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1,031 orders · Page 7 of 21
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not addressed the jurisdictional issue of the validity of reassessment proceedings, specifically regarding the notice under Section 143(2). Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the CIT(A) to decide this legal issue first.
The Tribunal admitted the additional ground concerning the jurisdiction for faceless assessment. Since this issue was not considered by the lower authorities, the case was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 147 were bad in law and void ab initio, quashing the same. The Tribunal found that the AO's belief of escapement of income was formed mechanically without establishing any live, rational, or proximate connection between the information received and the alleged escapement of income. The Tribunal also noted several procedural defects, including the material relied upon not being provided to the assessee, the response to the show cause notice not being considered, a variance between the show cause notice and the assessment order, and the invocation of Section 147 when Section 153C might have been applicable. On merits, the Tribunal found that the AO treated purchases as bogus but accepted sales figures without rejecting the books of account, violating the principle of approbate and reprobate and the doctrine of real income. The Tribunal also held that Section 69C could not be applied as the Revenue failed to prove that expenditure was incurred and not proved by the assessee, especially when the assessee had provided voluminous supporting documents that were not adversely commented upon by the AO. The AO's selective disallowance of purchases while accepting sales and closing stock was also found to be unreasonable and illogical. Therefore, the additions made by the AO and sustained by the NFAC were liable to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without hearing the assessee, despite opportunities granted. The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee did not file submissions before the Ld. CIT(A). However, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it proper to restore the issue to the file of the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(A) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim and decide the issue on merits as per facts and law. The assessee was also directed to appear before the Ld. CIT(A) and cooperate in the proceedings. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the finding of the Ld. CIT(A) was clear and categorical. The Tribunal agreed with the Ld. CIT(A) that Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be invoked unless the assessee has actually received cash or an amount which it fails to explain to the satisfaction of the AO. In this case, the sale proceeds were merely book entries, and no actual amount was received by the assessee. Therefore, the addition made under Section 68 was not sustainable. The Tribunal found the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) to be a speaking order and did not require any interference. The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the rights of natural justice of the assessee were violated as the impugned order under section 12AB(1)(b)(ii) was passed without providing an adequate opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had drawn unilateral conclusions without affording the appellant an opportunity to be heard. The right to an adequate opportunity of being heard is a fundamental right in all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Recognizing that no litigant benefits from the non-prosecution of their case, and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit the matter back to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for re-adjudication de novo, in accordance with law, and by passing a speaking order. The assessee was directed to comply with all statutory notices. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal by quashing the order under section 147 dated 03.02.2025, which was based on an invalid order under section 148A(d) dated 18.04.2023. The Tribunal found force in the assessee's argument that there was no material on record with the AO at the time of passing the order under section 148A(d) to suggest any escapement of income by the assessee. The Tribunal relied on coordinate bench decisions in CO No.08/Del/2025 (B.C. Enterprises) and ITA No.3454/Del/2025 (J. H. S Svendgaard Laboratories Pvt. Ltd.), which held that 148A(d) orders cannot be based on fishing inquiries and require live material connecting the material with the assessee's concealment. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court's decision in Sonansh Creations Pvt. Ltd. was also cited, stating that allegations of escapement of income must be based on cogent evidence. The Tribunal held that the jurisdictional conditions for section 147/148 were absent. Consequently, ground of appeal no.2 was allowed. All other grounds on merits were rendered academic and kept open. The operative direction was to quash the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the addition of ₹6,59,025/- made under Section 69A of the Act was unsustainable. The assessment order indicated that the addition was based on incriminating material found during a search in the case of Pavel Garg and family, and subsequent investigations involving M/s Combitic Global Caplet Private Limited and a statement from Shri Rakesh Prasad. However, the Tribunal observed that the assessment order did not reference any specific incriminating material or relevant extracts from Shri Rakesh Prasad's statement that implicated the assessee. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the alleged incriminating material and statement were not provided to the assessee, despite a specific request, thus violating the principles of natural justice. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Andaman Timber Industries Vs. CCE, the Tribunal stated that such a failure is a serious flaw that renders the order a nullity. Consequently, the addition was directed to be deleted, and the impugned order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities, including running guest houses and hostels, had previously been decided by the Tribunal to be charitable and not business. Following precedents, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant the registration and approval.
The Tribunal upheld the NFAC's decision to delete the additions. It found that the NFAC correctly reconciled the foreign remittances based on audited financial statements and that the assessee had discharged its onus regarding the unsecured loan by providing the lender's confirmation and ITR.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's activities, including running guest houses and hostels, had previously been decided by the Tribunal to be charitable and not business. Following precedents, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant the registration and approval.
The Tribunal held that the issues in dispute needed to be re-examined by the CIT(E) afresh. This was to be done after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard and verifying all documents, including a General Agreement that was not available to the CIT(E) during the initial assessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, finding reasonable cause supported by evidence. The matters were remitted back to the CIT(A) to decide the condonation of delay and adjudicate the appeals on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the ITAT, finding reasonable cause supported by evidence. The matters were remitted back to the CIT(A) to decide the condonation of delay and adjudicate the appeals on merits.
The Tribunal followed its own previous order in the assessee's own case, which held that development fees collected for specific capital expenditure should be treated as corpus receipts under Section 11(1)(d). Therefore, the CIT(A)'s decision to treat the fund as corpus was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the assessee deserved one more opportunity of being heard, as the CIT(A) had not given any finding on merit. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the non-issuance of a mandatory notice under section 143(2) is fatal to the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147 were vitiated due to the AO's wrong application of mind and incorrect reasons for reopening. Consequently, the assessment was quashed as void ab initio. The penalty under section 271(1)(c) was also deleted as it was based on the now-deleted quantum additions.
The tribunal found that its earlier order had already reversed the PCIT's Section 263 revision directions, which formed the sole basis for the impugned consequential assessment. Therefore, the tribunal held that the consequential assessment had no legal standing and quashed it.
The Tribunal held that the rectification sought was a correction of a mistake apparent from the record, not a fresh claim. The Assessing Officer and CIT(A) erred in rejecting the rectification application on technical grounds, particularly by misapplying the Goetze (India) Ltd. decision.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147 were vitiated due to the AO's wrong application of mind and incorrect reasons for reopening. Consequently, the assessment was quashed as void ab initio. The penalty under section 271(1)(c) was also deleted as it was based on the now-deleted quantum additions.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee's explanation that the jewellery was old, ancestral, gifted, and within reasonable limits as per CBDT circulars and social customs. The additions made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A) were deleted.
The Tribunal held that the final assessment order dated 24.11.2021 was passed after the statutory limitation period. The DRP directions were uploaded on 29.09.2021. As per section 144C(13) of the Act, the Assessing Officer is required to complete the assessment within one month from the end of the month in which the directions are received. Therefore, the last date for completion of the assessment was 31.10.2021. Since the AO passed the final assessment order on 24.11.2021, it was beyond the prescribed time limit and thus barred by limitation. The Tribunal relied on the co-ordinate bench decision in ITA No. 1733/Del/2022 (Honda R and D India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT), which dealt with a similar issue of time-barred assessment in the context of faceless assessment. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the final assessment order dated 24.11.2021 as being void and without jurisdiction. Ground No. 3 of the appeal was accepted, and other grounds were left undecided as they became academic. The additional ground regarding the absence of DIN was not explicitly decided as the appeal was allowed on limitation.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147 were vitiated due to the AO's wrong application of mind and incorrect reasons for reopening. Consequently, the assessment was quashed as void ab initio. The penalty under section 271(1)(c) was also deleted as it was based on the now-deleted quantum additions.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) rejected the registration application on a technical ground of misrepresentation without examining the genuineness of the charitable activities. The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for a decision on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) rejected the application for registration and approval due to the absence of donor confirmations, evidence of charitable activities (photographs/bills), details of beneficiaries, details of recipient trusts, and particulars relating to 'Social Activities' expenditure. The Tribunal found that the applicant needed one more effective opportunity to submit these documents. Therefore, the impugned orders of the CIT(E) were set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(E) for deciding afresh. The assessee was directed to make necessary detailed submissions before the CIT(E). The Tribunal allowed the appeals for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) rejected the application for registration and approval due to the absence of donor confirmations, evidence of charitable activities (photographs/bills), details of beneficiaries, details of recipient trusts, and particulars relating to 'Social Activities' expenditure. The Tribunal found that the applicant needed one more effective opportunity to submit these documents. Therefore, the impugned orders of the CIT(E) were set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(E) for deciding afresh. The assessee was directed to make necessary detailed submissions before the CIT(E). The Tribunal allowed the appeals for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that a penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed solely on the basis of disallowance of expenditure. A definite finding of concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars is required, which was absent here.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition, finding it unsustainable due to internal contradictions, lack of corroborative evidence, and the fact that CCM is a facility approved by SEBI for rectifying genuine punching errors. The AO failed to establish the assessee as the beneficiary or provide evidence of cash exchange.
The ITAT observed that the CIT(A) confirmed the addition without adequately considering the reconciliation statements, audited financial statements, and other supporting documents filed by the assessee. Consequently, the tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee with an adequate opportunity to present its case.
The ITAT condoned the 369-day delay, finding sufficient cause and emphasizing the principle of natural justice. The case was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, directing the CIT(A) to provide adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the AO's disallowance under Section 40A(3) was not legally tenable as it was made without specific findings or pointing out specific violations. The Tribunal affirmed the co-terminous powers of the CIT(A), stating that the CIT(A) can examine any matter connected with the assessment. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s action of rejecting the books of account under Section 145(3) and applying a net profit rate of 6% on gross receipts was upheld. The Tribunal reasoned that the deeming provision of Section 40A(3) never came into operation because the AO lacked the necessary details to trigger it. The Tribunal also noted that the reasoning of the CIT(A) might be legally unsound, but the approach was not faulted. Regarding Ground No. 4 concerning depreciation, no arguments were advanced by either party, and it was dismissed as not pressed. The appeal of the Department was dismissed.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's grievance regarding the AO's finding of no documentary evidence needed verification. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity to be heard and submit evidence.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeal against the AO's order, which made an addition of Rs. 31,81,47,710/- under Section 69A on a protective basis. It was also noted that a substantive addition of the same amount was made against Shri Ravinder Manohar Chavan. Crucially, the Tribunal observed that in the appeal filed by Shri Ravinder Manohar Chavan, the CIT(A), by an order dated 24.07.2025, had set aside the ex-parte assessment order and directed the AO to pass a fresh assessment order. In light of these material facts and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to set aside both the impugned order of the CIT(A) dated 07.11.2025 and the assessment order of the AO dated 19.03.2025. The matter was restored to the file of the AO for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. All grounds of appeal were left open for adjudication. The Tribunal did not decide on the substantive issues raised by the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings were bad in law. This was due to the AO issuing notices at an incorrect address and failing to comply with the proviso to Section 148A, rendering the assumption of jurisdiction a nullity.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had made perverse findings of fact and passed a cryptic, non-speaking order. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 252 days in filing the appeal, finding the assessee's justification for the delay to be adequate and unintentional. The Tribunal was satisfied with the explanation that the delay was bona fide and due to circumstances beyond the appellant's control, noting that no litigant benefits from intentionally delaying their own matters. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal held that in the interest of justice, the matter deserved to be remitted back to the Assessing Officer for re-adjudication de novo. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities, emphasizing that the Assessing Officer is the fulcrum of assessment proceedings and possesses the primary responsibility to examine facts. The AO was directed to provide opportunities for being heard to the assessee, who would be bound to comply with notices, with any non-compliance being viewed adversely. The Tribunal referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in TIN box 249 ITR 216.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in upholding the Assessing Officer's order. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had furnished bank account statements to demonstrate the source of funds for credit card payments. The Tribunal found that these statements were ignored by the Assessing Officer and subsequently by the CIT(A). The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and allowed the appeal of the assessee. The reasoning was based on the failure to consider the evidence presented by the assessee regarding the source of funds. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee's evidence demonstrating the source of funds for credit card payments, if properly furnished, must be considered by the revenue authorities. The operative direction is to set aside the CIT(A)'s order and allow the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeal in limine due to a 23-day delay in filing, which was not condoned. The reason for the delay was stated to be a lack of communication between the assessee and its counsel, and an issue with uploading particulars of one party due to inadequate space on the portal. The assessee had requested the matter be restored to the file of the AO. Considering these facts and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(A) and the AO. The matter was restored to the file of the AO for a fresh decision in accordance with the law, after affording a fair opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes. No specific findings were made on the merits of the additions or grounds raised by the assessee, as the matter was remitted back to the AO.
The Tribunal, while acknowledging the assessee's arguments regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and EPFO relaxations, ultimately dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal noted that while the Jodhpur Bench of the Tribunal had decided a similar issue in favour of the assessee, the jurisdictional Delhi High Court in Woodland (Aero Club) Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT had taken a contrary view. The Delhi High Court held that the Assessing Officer was justified in making the disallowance u/s 143(1) because, at the time of passing the order, the Gujarat High Court's decision in CIT v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, was in existence. The Tribunal found that the intimation u/s 143(1) was passed after the Gujarat High Court's judgment, making the disallowance legally permissible. The Tribunal rejected the assessee's arguments that the Delhi High Court's decision in Woodland (Aero Club) was per incuriam or that the issue was not final due to an SLP admitted by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal also held that the amendment to Section 29(1)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 2025 (presumably a typo and referring to Section 36(1)(va) or similar provision related to deductions) was prospective, operating from 01.04.2026, and did not alter the legal position mandated by Checkmate Services. Therefore, following the binding decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, the disallowance u/s 36(1)(va) was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening the assessment beyond three years was not in accordance with Section 151 of the Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India Vs. Rajeev Bansal. Therefore, the notice issued under Section 148 was without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee does not have a fixed place PE in India. It reasoned that the AO's reliance on the consolidated Form 10-K and website information was misplaced, as these documents pertained to the entire Donaldson group, not solely the assessee's Indian operations. The Tribunal emphasized that for a place of business to be considered at the disposal of a foreign enterprise, it must be used for carrying out the foreign enterprise's business, and mere information from a website is insufficient. The AO failed to discharge the onus of proving that the premises at Manesar, Gurgaon was at the assessee's disposal. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that DIFS is not a DAPE. It noted that DIFS's total turnover was Rs. 282 crores, with negligible sales to the assessee (Rs. 24.28 lacs) and significant overall purchases (Rs. 165 crores), establishing DIFS's economic independence. There was no evidence that DIFS had the authority to conclude contracts or habitually secured orders on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal also found the AO's reference to a clause in the license agreement flawed, as it pertained to a segment already offered to tax as royalty. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the mandatory conditions for constituting a PE or DAPE under Article 5 of the India-US DTAA were not satisfied. Since no PE or DAPE was found, the issue of profit attribution did not arise.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without considering the assessee's submissions. The issue was restored to the NFAC with a direction to decide the appeal on its merits after granting a final opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the addition made by the AO was on a ground different from the reason for which the assessment was reopened. This was found to be invalid based on High Court precedents.
The tribunal accepted the assessee's explanation, noting that the cash deposit originated from his sister. Since gifts from relatives are exempt under Section 56 of the Act, the addition of Rs. 20 lakhs was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC passed the order without giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the case was restored to the NFAC to grant one final opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 44,15,000 made by the AO and upheld by the CIT(A) was not justified. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate the genuineness of its sales activities, including cash book entries, VAT returns, and sale invoices. The Tribunal observed that the AO's contention of non-supply of documents was contradicted by the assessee's submission of replies and a certificate of production of documents before the AO. The Tribunal found that the cash deposits represented sales made prior to November 8, 2016, which were duly reflected in the assessee's books of accounts and income tax return. The Tribunal relied on several co-ordinate bench decisions, including Indowestern Commodities and Energy Trade Private Limited, DCIT vs Adarsh Kanch Udyog P. Ltd., ITO vs MOBI TRADELINK, and M/s HKT Retail Ventures Pvt. Ltd., which held that if trading results are accepted, books are not rejected, and sales are not doubted, no addition is permissible. The Tribunal concluded that accepting the sales made by the assessee and making a separate addition for cash deposits would amount to double addition. Therefore, the addition was set aside, and the AO was directed to delete the addition of Rs. 44,15,000. The issue regarding the applicability of Section 115BBE was also discussed in a cited case, indicating it applies from AY 2018-19 onwards.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC had allowed the appeal without properly considering the AO's objections regarding the admissibility of additional evidence. Therefore, the matter was restored to the AO for a fresh assessment.