40 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Tribunal held that additions under section 143(1) are limited in scope and cannot be made for debatable issues, especially in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court decision supporting the addition. The Explanations inserted by the Finance Act, 2021, were considered prospective, not retrospective, for the assessment years in question.
The Tribunal held that additions under section 143(1) are limited in scope and cannot be made for debatable issues, especially in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court decision supporting the addition. The Explanations inserted by the Finance Act, 2021, were considered prospective, not retrospective, for the assessment years in question.
The Tribunal held that the addition could not be made under section 143(1) as it involved a debatable issue and there was no decision by the jurisdictional High Court on the matter. The Explanations to sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were considered prospective and not applicable to the assessment year in question.
The Tribunal held that additions under Section 143(1) are limited to non-debatable issues. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were intended to be prospective, not retrospective, and therefore could not sustain the addition for the relevant assessment year.
The Tribunal held that adjustments under Section 143(1)(a) are limited and debatable issues cannot be decided at this stage. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were intended as prospective amendments, not retrospective.
The Tribunal held that adjustments under Section 143(1)(a) are limited and debatable issues cannot be decided at this stage. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, inserted by the Finance Act, 2021, were intended as prospective amendments and do not apply retrospectively to the assessment years in question.
The Tribunal held that additions under Section 143(1) are not permissible for debatable issues, especially in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court decision. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were held to be prospective, not retrospective.
The Tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The charging section is Section 234E, and the fee could be levied even before the machinery provision came into effect. Since the statements were filed after June 1, 2015, the levy was upheld.
The Tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The charging section is Section 234E, and the fee could be levied even prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c). Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the levy of late filing fee under Section 234E is valid, even for periods prior to the effective date of Section 200A, as Section 234E itself creates the charge. Since the statements in this case were filed after 01/06/2015, the processing under the amended Section 200A was permissible.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The Tribunal held that additions under Section 143(1) are not permissible for debatable issues, especially in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court decision. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were held to be prospective, not retrospective.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The tribunal held that Section 200A is a machinery provision and does not confer substantive power. The levy of fee under Section 234E is valid even for periods prior to the introduction of Section 200A(1)(c), as the charging section existed. Since the statements were filed after 01/06/2015, the levy was upheld.
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct adequate inquiry into the source of cash deposits and the genuineness of agricultural income. The assessment order lacked specific findings on these crucial aspects.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue failed to discharge its burden of proving the revision order was passed within the prescribed time limit. Consequently, the revision order and the subsequent assessment were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue failed to discharge its burden of proving the revision order was passed within the prescribed time limit. Consequently, the revision order and the subsequent assessment were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s method of calculating the average profit flawed as it included the year under assessment. While agreeing with the principle of averaging past profits, the Tribunal modified the estimated gross profit rates for both assessment years to provide some allowance for the decline in disclosed profits.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to apply his mind and conduct proper inquiries regarding the source and capacity of the creditor, rendering the assessment erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The Pr. CIT's order to set aside the assessment for de novo consideration was upheld.
The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s method of calculating the average profit flawed as it included the year under assessment. While agreeing with the principle of averaging past profits, the Tribunal modified the estimated gross profit rates for both assessment years to provide some allowance for the decline in disclosed profits.
The Tribunal held that adjustments under Section 143(1)(a) are limited in scope and cannot decide debatable issues. The Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were considered prospective, not retrospective, for the assessment year in question. Therefore, the disallowance made under Section 143(1) was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the additions made under Section 154 were not justified as the Explanations to Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, were prospective and not retrospective. Therefore, the disallowance for the assessment year in question was incorrect.
The Tribunal decided to correct minor typographical errors in its previous order. These corrections do not alter the substance of the original decision or prejudice either party.