ITAT Delhi Judgments — September 2026

The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs.1,43,624/- on account of unexplained cash was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that during the search, Rs.23,69,500/- in cash was found and seized. The AO had treated half of this as unexplained money in the assessee's hands. The assessee had provided a bifurcation of the seized cash, including affidavits from Shri Rajeev Agarwal and Mrs. Manisha Agarwal, admitting ownership of Rs.2,20,468/- and Rs.2,14,270/-, respectively. These affidavits confirmed that the cash owned by them was part of the total cash seized and had been reflected in their respective personal books of account. The assessee admitted only Rs.61,261/- as his own, also purportedly recorded in his personal books. The Tribunal reasoned that once cash amounts were owned by Shri Rajeev Agarwal and Mrs. Manisha Agarwal and accounted for in their books, there was no plausible reason to make an addition of that cash in the hands of the assessee. The addition of Rs.1,43,624/-, being part of the cash seized during the search and claimed by other family members, was therefore directed to be deleted. The issue of double taxation was implicitly addressed by this reasoning.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 2163 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC. The reasoning was based on the principle laid down in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), which emphasizes that technicalities should not impede substantial justice. The Tribunal held that the delay caused in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)/NFAC was to be condoned, and the assessee's appeal was restored to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A)/NFAC was directed to adjudicate the appeal within three effective opportunities, with the rider that the taxpayer would plead and prove the case at her own risk and responsibility. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay, namely the non-receipt of a physical copy of the penalty order and discovering it through the e-portal, were not contradicted by the revenue. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. MST. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), the Tribunal emphasized a liberal approach to condoning delay to do substantial justice. The Tribunal found the assessee's explanation to be a sufficient cause for condoning the 118-day delay. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, the delay was condoned, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing the assessee an effective opportunity of hearing. The assessee was directed to present its case before the CIT(A) within 60 days.

The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal on the ground of non-prosecution, specifically the failure to file written submissions despite several notices. The assessee's counsel requested one more opportunity to present its case before the Ld. CIT(A) with written submissions, stating they had a strong case on merits. The Revenue opposed this. Considering the principles of natural justice and the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present its case before the Ld. CIT(A). The assessee was directed to strictly comply with the proceedings, and the Ld. CIT(A) was instructed to adjudicate all grounds raised by the assessee, both legal and on merits, in accordance with law. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide the merits of the penalty or the grounds raised by the assessee, as the matter was remanded back to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that while the lower authorities had found that the assessee had not been able to prove his eligibility for presumptive taxation under section 44AD, a lumpsum addition of Rs. 2.5 lakhs in the assessee's hands would be just and proper in the given facts, considering the assessee's and his family's socio-economic status and accumulated past savings. This decision was made in the larger interest of justice, with a specific rider that it shall not be treated as a precedent. Necessary computation shall follow. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal held that the Revenue's appeal was without merit. Regarding the tax limit, the judgment notes that the tax involved (Rs.18.33 lakhs) is less than the prescribed limit of Rs.60 lakhs in CBDT Circular No. 9/2024. However, it does not explicitly state whether this renders the appeal non-maintainable or if the Tribunal has jurisdiction despite this. On the merits of the reassessment, the Tribunal found that apart from drawing inferences from seized material during the search at M/s. Omaxe group's premises, there was no actual evidence to support the allegation that the assessee had paid the 'on-money' of Rs.23.50 lakhs. The absence of any agreement or receipt signed with the vendor was highlighted as a lack of evidence. Therefore, the Tribunal saw no merit in the Revenue's case, even on merits, and declined it in very terms. The appeal was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the Revenue's grounds of appeal lacked merit. The Tribunal emphasized that various judicial precedents, including CIT-7 Vs. RRJ Securities Ltd., PCIT Vs. Ojjus Medicare (P) Ltd., and CIT Vs. Jasjit Singh, have settled the issue that for the purpose of Section 153C(1), the calculation of the block period should be based on the date of receiving the concerned seized material by the assessee's jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had correctly applied these dates to conclude that none of the assessment years involved fell within the specified period of ten assessment years. Regarding the pending SLP in the Ojjus Medicare case, the Tribunal stated that the mere pendency of an SLP is not a ground to deviate from a binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision quashing the Section 153C assessments. All other pleadings on merits were rendered academic. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal noted that nobody appeared on behalf of the assessee. It observed that the CIT(Exemption) passed a non-speaking order on the ground that the assessee failed to file required details and information supporting the genuineness of the trust's activities. Considering the circumstances, the Tribunal was of the view that restoring the matter to the CIT(Exemption) for fresh consideration would be in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(Exemption) with a direction to decide the matter afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and thereafter pass a speaking order in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal solely on the technical ground that the grounds of appeal did not match the AO's order. The assessee's counsel explained that this was due to a bona fide error by the previous counsel, supported by an affidavit. The Tribunal, considering the principles of natural justice and the interest of justice, deemed it fit to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present its case before the AO. The AO was directed to adjudicate all grounds raised by the assessee, both legal and on merits, in accordance with the law. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the addition made by the AO.

The Tribunal held that in the interest of justice and adhering to the principles of natural justice, where substantial law ought to prevail over procedural lapses, the assessee should be given one more opportunity. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had furnished an affidavit detailing the reasons for the delay, citing the serious illness and death of their CA. The Tribunal found that the substantial law should prevail over procedural lapses, a principle reiterated by various rulings of the Hon'ble Apex Court and High Courts. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the Ld. CIT(A) with a direction to condone the delay in filing the appeal and decide the matter on its merits. The assessee was directed to strictly comply with the proceedings before the Ld. CIT(A) without undue delay. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 866 days in filing the appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC). Regarding the main issue, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC had proceeded ex-parte against the assessee. The Tribunal acknowledged that in such situations, communication gaps between the taxpayer, auditor, and counsel could occur. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the assessee's appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A)/NFAC was directed to provide three effective opportunities to the assessee, subject to the condition that the taxpayer would plead and prove their case at their own risk and responsibility. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 439 days in filing the appeals. The reasoning was that the ends of justice would be served by giving the assessee an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. The Tribunal noted the reasons cited for the delay, including the critical illness of the proprietor's brother, supported by medical evidence. It was also observed that the assessee had failed to appear before the NFAC, likely for the same reasons. The Tribunal directed that the appeals be allowed for statistical purposes, and the issues on merits and law be restored to the file of the NFAC. The NFAC was directed to provide a fresh opportunity of hearing to the assessee and to send notices to the email address provided in Form 35, which was similar to the one in Form 36. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the impugned reopening of assessment was invalid. The reasoning was based on the observation that the approval granted by the prescribed authority under section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the Assessing Officer's proposal for reopening was merely mechanical. The authority's recorded satisfaction, "I am satisfied……", did not demonstrate an independent application of mind. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT Vs. S. Goyanka Lime and Chemical Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 64 taxmann.com 313 (SC), which mandates that the prescribed authority must apply its independent mind before granting approval for reopening. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the reopening. As a result of this finding, all other pleadings on merits were rendered academic. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal. The primary reason for dismissal was the assessee's consistent failure to plead and prove the source of impugned deposits/credits throughout the assessment, appellate, and Tribunal proceedings. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s action was to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer under section 251(1)(a) read with the proviso thereto, which was inserted by the Finance Act, 2024, effective from 01.10.2024. The Tribunal found no merit in the assessee's appeal, considering the lack of appearance and the ongoing procedural issues. The Tribunal did not explicitly decide on each ground raised by the assessee but rather dismissed the entire appeal based on the overall lack of substantiation by the assessee and the procedural context. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.

The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) was not justified. The Tribunal found that the assessee's explanation regarding the unsecured loans, including the fraudulent actions of Manoj Kumar and the registration of an FIR, was credible. The provision of ITRs and bank statements of lenders further supported the assessee's claim. The Tribunal also noted that the assessment order for AY 2022-23 was completed at returned income, which did not raise adverse inferences on the borrowed funds. Regarding the alleged violation of PF contribution law, the Tribunal opined that such technical breaches, unless they pertain to laws regulating the constitution or charitable activities of the assessee, cannot be grounds for rejection. The Tribunal emphasized that the scope of examination at this stage is limited to the genuineness of the assessee's activities and the absence of violations of specific laws. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, directing the Competent Authority to issue registration within four weeks.

The Tribunal held that the impugned orders of the NFAC were passed ex-parte without affording the assessee a proper opportunity of hearing. While the Revenue contended that sufficient opportunities were provided, the Tribunal observed that notices were issued via the ITBA portal. The assessee had provided an email address in Form 35, but it was not explicitly stated that notices could be served via email. Consequently, it appeared that notices issued through e-proceedings might not have come to the assessee's knowledge. Therefore, the Tribunal found it to be an appropriate case to grant the assessee an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, with a direction to the NFAC to issue fresh notices to the assessee on the email address provided in Form 35 and thereafter pass a fresh order.

The Tribunal held that the Revenue's grounds of appeal lacked merit. The Tribunal emphasized that various judicial precedents, including CIT-7 Vs. RRJ Securities Ltd., PCIT Vs. Ojjus Medicare (P) Ltd., and CIT Vs. Jasjit Singh, have settled the issue that for the purpose of Section 153C(1), the calculation of the block period should be based on the date of receiving the concerned seized material by the assessee's jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had correctly applied these dates to conclude that none of the assessment years involved fell within the specified period of ten assessment years. Regarding the pending SLP in the Ojjus Medicare case, the Tribunal stated that the mere pendency of an SLP is not a ground to deviate from a binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision quashing the Section 153C assessments. All other pleadings on merits were rendered academic. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal noted that the assessment order was ex-parte. The assessee argued that due to being in Dubai during the Covid-19 pandemic and a communication gap with his Chartered Accountant because of a criminal case against the CA, he could not furnish complete details before the AO and the CIT(A). The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's justification for non-compliance. Considering that the assessee failed to discharge the burden under Section 68, Section 69A, and provide satisfactory explanations for low gross profit, the Tribunal found that ends of justice would be met by restoring the matter to the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh adjudication. The assessee is directed to furnish necessary submissions and detailed material before the AO within 60 days of the order. The additions on account of unsecured loans, unexplained cash deposits, and low gross profit were not decided on merits but were set aside for fresh consideration by the AO. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the assessee failed to discharge the burden cast upon him under Section 68, Section 69A, and to substantiate reasons for the decline in gross profit.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal ex-parte without deciding the issues on merits. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was a non-speaking, cryptic order, passed in violation of Section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (now Section 359(4) of the Income-tax Act, 2025). The CIT(A) was obligated to pass a reasoned and speaking order on merits. The Tribunal noted that while the assessee was equally responsible for not complying with the notices, the CIT(A) should have still adjudicated the issues on merits. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) did not conduct any inquiry or call for assessment records. Therefore, the appellate order of the CIT(A) was set aside. The matter was remanded back to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after giving proper opportunity of being heard to both parties. The assessee was directed to comply with the notices in the set-aside remand proceedings, failing which the CIT(A) would be free to decide the appeal ex-parte on merits. The Tribunal clarified that it had not commented on the merits of the issues. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal of the assessee for statistical purposes. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) observed that the fundamental documents linking the property sale to share trading were not furnished. However, the Tribunal found these observations contrary to the documents available on record, specifically mentioning a bank statement at pages 17-20 and an agreement to sell dated 12.01.2016 at pages 21-30 of the paper book, which were furnished before the CIT(A). The Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the matter to the AO for de novo assessment, directing the AO to consider the documents furnished by the assessee before the CIT(A) and afford a reasonable opportunity of making submissions. The Tribunal found the assessee's reliance on Jag Mohan vs. DCIT misplaced, as that case dealt with a different factual matrix concerning the charging section.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal primarily on the ground that written submissions were not filed, despite notices being issued. The assessee's counsel requested one more opportunity to present its case before the CIT(A) by filing written submissions, stating the assessee had a strong case on merits. The Revenue opposed this. The Tribunal, deeming it fit to extend the assessee one more opportunity in the interest of justice and adhering to principles of natural justice, directed the assessee to strictly comply with the proceedings before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) was instructed to adjudicate all grounds raised by the assessee, both legal and on merits, considering all filed evidence, including additional evidence, in accordance with law. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes as per the observations.

The Tribunal, considering the assessee as an individual, was of the view that she ought to be given one more opportunity to present her case before the Ld. CIT(A) to adjudicate the issues on merits in the interest of substantial justice over procedural irregularities. The Tribunal directed the assessee to deposit a cost of Rs.10,000/- to the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund within one month. The Ld. CIT(A) was directed to condone the delay and decide the issues on merits, in accordance with law, based on the submissions and documentary evidence furnished by the assessee, adhering to the principles of natural justice. The grounds of appeal raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided, but the decision on the substantive grounds (issues 2, 3, and 4) is contingent upon the Ld. CIT(A)'s re-adjudication after condoning the delay.

The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeal ex-parte due to the assessee's failure to submit evidence despite notices. Before the ITAT, the assessee's counsel requested one more opportunity to present its case before the CIT(A) on merits. The Revenue's counsel opposed this, citing the assessee's non-compliance before the first appellate authority. The Tribunal, considering the interest of justice and adherence to principles of natural justice, decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity to present its case before the Ld. CIT(A). The Ld. CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate all grounds raised by the assessee, both legal and on merits. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The operative direction is to remand the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue is not maintainable. The reasoning was based on the application of CBDT Circular No. 09/2024 dated 17.09.2024, which revised the monetary limit for filing appeals before the Tribunal to Rs. 60 Lacs. The Tribunal noted that the tax effect in the present appeal was Rs. 49,30,779/-, which is below this revised limit. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. The Tribunal also clarified that the Revenue is at liberty to approach the Tribunal for re-institution of the appeal if they can demonstrate that it is protected by the exceptions prescribed in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of the aforementioned circular. No other issues were decided.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to follow the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Act by not adjudicating the appeal as per law, particularly by not deciding the jurisdictional grounds raised by the assessee. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee should get an opportunity to present their case and file evidence, indicating a failure to adjudicate the legal grounds alleging that the reopening of assessment was bad in law. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order restoring the matter to the AO without deciding these legal grounds was not in accordance with the law laid down by the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds related to the denial of effective appellate adjudication and set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the appeals afresh after affording the assessee an effective opportunity of hearing and deciding all grounds, including the jurisdictional ones, in accordance with law. The finding in the lead case was to apply mutatis mutandis to the other appeals. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 439 days in filing the appeals. The reasoning was that the ends of justice would be served by giving the assessee an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. The Tribunal noted the reasons cited for the delay, including the critical illness of the proprietor's brother, supported by medical evidence. It was also observed that the assessee had failed to appear before the NFAC, likely for the same reasons. The Tribunal directed that the appeals be allowed for statistical purposes, and the issues on merits and law be restored to the file of the NFAC. The NFAC was directed to provide a fresh opportunity of hearing to the assessee and to send notices to the email address provided in Form 35, which was similar to the one in Form 36. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The Tribunal found that the documents placed on record and the additional evidence required factual verification by the AO. Regarding the sale of property (Rs. 5 lakhs), the Tribunal noted the assessee's plausible explanation for the unregistered sale deed and directed the AO to examine the buyer to verify the transaction's veracity. If found correct, the source of Rs. 5 lakhs would be accepted. For gifts (Rs. 1,96,000) and loans (Rs. 6 lakhs), the Tribunal admitted the additional evidence and directed the AO to examine its veracity and conduct necessary verification. The Tribunal decided to restore all four disputed issues (agricultural income, property sale, gifts, and loans) to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication. The assessee was granted liberty to furnish fresh evidence. The ratio is that when substantial documentary evidence is presented, even if some require verification or were submitted late, and the AO has made bald assertions without concrete material, the matter should be remanded for proper factual inquiry to ensure justice and fair play. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the chargeability of interest, stating it would be consequential.

The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. The assessee's counsel presented a detailed explanation for the withdrawal, citing a mistake in the Tax Audit Report regarding the reason for disallowance (delay in depositing employees' contribution to PF and ESI, wrongly reported as service tax delay) and the inability to obtain a corrigendum. The assessee also stated that the disallowance amount was not substantial. In light of these submissions and the assessee's request, the Tribunal found no impediment to allowing the withdrawal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No other issues were decided by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal held that a protective addition cannot be sustained in the absence of a corresponding substantive addition in the hands of any other person. The Tribunal found that the solitary issue was squarely covered in favor of the assessee by the decision of the ITAT, Gauhati bench in *Income Tax Officer vs Keshava Nanda Kakati*. This decision, along with other cited precedents such as *ITO vs. Fussy Financial Services Private Limited*, *M.P. Ramachandran vs. DCIT*, *Gregory & Nicholas vs. ACIT*, and *G.K. Consultants Ltd. vs. ITO*, established the principle that a substantive assessment must precede a protective assessment. Since the assessment order of Shri Pankaj Goel did not reflect any substantive addition of Rs. 6,00,00,000, the protective addition made in the hands of the assessee was deemed legally unsustainable. Consequently, the Tribunal deleted the protective addition. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to follow the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Act by not adjudicating the appeal as per law, particularly by not deciding the jurisdictional grounds raised by the assessee. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee should get an opportunity to present their case and file evidence, indicating a failure to adjudicate the legal grounds alleging that the reopening of assessment was bad in law. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order restoring the matter to the AO without deciding these legal grounds was not in accordance with the law laid down by the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds related to the denial of effective appellate adjudication and set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the appeals afresh after affording the assessee an effective opportunity of hearing and deciding all grounds, including the jurisdictional ones, in accordance with law. The finding in the lead case was to apply mutatis mutandis to the other appeals. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw its appeals. The reasoning was based on the explicit submission made by the assessee's counsel, supported by a letter from the assessee, expressing the desire to withdraw the appeals. The Departmental Representative did not oppose this request. Therefore, the Tribunal acceded to the assessee's request. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee has the right to withdraw its appeals if it so chooses, provided there is no objection from the revenue and the request is properly communicated. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals as withdrawn. No issue was left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the re-characterization of gains from the sale of shares and securities as business income was squarely covered by its own previous decision in the assessee's own case for assessment years 2011-12 to 2013-14. The Tribunal noted that the revenue's counsel could not controvert the identical facts. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition by the CIT(A) on this ground. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D, the Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had applied the formula without recording the necessary satisfaction as mandated by Section 14A(2) and Rule 8D(1)(a). The AO did not point out specific expenditures relatable to exempt income. Consequently, the Tribunal deleted the addition on this jurisdictional issue. The assessee's appeal was allowed, and the revenue's appeal was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the impugned orders of the NFAC were passed ex-parte without affording the assessee a proper opportunity of hearing. While the Revenue contended that sufficient opportunities were provided, the Tribunal observed that notices were issued via the ITBA portal. The assessee had provided an email address in Form 35, but it was not explicitly stated that notices could be served via email. Consequently, it appeared that notices issued through e-proceedings might not have come to the assessee's knowledge. Therefore, the Tribunal found it to be an appropriate case to grant the assessee an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, with a direction to the NFAC to issue fresh notices to the assessee on the email address provided in Form 35 and thereafter pass a fresh order.

The Tribunal held that the impugned orders of the NFAC were passed ex-parte without affording the assessee a proper opportunity of hearing. While the Revenue contended that sufficient opportunities were provided, the Tribunal observed that notices were issued via the ITBA portal. The assessee had provided an email address in Form 35, but it was not explicitly stated that notices could be served via email. Consequently, it appeared that notices issued through e-proceedings might not have come to the assessee's knowledge. Therefore, the Tribunal found it to be an appropriate case to grant the assessee an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, with a direction to the NFAC to issue fresh notices to the assessee on the email address provided in Form 35 and thereafter pass a fresh order.

The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the revenue and the corresponding cross-objection filed by the assessee were dismissed. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench decision for Assessment Years 2012-13 and 2013-14 (ITA Nos. 8348 & 8349/Del/2025 and CO Nos. 58 & 59/Del/2026), where the revenue's appeals were dismissed. This dismissal was based on a prior decision (dated 06.11.2023 in ITA Nos. 285 & 286/Del/2022) where substantive additions in the hands of M/s RNB Overseas Pvt. Ltd. were deleted on merits. The Tribunal found no change in circumstances and concluded that the revenue's appeals lacked substance. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, and the cross-objections were rendered superfluous and academic, thus also dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the issue regarding the re-characterization of gains from the sale of shares and securities as business income was squarely covered by its own previous decision in the assessee's own case for assessment years 2011-12 to 2013-14. The Tribunal noted that the revenue's counsel could not controvert the identical facts. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition by the CIT(A) on this ground. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D, the Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had applied the formula without recording the necessary satisfaction as mandated by Section 14A(2) and Rule 8D(1)(a). The AO did not point out specific expenditures relatable to exempt income. Consequently, the Tribunal deleted the addition on this jurisdictional issue. The assessee's appeal was allowed, and the revenue's appeal was dismissed.

The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A) to quash the assessment. The primary ground for quashing was the absence of a notice under Section 143(2) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the AO issued a notice under Section 148, and the assessee responded by requesting their original return be treated as the return in response to the Section 148 notice. The assessment order itself did not mention the issuance of a Section 143(2) notice. The Tribunal relied on the Delhi Tribunal's decision in R.K. Gupta vs. ITO and the Supreme Court's ruling in ACIT vs. Hotel Blue Moon, which held that assessments framed without a Section 143(2) notice are liable to be quashed. Regarding the revenue's contention about the unsigned reply, the Tribunal followed the Kerala High Court's decision in CIT vs. Masoneilan (India) Ltd., holding that absence of proper signature or verification is curable under Section 292B and does not invalidate the return. Consequently, the revenue's appeal was dismissed, and the assessee's cross-objection was rendered infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the additions made under section 69A and section 69C were not justified. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer's addition under section 69A was based on the ledger account, which showed only an opening balance and no fresh loans received by the assessee during the year under consideration. The Tribunal agreed with the Ld. CIT(A)'s conclusion that the additions were not justified. The Ld. CIT(A) had allowed the assessee's appeal by holding that the loan of Rs. 37,18,663/- was taken and repaid through banking channels before the date of the section 148 notice. The Ld. CIT(A) relied on the ITAT's decision in Real Innerspring Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT, which held that repayment of loans before the notice under section 148, even if managed by an operator, indicates genuine transactions. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the Ld. CIT(A)'s conclusion. Consequently, the appeal filed by the department was dismissed, and the cross-objection filed by the assessee was rendered infructuous and dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) were sufficient cause. The Tribunal noted that no contrary material was brought on record by the revenue to dispute the assessee's explanation. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. MST. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), the Tribunal emphasized a liberal approach in condoning delays to enable substantial justice. The Tribunal found that refusing to condone the delay could lead to a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned appellate order, condoned the delay of 117 days, and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the issues afresh after giving effective opportunities of hearing to the assessee. The assessee was directed to present its case before the CIT(A) within 60 days of the order.

The Tribunal held that the commission income received by the assessee for referring potential customers to MEI was not Fees for Technical Services (FTS) under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act or Article 12(5)(b) of the India-Netherlands Tax Treaty. The assessee's activities involved calculating commission based on a fixed percentage of gross sales, and there was no evidence of providing design, technical, or consultancy services. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the assessee did not 'make available' any technical knowledge, skill, or know-how to MEI, which is a mandatory condition for FTS under the treaty. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents from the Delhi High Court in DIT vs Guy Carpenter and co Ltd, CIT vs Bio-Rad Laboratories (Singapore) Pte Ltd, and Tungsten Automation England Ltd vs DCIT. Consequently, the commission income was treated as business income, not taxable in India as per Article 7 of the treaty due to the absence of a PE. Ground 1 was not adjudicated as it was not seriously argued. Grounds 2 and 3 were allowed. For Grounds 4 and 5, the AO was directed to give effect to the beneficial provisions of the DTAA and grant TDS credit as per law. The appeal was allowed.

The Tribunal held that credit in the capital account of a partner cannot be subjected to addition as deemed income under Section 68 of the Act, as this issue is settled in favour of the assessee. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Vaishnodevi Refoils & Solvex Vs. Pr. CIT and the Madras High Court decision in CIT Vs. Metachem Industries. Regarding the addition for alleged suppression of sales and purchases, the Tribunal found that once sales are supported by sale bills, audit reports, and month-wise sales details, the assessee has discharged the burden of proof under Section 68. Taxing such sales again as income under Section 68 would amount to double taxation. The Tribunal also noted that the business of a petrol pump is regulated by statutory authorities, and tax authorities cannot discard evidence and allege suppression without proper verification. The assessee had provided necessary details of purchases from Essar Oil Ltd., and the rise in sales during demonetization was genuine. Therefore, making additions on mere surmises was not justified. Consequently, the grounds of appeal were sustained, and the impugned additions were deleted. The appeal was allowed.

The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were wholly without jurisdiction, illegal, and void ab initio. This was based on the fact that the notice initiating reassessment proceedings under Section 148 was issued by an ACIT who did not possess the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction over the appellant, as per CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011. The returned loss of the assessee was Rs. 11,07,875/-, and the instruction dictates that for corporate assessees in metro charges with returned income/loss less than Rs. 30,00,000/-, jurisdiction lies with the ITO, not ACIT/DCIT. The Tribunal relied on several precedents, including ITO v. Picheswar Gadde, to support this view, distinguishing between territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Consequently, Additional Ground No. 1 filed by the assessee was accepted, rendering other additional grounds academic. On the merits of the appeal, the Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) had correctly deleted the addition of Rs. 5,62,37,599/-. The CIT(A) had conducted an enquiry under Section 250(4) and found that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the nature and source of the unsecured loans with documentary evidence, establishing the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The Tribunal also noted that the remaining amount of Rs. 1,23,40,000/- pertained to credits from M/s Garvit Innovative Promoters Ltd., which had already been offered as revenue. Therefore, the grounds on merits were also found to have no substance. The appeal of the department was dismissed.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to follow the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Act by not adjudicating the appeal as per law, particularly by not deciding the jurisdictional grounds raised by the assessee. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee should get an opportunity to present their case and file evidence, indicating a failure to adjudicate the legal grounds alleging that the reopening of assessment was bad in law. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order restoring the matter to the AO without deciding these legal grounds was not in accordance with the law laid down by the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds related to the denial of effective appellate adjudication and set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the appeals afresh after affording the assessee an effective opportunity of hearing and deciding all grounds, including the jurisdictional ones, in accordance with law. The finding in the lead case was to apply mutatis mutandis to the other appeals. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw its appeals. The reasoning was based on the explicit submission made by the assessee's counsel, supported by a letter from the assessee, expressing the desire to withdraw the appeals. The Departmental Representative did not oppose this request. Therefore, the Tribunal acceded to the assessee's request. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee has the right to withdraw its appeals if it so chooses, provided there is no objection from the revenue and the request is properly communicated. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals as withdrawn. No issue was left undecided.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had failed to follow the provisions of Section 250(6) of the Act by not adjudicating the appeal as per law, particularly by not deciding the jurisdictional grounds raised by the assessee. The CIT(A) observed that the assessee should get an opportunity to present their case and file evidence, indicating a failure to adjudicate the legal grounds alleging that the reopening of assessment was bad in law. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order restoring the matter to the AO without deciding these legal grounds was not in accordance with the law laid down by the jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's grounds related to the denial of effective appellate adjudication and set aside the impugned order. The matter was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the appeals afresh after affording the assessee an effective opportunity of hearing and deciding all grounds, including the jurisdictional ones, in accordance with law. The finding in the lead case was to apply mutatis mutandis to the other appeals. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal held that the ground relating to the initiation of proceedings under Section 147 of the Act being without jurisdiction is sustained. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in M/s L-1 Identity Solutions Operating Company Pvt. Ltd. The Court observed that for issuing a notice under Section 148 beyond three years, the conditions under Section 149(1)(b) must be satisfied, requiring the income escaping assessment to exceed Rs. 50 lakhs in respect of the specified assessment year. While Section 149(1A) allows for cumulative income escaping assessment across multiple years to exceed Rs. 50 lakhs, this is subject to the income being represented in the form of an 'asset' or 'expenditure in relation to an event or occasion'. In the present case, the Hon'ble High Court found no singular occasion or event that resulted in income of more than one previous year exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer erred in proceeding on the basis that it was open to add income alleged to have escaped assessment for different previous years to determine the threshold figure of Rs. 50 lakhs. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.

The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue is not maintainable. The decision was based on the CBDT Circular No. 09/2024 dated 17.09.2024, which revised the monetary limit for filing appeals before the Tribunal to Rs. 60 Lacs and is applicable to all pending appeals. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel stated the tax effect was Nil. Furthermore, the Tribunal referred to a coordinate bench decision in DCIT Versus Hazoorilal & Sons Jewelers Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No. 3487/Del/2023) which held that if the tax effect is calculated based on provisions like Section 115BBE, which are not applicable to the impugned addition, then the tax effect should be considered below the prescribed monetary limit, rendering the appeal not maintainable. The Revenue was granted liberty to approach the Tribunal for re-institution of the appeal if protected by exceptions in the circular or for valid reasons with requisite material. The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its burden under Section 68 by establishing the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction. The Tribunal noted that the loan was received through banking channels via account payee cheque, and the assessee provided complete evidence, including bank statements and ledger accounts for interest payment and loan repayment. The Tribunal relied on the decision in DCIT vs. Shomit Finance Limited (ITA No. 8486/Del/2025) and other ITAT decisions where advances from lenders allegedly connected with Himanshu Verma were deleted. It also followed the principle from Capital Infra Projects (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT (ITA No. 927 and 928/Del/2019) that if an investor's investment is accepted in one company, addition for investment in another company is not permissible. The Tribunal further referred to its own decision in Real Innerspring Technologies (P) Ltd. (ITA No.647/Del/2023) which held that repayment of loan along with interest through banking channels proves the genuineness of the transaction. Consequently, grounds relating to the addition of Rs. 1,40,00,000/-, interest, and commission were allowed. The legal grounds regarding the initiation of proceedings were not adjudicated as the appeal was allowed on merits, and were kept open.

The Tribunal held that there was substance in the assessee's contention that the reopening was based on incorrect facts. The records indicated that an assessment order under Section 143(3) was passed on 11.08.2014. The AO's reasons for reopening, which stated that the assessee's return was processed under Section 143(1) and no assessment was made, were factually incorrect. The Tribunal found that when the foundational facts for the assumption of jurisdiction are recorded incorrectly, the assumption of jurisdiction is vitiated. Furthermore, since the reopening was after the expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the first proviso of Section 147 was applicable. This required the AO to record reasons specifically indicating the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Tribunal noted that the AO's incorrect premise that no Section 143(3) assessment was made meant the AO had not applied his mind to the specific failure of the assessee to disclose material facts. Consequently, there was a patent illegality in the assumption of jurisdiction. The Tribunal sustained grounds 2 to 4 of the assessee's appeal, quashed the impugned assessment order, and allowed the appeal.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 472 days in filing the appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land & Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC). The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of communication gaps, especially with the newly introduced virtual hearing mechanism, which could have prevented the assessee from effectively presenting their case. In the larger interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to restore the assessee's appeal back to the CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh adjudication. The NFAC was directed to provide three effective opportunities of hearing to the appellant, at the appellant's risk and responsibility. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.