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1,031 orders · Page 6 of 21
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G by the CIT(E) was erroneous. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's grounds of appeal. It reasoned that the absence of an explicit irrevocability clause in the trust deed does not necessarily mean the trust is revocable; in fact, the law often presumes irrevocability in such cases. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's trust deed contained a dissolution clause (Clause 26) and that Section 115TD of the Act, introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, addresses concerns regarding the transfer of net assets upon dissolution, thereby mitigating the apprehension of assets being transferred to other entities. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents, including the decisions of the Bombay High Court in The Chamber of Tax Consultants and Ors. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) and Ors., and its own prior rulings in similar cases. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E) and directed the CIT(E) to grant the registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assumption of jurisdiction for reassessment under Section 148A was vitiated as it was solely based on an unverified TEP without independent material. The reopening was found unsustainable in law.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 153C of the Act dated 05.09.2023 and the subsequent assessment order, issued after 01.04.2021, were bad in law and quashed them. Grounds 3 to 12 were left open as academic.
The Tribunal held that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer of the assessee was defective as it did not state that the seized documents had a bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application on a technical ground without considering the charitable nature of the assessee's activities was not appropriate. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal found that the expenses were indeed recorded in the 'repair and maintenance' ledger account and payments were made through banking channels. Therefore, the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) was not justified.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The primary reason for dismissal was the applicability of CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024, which stipulates that appeals with a tax effect below Rs. 60 lakhs should not be filed. The assessee contended that by excluding the application of Section 115BBE, as per the Madras High Court's decision in S.M.I.L.E Microfinance Ltd., the tax effect would be below the prescribed limit. The Tribunal noted that this Tribunal has consistently held on similar facts that Revenue's appeals are hit by this circular. Citing its own decisions in ITA No. 7172/Del/2025 (S.R. Timbers) and ITA No. 3497/Del/2023 (Hajurilal and Sons Jewellers Pvt. Ltd.), which followed the Madras High Court's ruling on Section 115BBE and the CBDT circular, the Tribunal found the facts of the present case to be identical. Therefore, all other grounds raised by the Revenue on merits were rendered academic. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, with a liberty to the Revenue to request recall if exceptions in the CBDT circular applied.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G by the CIT(E) was erroneous. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's grounds of appeal. It reasoned that the absence of an explicit irrevocability clause in the trust deed does not necessarily mean the trust is revocable; in fact, the law often presumes irrevocability in such cases. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's trust deed contained a dissolution clause (Clause 26) and that Section 115TD of the Act, introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, addresses concerns regarding the transfer of net assets upon dissolution, thereby mitigating the apprehension of assets being transferred to other entities. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents, including the decisions of the Bombay High Court in The Chamber of Tax Consultants and Ors. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) and Ors., and its own prior rulings in similar cases. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E) and directed the CIT(E) to grant the registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G to the assessee.
The Tribunal observed that the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on information suggesting the assessee received loans from entities alleged to be accommodation entry providers. The Ld. CIT(A) upheld the reopening, finding tangible material and due application of mind by the AO. However, on merits, the Ld. CIT(A) found that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiries into the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal noted that the assessee filed crucial details regarding the lender companies late in the proceedings. It highlighted peculiar facts about the four lender companies: they all issued Compulsory Convertible Debentures (CCDs) and raised substantial funds (ranging from INR 70.00 crores to INR 152.00 crores each), with zero interest rate value on these debentures. The Tribunal found it surprising that these companies, with no regular business activity and eroded capital, could collect interest-free funds. It also noted that the assessee company itself lacked regular business activity and creditworthiness, raising doubts about why it would receive funds from borrowed resources. The Tribunal concluded that the Ld. CIT(A) failed to make proper inquiries and that the AO was not given sufficient opportunity to rebut additional documents filed before the Ld. CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside both lower authorities' orders and remanded the matter back to the AO for proper investigation, including issuing summons under Section 133(6) if necessary.
The Tribunal held that the assessee discharged its burden under Section 68 by establishing the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction. The repayment of the loan and interest through banking channels, along with the lender being an NBFC, supported the genuineness.
The Tribunal held that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer of the assessee was defective as it did not state that the seized documents had a bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal held that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer of the assessee was defective as it did not explicitly state that the seized documents had a bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contentions regarding the aggregation of debit and credit entries. It held that a mechanical approach of adding both sides of a running ledger account is flawed and leads to double taxation. The Tribunal reasoned that the peak credit or net difference represents the actual unexplained quantum. For AY 2016-17, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the gross addition of Rs. 1,37,32,990/- and restrict the addition to the net difference of Rs. 14,42,350/-. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 4,11,990/- under Section 69C was also proportionately reduced to the net difference amount. For AY 2017-18, the Tribunal acknowledged that accommodation entries were entered into, but since the debit entry represented the credit entry of the preceding year and the differential amount of Rs. 14,42,350/- was upheld for that year, no separate addition was required. The addition for AY 2017-18 was deleted, being telescoped into the addition made for the preceding year. The Tribunal expressly left no issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer of the assessee was defective as it did not state that the seized documents had a bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal held that the right to a reasonable opportunity of being heard is a fundamental right of every taxpayer. It noted that the CIT(E) had rejected the assessee's applications for registration under section 12A and 80G on the premise of non-supply of requisite documents and a perceived failure to substantively reply to show cause notices regarding the genuineness of charitable activities. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) had rejected the applications without due consideration of facts and alluded to a non-application of mind. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E) and remitted the matters back to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication. The assessee was directed to comply with all statutory notices, with non-compliance to be viewed adversely. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that once a search is conducted, the assessment proceedings must be initiated under Section 148, as per Explanation 2 to Section 148, and a pending assessment under Section 143(3) cannot validly continue. Therefore, the assessment order passed under Section 143(3) was invalid.
The Tribunal held that the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions were established. Regarding the Rs. 3.60 crore transaction with M/s Fennie Commercial Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal noted that the lender confirmed providing share application money, which the appellant accounted for as an unsecured loan. The AO's verification of the ledger account and the lender's financial documents, including a significant share premium reserve, supported the genuineness of the transaction. The Tribunal found no evidence to negate the transaction's genuineness and stated that additions cannot be sustained on suspicion alone. Relying on CIT Vs. Fairfinvest Ltd., the Tribunal directed the deletion of the addition of Rs. 3,60,00,000/-. The Revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessees' cross-objections were not explicitly decided but were implicitly allowed by the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal held that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer of the assessee was defective as it did not state that the seized documents had a bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and restored the matter for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was to be given an adequate opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order for Assessment Year 2022-23, which was based on a search initiated on January 31, 2023, could not be sustained for the preceding year (AY 2021-22) by merely issuing a notice under section 143(2). The legislative scheme introduced by Rajesh Kumar Jain, effective from April 1, 2021, confined the erstwhile section 153A regime to searches initiated on or before March 31, 2021, and brought subsequent searches under the redesigned reassessment framework. Explanation 2(i) to section 148 expressly deems initiation of search on or after April 1, 2021, as information suggesting escaped income. Therefore, jurisdiction for the preceding year should have been assumed under sections 147 and 148, subject to their conditions. Since no notice under section 148 was issued and the assessment was completed under section 143(3), the assumption of jurisdiction was not in accordance with the statutory scheme. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed. The additions made therein could not survive independently. The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds raised by the assessee and allowed the appeal. The grounds challenging the additions on merits were rendered academic and left undecided. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objections were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions were established. Regarding the Rs. 3.60 crore transaction with M/s Fennie Commercial Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal noted that the lender confirmed providing share application money, which the appellant accounted for as an unsecured loan. The AO's verification of the ledger account and the lender's financial documents, including a significant share premium reserve, supported the genuineness of the transaction. The Tribunal found no evidence to negate the transaction's genuineness and stated that additions cannot be sustained on suspicion alone. Relying on CIT Vs. Fairfinvest Ltd., the Tribunal directed the deletion of the addition of Rs. 3,60,00,000/-. The Revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the assessees' cross-objections were not explicitly decided but were implicitly allowed by the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148, issued on March 31, 2021, and served on April 1, 2021, was bad in law. The Tribunal noted that the e-filing portal indicated the notice was issued on April 1, 2021, and served on March 31, 2021, which is an impossibility. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal, the Tribunal treated the notice as a deemed notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act. It was held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without following the due procedure prescribed under the amended Section 148A of the Act. Consequently, the reassessment order passed under Section 147 was quashed. The Tribunal allowed Grounds of Appeal No. 1 and 2. Since the legal issue was decided in favor of the assessee, the other grounds of appeal concerning the merits of the addition were not adjudicated. The Tribunal directed the AO to determine the date of issuance of the notice as per the law laid down in the Ashish Agarwal judgment and to proceed accordingly. If the date of issuance is determined to be on or after April 1, 2021, the notice will be construed as issued under Section 148A(b).
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was invalid. The primary issue was the validity of the notice issued under Section 148, which was admittedly issued beyond three years from the end of AY 2016-17. The Tribunal referred to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act, which prescribes a time limitation for reopening when the income escaping assessment is Rs. 50 lakhs or more. The Assessing Officer had alleged an escapement of Rs. 55,22,250. However, the Tribunal found that an opening balance of Rs. 15 lakhs could not be considered as income escaping assessment for the relevant previous year, as it represented a closing figure from the preceding year and was not liable for addition under Section 69. Citing Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms Pvt. Ltd (2008) and Naresh Balachander Rao Shinde vs ITO (2023), the Tribunal reasoned that excluding the Rs. 15 lakhs opening balance reduced the alleged escaped income to less than Rs. 50 lakhs. Consequently, the reopening was quashed as being in violation of Section 149(1)(b) of the Act. All other issues on merits were rendered academic.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 387 days and 660 days in filing the appeals, finding the assessee's justification of a bona fide misunderstanding of procedural requirements to be adequate. The Tribunal was satisfied with the explanation and acknowledged that no litigant benefits from intentionally delaying their own matters. Regarding the substantive issues, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had rejected the assessee's applications for registration under Section 12A and Section 80G without due consideration of the facts on record, indicating a non-application of mind. The Tribunal found that the rejection was purely on account of non-compliance, and that a reasonable opportunity of being heard is a right of every taxpayer. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E) and remitted the matters back to the CIT(E) for adjudication de novo in accordance with the law. The CIT(E) was directed to provide the assessee with a due opportunity of being heard, and the assessee was directed to comply with all statutory notices, with any non-compliance to be viewed adversely. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 387 days and 660 days in filing the appeals, finding the assessee's justification of a bona fide misunderstanding of procedural requirements to be adequate. The Tribunal was satisfied with the explanation and acknowledged that no litigant benefits from intentionally delaying their own matters. Regarding the substantive issues, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had rejected the assessee's applications for registration under Section 12A and Section 80G without due consideration of the facts on record, indicating a non-application of mind. The Tribunal found that the rejection was purely on account of non-compliance, and that a reasonable opportunity of being heard is a right of every taxpayer. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E) and remitted the matters back to the CIT(E) for adjudication de novo in accordance with the law. The CIT(E) was directed to provide the assessee with a due opportunity of being heard, and the assessee was directed to comply with all statutory notices, with any non-compliance to be viewed adversely. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer of the assessee was defective as it did not state that the seized documents had a bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C were deemed invalid.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding the assessee's justification for the delay to be adequate and unintentional, acknowledging that no litigant benefits from intentionally delaying their own matters. Regarding the penalty under Section 271(1)(c), the Tribunal noted the undisputed fact that the Assessing Officer had passed an appeal effect order on 18.02.2025, deleting the additions made in the order under Section 144/147. Consequently, there was no concealed income available for penalty on the date the penalty order under Section 271(1)(c) was passed (03.03.2025). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the lower authorities and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the penalty of Rs.17,62,147/-. For the penalty under Section 271(1)(b), the Tribunal considered the affidavits filed by the assessee, noting his lack of conversance with tax laws and dependence on professionals. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the lower authorities and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the penalty of Rs.20,000/-. The ratio decidendi for the Section 271(1)(c) penalty is that penalty cannot be levied when the basis for the penalty (concealed income) ceases to exist due to subsequent favorable appellate orders. For the Section 271(1)(b) penalty, the Tribunal exercised its discretion in the interest of justice, considering the assessee's circumstances.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, finding the assessee's justification for the delay to be adequate and unintentional, acknowledging that no litigant benefits from intentionally delaying their own matters. Regarding the penalty under Section 271(1)(c), the Tribunal noted the undisputed fact that the Assessing Officer had passed an appeal effect order on 18.02.2025, deleting the additions made in the order under Section 144/147. Consequently, there was no concealed income available for penalty on the date the penalty order under Section 271(1)(c) was passed (03.03.2025). Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the lower authorities and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the penalty of Rs.17,62,147/-. For the penalty under Section 271(1)(b), the Tribunal considered the affidavits filed by the assessee, noting his lack of conversance with tax laws and dependence on professionals. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the lower authorities and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the penalty of Rs.20,000/-. The ratio decidendi for the Section 271(1)(c) penalty is that penalty cannot be levied when the basis for the penalty (concealed income) ceases to exist due to subsequent favorable appellate orders. For the Section 271(1)(b) penalty, the Tribunal exercised its discretion in the interest of justice, considering the assessee's circumstances.
The Tribunal held that the Revenue's appeal was not maintainable due to low tax effect, as it fell below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT circulars for filing appeals before the ITAT. The appeal was dismissed on this technical ground.
The Tribunal noted the assessee's grounds regarding violation of natural justice and the lack of a show-cause notice. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the issue to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT(A) to provide three effective opportunities to the assessee.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench had restored a similar matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. In the interest of justice and to avoid contradictory findings, the Tribunal decided to follow the same course of action.
The Tribunal observed that the AO made the addition based on a difference in bills raised by the assessee and recorded by the parties. The assessee provided explanations, including credit notes, TDS, and GST amounts, along with reconciliation statements and supporting documents. However, these facts remained unverified by the AO during the assessment. Consequently, the Tribunal remanded the issue of the addition of INR 1,48,49,064/- back to the AO. The AO is directed to examine the reconciliation statements filed by the assessee for M/s Al-Ammar Frozen Foods Exports Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Mersel Foods Pvt. Ltd. The assessee is further directed to provide all necessary details and evidence, such as invoices, credit/debit notes, and TDS certificates, to reconcile the differences. The AO is to decide the issue in accordance with the law after verification. Grounds of appeal related to this issue were allowed for statistical purposes. Other grounds were rendered academic.
The Tribunal held that the grounds raised by the assessee deserved to be sustained. Regarding the addition of Rs. 6,46,76,004/- under Section 194LC, the Tribunal noted that the AO had made this disallowance in the draft assessment order but omitted it in the final assessment order, which only referred to Section 194LD. Therefore, the addition under Section 194LC could not be sustained. The Tribunal also referred to the decision in Amplus Energy Solutions Pte. Ltd., where a Coordinate Bench held that for the purpose of Section 194LD, what is important is that the security should be rupee-denominated, and the intention is to protect Indian companies from foreign exchange fluctuations. The distinction between different types of debentures (NCDs, CCDs, OCDs) was considered of no consequence as they are all debt instruments like bonds. The Tribunal found that the AO had erred in not extending the benefit of Section 194LD to NCDs. Consequently, the appeals of the assessee were allowed.
The Tribunal held that disallowing the expenditure again in AY 2024-25, after it was already disallowed in AY 2023-24, amounts to double disallowance. The deduction should be allowed in the year TDS was deducted and deposited.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide an adequate opportunity to the assessee to present their case.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the Ld. CIT(E) had passed ex-parte orders rejecting the application for registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) due to the absence of requisite evidence, and also declined approval under Section 80G for want of registration under Section 12AB. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remit both issues back to the file of the Ld. CIT(E). The CIT(E) is directed to adjudicate the matters afresh after making necessary verification, if any, and affording the assessee adequate opportunity of being heard to furnish the requisite documents and evidences. The assessee is directed to furnish complete details and evidence before the Ld. CIT(E) and cooperate with the proceedings. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the issues were being remitted for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the filing of Form 10DA is a directory requirement and not mandatory. The deduction under Section 80JJAA cannot be denied solely for the belated filing of Form 10DA, especially when it was filed before the processing of the return and no prejudice was caused to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 147 were bad in law and void ab initio, quashing the same. The Tribunal found that the AO's belief of escapement of income was formed mechanically without establishing any live, rational, or proximate connection between the information received and the alleged escapement of income. The Tribunal also noted several procedural defects, including the material relied upon not being provided to the assessee, the response to the show cause notice not being considered, a variance between the show cause notice and the assessment order, and the invocation of Section 147 when Section 153C might have been applicable. On merits, the Tribunal found that the AO treated purchases as bogus but accepted sales figures without rejecting the books of account, violating the principle of approbate and reprobate and the doctrine of real income. The Tribunal also held that Section 69C could not be applied as the Revenue failed to prove that expenditure was incurred and not proved by the assessee, especially when the assessee had provided voluminous supporting documents that were not adversely commented upon by the AO. The AO's selective disallowance of purchases while accepting sales and closing stock was also found to be unreasonable and illogical. Therefore, the additions made by the AO and sustained by the NFAC were liable to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without hearing the assessee, despite opportunities granted. The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee did not file submissions before the Ld. CIT(A). However, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it proper to restore the issue to the file of the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(A) to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim and decide the issue on merits as per facts and law. The assessee was also directed to appear before the Ld. CIT(A) and cooperate in the proceedings. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal, while bound by the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (2024) 465 ITR 101 (Delhi), held that for assessments under Section 153C concerning a person other than the searched person, the period of six/ten assessment years is to be reckoned from the date of handing over of documents, books of account, or assets by the AO of the searched person to the AO of the assessee. The search was conducted on October 18, 2019. The satisfaction note was prepared by the AO of the searched person on December 20, 2021, and by the AO of the assessee on December 24, 2021. The notice under Section 153C was issued on December 28, 2021. Consequently, the relevant assessment year for calculating the block period would be 2022-23, and the ten assessment years would be from 2013-14 to 2022-23. The impugned assessment year 2011-12 falls outside this period. The Tribunal directed that both parties would be bound by the outcome of the SLP filed by the Revenue against the Ojjus Medicare decision pending before the Supreme Court. The appeal of the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer was illegal and bad in law as it was passed after the declaration of moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The provisions of the IBC override the Income Tax Act in such cases.
The Tribunal held that the finding of the Ld. CIT(A) was clear and categorical. The Tribunal agreed with the Ld. CIT(A) that Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be invoked unless the assessee has actually received cash or an amount which it fails to explain to the satisfaction of the AO. In this case, the sale proceeds were merely book entries, and no actual amount was received by the assessee. Therefore, the addition made under Section 68 was not sustainable. The Tribunal found the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) to be a speaking order and did not require any interference. The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer failed to refer the matter to the Valuation Officer for determining the fair market value of the land as directed by the ITAT. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not addressed the jurisdictional issue of the validity of reassessment proceedings, specifically regarding the notice under Section 143(2). Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the CIT(A) to decide this legal issue first.
The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds of appeal, finding them to be of a legal nature. The matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for adjudication after allowing the assessee an adequate opportunity to present documents.
The Tribunal held that the Special Auditor's opinion alone could not be the basis for additions, as the AO must apply independent mind. The Tribunal found that the expenses related to the Kartavya Council were directly linked to the assessee's business of acting as an agent and addressing depositor grievances, thus allowing the claim.
The Tribunal held that the fee under Section 234E could only be charged for delays in filing TDS statements after June 1, 2015. Therefore, the levy was illegal for defaults prior to this date.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not interested in pursuing the appeal. This conclusion was reached because, despite due service of notice for the hearing before the ITAT, neither the assessee nor their representative appeared, and no adjournment application was filed. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal. The specific grounds raised by the assessee regarding the non-service of notice under Section 148 and the condonation of delay before the CIT(A) were not adjudicated on merits because the appeal itself was dismissed for non-prosecution. The operative direction was the dismissal of the assessee's appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds.
The Tribunal held that the NFAC had dismissed the assessee's appeal solely on the ground of delay, without condoning it, and that the assessee had indeed shown sufficient cause for the delay before the NFAC. The Tribunal was satisfied with the explanation provided by the assessee regarding the delay. Consequently, the Tribunal condoned the delay in preferring the appeal before the NFAC. Given that the NFAC dismissed the appeal without condoning the delay and the AO had passed an ex-parte assessment order, the Tribunal, considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, decided to restore the issue to the file of the AO. The AO was directed to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claims and decide the issue afresh based on facts and law. The assessee was also directed to appear before the AO and cooperate with the proceedings. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal admitted the additional ground concerning the jurisdiction for faceless assessment. Since this issue was not considered by the lower authorities, the case was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.