unlawful. Therefore, the six appeals by the Revenue concerning these years were dismissed. Regarding the addition for the search year (AY 2015-16) on account of excess stock valuation, the Tribunal found that the AO had correctly brought to tax the suppressed value/under-valuation of inventory. The CIT(A)'s deletion of this addition was set aside as being devoid of facts and merits, and the addition was restored. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal for AY 2015-16 was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the addition based on estimated differential production/sales for the block period of six assessment years (AY 2009-10 to 2014-15) was not permissible. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in 'PCIT Vs Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd.' (2023) 454 ITR 212 (SC), which held that assessments stemming from search actions must be grounded on incriminating material with a direct, year-wise connection. In the absence of such material for each of the six assessment years, the extrapolation of incriminating material to multiple years was unlawful. Therefore, the six appeals by the Revenue concerning these years were dismissed. Regarding the addition for the search year (AY 2015-16) on account of excess stock valuation, the Tribunal found that the AO had correctly brought to tax the suppressed value/under-valuation of inventory. The CIT(A)'s deletion of this addition was set aside as being devoid of facts and merits, and the addition was restored. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal for AY 2015-16 was allowed.
The Tribunal upheld the rejection of the assessee's books of accounts under Section 145(3) due to the non-maintenance and non-production of essential records like stock/inventory registers and purchase/sales ledgers, citing precedents like Dhondiram Dalichand Vs CIT, Bastiram Narayandas Vs CIT, and Kachwala Gems Vs Jt. CIT. However, the Tribunal found the estimation of net profit (NP) at 14.72% by the AO and its restriction to 8% by the CIT(A) to be ad-hoc and lacking rationale. It set aside this estimation and directed the AO to determine the NP based on the simple average NP earned by the assessee in the five assessment years preceding AY 2017-18, with a further direction that no addition would be permissible if the re-computed NP fell below the declared NP. Regarding the addition of ₹32,50,800 on account of sundry creditors, the Tribunal, citing CIT Vs Jansampark Advertising & Marketing (P) Ltd., granted the assessee one more opportunity to furnish necessary evidence and explanations regarding the nature and source of the change in audited figures, restoring this issue for verification.
The Tribunal held that for the six assessment years (AY 2009-10 to 2014-15) falling within the block period, the Revenue was unlawful in drawing extrapolated presumptions about incriminating material. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in PCIT Vs Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd., which mandates that assessments stemming from search actions must be grounded on incriminating material with a direct, year-wise connection. In the absence of such material for each of these six years, no addition is permissible under Section 153A. Consequently, the additions made on the estimation of net profit attributable to unaccounted production/sale were set aside, and the six assessment orders were quashed. The Revenue's appeals for these years were dismissed. Regarding the addition for the search year (AY 2015-16) on account of excess stock valuation, the Tribunal found merit in the Revenue's ground. It observed that the AO had correctly identified a discrepancy in the valuation of physical stock as against the value recorded in the books, based on the DVO's report. The CIT(A)'s deletion was considered to have overlooked the valuation aspect and focused on quantitative details. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s adjudication, restoring the addition of the differential value of stock in terms of the assessment order. The Revenue's appeal for this year was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the ex-parte dismissal of the assessee's appeal by the CIT(A) could not be sustained. The Tribunal noted that the first eight notices issued by the CIT(A) fell within the period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the exclusion period directed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, which provided sufficient reason for the assessee's inability to respond. Furthermore, for the subsequent notices, the assessee had provided reasons such as the severe illness and hospitalization of his counsel and a personal accident. While acknowledging the CIT(A)'s mandate to dispose of old pending cases, the Tribunal emphasized that this should not come at the cost of violating the principles of natural justice. Relying on the judgments of the Delhi High Court in CIT Vs Jansampark Advertising & Marketing (P) Ltd. and the Supreme Court in Raheem Shah & ANR Vs Govind Singh & Ors., the Tribunal stated that a justice-oriented approach should be adopted. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for adjudication de novo, directing the CIT(A) to decide the taxability of capital gains and the deductibility of the exemption claimed in accordance with the law, ensuring compliance with Section 250(6) of the Act. The first ground of appeal was considered partly allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the addition based on estimated differential production/sales for the block period of six assessment years (AY 2009-10 to 2014-15) was not permissible. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in 'PCIT Vs Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd.' (2023) 454 ITR 212 (SC), which held that assessments stemming from search actions must be grounded on incriminating material with a direct, year-wise connection. In the absence of such material for each of the six assessment years, the extrapolation of incriminating material to multiple years was unlawful. Therefore, the six appeals by the Revenue concerning these years were dismissed. Regarding the addition for the search year (AY 2015-16) on account of excess stock valuation, the Tribunal found that the AO had correctly brought to tax the suppressed value/under-valuation of inventory. The CIT(A)'s deletion of this addition was set aside as being devoid of facts and merits, and the addition was restored. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal for AY 2015-16 was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the facts and circumstances of the present case were identical to those in the Assessment Year 2018-19, for which a Co-ordinate Bench had previously decided the issue. The Tribunal referred to the co-ordinate bench's observation that the CIT(A) had rationally arrived at the basis of working unaccounted sales and, relying on jurisdictional High Court decisions, concluded that only the profit element embedded in unaccounted sales should be taxed. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s findings for AY 2018-19. Since the Departmental Representative did not point out any change in facts for the current assessment years, the Tribunal, in light of the Division Bench's decision for AY 2018-19 and 2019-20, deemed it appropriate to restore the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. The AO is directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and decide the issue afresh in light of the Division Bench's order in the assessee's own case. The grounds raised in both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the facts and circumstances of the present case were identical to those in the Assessment Year 2018-19, for which a Co-ordinate Bench had previously decided the issue. The Tribunal referred to the co-ordinate bench's observation that the CIT(A) had rationally arrived at the basis of working unaccounted sales and, relying on jurisdictional High Court decisions, concluded that only the profit element embedded in unaccounted sales should be taxed. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s findings for AY 2018-19. Since the Departmental Representative did not point out any change in facts for the current assessment years, the Tribunal, in light of the Division Bench's decision for AY 2018-19 and 2019-20, deemed it appropriate to restore the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration. The AO is directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and decide the issue afresh in light of the Division Bench's order in the assessee's own case. The grounds raised in both appeals were allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeal ex-parte. The assessee contended that notices from the Ld. CIT(A) were not received, preventing them from representing their case. The Tribunal acknowledged that appellate proceedings should ordinarily be decided after providing a reasonable and effective opportunity of hearing, and the right of appeal is a substantive legal right. Depriving an assessee of this right due to non-appearance, especially when there's an explanation of non-receipt of notices, is not permissible. The issues raised by the assessee, concerning the Rs. 1,00,000 expenditure addition and the Rs. 9,30,000 addition under Section 50C (including the opportunity under Section 50C(2)), required examination on merits. Since the Ld. CIT(A) had not decided the matter on merits, the Tribunal, to sub-serve the principles of natural justice, set aside the impugned order. The appeal was restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) to be decided afresh by way of a speaking order on merits after the assessee co-operates and furnishes relevant evidence. The grounds raised were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer were primarily on two counts: the alleged difference in turnover and the alleged unexplained cash deposits. The assessee contended that the turnover difference arose from the AO's erroneous comparison of bank credits (Rs. 1,84,50,445/-) with declared sales (Rs. 96,03,650/-). The assessee also claimed that cash deposits were out of business transactions recorded in the books of accounts. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had furnished some explanation regarding cash deposits and turnover, which should have been verified by the AO. In the absence of such verification by the lower authorities, the assessee's claims remained unverifiable. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the assessment to the AO for fresh assessment, directing the assessee to furnish all material evidence. The grounds raised were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay of 62 days in filing the appeal, finding that the reasons provided, supported by a medical certificate, constituted 'sufficient & bonafide cause' preventing the appellant from filing in time, relying on the jurisdictional High Court decision in 'Neel Kumar Ajmera Vs PCIT'. Regarding the rejection of the registration application, the Tribunal held that the rejection was predominantly due to the want of evidential documents and the appellant's failure to explain the fulfillment of conditions for registration under Section 10(23C)(ii). The Tribunal noted that the non-compliance was accidental and undeliberate. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) for de-novo consideration. The assessee is to be granted an effective opportunity to adduce fresh documents as directed by the CIT(E) and to rectify the application if law permits. The Tribunal explicitly stated it was not commenting on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for regular registration under Section 80G(5) and the cancellation of its provisional registration were unjustified due to a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that as per Clause (ii)(b)(B) of the 2nd proviso to Section 80G(5) of the Act read with the proviso to Rule 11AA(5) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, the CIT(E) was duty-bound to provide an opportunity in the form of a show-cause notice before rejecting the application and cancelling the provisional registration. The judgment stated that the assessee was not confronted with the negative findings forming the basis of the rejection. The notice issued was considered insufficient, not providing a real, reasonable, and effective opportunity, nor a reasonable period of not less than fifteen clear days. Citing the Supreme Court's pronouncements that if a statute provides a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done so, and the Patna High Court's decision, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order. The matter was remanded to the CIT(E) to provide the appellant with three opportunities to refute the reasons for rejection and cancellation. The merits of the case were not commented upon.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal ex-parte. While acknowledging the CIT(A)'s constraint to dispose of the appeal due to CBDT guidelines for prompt disposal of old pending appeals, the Tribunal found that the proceedings suffered from a violation of the principles of natural justice. This was due to the absence of evidential material, written submissions, and assistance from the assessee. The Tribunal relied on the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT Vs Jansampark Advertising & Marketing (P) Ltd. and the Supreme Court's judgment in Raheem Shah & ANR Vs Govind Singh & Ors., emphasizing a justice-oriented approach over a rigid technical one. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication on merits, with a direction to consider evidential material, written submissions, and explanations from the assessee, and to pass a speaking order in terms of Section 250(6) of the Act. No comment was made on the merits of the additions.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC had issued five hearing notices to the assessee, allowing only six days for compliance, which is less than the reasonable period of at least fifteen clear days. The NFAC proceeded ex-parte without evidential material, written submissions, or assistance from the assessee, and without remanding the case to the AO, despite the proviso to Section 251(1)(a) of the Act. Relying on the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT Vs Jansampark Advertising & Marketing (P) Ltd., the Tribunal found that appellate authorities are duty-bound to remit files for fresh adjudication when assessments are carried out without reference to evidence. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the AO for de-novo adjudication, directing the AO to frame the assessment afresh on merits after considering evidential material, written submissions, and the assessee's explanation, and to pass a speaking order. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it was not commenting on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding that the reasons provided by the assessee, relating to pre-board examinations, constituted a 'sufficient and bonafide cause' and were neither intentional nor deliberate, citing the jurisdictional High Court decision in 'Neel Kumar Ajmera Vs PCIT'. On the substantive issue, the Tribunal noted that the Commissioner rejected the registration application primarily due to the lack of evidential documents and the assessee's failure to explain the fulfillment of conditions for registration. However, the Tribunal observed that the non-compliance was accidental and undeliberate. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to grant one more effective opportunity to the assessee. The impugned order of rejection was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) for de-novo consideration. The Commissioner was directed to issue a notice for fresh consideration, allowing the assessee to furnish all required documents for verification and examination, and to provide an effective hearing opportunity. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it was not commenting on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's request to withdraw the appeal, as communicated through a letter dated 15/09/2026. The Revenue did not raise any objection to this withdrawal. After reviewing the application and finding no grounds to reject it, the Tribunal granted permission for the withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. No issues were left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal in limine as time-barred. The Tribunal noted that the NFAC incorrectly calculated the delay by referencing the date of the assessment order rather than the date of receipt of the assessment order and demand notice by the assessee, which was 17/06/2024. The Tribunal found that the actual delay was only 78-79 days, as agreed by both parties. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the NFAC failed to provide the assessee with an opportunity to explain the delay, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment was completed ex-parte without sufficient evidence. Citing the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raheem Shah & ANR Vs Govind Singh & Ors and the Delhi High Court in CIT Vs Jansampark Advertising & Marketing (P) Ltd., the Tribunal emphasized the need for a justice-oriented approach and the duty of appellate authorities to remit files for fresh adjudication when assessments are carried out without reference to evidence. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer (AO) for de novo assessment, directing the AO to reframe the assessment afresh on merits, considering evidential material, written submissions, and explanations from the assessee. The issue of the delay was to be adjudicated by the NFAC, but the Tribunal opted to remand to the AO for reframing the assessment on merits.
The Tribunal permitted the withdrawal of the appeal. The reasoning was based on the assessee's explicit request to withdraw the appeal, supported by a letter dated 07/09/2026, and the Revenue's lack of objection. The Tribunal found no grounds to reject the withdrawal request. Therefore, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal considered the assessee's letter dated 07/09/2026 seeking withdrawal of the appeal. The Tribunal perused the application for withdrawal, which was received with inward number 668 on 07/09/2026. Finding no reasons to reject the request, the Tribunal permitted the withdrawal of the appeal. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the original appeal or the rectification order. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC dismissed the appeal ex-parte without sufficient time for the assessee to respond and without considering the proviso to Section 251(1)(a). The Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the case to the AO for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that the issue of cash deposits needed to be examined in conjunction with the assessee's books of account and business transactions, especially since the books were not rejected. The matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) ought to have considered the exclusion period for limitation as directed by the Supreme Court and should not have dismissed the appeal solely on grounds of delay. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the issue of addition on account of cash purchases was identical to a previous decision in the assessee's own case, which was decided in favor of the assessee.